IN RE: The Paternity of R.E.W. (Minor Child); Colbern Williamson (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Colbern Williamson (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order that denied his motion to modify parenting time with his son, R.W. (“R.W.”). Father raises multiple arguments, which we consolidate and restate as whether: (1) the trial court's order denying Father's motion to modify parenting time is clearly erroneous; and (2) the trial court misinterpreted the parties’ settlement agreement. Concluding that: (1) the trial court's order denying Father's motion to modify parenting time is not clearly erroneous; and (2) the trial court did not misinterpret the parties’ settlement agreement, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court's order denying Father's motion to modify parenting time is clearly erroneous.

2. Whether the trial court misinterpreted the parties’ settlement agreement.

Facts

[2] The facts most favorable to the judgment reveal that Father and Adrianna Kummerer (“Mother”) (collectively “Parents”) are the parents of R.W., who was born in February 2022. Parents never married, and in July 2022, Father filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, and parenting time. At the time Father filed this petition, Mother and R.W. lived in Dana, Indiana, with Mother's parents (“maternal grandparents”). In addition, Father lived in New Palestine, Indiana, which is a two-hour drive from maternal grandparents’ home.

[3] Two months later, in September 2022, the trial court issued an order establishing Father's paternity of R.W. Nearly one year later, in June 2023, Parents reached an agreement (“the June 2023 agreement”) regarding R.W.’s custody and parenting time. Specifically, Parents agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of R.W. They also agreed to a 2/2/3 overnight parenting time format, which required them to frequently exchange R.W. In this regard, Parents agreed to exchange R.W. at the Hendricks County Courthouse (“the courthouse”), which is the midway point between Parents’ residences, at 6:30 p.m. on the exchange days.

[4] Provision 3 of the June 2023 agreement further provides as follows regarding parenting time exchanges:

a. Parenting Time Exchanges. [Parents] shall exchange [R.W.] at 6:30 p.m. on exchange days as marked on Exhibit A. [Parents] shall continue to use Hendricks County Courthouse as the parenting time exchange location so long as they both reside in their present residences. If either party relocates, then the parenting time exchange should occur at a location exactly equally between [Parents’] residences. Per the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (“INPTG”), both parents should be present at the time of the exchange and should make every reasonable effort to personally transport [R.W.]. At parenting time exchanges [Parents] shall refrain from having any substantive conversations, and instead shall be limited to simple polite greetings and a farewell. At no time should either parent walk up to or get into the other's personal space nor vehicle. After [Parents’] exchange [R.W.], Father shall immediately leave the premises (within 5 minutes) and then Mother leave the premises. Neither party shall lie in wait for the other to leave nor follow the other's vehicle at any time. [Parents] shall instruct any designated childcare providers that may assist with the exchanges to abide by this paragraph. Failure of any other responsible adult individual trusted with facilitating transport on behalf of one of the parents to abide by this paragraph without reasonable cause shall give rise to that individual no longer being allowed at parenting time exchanges․

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h. The opportunity for additional parenting time shall arise upon any time period of five (5) hours or more that the child requires childcare outside of the normal/typical 9am-5pm work-related childcare, or whenever the child requires childcare overnight (if parent is unavailable between the hours of midnight and 4:00 a.m.).

i. [Parents] understand and agree that grandparents and/or extended family (i.e. great grandparents, aunts or uncles) may have occasional visits with [R.W.] during his and her parenting time, however the same is not to become a regular event wherein grandparents take the place of the other parent without offering the opportunity for additional parenting time. Any overnight visits with grandparents shall be agreed by the parties in advance in writing, with specific notice that each party shall be entitled to at least one (1) overnight annually with a grandparent/extended family during that parent's parenting time with notice but without having to offer the right to additional parenting time.

(App. Vol 2 at 39, 40).

[5] In the June 2023 agreement, Parents also agreed to the appointment of a parenting coordinator. The purpose of the parenting coordinator was “to assist [Parents] in communication, reasonable solutions, enforce reasonable informal agreements on occasion, applying the agreement, and enforcing the GAL's recommendations.” (App. Vol. 2 at 46). The trial court approved the June 2023 agreement.

[6] When Parents executed the June 2023 agreement, they both worked during the day, and R.W. required childcare during parenting time with each parent. Shortly after Parents executed the agreement, Mother made a lateral employment move that allowed her to maximize her parenting time with R.W. Specifically, Mother, who is a nurse at the V.A. Medical Center in Danville, Illinois, transferred to a position that would allow her to work twelve-hour days while Father had parenting time with R.W. and to be off work during her parenting time with R.W. However, in her new position, Mother worked until 9:00 p.m. on parenting time exchange days and would no longer be able to be at the courthouse at 6:30 p.m.

[7] Maternal grandparents agreed to assist Mother with the parenting time exchanges by meeting Father at the designated time, picking up R.W., transporting him to maternal grandparents’ home, and caring for him for approximately ninety minutes until Mother returned home from work at 9:00 p.m. Maternal grandfather (“maternal grandfather”) is a fire safety supervisor for an oil company. He works for thirty-two days in Dubai and then returns home for twenty-eight days. Maternal grandfather typically assists with the parenting time exchanges when he is home. Fifty-seven-year-old maternal grandmother does not work outside the home and assists with the parenting time exchanges when maternal grandfather is in Dubai.

