K.G. (Mother), Appellant/Respondent v. Kid's Voice of Indiana Appellee/Guardian ad Litem (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] B.C. (“Child”) was born to B.C. (“Father”)¹ and K.G. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) on January 18, 2023, and spent at least a few weeks in a hospital after birth. In February of 2023, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned to have Child found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”), which the juvenile court did in July of 2023. In July of 2024, DCS petitioned to have Parents’ parental rights to Child terminated. Throughout the duration of the CHINS and termination cases, Mother's compliance with ordered services was sporadic at best, and she was never able to attain housing stability, demonstrate sustained sobriety, or show that she was a fit and willing parent. In May of 2025, the juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing, and, in August, issued its order terminating Parents’ parental rights to Child. Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights to Child. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 7, 2023, Child was removed from Parents’ care due (at least in part) to Mother's drug use; Child was three weeks old and had been hospitalized since birth. Child was placed with maternal grandmother. On February 9, 2023, DCS petitioned to have Child found to be a CHINS.

[3] Abimbola Adegoke was assigned as a home-based caseworker for Mother in April of 2023. Adegoke was unable to contact Mother during the month of April, despite trying to text and call, due to Mother's telephone not connecting. Adegoke did manage to contact Mother in May, and their first visit occurred at a laundromat because Mother was living in a motel at the time. During the first visit, Adegoke and Mother identified goals, such as obtaining housing, achieving sobriety, and becoming employed. Mother admitted to actively using heroin at the time and was not completing her drug screens.

[4] In June of 2023, Parents obtained adequate housing, but Adegoke had trouble contacting Mother, who would not respond to texts or would not be at home for scheduled visits. Once in July of 2023, Mother admitted to using heroin the night before a scheduled meeting. Adegoke closed the referral for Mother in February of 2024 due to Mother's poor attendance. In the eleven months Adegoke had worked with Mother, Mother had only attended six meetings, the last being in October of 2023, when Adegoke had driven Mother to her drug screening because Mother kept missing her screens.

[5] Demetria Williams was referred to Mother as a visitation facilitator in June of 2023 and successfully contacted Mother and scheduled the first visit for June 22. The visits were scheduled for every Wednesday and Thursday from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. During visits, Williams would assess Mother for whether a parent-child bond was forming, Mother's parenting skills and responses to Child, and whether Mother was meeting Child's basic needs and had brought adequate supplies. Child was born with injuries, sees a “swallow specialist,” and is on a special diet. Tr. Vol. II p. 135. During one visit, Williams had to wake Mother up twice and remind her to rest before coming to visitation. Parents also failed to provide necessities for Child at all but one or two of the visits attended. In September or October of 2023, Williams closed the referral because Mother had attended only five of her over thirty scheduled visits with Child: two in June, two in July, and one in August. Meanwhile, on July 7, 2023, the juvenile court found Child to be a CHINS and ordered Mother to complete home-based case management, a substance-abuse assessment, and random drug screens.

[6] Regina Parrish was referred to Mother as a home-based case manager in the fall of 2023 and also took over the facilitation of visitation. Parrish tried to contact Mother but was unable to for several weeks. Visitation was scheduled between Mother and Child on Thursdays, with the first occurring in December of 2023. Mother tried to interact with Child at the start of the two-hour visit but left the room after thirty minutes and was gone for over thirty minutes. When Mother returned, Parrish observed that Mother was more “hyped” than she had been before, and Mother fell asleep later in the visit. Tr. Vol. II p. 71. Although Parrish tried to contact Mother several times, even going to Mother's house and waiting thirty to forty minutes to drive Mother to visits, the second visit did not occur until February or March of 2024.

[7] Mother's third visit facilitated by Parrish did not occur until May of 2024, during which Mother was surprised when Child walked toward her. Mother interacted with Child for an hour before leaving the room for fifteen to twenty minutes. Mother returned to interact with Child for twenty-five to thirty minutes before leaving again for thirty minutes when Father arrived. Parrish closed the referral in July of 2024 due to repeated cancellations and no-shows. Meanwhile, the permanency plan for Child had been changed from reunification with Parents to adoption by the maternal grandmother in May of 2024. On July 2, 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child.

