Kamoria Clark, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Kamoria Clark appeals her conviction of voluntary manslaughter, arguing insufficient evidence. Finding the evidence to be sufficient, we affirm.

Issue

[2] The sole issue Clark presents for our review is whether the State presented sufficient evidence that she acted under sudden heat to sustain her conviction of voluntary manslaughter.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 8, 2019, the police were dispatched to the home of Clark and Victim ¹ on a report of a shooting. Officers found Victim on the floor of a bedroom in a pool of blood with a gunshot wound to his face. Clark was present when the officers arrived but had taken Child Witness 1 and Child Witness 2 to the neighbors’ house. Victim died from the gunshot wound.

[4] In March 2020, the State charged Clark with reckless homicide as a Level 5 felony. In March 2025, the State filed an additional charge of voluntary manslaughter as a Level 2 felony. A jury found Clark guilty of both offenses. At sentencing, the trial court vacated the conviction for reckless homicide and sentenced Clark to twenty-four years for voluntary manslaughter. Clark now appeals her conviction.

Discussion and Decision

[5] When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. Labarr v. State, 36 N.E.3d 501, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of her conviction after a jury verdict, “the appellate posture is markedly deferential to the outcome below ․” Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016).

[6] We first observe that while “voluntary manslaughter may be brought as a standalone charge,” it is an “unusual and rare circumstance where a defendant is charged with voluntary manslaughter without also being charged with murder.” Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 571, 568 (Ind. 2018).² Nevertheless, that is what the State did in this case.

[7] To convict Clark of voluntary manslaughter in this instance, the State had to prove that (1) she (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) killed (4) Victim (5) while acting under sudden heat. Appellant's App. Confid. Vol. 3, p. 5 (charging information); Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a)(1). Clark concedes the State proved the killing of Victim. Appellant's Br. p. 14. And, although she does not concede that the State proved she did the killing or that it was knowing or intentional, she acknowledges that a jury “could have drawn reasonable inferences” from the totality of the evidence to support those elements. Id. at 14-15. Consequently, Clark challenges her conviction by alleging only that the evidence failed to show she acted in sudden heat.

[8] “[S]udden heat is a mitigating factor, not an element.” Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 572. Even without a lead murder charge, the State must prove the elements of murder, and there must be some evidence of the sudden heat mitigating factor for a defendant to be found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Id.; see also I.C. § 35-42-1-3(b) (“The existence of sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder under [Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1(1)] to voluntary manslaughter.”).

[9] Further,

[s]udden heat exists when a defendant is provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection. Evidence of sudden heat may be found in either the State's case or the defendant's.

Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 572 (citations and quotation omitted). The “[e]xistence of sudden heat is a classic question of fact to be determined by the jury.” Fisher v. State, 671 N.E.2d 119, 121 (Ind. 1996).

[10] The evidence at trial showed that when Clark called 911, she reported that Victim was taking the gun away, and it went off. Tr. Vol. III, p. 94. To the officers who arrived on the scene and in her subsequent interview with police, Clark's account of the evening was that she and Victim had not argued. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 122, 124, 244. Rather, she was asleep on the couch with Child Witnesses 1 and 2 when she heard a gunshot, entered the bedroom, and found Victim shot. Id. at 121, 124, 125, 244; Tr. Vol. III, pp. 137, 138.

[11] Turning to the evidence most favorable to the verdict in this case, we find there was evidence of sudden heat. The responding officers observed evidence of a disturbance in the bedroom where Victim was found. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 123, 124, 125, 160. Specifically, an entertainment center had been damaged, there was glass on the entertainment center, a television was knocked over, and a mirror was cracked. Id. at 125, 160-61, 176.

[12] An assessment worker with the Department of Child Services (DCS) was called to the scene to pick up Child Witnesses 1 and 2 because no appropriate caregiver was available to take them. The DCS employee testified at trial as to the spontaneous statements of the children as they left the scene. Child Witness 1 stated that “[Clark] shot [Victim].” Tr. Vol. III, p. 63. Child Witness 2 stated that “[Clark] and [Victim] were fighting” because “[Victim] took [Clark]’s phone.” Id. at 62.