[8] In November 2023, Father notified Parenting Coordinator Lainie Hurwitz (“PC Hurwitz”) that he had concerns about maternal grandmother participating in the parenting time exchanges. Father specifically told PC Hurwitz that R.W. cried when being handed to maternal grandmother and that Father believed that the June 2023 agreement required Mother to be present at the exchanges. In addition, Father told PC Hurwitz that he was concerned about maternal grandmother's mobility and the amount of prescription drugs that she took.

[9] Based on Father's concerns, PC Hurwitz spoke with Parents, reviewed the guardian ad litem's report, and watched videos of several parenting time exchanges. In December 2024, PC Hurwitz filed, in the trial court, her report regarding whether third parties were permitted to assist with parenting time exchanges. In her report, PC Hurwitz recommended that maternal grandmother be permitted to continue assisting with the exchanges if Mother was not available.

[10] One week later, Father filed a motion for leave to file an objection to PC Hurwitz's recommendation and/or in the alternative a motion to modify parenting time. According to Father, he had “major safety concerns regarding Maternal Grandmother's mental and physical health as it relate[d] to transporting and caring for [R.W.] in this matter.” (App. Vol. 2 at 71). He asked the trial court to “preserve his objection, and to set the matter some sixty (60) days hence to allow sufficient time to investigate the matter.” (App. Vol. 2 at 71). Further, in the event that the trial court denied his request to preserve his objection, Father asked the trial court “to modify the parenting time and parenting time provisions to be in [R.W.]’s best interests[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 72). Father's motion did not specify the modification that he was seeking.

[11] Three months later, in March 2025, Mother filed a verified motion for rule to show cause, wherein she alleged that Father had willfully and intentionally violated the June 2023 agreement. Specifically, Mother explained that although the agreement had contemplated designated childcare providers assisting with the parenting time exchanges, Father had refused to complete the parenting time exchange with maternal grandmother three times in 2023, three times in November 2024, one time in December 2024, and one time in February 2025. Mother also asked the trial court to find Father to be in contempt and to award her attorney fees incurred in her effort to obtain Father's compliance with the June 2023 agreement.

[12] In April 2025, Father filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court granted. One month later, in May 2025, Mother filed a second verified motion for rule to show cause, wherein she alleged that Father had willfully and intentionally violated the June 2023 agreement by changing R.W.’s dentist appointment without consulting her. Mother again asked the trial court to find Father to be in contempt and to award her attorney fees incurred in her effort to obtain Father's compliance with the June 2023 agreement. Two weeks later, Father filed a motion to dismiss Mother's second verified motion for rule to show cause and a request for the attorney fees that he had been required to pay to defend himself against Mother's motion. The trial court denied Father's motion to dismiss.

[13] One month later, in June 2025, Mother filed a third motion for rule to show cause, wherein she alleged that Father had willfully and intentionally violated the June 2023 agreement when he and R.W. had failed to appear for a scheduled exchange and had left maternal grandmother and a designated third-party driver waiting at the courthouse. Mother asked the trial court to find Father to be in contempt, to award her attorney fees, and to order Father to reimburse maternal grandmother “for the gas expended in traveling to the exchange[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 89).

[14] At the end of June 2025, Father filed a motion for rule to show cause and a response to Mother's multiple motions for rule to show cause. According to Father, Mother had willfully violated the June 2023 agreement by delegating the transportation of R.W. to a medically impaired maternal grandmother. Father further averred that Mother's actions reflected “a disturbing indifference to [R.W.]’s safety[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 116). Father asked the trial court to modify the existing parenting time order, to find Mother to be in contempt, and to order Mother to pay Father's attorney fees incurred in defending against Mother's motions for rule to show cause.

[15] Two days later, Mother filed a fourth motion for rule to show cause, wherein she alleged that Father had violated the June 2023 agreement when he had refused to attend the scheduled exchange at 6:30 p.m. on June 19, 2025. Rather, Father had not returned R.W. to Mother until 6:15 a.m. on June 20, 2025. Mother asked the trial court to find Father to be in contempt, to order him to pay her attorney fees, and to award her make-up parenting time for the time that she had missed.

[16] The trial court held a two-day hearing on Parents’ pending motions at the end of June 2025 and in September 2025. At the hearing, the trial court heard the facts as set forth above. In addition, at the beginning of the first day of the hearing, Father's counsel told the trial court that Father “would like to prioritize the issue on whether or not the maternal grandmother will be permitted to continue to provide transportation and unsupervised child care for the toddler in this case.” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 5).

[17] Further, during the first day of the hearing, the trial court qualified Dr. Leonard Guyer (“Dr. Guyer”) as an expert medical witness. Dr. Guyer testified that he had reviewed fifty-seven-year-old maternal grandmother's medical records and determined that she had been diagnosed with peripheral neuropathy, muscular dystrophy, vertigo, hypothyroidism, depression, anxiety, migraines, and insomnia. According to Dr. Guyer, any of these diagnoses could impair a person's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle and care for a young child. Dr. Guyer further testified that he had reviewed maternal grandmother's pharmacy records and determined that her prescribed medications could also impair a person's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle and care for a young child.