[8] Robert Stephens was referred to Mother as a family consultant in November of 2024 and started identifying goals with Mother at the beginning of December. The goals included housing, employment, and setting up community resources. Stephens planned to meet with Mother every week but had concerns about her inconsistent attendance. Mother told Stephens that she had stable housing, but Stephens could not verify whether Mother had stable employment. Stephens also discussed sobriety with Mother, and Mother informed Stephens that she had not been completing her drug screens regularly.

[9] Mara Alis Butler was referred to Mother as a home-based therapist on March 4, 2025, but was unable to make contact with Mother until March 19. During the first appointment, Mother and Butler agreed to meet on Wednesdays at 2 p.m. to address her substance abuse and work on Mother's communication with others. Mother's attendance at appointments and drug screenings was inconsistent. At some point, Mother told Butler that she, Father, and paternal grandfather were being evicted from their current residence due to conflicts and complaints from a next-door neighbor. Butler was unaware if Mother had secured other housing at this time.

[10] Also in March of 2025, DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Tracy Pennyman was assigned to Mother's case. After FCM Pennyman's assignment, Mother completed one random drug screening. Mother had just started or restarted visitation with Child when FCM Pennyman was assigned the case, and during those visits Mother did not participate. FCM Pennyman was concerned that Mother did not know about, and could not meet, Child's special health needs. FCM Pennyman had no knowledge or records of Mother's sobriety, stable employment, income, or safe and appropriate housing and later noted that neither Mother nor Father had ever completed a substance-abuse assessment. FCM Pennyman never recommended Mother for unsupervised visits or increased visitation time.

[11] Shannon Rockey was referred to Mother as a family consultant on May 4, 2025. After initially being unable to contact Mother, Rockey was able to schedule supervised parenting time for every Monday from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. The first appointment was scheduled for May 12, 2025, but Mother cancelled five to ten minutes beforehand. The second appointment was scheduled for May 19, 2025, to which Mother arrived almost thirty minutes late. Child interacted with Mother but displayed no bonding behavior, including no touching, hugging, or verbal communication. Mother did arrive with a diaper bag, but it contained a dirty diaper that could not be used and food and drink that could not be consumed by Child because Mother had brought neither a sippy cup, a bottle, nor a liquid thickener, which was necessary due to Child's stomach issues. A spoon had to be provided for Mother from DCS's supplies for Child to eat the food she had brought. Rockey became concerned about Mother's inadequate preparation for the visits and inconsistent attendance.

[12] On May 8, 2025, the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on DCS's termination petition. Mother testified and admitted to having relapsed and having entered a seven-day rapid detox in March of 2025. Jessica Garza testified that she had been appointed Child's Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) in January of 2024. GAL Garza observed that neither Parent had shown any willingness or ability “to provide [Child] with a safe and stable home environment free from abuse, neglect, [and] substance abuse.” Tr. Vol. II p. 110. GAL Garza indicated that, in the two-and-one-half years the case had been opened, both Parents had exhibited “less than minimal engagement in services” and had not successfully completed any of the ordered services. Tr. Vol. II p. 110. GAL Garza also noted that Mother had not been able to establish her sobriety, financial stability, or anything else tending to show that she was a fit and willing parent. As for Child's post-removal placement, GAL Garza observed that Child was happy with his maternal grandmother, had bonded with her and the other children present at the home, and had met all milestones while in her care. GAL Garza testified that termination of Parents’ parental rights to Child was in Child's best interests.

[13] FCM Pennyman testified that the conditions that led to Child's removal from Parents’ care would not be remedied, pointing to Mother's sporadic compliance with drug-screen and visitation requirements. FCM Pennyman also indicated her belief that the continuation of Mother's parent-child relationship with Child would be harmful to him because of Mother's failure to maintain sobriety and inability to address his special needs.