[13] That same day, a DCS case manager conducted forensic interviews of both children. The DCS interviewer asked Child Witness 1 what had happened that day, to which Child Witness 1 replied, “[Victim] just died[.]” Id. at 118. When asked how Victim died, Child Witness 1 stated, “Because [Clark] just shoot the gun[.]” Id. In response to being asked why [Clark] shot [Victim], Child Witness 1 explained that: “They were talking and fighting.” Id. at 119. In the interview of Child Witness 2, the DCS interviewer asked what had happened that day. Child Witness 2 stated, “[Victim] died.” Id. at 122. And when the interviewer asked why, Child Witness 2 replied that “[Clark] shoot him.” Id. Finally, in response to the question of where Child Witness 2 was when [Clark] shot [Victim], Child Witness 2 stated: “In my room to get her phone back.” Id.

[14] The State also presented evidence concerning Clark's cell phone that Child Witness 2 stated Clark and Victim had fought over. The State's evidence established that there was a cell phone with a pink case on the bed next to the handgun. Id. at 89, 90, 95. One of the detectives that worked on this case identified the phone number for this phone at trial and testified that the number matched the number Clark had given police as her cell phone number. Id. at 95-96.

[15] On cross-examination, Clark was asked to explain why her phone was on the bed next to the gun. She replied that it was not her phone because her phone had a blue case. Id. at 156. Later on cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Clark to review her statement to police in which she identified her phone as being “[s]ilverish pinkish.” Id. at 166. Clark then reluctantly admitted that it was her phone on the bed next to the gun. Id.

[16] The State also presented evidence of the dynamics of Clark and Victim's relationship. Victim's sister testified that Clark “brought [Victim] down, tore his things up[.]” Tr. Vol. II, p. 229. Victim's friend from work testified that Victim told her that if anything ever happened to him, Clark did it. Tr. Vol. III, pp. 53-54. The State's evidence also included a message that Clark identified as being sent from her Facebook account to a particular individual. Although Clark denied any recollection of sending the message, in her own words Clark stated:

I tried to stab him. I did. That's why I, girl I know, like he knows that he really hurt me bad and he said he will do whatever it takes to make it better. So he's a lot, a lot of doing. If I decide to let him be back with me, I mean of course he's still sleeping in the house, but he sleeps in the kids’ room, but they love [Victim].

And that's the only reason why he's still here. He's going to prove to me that he really loves me. He said people at work was making fun of him because he had a black eye and because he gets dropped off. Who cares if you're getting dropped off at work so me and [the] kids can go do something like you care about what they think.

Id. at 147-48. Furthermore, when questioned, Clark testified that on one prior occasion she had called law enforcement to intervene in an argument with Victim because he had taken her glasses and would not return them. Id. at 156. While these instances are not direct evidence of any violence on July 8, 2019, they demonstrate that the relationship between Clark and Victim could be volatile. See, e.g., Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 572 (considering evidence that chaotic situation day of shooting was not “a one-off occurrence” and stating that “it would be misguided to think of it in a vacuum” in determination of existence of sudden heat).

[17] It was well within the jury's province to determine that Clark, in response to Victim taking her phone, was provoked into a rage sufficient to prevent deliberation. See Fisher, 671 N.E.2d at 121 (existence of sudden heat is classic question of fact for jury).

Conclusion

[18] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence of sudden heat to support Clark's conviction of voluntary manslaughter.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In compliance with the Indiana General Assembly's newly enacted standards in Indiana Code sections 35-32-4-1 to -4 (2026), we use descriptive anonymous designators to reference any child witness and any person whose name could be used to identify a child whose name is required to be redacted.

2.   Labeling the case “a cautionary tale that counsels against the approach” of charging voluntary manslaughter without also charging murder, our Supreme Court warned that “simply because the State may charge voluntary manslaughter as a standalone, it ‘does not mean the State selected a wise course.’ ” Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 571 n.1 (quoting Brantley v. State, 71 N.E.3d 397, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (Bailey, J., dissenting), overruled by Brantley, 91 N.E.3d 566.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.