Anthony Johns, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Anthony Johns (“Johns”) was convicted after a bench trial of Level 6 felony domestic battery ¹ and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.² Johns appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for resisting law enforcement. Identifying sufficient evidence, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 20, 2025, Johns and his wife were staying with his wife's friends. During an argument that evening, Johns pinned his wife against a wall, kneed her in the stomach, and pulled her hair in the presence of a fifteen-year-old child. One of the friends in the home called 911. Officers Jessica Thom (“Officer Thom”) and Brian Ethridge (“Officer Ethridge”) of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department responded to the scene. Officer Thom first spoke with Johns and the home's other occupants, and Officer Ethridge, observing Johns to be “very agitated[,]” had Johns step outside to speak with him. Tr. Vol. II p. 60. After learning that a physical altercation had occurred between Johns and his wife, the officers decided to detain Johns.

[3] Officer Ethridge informed Johns that he was being detained and “told him to place his hands behind his back.” Id. When Officer Ethridge went to place Johns's left hand behind his back, Johns “swung [his left hand] in front of him and then turned his whole body towards [him] and then started to back away from [him].” Id. at 61. Officer Thom noted that Johns “pulled away from off[ic]ers” and “jerked his body away as officers went to place him in the handcuffs.” Id. at 47; see also State's Ex. 3 at 00:09. As Johns pulled away from the officers, he said “no, no, no, no, no[,]” Tr. Vol. II p. 88, and “that he didn't do anything wrong[,]” id. at 47. Johns “aggressively moved both arms and hands towards the front of him and turned towards [Officer Ethridge].” Id. at 69.

[4] At that point, the officers perceived Johns to be a threat and believed that Johns was going to “begin to fight or assault” either Officer Ethridge or Officer Thom. Id. at 61. Officer Ethridge drew his taser and pointed it at Johns, instructing him to place his hands behind his back or he would be tased. Johns complied and placed his hands behind his back. Officer Thom arrested him.

[5] On December 21, 2025, Johns was charged with Count I: Level 6 felony domestic battery based on the presence of a child and Count II: Level 6 felony domestic battery. On February 12, 2026, the State moved to amend the charging information and add Count III: Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. A bench trial was held on February 24, 2026, with testimony from Officers Thom and Ethridge, Johns, and other witnesses. Johns testified that he had a bad shoulder and was “caught off guard” when the officers tried to arrest him. Id. at 87. He said that the officers “tried to grab [him] right away[,]” and “didn't even warn [him] that they were arresting [him].” Id. at 88.

[6] Ultimately, the trial court found Johns guilty of all three counts but entered judgment of conviction on only Counts I and III, declining to enter judgment on Count II due to double jeopardy concerns. On March 3, 2026, the trial court sentenced Johns to an aggregate term of one year, with 148 days executed as time served and the balance suspended to probation. Johns now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Johns challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor. He argues that he did not forcibly resist law enforcement by merely pulling away from the officer. See Appellant's Br. p. 7. “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments trigger a deferential standard of appellate review, in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the [fact-finder].’ ” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 264 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018)). We consider instead only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting the trial court's judgment, affirming “unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016)).

[8] A person commits Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement when the person “knowingly or intentionally: (1) forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer's duties[.]” Ind. Code § 35- 44.1-3-1(a)(1). The Indiana Supreme Court has determined that “forcibly” is an essential element that modifies all three verbs—resists, obstructs, or interferes— such that, to obtain a conviction, the State must establish forcible resistance, forcible obstruction, or forcible interference. Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 722–23 (Ind. 1993); see also Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726–27 (Ind. 2013); Jordan v. State, 37 N.E.3d 525, 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[9] A person forcibly resists law enforcement when the person uses “strong, powerful, violent means ․ to evade a law enforcement official's rightful exercise of his or her duties.” Tyson v. State, 140 N.E.3d 374, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Spangler, 607 N.E.2d at 723), trans. denied. This does not require “an overwhelming or extreme level of force.” Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 727. Rather, the element “may be satisfied with even a modest exertion of strength, power, or violence[,]” which can occur even if there is no “actual physical contact” between the officer and the defendant. Id. The statute also “contemplates punishment for the active threat of such strength, power, or violence when that threat impedes the officer's ability to lawfully execute his or her duties.” Id. “[A]ny action to resist must be done with force in order to violate this statute. It is error as a matter of law to conclude that ‘forcibly resists’ includes all actions that are not passive.” Spangler, 607 N.E.2d at 724.

[10] Here, Johns contends that his actions did not amount to forcible resistance, directing us to four decisions where the evidence of force was insufficient. In K.W. v. State, the evidence was that a juvenile “turned [and] pulled away” when an officer grabbed his wrist to handcuff him. 984 N.E.2d 610, 612–13 (Ind. 2013). In Brooks v. State, the arrestee “tensed up” and used “her physical stature to not give [the officer] her arms.” 113 N.E.3d 782, 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). In Runnells v. State, an arrestee twice “pull[ed] away” or “step[ped] away” as an officer attempted to handcuff him. 186 N.E.3d 1181, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Finally, in McNary v. State, the arrestee refused to present her arms and “pull[ed] against” the officer's hand as he maneuvered it behind her back. 269 N.E.3d 1245, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. In each of these cases, the State did not establish the exertion of strength, power, or violence—or a threat of that force—with the evidence proving only that the defendant withheld cooperation or pulled away to some degree in response to being taken into custody by an officer.

[11] Here, Johns used physical force to escape from the officer's grasp, then turned and faced the officer in a confrontational manner. Johns “jerked his body away” and “aggressively moved both arms and hands towards the front of him” before turning toward an officer, causing the officer to perceive him as a threat and to believe he was going to “begin to fight or assault” one of the officers. Tr. Vol. II pp. 47, 61, 69. Johns physically breaking free from the officer's grasp and his confrontational actions amounted to forcible resistance, with him posing an “active threat of ․ strength, power, or violence” that impeded the officers in the lawful execution of their duties. See Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 727; see also A.A. v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1277, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). To the extent Johns argues that he pulled away only instinctively because the officers aggravated a bad shoulder when they caught him off guard, the trial court was free to credit the officers’ account over his, and we will neither reweigh that evidence nor reassess the court's credibility determination.

[12] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Johns committed resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (b)(2).

2.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur.