Marion County Sheriff's Office, Appellant-Defendant v. Lisa R. Williams, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] This case involves a slip-and-fall at the Marion County City-County Building (“the CCB”). At all times relevant to this appeal, the CCB was maintained and managed by the Indianapolis Marion County Building Authority (“the Building Authority”). The Marion County Sheriff's Office (“MCSO”) provided security at the CCB. City Janitor Service Co. (“City Janitor”) provided janitorial services at the CCB.

[2] Lisa Williams alleges that she was injured on February 10, 2020, when she slipped and fell on a wet floor about twenty to thirty feet inside the CCB. She initiated a lawsuit against the City Janitor, MCSO, and others on January 26, 2022, alleging that the defendants were liable for the injuries that she claimed to have suffered as a result of her fall. MCSO moved for summary judgment, claiming that while it had a contractual duty to provide security services for the CCB, it did not owe Williams a duty of care. Williams opposed MCSO's motion and moved to strike a portion of MCSO's designated evidence. The trial court denied MCSO's motion for summary judgment, denied Williams's motion to strike, and certified the matter for interlocutory appeal. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in denying MCSO's motion for summary judgment but did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams's motion to strike a portion of the MCSO's designated evidence, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Williams alleges that on February 10, 2020, she “was walking into work in the [CCB], and as she walked through the north entrance door and entered the building (about 20–30 feet inside), she slipped on a wet, slippery surface on the floor, injuring her hip, shoulder, collarbone, bicep tendon, and other bodily injuries.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 33. Williams claimed that the MCSO failed to discover and remedy the wet and slippery surface, to warn her of the allegedly hazardous condition, and to provide her with a reasonably safe and secure premises to walk.

[4] On January 26, 2022, Williams filed her complaint for damages, arguing that MSCO was liable for the injuries she had suffered when she had slipped and fallen on February 10, 2020. MCSO moved for summary judgment on December 13, 2024, claiming that “[t]here exists no genuine issue of material facts, and [Williams] cannot demonstrate, as a matter of law, that she is entitled to recover damages against MCSO because MCSO did not owe [her] a duty of care.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 51.

[5] In support of its summary-judgment motion, MCSO designated the affidavit of Mark Peterson, who serves as General Manager of the Building Authority. Peterson averred that on the date of Williams's fall, the Building Authority “contracted [City Janitor] to provide a day crew with the primary function to re-cleaning high traffic areas including to spot mop the first-floor lobby as needed during inclement weather conditions[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 75. Peterson provided a copy of the Building Authority's contract with City Janitor, which detailed City Janitor's duty to clean and maintain the CCB. Peterson further averred that the MCSO “provided security for” the CCB and the “expectation of the security was for MCSO to keep the [CCB] and its occupants safe from all criminal related activity.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 75. Peterson additionally averred that “[t]he expectation of MCSO's security of the [CCB] was not to mop or warn occupants of wet floors during inclement weather because that was the responsibility of [City Janitor].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 75. Williams moved to strike portions of Peterson's affidavit, claiming that he lacked the necessary personal knowledge to make some of the averments within.

[6] MCSO also designated the affidavit of Kelvis Williams, who serves as the Deputy Chief of the Judicial Enforcement Division of MCSO. Kelvis averred that as part of his duties as Deputy Chief of the Judicial Enforcement Division, he personally oversaw the management of MCSO operations at the CCB. Kelvis further averred as follows:

7. ․ MCSO provided security for the [CCB], which meant MCSO kept the [CCB] and its occupants safe from all criminal related activity.

8. MCSO's security obligation of the [CCB] did not include mopping or warning occupants of wet floors during inclement weather.

9. The [Building Authority] maintained and managed the [CCB]․.

10. Prior to [Williams's] fall, the MCSO has never mopped or warned occupants of wet floors during inclement weather at the [CCB], nor has the MCSO ever been asked by [the Building Authority] or any other agency to mop or warn occupants of wet floors of the [CCB] during inclement weather.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 70.

[7] MCSO designated a portion of Williams's deposition response to the question of why she believed that MCSO should have warned her of the wet floor, which read

Because they were responsible for the building, and they were there every day to see. This was the first person that you seen [(sic)] when you came through the building was the [MCSO]. That's who controls the metal detectors. There was at least two sheriffs there every day. And then somebody at the podium for the employees to show their ID.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 150.

