IN RE: : The Marriage of Cuffia (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] James Cuffia (“Husband”) and Deborah Cuffia (“Wife”) were married for nearly thirty-three years before Wife filed a petition seeking the dissolution of the parties’ marriage in June of 2024. In its dissolution order, the trial court concluded that Wife had overcome the statutory presumption of equal division of the marital estate and awarded Wife sixty-five percent. Husband argues that the trial court's determination was clearly erroneous. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Husband and Wife were married on July 20, 1991. No children were born of their marriage, but Wife had a daughter from a previous relationship, whom Husband claims he had cared for until she was old enough to care for herself. Husband is thirteen years younger than Wife. At the time of the final hearing, Wife was seventy-four years old and Husband was sixty-one.

[3] When the two married, Husband was unemployed but had bachelor's and master's degrees in civil engineering. A few months into their marriage, Husband started working for Valvoline in Lexington, Kentucky, and then at their location in Willow Springs, Illinois. Husband held various jobs from 1991 through 2008, including running his own computer business from the parties’ basement.

[4] In 2008, Husband left his engineering job “to pursue his dream of working as a political operative.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 14. The parties agreed that Husband could chase this dream for one year. As it happened, Husband traveled across the country as an unpaid campaign volunteer from 2008 until 2011, after which Wife insisted that he obtain paid employment. Husband returned to work as an engineer for various employers. When the parties separated in June of 2024, Husband's annual salary at Alpha Engineering in Indianapolis, Indiana, was approximately $161,000.00.

[5] Wife worked as a public-school teacher from 1973 through 2007 in Crown Point. In 2007, Wife became an assistant principal. During her tenure in the public-school system, Wife also served as a tennis coach for Crown Point High School. After her retirement from full-time employment in 2013, Wife continued working for the school as a part-time interventionist until the end of the 2024–2025 school year.

[6] The parties’ marital residence is in Crown Point. Wife owned the marital residence before the marriage, and it remained solely titled in her name throughout the marriage and after the parties’ separation. As of July 20, 1991, the home loan had had an outstanding balance of approximately $47,000.00. By December of 1993, Wife had paid off the balance “without any direct contributions from Husband.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 16. Afterwards, Wife had paid the property taxes and insurance premiums for the marital residence, again, “without any direct contribution from Husband.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 16. Wife presented evidence of nearly $89,000.00 that she had paid for repairs and improvements to the marital residence. Although Husband claimed that he had also paid for some repairs and improvements, he “did not provide any documented evidence[,]․ even when said information was sought through a Request for Production of Documents.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 16.

[7] Early in their marriage, the parties had come “to an oral agreement that Wife would pay all the household expenses and that Husband would invest his earnings into retirement savings with the goal that they would be able to retire together given their age disparity.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 17. Apart from three individual utility bills and the telephone bill, Wife had paid all utility payments for the marital residence. At some point, when Wife had asked about the balances of Husband's retirement accounts, he had informed her that he had only made minimal investments. Husband had promised to start making contributions to his retirement accounts as the parties had initially agreed. Instead, from as early as 2003, Husband had been making donations to various political campaigns and action groups totaling nearly $491,000.00. Though Husband claims that Wife had acquiesced to these donations, Wife stated that she had been unaware of them until after she had filed for dissolution.

[8] Wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on June 13, 2024. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing over the course of three days on May 29, June 4, and June 11, 2025. After the hearing, the trial court issued its order, which provides, in part, as follows:

9. Wife has rebutted the statutory presumption for an equal division of marital assets. The Court has taken into account the following factors in reaching this determination:

a. Before and during the marriage, Wife contributed portions of her income into various savings, pension, and/or retirement accounts which account for the vast majority of the marital assets;

b. Wife owned the marital residence on Cheyenne Drive for many years prior to the parties’ marriage and was solely responsible for all debts and expenses associated with said residence before and during the marriage, except for minimal contributions made by Husband for his primary benefit;

c. Husband brought little to no assets into the marriage;

d. Despite the fact that the parties agreed that Wife would pay all of the household expenses so that Husband could invest the bulk of his earnings into retirement savings for their future mutual benefit, Husband failed to do so and hid this fact from Wife during most of the marriage. Instead, Husband contributed nearly $491,000.00 to political candidates, many of which Wife did not support. While Husband's political contributions may not amount to a dissipation of marital assets, it is clear to this Court that instead of Husband contributing to his retirement, as the parties had agreed and as Wife continued to contribute toward her retirement accounts, Husband's choice is further example of Husband's lack of contribution to the parties’ marital assets;

e. Husband did not engage in gainful employment during certain periods in the marriage; including, but not limited to, one instance in which Husband took three (3) years off to pursue his dream of becoming a political operative, which led to Husband traveling the U.S. at his own expense and working as an unpaid political campaign volunteer; and,

f. Husband is 61 years old, is thirteen (13) years younger than Wife and is employed as an engineer earning $161,000.00 annually. Wife, age 74, is retired.

10. Based upon the foregoing, Wife shall receive sixty-five percent (65%) of the parties’ net marital estate and Husband should receive thirty-five (35%) of the net marital estate.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23. Husband challenges each of these legal conclusions and the trial court's division of marital assets on appeal.

Discussion and Decision

I. The Trial Court did not Err in Awarding an Unequal Division of the Marital Estate

[9] Husband advances several grounds in which he alleges that the trial court erred in finding that Wife overcame the presumption of equal division and awarding her sixty-five percent of the marital estate. Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 provides:

The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

“Per the statute, a trial court starts with the presumptive fifty/fifty division of marital assets and then determines whether the presumption has been rebutted by relevant evidence indicating that an equal division would not be just and reasonable.” Bock v. Bock, 116 N.E.3d 1124, 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “If the court deviates from the presumptive equal division, it must state its reasons for that deviation in its findings and judgment.” Id.

[10] In issuing a decree of dissolution, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Where a trial court has made findings of fact, we apply the following two-tier standard of review: whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions thereon. Findings will be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. To determine that a finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous, our review of the evidence must leave us with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Campbell v. Campbell, 993 N.E.2d 205, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied. “As we conduct our review, we presume the trial court followed the law.” Id. “It is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Id.

A. The Trial Court Properly Considered Wife's Retirement Account and Husband's Non-Financial Contributions to the Marriage

[11] In determining that Wife rebutted the statutory presumption of equal division, the trial court concluded that Wife had contributed to her retirement account, which accounted for most of the marital assets, before and during the marriage. Husband argues that the evidence does not support the fact that Wife contributed to her retirement account prior to marriage. However, factual “[f]indings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Campbell, 993 N.E.2d at 209 (emphasis added). Wife testified that she had started working as a public-school teacher in 1973, eighteen years before marrying Husband. As Wife notes, Indiana public-school teachers must contribute at least three percent of their annual salary to the Indiana Teacher's Retirement Fund. Ind. Code § 5-10.4-4-11(b). This is true today, as it was when Wife started her career in 1973. See Reilly v. Robertson, 360 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Ind. 1977) (discussing the history of the Indiana Teacher's Retirement Fund). Furthermore, despite his argument to the contrary, Husband seems to concede that Wife in fact contributed to her retirement account as early as January of 1972. Therefore, the trial court could reasonably infer that Wife had contributed to her retirement fund prior to her marriage to Husband.

[12] Husband also argues that the trial court erred in failing to acknowledge his non-financial contributions to the marriage because, without him, “Wife would not have been in a position to make those financial contributions.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. The trial court determined that Husband's alleged contributions to the household, such as caring for Wife's then-ten-year-old daughter, were not credible because Husband was living in Kentucky or Illinois at the time and because Wife's schedule aligned with her daughter's as her tennis coach. Husband's assertions to the contrary effectively amount to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 850 N.E.2d 969, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.

B. The Trial Court Properly Awarded the Marital Residence to Wife

[13] Husband next argues that the trial court erred in awarding Wife all equity in the marital residence because its value appreciated during the marriage and the loan payments were allegedly made from a joint bank account. “The division of marital assets is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Smith v. Smith, 854 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). The trial court is not required to proportionately split each individual asset in distributing the marital property but may distribute certain assets solely to a particular spouse to achieve the desired division. See Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 229 (Ind. 2022) (“[A] trial court need not follow a rigid, technical formula in dividing the marital estate[.]”).

[14] Wife owned the marital residence before the parties’ marriage, and the home was solely titled in Wife's name throughout the marriage. The trial court found that Wife had solely paid off the home loan, paid property taxes, and made insurance payments “without any direct contributions from Husband.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 16. The trial court also determined, based on a plethora of receipts, that Wife had paid for all household repairs, improvements, and expenses, apart from three utility bills paid by Husband. Husband failed to provide evidentiary support for any purported financial contributions he made to the home. Given the abundance of evidence presented, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in awarding the marital residence to Wife. See Keller v. Keller, 639 N.E.2d 372, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“Where the trial court has determined that a party opposing an equal division has met his or her burden under the statute and the trial court adequately records its reasons based on the evidence for an unequal division, we will affirm the trial court's decision.”), trans. denied.

C. The Trial Court Properly Considered Husband's Professional Degrees

[15] In finding that “Husband brought little to no assets into the marriage[,]” Husband contends that the trial court failed to consider his “two degrees ․ together with his youth.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23; Appellant's Br. p. 17. However, the trial court included both Husband's age and engineering degrees in its findings of fact. “It was within the trial court's prerogative to determine that the value of the property Husband brought into the marriage was not of such great value as to substantially outweigh the other statutory factors[.]” Akers v. Akers, 729 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Again, “[w]e decline Husband's invitation to reweigh the evidence or substitute our discretion for that of the trial court.” Id.