[18] Mother's counsel began his cross-examination of Dr. Guyer by confirming with the doctor that his medical license was on probation. In addition, Mother's counsel pointed out that he had noticed during Dr. Guyer's testimony that “there [had been] a lot of hedging as in ․ you know this could happen to this patient, these medications could have these side effects.” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 51). Mother's counsel asked Dr. Guyer if he had ever treated maternal grandmother or been in the same room with her, and Dr. Guyer responded that he had not. Dr. Guyer further acknowledged that maternal grandmother's physician would have better clinical insight into her treatment. In addition, Dr. Guyer acknowledged that prescription medications affect people differently and that he did not know whether maternal grandmother had even taken the prescriptions that were in her pharmacy records. Moreover, Dr. Guyer acknowledged that even if maternal grandmother had taken the prescriptions, he did not know if she had experienced any side effects from them.

[19] Thereafter, when maternal grandmother was called to testify, Mother's counsel asked the trial court to “take a notice of her mobility walking into the courtroom[.]” (Tr. Vol. 1 at 61). Maternal grandmother testified that she had been diagnosed with muscular dystrophy in 1986 when she had joined the navy. According to maternal grandmother, the muscular dystrophy had slowly progressed over the next nearly forty years and that she wore shoes that helped her to walk better.

[20] Maternal grandmother also testified that she had tripped and fallen over R.W.’s toys in September 2024. In addition, according to maternal grandmother, in December 2024, she had noticed a problem with her foot and had gone to the podiatrist, who had recommended surgery to remove ganglion cysts. Maternal grandmother further testified that she had had the cysts removed in December 2024 when paternal grandfather had been home to assist with her recovery. In addition, maternal grandmother testified that, in February 2025, she had had to have a second foot surgery when a screw that had been inserted into her foot had come loose. According to maternal grandmother, the only time that a medical provider had told her not to drive was following surgery while she had been taking pain medication. Maternal grandmother testified that she had not driven during that time and that paternal grandfather had driven to the courthouse for the parenting time exchanges. In addition, maternal grandmother testified that she does not take medications that could cause dizziness when she has to participate in a parenting time exchange.

[21] Maternal grandmother also testified that she had no restrictions on her driver's license, she felt comfortable driving, and she had never felt unsafe driving to the courthouse to pick up R.W. According to maternal grandmother, she cooks, cleans, takes care of chickens and dogs, and carries firewood into her house. Maternal grandmother testified that she had never fallen or felt dizzy while participating in these activities. In addition, maternal grandmother testified that she and R.W. participated in activities, including playing with dinosaurs, running around the yard, and playing on the trampoline.

[22] Also, at the hearing, PC Hurwitz testified that after Father had filed his objection to her December 2024 report, she had done a further investigation to see if she needed to make any changes to her recommendations. Specifically, PC Hurwitz had spoken with both maternal grandmother and maternal grandmother's nurse practitioner. Thereafter, PC Hurwitz declined to change her recommendation that maternal grandmother should be permitted to assist with the parenting time exchanges. After PC Hurwitz had finished testifying, the trial court ended the first day of the hearing and scheduled the second day of the hearing.

[23] In early September 2025, before the second day of the hearing, Mother filed a fifth motion for rule to show cause, wherein she alleged that Father had violated the June 2023 agreement. Specifically, according to Mother, Father had refused to exchange R.W. at the courthouse on September 2, 2025, and Mother had been required to pick up R.W. from Father's house at 8:30 p.m. According to Mother, she and R.W. had not arrived at maternal grandparents’ house until 11:30 p.m. In addition, Mother alleged that maternal grandfather had been present at the courthouse at 6:30 p.m. on September 7, 2025 and that Father had “never showed up” with R.W. (App. Vol. 2 at 133). Rather, Father had not returned R.W. to Mother until 6:30 a.m. on September 8, 2025. Mother asked the trial court to find Father to be in contempt, to order him to pay Mother's attorney fees incurred in defending against Father's contempt, and to award her make-up parenting time.

[24] Ten days later, on September 18, 2025, Mother filed a sixth verified motion for rule to show cause, wherein she again alleged that Father had violated the June 2023 agreement. Specifically, Mother alleged that on September 11, 2025, Father had told Mother that he would not bring R.W. to an exchange that evening with maternal grandfather. Rather, Mother had been required to pick up R.W. from Father's house at 6:00 a.m. on September 12, 2015. Five days later, Father again refused to attend an exchange with maternal grandfather and had not returned R.W. to Mother until 6:15 a.m. the following morning. Mother asked the trial court to find Father to be in contempt, to order him to pay Mother's attorney fees, and to award her make-up parenting time.

[25] The trial court held the second day of the hearing at the end of September 2025. During the hearing, paternal grandfather testified that he had no concerns about maternal grandmother driving and that she sometimes drove him when he was too tired to drive. He also testified that he had no concerns about maternal grandmother taking care of R.W. and that maternal grandmother got on the floor and in the sandbox to play with R.W.

[26] In addition, Mother testified that, as a registered nurse who is familiar with maternal grandmother's medical conditions and prescriptions, she had never had any concerns regarding maternal grandmother's ability to transport or care for R.W. According to Mother, if she ever noticed that maternal grandmother appeared too medically impaired to transport or care for R.W., Mother would return to her previous job working regular hours so that she could drive R.W. to the parenting time exchanges. In addition, Mother testified that maternal grandparents only assisted her with the exchanges when she was working and that she participated in the exchanges when she was not working. Mother further testified that maternal grandmother also cared for another grandchild, who was eighteen months old at the time of hearing. According to Mother, maternal grandmother had taken care of that grandchild since he had been an infant.

