G.S., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] G.S. appeals his adjudication as a delinquent for battery as a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult. G.S. raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court's implied finding of necessity for having a witness testify remotely.

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his adjudication.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In February 2025, G.S. attended high school in Hancock County with H.A. (“Victim”) and J.C. (“Witness”). On February 28, the three juveniles were in a bathroom at the same time. There, G.S. punched Victim in the face. The attack caused Victim to lose consciousness and have a seizure. The Victim later regained consciousness in an ambulance en route to a hospital.

[4] The State filed a delinquency petition and alleged G.S. to have committed an act of battery as a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult. Victim gave deposition testimony at which he was examined by counsel for both the State and G.S. In November, the court attempted to hold a hearing on the State's delinquency petition, but Victim did not appear. The State represented to the court that Victim had moved to New York and was in an assisted-housing program. Pursuant to that program, if Victim did not return to his housing unit every night, he would lose his housing. Thus, the State sought to have Victim's deposition testimony admitted into the record based on Victim's nonappearance.

[5] G.S. objected to the State's representations on the ground that they were based in hearsay. The trial court did not accept that objection. G.S. also objected under the Sixth Amendment to any proceeding at which Victim was not present in-person for cross-examination. See Tr. Vol. 2, p. 10. The trial court continued the hearing so the State could take additional efforts to try and secure Victim's in-person testimony.

[6] In January 2026, the court held its continued hearing. At that hearing, the State submitted, without objection, numerous documents showing its attempts to secure Victim's in-person participation for the January hearing. But Victim did not appear in person; instead, he appeared via Zoom. G.S. reiterated his prior objections to Victim's testimony, which the trial court overruled.

[7] Victim then testified regarding G.S.’s attack. G.S.’s counsel subjected Victim to cross-examination. Witness also testified, and his testimony corroborated Victim's testimony. A responding school-resource officer also testified and corroborated Victim's testimony regarding the injuries.

[8] Following the hearing, the court found the State's allegation to be true and adjudicated G.S. to be a delinquent. The court entered its dispositional order thereafter. This appeal ensued.

1. The trial court's implied finding that Victim's remote testimony was necessary is supported by the record.

[9] On appeal, G.S. first argues that the trial court violated his state and federal rights to confront witnesses when the court permitted Victim to testify remotely. But we first note that G.S. did not object in the trial court on state constitutional grounds. That argument therefore has not been preserved for our review, and we do not consider it.¹ See, e.g., Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013).

[10] As for G.S.’s argument under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we review such claims de novo. Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 452 (Ind. 2026). As we have explained:

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against [them].” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as guaranteeing “the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2801, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857 (1988). The Supreme Court has also held that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute; however, that “does not ․ mean that it may easily be dispensed with.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990).

“The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” Id. at 845, 110 S. Ct. 3157․

Johnson v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1198, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App.) (alteration and first omission original to Johnson), clarified on other grounds on reh'g, 206 N.E.3d 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) trans. denied.

[11] However:

“Literal face-to-face confrontation is not the sine qua non of the confrontation right.” [Craig, 497 U.S.] at 847, 110 S. Ct. 3157. And “physical confrontation may constitutionally be denied where the denial is necessary to further an important public policy and ‘the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, face-to-face confrontation at trial is preferred, but that preference “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case[.]” Id. at 849, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (citations omitted). For this reason, the Confrontation Clause must “be interpreted in the context of the necessities of trial and the adversary process.” Id. at 850, 110 S. Ct. 3157.

Before the right to face-to-face confrontation can be abridged there must be a “case-specific” finding of necessity. Id. at 855, 110 S. Ct. 3157․

Id. at 1204 (emphases and first alteration added; omission removed).

[12] In allowing Victim to testify remotely, the trial court stated that the State had made “reasonable attempts” to secure Victim's in-person testimony. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 25. The court also stated:

yes, [Victim] did move, but in effect telling a guy that if you come here and you leave your place alone that's not the same thing as just somebody[ ] who[’s] hanging out and doesn't really want to come ․ I think it's most appropriate [to do the testimony remotely] considering the fact that the Court[s] have allowed [Z]oom because [of] COVID situations in the past ․ [U]nder the facts [and] circumstance[s] of this case I do believe confrontation has been done in some respects, but can be done even more through this method [of remote testimony rather than admission of the deposition].

