DANNER v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jason Danner appeals his conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting and raises two issues. First, he argues that the victim's testimony was incredibly dubious, and, therefore, the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. He also argues that his forty-three-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2017, when B.L. was six or seven years old, he developed a friendship with Danner because he was friends with Danner's nephew. Danner also lived across the street from B.L. and his mother. Danner lived with his parents in a home that had an apartment that could be accessed by using a separate outside staircase. There was also a camper on the property. For approximately four years, B.L. spent significant time at Danner's home and frequently spent the night with Danner. In 2021, when B.L. was ten or eleven years old, his mother died.

[4] After his mother's death, B.L.’s older sister obtained guardianship over B.L. and he began to live with his sister and her husband. B.L. exhibited behavioral issues both at home and at school. B.L. also tried to run away from his sister's home. On two occasions, Danner appeared in places where B.L. was playing basketball and watched B.L.

[5] B.L.’s sister and her husband became concerned that Danner had molested B.L., and B.L.’s brother-in-law confided in B.L. that “stuff” had happened to him when he was younger. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 109. B.L. then disclosed that something had happened to him. Id. at 110. Shortly after that disclosure, B.L.’s sister took him to the Columbus Police Department and a law enforcement officer scheduled a forensic interview of B.L.

[6] After the interview took place, the State charged Danner with Level 1 felony child molesting,¹ and the charging information provided in pertinent part:

That between January 1, 2017 through November 30, 2021 in Bartholomew County ․ the defendant, Jason S. Danner, a person of at least twenty-one (21) years of age, did knowingly or intentionally perform or submit to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct as defined in Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-221.5 with VICTIM 1, a child under the age of fourteen years (14).

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 17.

[7] Danner's jury trial commenced on September 24, 2025. B.L. stated that Danner had touched his penis many times when B.L. was staying with Danner. These incidents occurred in multiple bedrooms in Danner's home, in the upstairs apartment, and on one occasion in the camper. Danner threatened to hurt B.L. if he told anyone about the molestation. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 100. B.L. described an incident where he and Danner were sleeping in Danner's bedroom and B.L. woke up when Danner put his mouth on B.L.’s penis. B.L. told Danner to stop and tried to push Danner away, but Danner continued to perform oral sex on B.L. while Danner also touched his own penis. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 102-04. B.L. testified that Danner put his mouth on B.L.’s penis many times when B.L. spent the night with Danner. Id. at 104-05. Danner testified in his own defense and denied that he had molested B.L. The jury found Danner guilty as charged.

[8] The trial court sentenced Danner on October 23, 2025. In its sentencing order, the court found the following aggravating circumstances: 1) that Danner took advantage of a child who was vulnerable and had no support from other people, 2) that Danner did not express any remorse and continued to blame the victim, 3) that B.L. was under the age of twelve when Danner molested him,² 4) that Danner was in a position of trust and control over B.L., 5) that Danner groomed B.L. over an extended period of time, 6) that the harm to B.L. was more severe than the elements needed to prove the crime, 7) that Danner threatened to harm B.L., 8) that Danner is a danger to the community, and 9) that Danner was actively using drugs when he committed the offense. The court considered Danner's limited prior criminal history consisting of two misdemeanor convictions and successful completion of probation, as a mitigating circumstance. The court then ordered Danner to serve a forty-three-year sentence with thirty-nine years executed and four years suspended to probation.

[9] Danner now appeals.

B.L.’s testimony was not incredibly dubious.

[10] Danner argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his child molesting conviction because B.L.’s testimony was incredibly dubious. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (citation omitted). We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). A conviction for child molesting may stand solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim. See Baxter v. State, 132 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[11] However, in extraordinarily rare circumstances, “[a]ppellate courts may impinge upon a jury's function to judge the credibility of a witness ․ by applying the ‘incredible dubiosity’ rule.” Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211, 1221 (Ind. 2015) (citing Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2007)). “Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is limited to cases with very specific circumstances because we are extremely hesitant to invade the province of the jury.” Id. “[T]o warrant application of the incredible dubiosity rule, there must be: ‘1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015)). Our court “will reverse a conviction if the sole witness presents inherently improbable testimony and there is no circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt.” Feyka v. State, 972 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “Application of the incredible dubiosity rule ‘is rare and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.’ ” Id. (quoting Fajardo, 859 N.E.2d at 1208).