[27] Further, Mother testified about the incidents that had led her to file the six rule to show cause petitions. She also testified that it was not in R.W.’s best interests to do a later exchange when she got off work because she and R.W. did not return to maternal grandparents’ home until 10:30 or 11:30 p.m. Mother further testified that it was not in R.W.’s best interests to do a 6:15 a.m. exchange at the courthouse because R.W. had to wake up at 4:30 a.m. Further, according to Mother, when Parents had done a 6:15 a.m. exchange at the courthouse, R.W. had been tired and overwhelmed throughout the day, which had resulted in him having a bad day at pre-school.

[28] Mother asked the trial court to deny Father's motion to modify parenting time, to allow maternal grandmother and maternal grandfather to be designated drivers for the parenting time exchanges, to find Father in contempt, and to order Father to pay her attorney fees. In support of her request for attorney fees, Mother tendered to the trial court her counsel's attorney fee affidavit, which provided that “[t]he total attorney fees and expenses [that she] ha[d] incurred for which she [was] seeking Father's reimbursement [was] $28,860.09, not including fees to attend the September 26, 2025 hearing.” (App. Vol. 2 at 164).

[29] Lastly, Father testified that he works from 7:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. and that his mother (“paternal grandmother”) and his grandmother (“paternal great grandmother”) care for R.W. while Father is working. Father asked the trial court to prohibit maternal grandmother and maternal grandfather from participating in the parenting time exchanges.¹ Specifically, he asked the trial court to grant his motion to modify parenting time and to shift the parenting time schedule in such a way that would allow Mother to be present at the exchanges. Father proposed that if Mother was not available for the 6:30 p.m. parenting time exchange, the exchange could take place the following morning at 6:30 a.m.

[30] Father also asked the trial court to find Mother to be in contempt and to order her to pay his attorney fees. In support of his request for attorney fees, Father tendered to the trial court his counsel's attorney fee affidavit providing that “the total amount of attorney[ ] fees incurred and anticipated [was] $84,679.43.” (App. Vol. 2 at 147). Father told the trial court that in order to pay these attorney fees, he had sold the Ford Thunderbird that he had inherited from his grandfather and was in the process of cashing out his retirement plan. According to Father, he just wanted to keep R.W. safe.

[31] In October 2025, the trial court issued an order (‘the October 2025 order”) denying Father's petition to modify parenting time with R.W. That order provides, in relevant part, as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

19. Dr. Guyer, a medical doctor, testified about concerns with [maternal grandmother's] diagnosis and the medications Maternal Grandmother was taking. Dr. Guyer has not met or examined maternal grandmother.

20. Dr. Guyer testified about potential side effects of certain medications that maternal grandmother was prescribed, however, he did not testify as to the effect these medications cause to Maternal G[r]andmother.

21. While some of Maternal Grandmother's prescribed medications may cause the side effects of dizziness or drowsiness, Maternal Grandmother is not required to and does not take these medications while she is solely caring for [R.W.] according to her testimony.

22. Mother has not witnessed Maternal Grandmother in a state where her medical conditions or side effects from her medications have negatively impacted her to the point where she could not safely transport or supervise [R.W.]. Father did not testify about any significant impairment he saw in Maternal Grandmother during parenting time exchanges.

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26. Maternal Grandmother has a valid driver's license and valid car insurance.

27. Maternal Grandmother has not received a traffic citation or been in a traffic accident.

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30. There is no evidence that Maternal Grandmother is abusing prescription medications while caring for [R.W.] or that she has been impaired while caring for [R.W.].

31. Mother has never seen Maternal Grandmother impaired upon returning home from work.

32. Although Father has had ongoing concerns since 2023, there have been no recorded instances when [R.W.] was in danger because of Maternal Grandmother being impaired while transporting or caring for [R.W.].

33. There have been no incidents where [R.W.] was put in a dangerous situation because of Maternal Grandmother's medical diagnoses or side effects of her prescribed medications.

34. Maternal Grandmother's medical conditions do not render her unable to provide safe and appropriate childcare for [R.W.].

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37. The Court had the opportunity to see and hear the Maternal Grandmother during Court proceedings on at least two occasions and nothing gave concern to the Court regarding impairment either physically or mentally. Maternal Grandmother was able to physically take the stand on her own and answer questions posed to her in a coherent and logical manner.

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40. Throughout the pendency of this case, Father has maintained he has concerns with maternal grandmother's ability to transport and care [for] [R.W.].

41. Father has at times been late to parenting time or refused to do parenting time exchanges with Maternal Grandmother due to his concerns.

42. Father objected to the Parenting Time Coordinators Report and Recommendation that Maternal Grandmother be allowed to assist in parenting time exchanges. The PC testified at the hearing that Father's concerns were initially around [R.W.]’s reaction of crying at parenting time exchanges with maternal grandmother and morphed over time to be more focused on health issue of Maternal [ ]G[r]andmother.

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44. If Mother and Father keep their current work schedules and Mother is required to be present for the exchange, the exchange would have to occur after 10:15 p.m. or before 6:30 a.m. because of each parent's scheduled working hours.

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49. The parties meet several times a week based upon their parenting time schedule. There have been about a dozen times since June of 2023 when Mother alleges Father is in contempt for not following the 6:30[ ]p.m. exchange time at the Hendricks County Courthouse.