[8] Williams opposed MCSO's summary-judgment motion, arguing that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether MCSO owed her a duty of care. In support, Williams designated her deposition testimony in which she claimed that MCSO should have made sure that City Janitor was cleaning up or notifying visitors of wet floors “since they was responsible for the building. Then they should have been responsible for making sure that the people that they hired to clean the building was doing their job.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 183. Williams admitted that she was “not sure” who had hired City Janitor. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 183. Williams further admitted that she had “[n]ot visually” seen any water on the floor before she fell and that she was approximately eight feet beyond the security area when she fell. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 185. Williams also relied on her answers to interrogatories, in which she had stated her belief that MCSO controlled the area where she fell and, as such, “should have at a minimum made efforts to warn [her] of the hazard posed.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 190.

[9] On June 22, 2025, the trial court issued an order denying MCSO's summary-judgment motion and Williams's motion to strike Peterson's affidavit. In denying the MCSO's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that “there are genuine issues of material facts that include, but are not limited to, whether the [MCSO's] security role and control of the lobby area is sufficient to impose a duty regarding slip hazards, despite not owning the property or having an explicit cleaning warning obligation.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29. At the MCSO's request, the trial court certified the matter for interlocutory appeal, and we accepted jurisdiction.

Discussion and Decision

I. The Trial Court Erred in Denying MCSO's Motion for Summary Judgment

[10] When reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment our standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court. The moving party bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is improper if the movant fails to carry its burden, but if it succeeds, then the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. In determining whether summary judgment is proper, the reviewing court considers only the evidentiary matter the parties have specifically designated to the trial court. We construe all factual inferences in the non-moving party's favor and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party. Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012) (internal citations and quotation omitted).

[11] In seeking to recover from MCSO, Williams alleged negligence, claiming that MCSO had owed her a duty of care; had breached that duty; and, as a result of MCSO's breach, she had been injured.

To prevail on a claim of negligence the plaintiff must show: (1) duty owed to plaintiff by defendant; (2) breach of duty by allowing conduct to fall below the applicable standard of care; and (3) compensable injury proximately caused by defendant's breach of duty. Absent a duty there can be no negligence or liability based upon the breach. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide.

Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386–87 (Ind. 2016) (internal citations and quotation omitted). “A defendant is entitled to summary judgment by demonstrating that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claim.” Countrymark Coop., Inc. v. Hammes, 892 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

A. The MCSO did not Owe Williams the Claimed Duty

[12] MCSO contends that the trial court erred in denying their summary-judgment motion because they did not owe a duty to Williams to warn her of the allegedly hazardous conditions of the CCB floor. The question of whether a duty exists “is a question of law for the court to decide.” Est. of Staggs by & through Coulter v. ADS Logistics Co., LLC, 102 N.E.3d 319, 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. The question “depends upon balancing the following factors: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person(s) injured; and (3) public policy concerns.” Id. at 325.

1. Relationship Between the Parties

[13] “Generally, a duty of reasonable care is not owed to the world at large, but instead arises out of a relationship between the parties.” Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. v. Dalton-McGrath, 157 N.E.3d 5, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). In this case, to the extent that a relationship existed between MCSO and Williams, the relationship was indirect and limited. MCSO provided security at the CCB, which was managed and maintained by the Building Authority. MCSO's responsibilities included checking employee identification and manning a metal detector at the public entrance of the building to protect the CCB's occupants from criminal activity. Williams was employed by the Building Authority and worked at the CCB. There is no designated evidence that Williams had any special relationship with MCSO but rather the designated evidence indicates that she fell under the general class of individuals to whom MCSO was expected to provide security services.

2. Foreseeability of Harm to Williams

[14] In some cases, “foreseeability is not only a component of the proximate cause element of negligence, it is also a component of the duty element of negligence as well.” Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 389.

[F]oreseeability in this context—as a component of duty—is evaluated differently than foreseeability in proximate cause determinations: while the latter foreseeability analysis requires a factfinder to evaluate the specific facts from the case, the former involves a lesser inquiry, requiring a court, as a threshold legal matter, to evaluate the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence. By focusing on the general class of persons of which the plaintiff was a member and whether the harm suffered was of a kind normally to be expected, courts must assess whether there is some probability or likelihood of harm that is serious enough to induce a reasonable person to take precautions to avoid it, not merely that harm is sufficiently likely[.]

Cavanaugh's Sports Bar & Eatery, Ltd. v. Porterfield, 140 N.E.3d 837, 840 (Ind. 2020) (brackets added, internal brackets, citations, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, “the foreseeability component of duty requires a more general analysis of the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence.” Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 391.

[15] Williams was a member of the general class of persons who entered the CCB through the MCSO-staffed security area, and MCSO personnel had a duty to protect those individuals, including Williams, from criminal activity. See Lane v. St. Joseph's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 817 N.E.2d 266, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that the hospital security staff owed a duty to patrons to protect them from criminal activity in the hospital emergency room). The designated evidence, however, establishes that MCSO's responsibilities were limited in scope to security and did not cover general maintenance or upkeep in the CCB. Thus, while it would be foreseeable that MCSO would have to act on Williams's behalf with regard to a security threat at the CCB, nothing in the designated evidence suggests that MCSO could reasonably foresee having to act on Williams's behalf for any non-security reason.

[16] The alleged duty argued by Williams did not fall under the umbrella of a security threat but rather was a duty to warn her of hazardous conditions, i.e., a slippery floor, inside the CCB approximately eight feet beyond MCSO's security-operations base. MCSO designated evidence tending to show that the Building Authority had “contracted [City Janitor] to provide a day crew with the primary function to re-cleaning high traffic areas including to spot mop the first-floor lobby as needed during inclement weather conditions[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 75. MCSO “provided security for” the CCB and the “expectation of the security was for MCSO to keep the [CCB] and its occupants safe from all criminal related activity.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 75. “The expectation of MCSO's security of the [CCB] was not to mop or warn occupants of wet floors during inclement weather because that was the responsibility of [City Janitor].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 75.

Prior to [Williams's] fall, the MCSO has never mopped or warned occupants of wet floors during inclement weather at the [CCB], nor has the MCSO ever been asked by [the Building Authority] or any other agency to mop or warn occupants of wet floors of the [CCB] during inclement weather.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 70.

[17] For her part, Williams relied on her deposition testimony in which she had expressed her belief that MCSO should have warned her of the wet floors, stating

Because they were responsible for the building, and they were there every day to see. This was the first person that you seen [(sic)] when you came through the building was the [MCSO]. That's who controls the metal detectors. There was at least two sheriffs there every day. And then somebody at the podium for the employees to show their ID.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 150. Williams also expressed her belief that MCSO should have made sure that City Janitor was cleaning up or notifying visitors of wet floors “since they was responsible for the building. Then they should have been responsible for making sure that the people that they hired to clean the building was doing their job.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 183. Williams also relied on her answers to interrogatories, in which she had stated her belief that MCSO controlled the area where she fell and, as such, “should have at a minimum made efforts to warn [her] of the hazard posed.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 190. While Williams may express her opinion based upon her belief or understanding, we have previously concluded that “a person's belief or understanding is not an objective fact, and objective facts are required to create genuine issues of material fact.” Akin v. Simons, 180 N.E.3d 366, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021); see also White v. Am. Legion Post #354, Inc., 267 N.E.3d 451, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (concluding that none of the affiant's statements were objective facts that were reasonably ascertainable, nor were they sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact to prevent the entry of summary judgment), trans. denied.

[18] Williams admitted that she had “[n]ot visually” seen any water on the floor before she fell and that she was approximately eight feet beyond the security area when she fell. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 185. There is no designated evidence beyond Williams's belief that MCSO should have been aware of and warned her about the hazardous conditions that even suggested that MCSO knew or was responsible for alerting the general class of persons of the potential harm. Williams's belief is not sufficient to create an issue of material fact on this question. Id.; Akin, 180 N.E.3d at 377.