[14] On August 27, 2025, the juvenile court terminated Parents’ parental rights to Child. The juvenile court concluded, inter alia, that “there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [Child]’s removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by [Parents.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 97. The juvenile court also concluded that the “[c]ontinuation of the parent child relationship poses a threat to [Child]’s well-being in that it would serve as a barrier for him to obtain permanency through an adoption when his parents are unable and unwilling to parent and offer permanency.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 97.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights to Child. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Moreover, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships in our culture.” Id. (citation omitted). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court has made clear that the “purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children.” Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1992). “Termination of parental rights is proper where the children's emotional and physical development is threatened.” In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d at 773. The juvenile court need not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[16] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Invol. Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We recognize the juvenile court's “unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court's only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “ ‘We accept unchallenged findings as true.’ ” In re W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)).

[17] In order to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child, DCS was required to prove the following:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

[․.]

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.

[18] Mother challenges the juvenile court's conclusions that there was a reasonable probability that (1) she would not remedy the conditions that had resulted in Child's removal or continued placement outside the home and (2) continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being, safety, physical health, or life. We note that, because Indiana Code section 31-35-2- 4(d) is written in the disjunctive, DCS is only required to establish one of the above circumstances. See, e.g., In re J.S., 183 N.E.3d 362, 369–70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing to a previous version of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4), trans. denied. We choose to first address Mother's challenge to the juvenile court's conclusion that a continuation of the parent-child relationship would pose a threat to Child's well-being.

[19] When reviewing the question of whether continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to a child's well-being, a juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that his or her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. K.E. v. Ind. Dep't Child Svcs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 (Ind. 2015). Instead, we look to the “to both the parent's habitual pattern of conduct and [her] fitness at the time of the termination hearing to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[20] Here, the juvenile court concluded that the “[c]ontinuation of the parent child relationship poses a threat to [Child]’s well-being in that it would serve as a barrier for him to obtain permanency through an adoption when his parents are unable and unwilling to parent and offer permanency.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 97. Mother challenges this conclusion as though it were based solely on Parents’ failure to provide permanency, which is not the case.

[21] The juvenile court clearly also based this conclusion on Parents’ inability and/or unwillingness to parent Child, which it addressed in several findings:

5. In June of 2023, [Williams], a parenting time facilitator with Seeds of Life Homebased Services, received a referral to provide supervised parenting time for [Mother]. [․.] [Mother] was not consistent in attending parenting time and did not attend any parenting time sessions in August or September. Ultimately, [Williams] closed the parenting time referral in September or October of 2023 due to lack of engagement from [Mother]. Despite having the opportunity to exercise at least eight parenting time sessions a month for four months, [Mother] participated in only five.

6. In April of 2023, [Adegoke], a homebased case manager with Seeds of Life Homebased Services, received a referral to work with [Mother]. Despite [Adegoke]’s numerous attempts at contact, [Mother] did not respond to [Adegoke]’s attempts at contact until one month later.

7. The treatment plan [Adegoke] developed with [Mother] included working with her to obtain housing as [Mother] was living in a motel, obtain sobriety as [Mother] was actively using heroin, and obtain employment as [Mother] stated she was self-employed.

[․.]

9. In July of 2023, [Mother] informed [Adegoke] that she and [Father] were still actively using heroin.

[․.]

11. Despite being scheduled to meet with [Adegoke] weekly, [Mother] attended only six sessions over the course of approximately ten months. [Mother] was unsuccessfully discharged from [Adegoke]’s service in February of 2024.

12. In the fall of 2023, [Parrish], a homebased case manager with Midwest Psychological Center, initially received a referral to provide homebased case management and supervised parenting time for [Mother]. [Mother] did not respond to [Parrish]’s attempts to provide homebased case management and the case management portion of the referral was unsuccessfully closed.

13. [Parrish] encouraged [Mother] to engage in parenting time and provided her with transportation to the sessions. At times, [Parrish] had to wait 30–40 minutes before [Mother] would exit her home to be transported to parenting time. [Parrish] supervised three, two-hour sessions which were scheduled by [Mother]. [․]

14. [Parrish]’s first session with [Mother] occurred at the DCS office at the end of December 2023. At the beginning of the visit, [Mother] left the visitation room for approximately 30 minutes and returned “hyped”. [Mother] interacted with [Child] for a while and fell asleep an hour later.