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52. Most of the parenting time issues occur when Father does not feel comfortable releasing [R.W.] into Maternal Grandmother's care. Father did not testify about any impairment he personally saw but just his fears that kept him from wanting to release [R.W.].

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54. The parties have a long, litigious, and acrimonious relationship with each other as evidenced by [the] amount of legal expenses presented through the attorney affidavits.

CONCLUSION[S] OF LAW

1. Father objects to the recommendations of [PC Hurwitz] and Father seeks to modify parenting time pursuant to IC § 31-17-4-2[ ]. Chapter 4 of IC 31-17-4-1 pertains to the Parenting Time Rights of [a] Noncustodial Parent which permits a court to modify a non-custodial parent's parenting time if such a modification is in the best interests of the children.

2. Since Mother and Father share joint physical custody with equal parenting time, neither parent is the non-custodial parent․ Because the parties share equal parenting time, a change in parenting time which reduces one parent's time and increases the other parent's time would be a change in physical custody which would result in one parent being the custodial parent and the other being the non-custodial parent. See, Julie C. v. Andrew C., 924 N.E.2d 1249, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

3. Pursuant to IC § 31-17-2-21[,] the court may not modify a child custody order unless the modification is in the best interests of the child and there is a substantial change in one or more of the factors listed in IC § 31-17-2-8 relating to the best interests of the child.

4. In determining the best interests of the child, the factors considered are:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

a. the child's parent or parents;

b. the child's sibling; and

c. any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest.

(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:

a. home;

b. school; and

c. community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

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IC § 31-17-2-8

5. When a party seeks to modify an existing order, he or she bears the burden of proving that the order should be changed. Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002). Therefore, Father bears the burden of demonstrating that the current Order should be modified.

6. The Court finds the mental and physical health of all individual[s] involved to be the main argument to modify parenting time and that must be evaluated in our case.

7. In the Court's review of this case, Maternal Grandmother's medical condition was known and was a concern as far back as the Guardian Ad Litem report on May 16, 2023. Maternal Grandmother's medical conditions existed on June 1, 2023 when [Parents]’ agreement regarding custody and parenting time was made an order of the court. There have been no substantial changes to Maternal Grandmother's medical conditions, nor have there been any significant incidents arising from Maternal Grandmother's medical conditions since June 1, 2023 which impact the best interests of [R.W.].

8. The Court will not speculate as to what may happen in the future, but at this time the Court does not find Maternal Grandmother's medical condition to be such that she places [R.W.] in danger. While there has been expert medical testimony regarding the potential impairment of maternal grandmother's physical and cognitive well-being due to her medical conditions and prescribed medications, there has been no witness testimony from either Mother or Father that directly indicates maternal grandmother is impaired when transporting and/or caring for [R.W.]. There is absolutely no evidence that maternal grandmother abuses those prescription drugs or has had any limitations imposed on her activities (absent right after surgery on a temporary basis).

9. By all accounts, both parents and all grandparents involved in this case care for and love [R.W.] and would not knowingly place [him] in a situation that would endanger his life.

10. The court finds Father has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that a substantial change has occurred which impacts the best interests of [R.W.].

11. Both Father and Mother require childcare in order to work. The need for childcare is common and does not in and of itself impact the best interests of [R.W.].

12. Father failed to establish that Mother's use of Maternal Grandmother or Maternal Grandfather as childcare providers impacts [R.W.]’s best interests. In addition, Father has failed to prove that Maternal Grandmother or Maternal Grandfather provide childcare which is substandard or harmful to [R.W.].

13. Maternal Grandmother and Maternal Grandfather are both responsible household family members of Mother who are available during Mother's parenting time to provide childcare. Because Mother requires childcare at the start of her parenting time for a period less than five hours, Mother is not required to offer the opportunity for additional parenting time to Father pursuant to Paragraph 3(h) of the Order.

14. Mother's need for childcare includes the need to utilize childcare at the time of the parenting time exchange at the commencement of her parenting time for a few hours.

15. While the [the June 2023 agreement] instructs in Paragraph 3(a) that parents should be present at parenting time exchanges and should make every reasonable effort to personally transport [R.W.], the parties also expressly contemplated in Paragraph 3(a) that parents may need childcare providers to complete parenting time exchanges.

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17. Father advocates that Mother be held in contempt for failing to be present at and personally provide transportation for the parenting time exchanges which begin her parenting time.

18. Since the parties expressly contemplated the use of childcare providers as alternate drivers in their agreed Order, the use of an alternate driver cannot be a violation of the Order. The Order cannot prohibit what it expressly permits.

19. When Mother needs to utilize an alternate driver to facilitate a parenting time exchange, both Maternal Grandmother and Maternal Grandfather are acceptable alternative drivers. Both are licensed and insured drivers as required by the Order.

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23. Mother's six Verified Motions for Rule to Show Cause allege that Father willfully violated the Order by delaying and/or refusing to exchange [R.W.] at the ordered exchange time and location and for rescheduling a dentist appointment without first consulting with Mother.

24. Father is not held in contempt regarding the rescheduling of the dentist appointment. The Court find[s] that Father had an emergency situation and acted appropriately and responsibly under the circumstances.

25. Father's attempted to resolve the disputes regarding parenting time exchanges on multiple occasions. Although the Court does not agree with Father's assessment of maternal grandmother as a threat to [R.W.]’s safety, the Court finds Father did not act in a malicious manner, but rather out of his concern.