D. The Trial Court Properly Considered Husband's Political Contributions

[16] Husband next contends that the trial court erred in considering his $491,000.00 worth of political donations as a basis for an unequal division of the marital estate. For the first time in his reply brief, Husband alleges that the trial court characterized the parties’ understanding that Husband would invest into his retirement savings as a post-nuptial agreement. However, because Husband did not originally contest this factual finding in his opening brief, any argument as to a pre- or post-nuptial agreement is waived. See Davidson v. State, 211 N.E.3d 914, 925 (Ind. 2023) (providing that an appellant who failed to raise an argument in her opening appellate brief waived the issue for appellate review).

[17] Waiver notwithstanding, Husband claims that he should not be penalized by his political donations because the trial court determined that it was not a dissipation of assets. When determining how to divide the marital estate, however, Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5(4) allows a trial court to consider a party's “disposition or dissipation” of marital property. (emphasis added). “The disposition of marital property is a separate issue; it refers not to transfers or transactions that are wasteful, foolish or frivolous but to those that are unusual or out of the ordinary.” Pitman v. Pitman, 721 N.E.2d 260, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Therefore, deviating from the presumed equal division does not require a showing of wasteful, foolish, or frivolous conduct. In re Marriage of Coyle, 671 N.E.2d 938, 944 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

[18] The fact that Husband disposed of, instead of investing into retirement, nearly $491,000.00 by donating to various political campaigns is supported by the evidence. Wife also claimed that she had asked Husband about the status of his retirement savings a few years ago, and when she had learned that he had saved little, Husband had promised to “make amends[.]” Tr. Vol. III. p. 20. Although the parties debate Wife's acquiescence to these donations, the trial court believed Wife's testimony that she had been unaware of the extent of these donations until after she had filed for dissolution. “We will neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess the credibility of witnesses[.]” W.M. v. H.T., 157 N.E.3d 1231, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Even if Husband's political contributions did not rise to the level of dissipation, the trial court's findings support the conclusion that Husband disposed of money that was understood to have been invested for the parties’ retirement.

E. The Trial Court Properly Considered Husband's Employment History

[19] Next, Husband argues that the trial court erred in using his periods of unemployment to support unequal division. Husband does not dispute the fact that he was periodically unemployed, most notably for three years to work as an unpaid political-campaign volunteer. Instead, he argues that the trial court should not have weighed this factor against equal division because Wife was supportive of his political endeavors. Husband does not advance any legal argument to show how Wife's support would alter the trial court's conclusions. Even so, the trial court determined that “Wife became increasingly frustrated with Husband for not having a paid job for those three years where Husband was working in politics as a volunteer and was not being financially paid.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 14. Husband's contentions on appeal amount to another request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Maxwell, 850 N.E.2d at 972.

F. The Trial Court Properly Considered Husband's and Wife's Incomes

[20] Husband argues that the trial court erred in using Husband's and Wife's age and income as a basis for deviating from equal division. In support of this assertion, Husband claims that he had foregone higher paying jobs during the marriage because he had chosen to work close to the marital residence. He also argues that unequal division is improper because, while Wife's income is fixed, his “current income is not guaranteed.” Appellant's Br. p. 20.

[21] Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5(5) directs trial courts to consider “[t]he earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to: (A) a final division of property; and (B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.” Pursuant to this statute, the trial court determined that Husband's $161,000.00 annual salary compared to Wife's annual retirement and Social Security income of $69,876.00 justified an unequal division of the marital estate. The trial court also noted that Husband was thirteen years younger than Wife, who had retired from full-time teaching in 2013. The fact that Wife lives on a fixed income as a retired teacher while Husband continues working as an engineer is indicative of a disparity in the “earning ability of the parties[.]” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5(5). This supports the trial court's deviation from an equal division of the marital estate.

II. The Trial Court Properly Considered Wife's Inheritance and 403(b) Account

[22] Finally, Husband appears to argue that Wife's contributions to her 403(b)-retirement account and a portion of her inheritance were commingled with the marital estate and should have been considered as such. However, the trial court did not use Wife's 403(b)-retirement account or her inheritance as a basis for deviating from an equal division. The trial court noted that Wife had received an inheritance in 2008, which was invested into Wife's Edward Jones Roth IRA account. Husband claims that this inheritance was first deposited into one of the parties’ joint checking accounts before Wife's IRA. Even if this were the case, like the marital residence, the IRA was included in the marital pot, and its value was accounted for when the trial court divided the assets between the parties. We cannot say that error occurred in this regard.

[23] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.