Brian M. Lewis, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After pleading guilty to Level 4 felony child solicitation, Brian M. Lewis was sentenced to nine years, with three years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) and six years suspended to probation. He now appeals his sentence, arguing it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In April 2025, forty-five-year-old Lewis began communicating online with a fifteen-year-old girl, offering to buy a dress the girl was selling if she would give him a hug and a kiss. The girl reported this communication to her father, who posed as her and continued communicating with Lewis. The conversations “became sexual” and the girl's parents then reported it to the police. Ex. Vol. II p. 7.

[3] The police initiated an online conversation with Lewis while pretending to be a different fifteen-year-old girl. The conversations between Lewis and the officer became sexual, and Lewis made plans for them to meet at a local hotel to have sex. When Lewis arrived at the hotel, he was arrested. The State charged Lewis with Level 4 felony child solicitation. Lewis later pled guilty to the offense pursuant to a plea agreement that called for his sentence to be nine years but left placement of that sentence up to the trial court's discretion.

[4] At sentencing, the court found no aggravating factors and the following mitigating factors: (1) Lewis accepted responsibility by pleading guilty, (2) he has no criminal history, (3) he showed remorse, and (4) he participated in counseling. The trial court sentenced Lewis to nine years, with three years executed in the DOC and six years suspended to probation. Lewis now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Lewis argues his sentence is inappropriate and asks us to revise it pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We give “considerable deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision and attempt only to “leaven the outliers” rather than achieve the “perceived ‘correct’ result” in every case. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1225 (Ind. 2008)).

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is a rare avenue for appellate relief that is reserved for exceptional cases. Even with Rule 7(B), sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference. Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character). Absent such a sufficiently compelling evidentiary basis, we will not override the decision of ․ the trial court.

Sorenson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 717, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted), trans. denied.

[6] A person convicted of a Level 4 felony shall be sentenced to a fixed term of between two and twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5 (2014). Here, pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Lewis to nine years. Of those nine years, three were to be executed in the DOC, and six suspended to probation. Lewis does not challenge the length of his sentence. Instead, he argues his sentence is inappropriate because he was ordered to serve three years in the DOC, rather than home detention.

[7] “The location where a sentence is to be served is an appropriate focus for application of our review and revise authority.” King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Nonetheless, it is quite difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim that the placement of his sentence is inappropriate because the question under Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate but whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. Id. at 267-68. A defendant challenging the placement of his sentence must convince this Court that the given placement is itself inappropriate. Id. at 268.

[8] As to the nature of the offense, Lewis argues there is “nothing particularly egregious or remarkable” about his actions. Appellant's Br. p. 10. We disagree. Lewis initially contacted a fifteen-year-old girl online and asked her for a “hug and a kiss” in exchange for purchasing a dress she was trying to sell. Ex. Vol. II p. 7. While still believing he was communicating with that child, Lewis turned the communications “sexual[.]” Id. This communication ceased when the child's parents contacted law enforcement. Lewis later began communicating with a person he believed to be a different fifteen-year-old girl and arranged for her to come to a hotel to have sex with him. Nothing about the nature of the offense here warrants a revision of placement in the DOC.

[9] Lewis further argues he has shown good character, emphasizing his lack of criminal history and supportive family. But the trial court already accounted for these circumstances, as evidenced by the fact that the executed portion of Lewis's sentence is only three years—six years below the maximum the court could have ordered under the plea agreement. See Boner v. State, 243 N.E.3d 354, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (declining to revise defendant's sentence under Rule 7(B) where evidence of defendant's good character was already reflected in the below-advisory sentence), abrogated on other grounds by Moyers v. State, 277 N.E.3d 33, 40 (Ind. 2026). Lewis has not met the high burden to show us his placement in the DOC is inappropriate.

[10] The trial court's order that Lewis serve three years of his sentence in the DOC is not inappropriate.¹

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Lewis also contends his sentence should be revised because at sentencing the State made “inaccurate statements that two children were involved here[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 12. We see no such statements in the record. Lewis's wife testified she thought “two” children were involved in this case, but the State never asserted that. Tr. Vol. II p. 17. Nor did this appear to be a consideration by the trial court. The record is clear that Lewis only communicated to one child in this case, and the other communication was to a police officer posing as a child. We find no error here.

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.