26. The Court notes that Mother is alleging approximately a dozen events in a span of two years when the parties have multiple parenting time exchanges a week.

27. Based upon the foregoing and facts mentioned previously, the Court declines to hold Father in contempt for the allegations in the [six] Rule to Show Causes that were filed.

(App. Vol. 2 at 184-94).

[32] The trial court concluded its order by denying Father's motion for leave to preserve his objection to PC Hurwitz's recommendation and to modify parenting time. In addition, the trial court denied Father's motion for rule to show case and Mother's six verified motions for rule to show cause. Further, the trial court concluded that because it did not find either party to be in contempt, Parents were to “pay their own attorney fees.” (App. Vol. 2 at 195)

[33] In November 2025, Father filed a six-page motion to stay, wherein he argued that if the trial court did not stay its final order, “Father w[ould] be forced to comply with an order that place[d] [R.W.] in the care of an impaired driver, contrary to Indiana statute and public safely principles, resulting in potential irreparable harm, or to directly defy the Order to keep [R.W.] safe from harm.” (App. Vol. 2 at 207). The trial court denied Father's motion to stay.

[34] Father now appeals the trial court's October 2025 order.

Decision

[35] Father argues that: (1) the trial court's order denying his motion to modify parenting time is clearly erroneous; and (2) the trial court misinterpreted the June 2023 agreement. We address each of his contentions in turn.

1. Denial of Motion to Modify Parenting Time

[36] At the outset, we note that there is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to the trial court in family law matters. Hahn-Weisz v. Johnson, 189 N.E.3d 1136, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Appellate courts “are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). “Appellate deference to the determinations of our trial court judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of their unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face, often over an extended period of time.” Id. (cleaned up). “Thus enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense, particularly in the determination of the best interests of the involved children.” Id. (cleaned up).

[37] We further note that Father requested specific findings and conclusions pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52. The purpose of Trial Rule 52(A) is to provide the parties and the reviewing court with the theory upon which the trial court decided the case in order that the right of review for error may be effectively preserved. In re Paternity of S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d 879, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). When a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Trial Rule 52, we apply the following two-tiered standard of review: (1) whether the evidence supports the findings; and (2) whether the findings support the judgment. Hazelett v. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d 153, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). The trial court's findings and conclusions will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous, that is, if the record contains no facts or inferences supporting the judgment. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In making these determinations, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses but consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment. Id.

[38] Father argues that the trial court's order denying his motion to modify parenting time is clearly erroneous. We disagree.

[39] First, Father contends that the trial court's order is clearly erroneous because the trial court “requir[ed] proof of a ‘substantial change in circumstances’ when Father sought modification of parenting time provisions governed by Indiana Code section 31-17-4-2, which requires only a best interests analysis.” (Father's Br. 21) (emphasis removed). However, as the trial court properly noted, Julie C. v. Andrew C., 924 N.E.2d 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) is the controlling case on this issue. In the Julie C. case, the mother had primary physical custody of the parties’ children, and Father had parenting time each Monday, Wednesday, and Friday afternoon and every other weekend. The trial court subsequently awarded Father overnight parenting time on Mondays and Tuesdays and every other weekend, including Sunday nights, and the mother appealed. Although it had appeared that the trial court had only increased the father's parenting time, we concluded that an increase to fifty percent of all parenting time amounted to a modification of physical custody and that such a modification required a substantial change in circumstances. Id. at 1256.

[40] The facts before us are analogous to those in Julie C. Specifically, Father proposed that if Mother was not available for the 6:30 p.m. parenting time exchange, the exchange could take place the following morning at 6:30 a.m., which would have increased Father's parenting time from fourteen overnights out of every twenty-eight days to twenty overnights every twenty-eight days. We agree with Mother that such a modification of parenting time would have “transform[ed] Father from a parent sharing joint physical custody to the parent exercising primary physical custody.” (Mother's Br. 16). Accordingly, the trial court properly found that such a modification required Father to show a substantial change in circumstances. See Julie C., 924 N.E.2d at 1256.

[41] Second, Father argues that the trial court's order is clearly erroneous because even if a substantial change showing was required, he met his burden to make that showing. He specifically contends that “the record establishe[d] post order escalation in [maternal grandmother's] medical conditions, medication burden, functional limitations, and caregiving practices materially affecting [R.W.]’s safety, such that the trial court's contrary conclusion is clearly erroneous and contrary to law.” (Father's Br. 26) (emphasis removed). In support of his argument, Father cites Owen v. Owen, 563 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. 1990), reh'g denied, superceded by statute on other grounds,² for the proposition that “a parent's worsening medical condition provided substantial evidence of change in circumstances sufficient to necessitate modification of custody.” (Father's Br. 28). According to Father, “Indiana law is clear that a “substantial change” need not be a wholly new condition; it may arise from material developments or escalation of circumstances that affect the child's welfare after the prior order.” (Father's Br. 28). He further asserts that “[t]he relevant inquiry is functional and forward-looking on whether the circumstances as they exist now materially affect the child's best interests.” (Father's Br. 28).