[12] B.L. testified to numerous molestations including that Danner performed oral sex on him. Danner claims that B.L.’s testimony is incredibly dubious because B.L.’s “allegations were uncorroborated and inherently contradictory.” Appellant's Br. at 12. Danner specifically directs our attention to the following statements:

B.L. stated during his forensic interview that the first time Danner touched him B.L. was asleep and was subsequently told by a friend Danner had touched him. B.L. admitted this was not true and claimed he did not recall having made said statement. B.L. also stated during his forensic interview that on one occasion Danner instructed B.L. to remove B.L.’s clothing in the bathroom and Danner then touched B.L.’s genitals with Danner's hands and mouth. B.L. stated that Danner's mother and Danner's nephew, G.D., entered the bathroom and witnessed the event. B.L. admitted that this was not true and claimed he did not recall making the statement.

Id. (record citations omitted).

[13] In response, the State argues that the discrepancy between pre-trial statements B.L. made during his forensic interview and his testimony at trial does not render B.L.’s testimony incredibly dubious. The State is correct. The incredible dubiosity rule applies only when a witness contradicts herself “in a single statement or while testifying, not to conflicts between multiple statements.” Glenn v. State, 884 N.E.2d 347, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied; see also Chambles v. State, 119 N.E.3d 182, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (explaining that, “[w]hen a witness's trial testimony contradicts a statement she made before trial, it is the jury's province to decide which statement to believe”), trans. denied. The two inconsistencies between B.L.’s statements during the forensic interview, which took place nearly three years before Danner's jury trial, and his trial testimony go to the weight and credibility of B.L.’s testimony but do not render his testimony incredibly dubious.

[14] B.L. unequivocally and specifically described the first time Danner performed oral sex on him including where that molestation occurred. Moreover, Danner's mother corroborated B.L.’s testimony that B.L. and Danner slept in the same bedroom in her home. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 127-28. She also corroborated B.L.’s testimony that Danner and B.L. eventually moved to the apartment upstairs. Id. at 128. We therefore conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Danner's Level 1 felony child molesting conviction.

Danner's forty-three-year sentence is not inappropriate.

[15] Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[16] However, sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we will defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offense and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[17] The sentencing range for Level 1 felony child molesting is twenty to fifty years, with the advisory sentence being thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(c). The trial court ordered Danner to serve forty-three years, with thirty-nine years executed and four years suspended to probation.

[18] The nature of Danner's offense does not warrant revision of his sentence. Danner groomed a vulnerable, young child who was practically parentless, and took advantage of the child's trust in him. Danner molested B.L. repeatedly over approximately four years before B.L.’s sister established guardianship over B.L. Danner also threatened to harm B.L. if he disclosed the molestation to anyone. Danner did not present any compelling evidence that would tend to portray the nature of his offense in a positive light. The molestation only stopped because B.L. moved to his sister's home.

[19] Danner claims that his character supports a downward revision of his sentence because he had full-time employment at the time of his arrest, his prior criminal history is minimal, and he is at low risk to reoffend. But these character traits do not portray his character in such a positive light that we are convinced that his sentence is inappropriate. Danner's character is also reflected in his offense. He groomed a young child and violated his position of trust and control over B.L., and he was using methamphetamine when the molestations occurred.

[20] For all of these reasons, Danner has not convinced us that his forty-three-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense or his character.

Conclusion

[21] B.L.’s testimony was not incredibly dubious, and Danner's forty-three-year sentence is not inappropriate. We therefore affirm Danner's Level 1 felony child molesting conviction and sentence.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also charged Danner with Level 4 felony child molesting. Prior to trial, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss that charge.

2.   Within the argument section of his brief, Danner states that the trial court should not have considered the age of the victim because B.L.’s age is an element of the offense. However, Danner makes this one-sentence argument within his claim that his sentence is inappropriate and does not raise it as a separate issue with citation to relevant authority or cogent reasoning. Therefore, he has waived the issue on appeal. See Appellate Rule 46(a)(8); Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015); Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 264 (Ind. 2014).

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.