15. Approximately six weeks passed before [Mother]’s second parenting time session. [Mother] was more engaged with [Child] and the session went well.

[․.]

17. The third parenting time session occurred in May of 2024. [Mother] left for the restroom for 15–20 minutes and again for 30 minutes when [Father] arrived. Other than [Mother] not utilizing all the available time, the session went well.

[․.]

21. In November of 2024, [Stephens], a Family Consultant with Lifeline Youth and Family Services, received a referral to provide homebased case management to [Mother]. [Mother] did not promptly respond to [Stephens's] attempts at contact and did not meet with him until December. [Stephens's] treatment goals include obtaining larger housing, obtaining stable housing, and connecting [Mother] to community resources.

22. [Mother] is not [ ]consistent in her participation with [Stephens] and has fallen asleep during session. However, the referral remains active.

23. On March 4, 2025, [Butler], a homebased therapist with Lifeline Youth and Family Services, received a referral to provide homebased therapy to [Mother]. [Mother] did not promptly respond to [Butler]’s attempts at contact and met with [Butler] for the first time on March 19, 2025. [․]

24. [Mother] reported to [Butler] she is being evicted from her residence due to conflict and complaints from her neighbor.

25. [Mother] has not been consistent in her engagement with [Butler] and has fallen asleep during sessions.

26. On May 4, 2025, [Rockey], a Family Consultant with Lifeline Youth and Family Services, received a referral to supervise [Mother] and [Father]’s parenting time.

27. The first parenting time session with [Rockey] was scheduled to occur on May 12, 2025 at the Jennings County Library. Despite confirming her attendance the day before, [Mother] did not attend the parenting time session and left [Rockey], [Child] and maternal grandmother at the library waiting for her.

28. [Mother] and [Father]’s next parenting time occurred at the DCS office on May 19, 2025. [Mother] was 25 minutes late for the session[.] [Child] was upset, crying and wanted to return to his grandmother. [Mother] brought clothes, electrolyte drink and two containers of yogurt. However, [Mother] did not bring a sippy cup, spoon and or thickener necessitated by [Child]’s dietary restrictions. [Rockey] did not observe a bond between [Child] and either parent.

[․.]

30. [Mother] testified she relapsed on heroin in March of 2025 and participated in a seven-day “rapid detox” at Recovery Works. [Mother] attends NA/AA meetings once or twice a month.

[․]

32. [GAL Garza] testified that [Child] barely knows his parents. [GAL Garza] does not feel providing parents with additional time to engage in service is in [Child]’s best interests due to each having over two years to do so. [GAL Garza] agrees with the termination of parental rights and subsequent adoption of [Child] by his grandmother.

33. [FCM Pennyman], a family case manager with the DCS has been assigned as the family's permanency worker since March of 2025. Neither parent has maintained contact with FCM Pennyman.

34. Parents continued to use heroin after [Child] was removed from their care and neither have consistently engaged in drug screens to demonstrate sobriety.

35. [․] [Mother] has only engaged in seven days of drug and alcohol detoxification and occasionally attends NA/AA meetings.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 93–96. Because Mother challenges none of these findings, we accept them as true regarding her failure to establish sobriety, stable housing, or employment; meaningfully participate in (much less complete) any services; and demonstrate that she is motivated or equipped to address Child's special needs. See, e.g., In re W.H., 254 N.E.3d at 554 (noting that we accept unchallenged findings as true). In other words, these findings establish that Mother is unwilling and/or unable to effectively parent Child, which is sufficient to support a conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationship would likely endanger Child's well-being.

[22] Mother points to some evidence that she had, on occasion, been able to meet Child's needs during visitation, had formed a bond with him, and had not actively harmed him. This evidence, however, does not support the juvenile court's judgment, and we will not consider it. See, e.g., In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879. The juvenile court was in the best position to evaluate evidence regarding Mother's sobriety and ability to safely parent Child, and we will not second-guess its determinations. In the end, Mother's arguments amount to nothing more than requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Matter of Eq.W. 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2019).²

[23] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Because we affirm the juvenile court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of Child, we need not address Mother's argument challenging the conclusion that the reasons for Child's continued removal from her care are not likely to be remedied.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.