[42] We have no quarrel with Father's interpretation of the Owen case, wherein our Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the mother's worsening mental health condition, which had resulted in a four-week hospitalization, constituted a substantial change in circumstances that “merited a change of custody.” Owen, 563 N.E.2d at 609. However, the facts before us are distinguishable from those in the Owen case because the evidence most favorable to the judgment reveals that there had been no change in maternal grandmother's medical conditions since the June 2023 agreement. Indeed, the trial court specifically found that maternal grandmother's medical conditions had existed on June 1, 2023 when Parents had executed the June 2023 agreement and that there had been no substantial changes to maternal grandmother's medical conditions since that time. Father's argument invites us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d at 157.

[43] Third, Father argues that the trial court's order is clearly erroneous because the trial court should have applied “a preventative best interests framework.” (Father's Br. 22) (emphasis removed). In support of his argument, he directs us to Matter of J.M., 246 N.E.3d 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).³ According to Father, in J.M. we “emphasized that ‘ongoing safety risks animated the trial court's decision,’ demonstrating judicial focus on preventing future harm rather than waiting for children to be injured.” (Father's Br. 23).

[44] However, we disagree with Father's interpretation of J.M. and its application to the facts of this case. In the J.M. case, the trial court found that a history of domestic violence between the children's parents had placed the children at risk of harm. Here, however, maternal grandmother has no history of placing R.W. at risk of harm. Father is simply inviting us to speculate about possible harms that could befall R.W. while he is in maternal grandmother's care. We further note that the trial court properly concluded that it would “not speculate as to what may happen in the future[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 191). See J.O'S. v. K.S., 268 N.E.3d 1229, 1238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (reversing the juvenile court and explaining that the mother's speculation could not support the juvenile court's finding that the father had purchased alcohol); Estate of Carter v. Szymczak, 951 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“Standing alone, evidence establishing a mere possibility of cause or which lacks reasonable certainty or probability is not sufficient evidence by itself to support a verdict. Civil liability may not be predicated purely upon speculation.”) (cleaned up), trans. denied.

[45] Fifth, Father argues that the trial court's order is clearly erroneous because the evidence does not support the trial court's findings. He specifically contends that “the trial court's findings that there was ‘no evidence’ and ‘no witness testimony’ establishing impairment of the maternal grandmother are clearly erroneous and unsupported by the record.” (Father's Br. 30) (emphasis removed). However, as Mother points out, “Father's Brief does not identify specific factual findings made by the trial court which form the basis of his argument, [and] there is only one factual finding which contains the language identified by Father.” (Mother's Br. 21).

[46] This Court has previously explained that “[a] court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator.” Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Therefore, “[w]e will not ․ address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (cleaned up), reh'g denied. Such arguments are waived. Id.

[47] Waiver notwithstanding, it appears that Father misunderstands our appellate standard of review. As set forth above, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d at 157. Further, in our review, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and we will only set aside the trial court's findings if they are clearly erroneous, that is, if the record contains no facts supporting the judgment. Here, our review of the evidence most favorable to the judgment reveals that this evidence supports the trial court's findings regarding maternal grandmother's health and her ability to transport and care for R.W. Father's argument is a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See id.

[48] Sixth, and lastly, Father contends that the trial court's order is clearly erroneous because the trial court “deferr[ed] to the Parenting Coordinator's recommendation on medical safety after the coordinator admitted she lacked medical expertise and issued her recommendation without reviewing medical records, while disregarding uncontroverted expert medical testimony.” (Father's Br. 44) (emphasis removed). Father appears to suggest that without expert testimony to the contrary, the trial court was not free to discredit Dr. Guyer's testimony. “It is true that the testimony of a trained physician who has examined and treated a patient concerning matters purely within the medical realm cannot be controverted by lay opinion or by judicial speculation or inference.” Flores v. Gutierrez, 951 N.E.2d 632, 636-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (cleaned up), trans. denied.

[49] Here, however, Dr. Guyer neither examined nor treated maternal grandmother. We further note that in addition to hearing Dr. Guyer's testimony that maternal grandmother's medical conditions and prescriptions could impair a person's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle and care for a child, the trial court also heard testimony from maternal grandmother, maternal grandfather, and Mother that maternal grandmother's medical conditions and prescriptions did not impair her ability to drive or care for R.W. Further, PC Hurwitz testified that after Father had objected to her December 2024 report, she had spoken with both maternal grandmother and maternal grandmother's nurse practitioner. Following these conversations, PC Hurwitz declined to change her recommendation that maternal grandmother should be permitted to assist with the parenting time exchanges. Lastly, and importantly, the trial court had the opportunity to observe and hear maternal grandmother testify and specifically found that “nothing gave concern to the Court regarding impairment either physically or mentally.” (App. Vol. 2 at 186). Father's argument again invites us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d at 157.

[50] In sum, our review of the record does not leave us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's order denying Father's motion to modify parenting time is not clearly erroneous.

2. Interpretation of the June 2023 Agreement

[51] Father also argues that the trial court misinterpreted the June 2023 agreement. Again, we disagree.

[52] When a party asks a trial court to clarify a settlement agreement, the court's task is one of contract interpretation. Ryan v. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d 359, 363 (Ind. 2012). This is because settlement agreements are contractual in nature and are binding on the parties if approved by the trial court. Id. “As such, a settlement agreement is interpreted according to the general rules for contract construction.” Id. at 364 (cleaned up). The interpretation and construction of contract provisions is a function for the courts. Overholtzer v. Overholtzer, 884 N.E.2d 358, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g denied. In other words, reviewing the terms of a contract is a pure question of law. G.G.B.W. v. S.W., 80 N.E.3d 264, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Therefore, our standard of review is de novo. Id.