Id.

[13] G.S. argues that the trial court's statements are not a sufficient “case-specific” finding of necessity to justify setting aside his right to confront Victim face-to-face. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855. We are obliged at least to acknowledge that the court's statements are not explicit statements of a case-specific finding of necessity. But how explicit a trial court needs to be here is not clearly stated in Craig, and there is some dispute on that question across jurisdictions. Compare Stewart v. State, 399 So. 3d 995, 1004 n.5 (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (a “finding of necessity should be made by the trial court, on the record, with prior notice to all parties”) with Lively v. State, 968 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc) (“Nothing in Maryland v. Craig requires that a trial court make explicit, as opposed to implicit, findings regarding the necessity” of remote testimony, and such findings may be “implicit” in the trial court's ruling).

[14] We conclude that recent precedent from our Supreme Court makes clear that a finding of necessity may be implied from the trial court's ruling so long as the record demonstrates case-specific support for such an implied finding. Specifically, in Shabazz v. State, our Supreme Court reviewed the trial court's decision to permit remote testimony under Interim Administrative Rule 14(C). 274 N.E.3d 114, 120 (Ind. 2026). That Rule requires “good cause” to exist to support a trial court's decision to allow remote testimony. Id.

[15] In discussing Interim Rule 14's “good cause” requirement, our Supreme Court emphasized the Rule's relationship to constitutional guarantees:

Three years ago, we explained that a showing of good cause under ․ Rule 14(C) requires “particularized and specific factual support.” But that holding arose in a civil case. And this is our first time addressing how the good-cause requirement applies in a criminal trial, particularly given the rule's express mandate that the proceeding “comply with constitutional ․ guarantees.” Because of this mandate, it follows that the State's good-cause showing is informed by the minimum constitutional prerequisites for allowing an adverse witness to testify remotely against a criminal defendant.

․ While we do not address a constitutional challenge here, we do find one prong of the Craig framework applicable to a good-cause showing in a criminal trial under Interim Rule 14(C): the State must present case-specific evidence that allowing a witness to testify remotely is necessary to further an important public policy interest. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 852-55, 110 S. Ct. 3157. In this context, an “important public policy interest” is not an abstract governmental interest, but one grounded in the need to prevent a real, identifiable risk of harm that would otherwise result from requiring the witness to testify in the defendant's physical presence. See id. at 855-56, 110 S. Ct. 3157. This requirement is consistent with the “particularized and specific factual support” good-cause standard under Interim Rule 14(C) for civil cases but heightened to accommodate the unique risk virtual testimony poses to criminal defendants. And it aligns with our precedent interpreting Article 1, Section 13, which similarly permits departures from in-person confrontation when necessary to avert serious harm arising from face-to-face testimony against a defendant. See Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981, 988-89 (Ind. 1991).

Accordingly, to establish good cause under Interim Rule 14(C) for permitting a witness to testify remotely against a criminal defendant at trial, the State must present case-specific evidence that allowing the witness to testify remotely is necessary to prevent a concrete and substantial harm that would otherwise likely occur and that could not be adequately addressed if the witness were to testify in person. This heightened showing has two essential components, each of which warrants brief explanation.

First, the State must present case-specific evidence. The trial court is best positioned to balance a defendant's rights against the asserted need for remote testimony in each case. But the court can perform that function only if it is presented with evidence tailored to the specific witness and circumstances at issue. When the State fails to make this evidentiary showing, the defendant is left with little meaningful opportunity to test the factual basis for the claimed necessity. And without adversarial testing of that necessity, the trial court lacks the factual context required to determine whether remote testimony is truly necessary.

Second, the State must demonstrate that remote testimony is necessary—not merely helpful—to prevent a concrete and substantial harm associated with requiring a particular witness to testify in person. General concerns about efficiency, logistics, or expense are insufficient. Instead, the State must show why in-person testimony would likely cause serious harm and why that harm cannot be mitigated through reasonable measures short of remote testimony․

Id. at 120-22 (emphases added; cleaned up). Our Supreme Court summarized its position: “we conclude Interim Rule 14(C) requires a heightened good-cause showing—informed by, but separate from, a defendant's constitutional rights to confront witnesses—when the State seeks to have a witness testify remotely in a criminal trial.” Id. at 120.

[16] Our Supreme Court's analysis on Interim Rule 14 in Shabazz is not on all fours with G.S.’s federal constitutional argument.² But the Shabazz Court was clear on two key points. First, Interim Rule 14's “good cause” requirement is “informed by” a criminal defendant's constitutional rights and imposes a “heightened ․ showing” relative to those constitutional rights. Id. Second, under Interim Rule 14 the question is not what the trial court said but what the State showed. Id. at 120-22. If our Supreme Court does not require an explicit good-cause finding by the trial court under the heightened protections of Interim Rule 14, it follows that our Supreme Court would not read Craig to impose such a requirement under the Sixth Amendment.

[17] We therefore consider whether the State sufficiently supported the trial court's implied finding of necessity here. And we conclude that the State did so. The State represented to the trial court at both the November hearing and the January hearing that the State had spoken with Victim. The State represented that Victim lived in New York with a precarious housing arrangement; if Victim was not back in his housing location by the end of any given day, he could lose his housing. The State's representations support the trial court's ruling that Victim's testimony over Zoom was necessary under the facts and circumstances before the court.

[18] Still, G.S. contends that the State's representations to the trial court were not “evidence” and were based in hearsay. Appellant's Br. at 15. But the question before the trial court was a preliminary question about the admissibility of Victim's remote testimony. The Rules of Evidence do not apply to such questions. Ind. Evidence Rule 104. The trial court accordingly had the discretion to credit the State's representations. See id.

[19] G.S. also appears to contend that the State did not do all that it could have done to secure Victim's in-person testimony. But the State presented to the court, without objection, numerous documents showing the State's communications with New York authorities to have Victim appear at G.S.’s trial. But Victim nonetheless did not appear. The trial court acted within its discretion when it concluded that the State's documents established a reasonable effort to secure Victim's in-person testimony.

[20] Accordingly, the trial court did not violate G.S.’s Sixth Amendment right to confront Victim face-to-face when the court permitted Victim to testify remotely.

2. The State presented sufficient evidence to support G.S.’s adjudication.

[21] We thus turn to G.S.’s argument on appeal that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his testimony that he acted in self-defense. As our Supreme Court has made clear:

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile adjudication, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Ind. 2006) (citation omitted). We consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences supporting it. Id. We will affirm a juvenile-delinquency adjudication if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the [juvenile committed the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt. Moran v. State, 622 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 1993) (citations omitted).

B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018).

[22] Further:

A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. In order to prevail on a claim of self-defense[,] a defendant must show: (1) he was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) he acted without fault; and (3) he had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.

Coleman v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind. 2011) (citation omitted). The issue on appellate review from such claims is typically whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that at least one of the elements of the defendant's self-defense claim was negated. Randolph v. State, 755 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ind. 2001). The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence claim. Id.

[23] The State presented sufficient evidence to support G.S.’s adjudication and to negate his claim of self-defense. Victim testified that G.S. attacked him in the high school bathroom, which caused Victim to lose consciousness. Witness corroborated Victim's testimony. And a responding school-resource officer corroborated Victim's injuries. G.S.’s arguments on appeal on this issue simply seek to have our Court give weight and credit to his testimony over other testimony, which we will not do.

Conclusion

[24] For all of these reasons, we affirm G.S.’s adjudication as a delinquent for having committed battery as a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   And, regardless, G.S. asserts in his reply brief that his state and federal arguments here are “co-extensive.” Reply Br. at 6. Thus, for the same reasons his federal argument fails, so too would his state argument.

2.   In his brief to our Court, G.S. states that the requisite “good cause” showing does not exist. Appellant's Br. at 14. The “good cause” language is from Interim Administrative Rule 14. But, for the reasons explained in Shabazz and as applied to G.S.’s preserved federal constitutional argument, we interpret G.S.’s references to “good cause” to be a stand-in for Craig’s requirement that a case-specific necessity for the remote testimony exists.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.