3. Public Policy Concerns

[19] “The final factor in the Goodwin test is the public policy consideration of who is, or should be, in the best position to prevent injury and how society should allocate the costs of such injury.” ONB Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Est. of Megel, 107 N.E.3d 484, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. In this case, the entities best suited to warn Williams of potentially hazardous floor conditions inside the CCB were the Building Authority and City Janitor. The Building Authority managed and maintained the CCB and had contracted with City Janitor for all janitorial services, including cleaning up wet or slippery spots on the floor. In fact, the Building Authority and City Janitor had foreseen the potential risk of hazardous conditions creating a slip and fall risk during certain weather conditions as City Janitor's contract with the Building Authority required it to “provide a day crew with the primary function to re-cleaning high traffic areas including to spot mop the first-floor lobby [i.e., the area where Williams fell,] as needed during inclement weather conditions[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 75. Moreover, as a practical matter, if we were to conclude that MCSO has a duty to focus on floor conditions inside the CCB, this would take away from their responsibility to provide security services to protect the CCB's inhabitants from criminal activity. This would arguably divert MCSO's attention from potential security risks, thus placing the public in a position of greater risk of harm. We do not believe that it is in the public's interest to do so.

[20] In sum, we conclude that all three of the Goodwin factors weigh in favor of the conclusion that, as a matter of law, MCSO did not owe the claimed duty to Williams. Again, “[a]bsent a duty there can be no negligence or liability based upon the breach.” Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 386. As such, we conclude the trial court erred when it denied MCSO's motion for summary judgment on Williams's negligence claim against it.¹ See Penske Truck Leasing, 157 N.E.3d at 15 (concluding that the trial court had erred by denying Penske Truck Leasing's motion for summary judgment because it had not owed a duty to the McGraths).

II. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Williams's Motion to Strike Portions of Peterson's Affidavit

[21] Effectively on cross-appeal, Williams contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to strike portions of Peterson's affidavit. “We review a decision regarding a motion to strike for an abuse of discretion.” Williamson v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 55 N.E.3d 906, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). A trial court abuses its discretion when its “decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id.

[22] Williams claims that portions of Peterson's affidavit should have been struck for a lack of personal knowledge. Indiana Trial Rule 56(E) provides that supporting and opposing affidavits to a summary-judgment motion “shall be made on personal knowledge[.]” Peterson's affidavit meets this requirement.

[23] The opening portion of Peterson's affidavit provides as follows:

1. My name is Mark Peterson. I am over the age of eighteen and I am competent to make this Affidavit. The facts stated in this Affidavit are within my personal knowledge.

2. I am and have been employed by the [Building Authority] since 2001 and have served as General Manager of the [Building Authority] since 2017.

3. I have reviewed the Plaintiff's Complaint and am generally aware of the Plaintiff's allegations for the slip and fall that occurred in the [CCB] on February 10, 2020 (the “Incident”).

4. The [Building Authority] maintains and manages the [CCB] located at 200 E. Washington Street, Indianapolis, IN, and it did on the date of the Incident.

5. As General Manager of the [Building Authority], I personally oversee the management of the [CCB].

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 74 (emphasis added).

[24] Williams claims that three portions of Peterson's affidavit lacked personal knowledge. Specifically, she points to Peterson's statements that (1) he had reviewed her complaint and was aware of her allegations, (2) City Janitor had a duty to spot mop the first-floor lobby as needed, and (3) the expectation for MCSO's security operations was to keep the CCB and its occupants safe from criminal activities. In the first paragraph of his affidavit, however, Peterson expressly stated that “[t]he facts stated in this Affidavit are within my personal knowledge.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 74. Given Peterson's express statement that all matters within his affidavit were within his personal knowledge, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Williams's motion to strike portions of Peterson's affidavit for an alleged lack of personal knowledge.²

[25] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We are likewise unconvinced by Williams's argument that MCSO owed her a duty because it was a joint possessor of the CCB. The designated evidence clearly establishes that the Building Authority managed and maintained the CCB and that the MCSO merely provided limited services, i.e., security services, to the Building Authority.

2.   We also disagree with Williams's assertion that the challenged portions of Peterson's affidavit, which relate squarely to Williams's claims and, again, were made with his personal knowledge, contained inadmissible opinions as to the ultimate issue of law or hearsay.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.