[53] To interpret a contract, a court first considers the parties’ intent as expressed in the language of the agreement. Id. The court must then read all the provisions as a whole to find an interpretation that harmonizes the contract's words and phrases and gives effect to the parties’ intentions at the time they entered the agreement. Id. If the terms of the contract are unambiguous, the terms will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Oberholtzer, 884 N.E.2d at 361. The terms of a contract are not ambiguous simply because controversy exists between the parties regarding the proper interpretation of terms. Id. Where the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, the terms are conclusive, and we will not construe the contract or look at extrinsic evidence. Id. Rather, we will merely apply the contractual provisions. Id.

[54] Here, Father specifically argues that “the [June 2023] Agreement expressly provides that ‘both parents should be present at the time of the exchange and should make every reasonable effort to personally transport [R.W.],’ and further provides that extended family are ‘not to become a regular event wherein grandparents take the place of the other parent.’ ” (Father's Br. 47-48). According to Father, the trial court's interpretation of the June 2023 agreement “permits Mother to routinely delegate transportation and supervision to the maternal grandmother ․ That construction renders the ‘make every reasonable effort to transport’ language meaningless and nullifies the provision limiting grandparents from becoming regular substitutes.” (Father's Br. 48). Father contends that “such an interpretation constitutes legal error.” (Father's Br. 48).

Mother responds that:

[w]hen viewed in harmony with one another, the contractual terms of the [June 2023 agreement] mean exactly what the trial court determined them to mean. Parents should make a reasonable effort to be present at parenting time exchanges, and childcare providers can serve as alternate drivers under the explicit terms of the [June 2023 agreement]. Grandparents should not be substituted for parents but using grandparents as childcare providers while parents work is not a violation of the [June 2023 agreement] as long as it is not for more than five hours outside the 9:00 am - 5:00 pm window or overnight.

(Mother's Br. 35-36).

[55] We agree with Mother. Specifically, our review of the June 2023 agreement reveals that although Provision 3(a) states that both parents should be present at the time of the exchange and should make every reasonable effort to personally transport R.W., the provision further contemplates that other designated childcare providers may assist with the exchanges. Further, because maternal grandparents only assist Mother with the exchanges when she is working and Mother participates in the exchanges when she is not working, we conclude that Mother makes every reasonable effort to personally transport R.W.

[56] Lastly, to the extent that Father contends that Mother “routinely delegate[s] ․ supervision” of R.W. to maternal grandmother, we note that the evidence reveals that when maternal grandmother participates in the exchange, she picks up R.W. at 6:30 p.m. and cares for him for two and one-half hours until Mother returns home from work at 9:00 p.m. (Father's Br. 48). Mother cares for R.W. during the rest of her parenting time. Quite simply, maternal grandmother caring for R.W. for two and one-half hours while Mother is working does not constitute a routine delegation of R.W.’s care to maternal grandmother. Further, in light of the fact that paternal grandmother and paternal great grandmother care for R.W. for eight hours each day that Father is working, we find Father's argument to be disingenuous. The trial court did not misinterpret the June 2023 agreement.⁴

[57] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father acknowledged that he did not have any medical concerns about maternal grandfather.

2.   We note that the Owen case is an Indiana Supreme Court case. In his appellate brief, Father cites Owen as an Indiana Court of Appeals case.

3.   We note that Father's citations to authority do not include pinpoint cites to help us determine where, within a decision, support for his contentions may be found. We direct Father to Indiana Appellate Rule 22(A)(3), which provides that “[p]inpoint citations must be included to the specific pages(s) on which information appears.” “We will not, on review, search through the authorities cited by a party in order to try to find legal support for its position.” Cox v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

4.   Mother argues that she is entitled to appellate attorney fees pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) “based upon the vexatious nature of [Father]’s Brief and the presence of bad faith.” (Mother's Br. 36) (emphasis removed). She specifically contends that she was “often engaged in guesswork about the nature of Father's legal arguments[,]” which did not apply the standard of review and did not identify specific findings of fact or conclusions of law. (Mother's Br. 36). Mother further contends that Father “actively misrepresent[ed] the law” and failed to adhere to the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure.” (Mother's Br. 36).Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) provides that “[t]he Court may assess damages if an appeal, petition, or motion, or response, is frivolous or in bad faith. Damages shall be in the Court's discretion and may include attorneys’ fees. The Court shall remand the case for execution.” “Our discretion to award attorney fees under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) is limited, however, to instances when an appeal is permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay.” Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “A strong showing is required to justify an award of appellate damages, and the sanction is not imposed to punish mere lack of merit, but something more egregious.” In re Estate of Carnes, 866 N.E.2d 260, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).Here, although we understand Mother's frustration, we do not believe that such an award is appropriate in this case. Mother was able to identify the issues that Father raised and respond appropriately. Further, it does not appear that Father initiated this appeal to harass Mother. Specifically, we note, as did the trial court, that Father appears to have acted out of concern for R.W.’s safety and well-being. Accordingly, we decline Mother's request for appellate attorney fees. See Holland v. Steele, 961 N.E.2d 516, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that “we are cautious to award attorney fees because of the potentially chilling effect the award may have upon the exercise of the right to appeal.”), trans. denied.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.