HARVES v. INDIANA FAMILY SOCIAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

 Case Summary

[1] The Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA) denied Medicaid nursing-home benefits to Natalie A. Harves just before her death in December 2019. After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Harves, by her personal representatives, petitioned for judicial review (Count I). In her petition she also included a civil rights claim (Count II) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983), by which she ostensibly sought injunctive relief against the Secretary of FSSA (the Secretary),¹ as well as attorney fees.

[2] The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law affirming FSSA's denial of benefits and resolving Count I. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment with respect to Count II, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.

[3] Harves appealed both orders and obtained a reversal on Count I, with this court remanding to the trial court with instructions to grant the petition for judicial review and return the matter to FSSA for further proceedings. See Harves v. Rusyniak (Harves I), 219 N.E.3d 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). This court, however, affirmed the order granting summary judgment to the Secretary on Count II. Id. at 172 n.4. Harves filed a petition for rehearing with respect to our resolution of Count II, arguing that Counts I and II were based on a common nucleus of operative facts and that the resolution of Count I in her favor also made her a prevailing party on Count II, entitling her to attorney fees. This court denied the petition for rehearing, and Harves did not seek transfer.

[4] After remand, FSSA reconsidered Harves's eligibility for Medicaid assistance and reversed course. FSSA determined that Harves was eligible for full coverage from July 2019 through December 2019, the month of her death. FSSA paid these benefits in full in November 2024.

[5] Thereafter, Harves returned to the trial court and filed a motion for relief from judgment on Count II pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(7). The trial court denied Harves's request for relief from judgment, observing that she already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her Section 1983 claim and that FSSA's recent change in position regarding eligibility had no impact on the court's prior decision regarding Count II. We agree with the trial court that Harves is not entitled to relitigate her Section 1983 claim.

[6] We affirm.

 Facts & Procedural History

[7] In January 2019, Harves, then age ninety-one, and her children executed several documents, including one that created an irrevocable trust, the N. Harves Family Trust (the Trust). Harves's assets, worth $557,240, were placed in the Trust.²

[8] Four months later, in May 2019, Harves applied for Medicaid nursing-home benefits. FSSA denied the application on December 6, 2019, finding that the assets of the Trust were available to her and thus her resources exceeded the threshold for Medicaid eligibility. Harves died three days later. The negative eligibility determination was upheld at each stage of the administrative process, and Harves, by Richard E. Harves and Karen Sue Harves, her personal representatives, filed a petition for judicial review in April 2020.

[9] As amended, Harves's petition asserted two counts. Under Count I, Harves sought judicial review of FSSA's decision to deny benefits and alleged that FSSA improperly included the assets of the Trust when determining her available resources. Under Count II, Harves pursued a civil rights action under Section 1983 against the Secretary seeking injunctive relief, specifically to enjoin the Secretary “from denying [Harves] of her statutory rights to these Medicaid benefits under the color of the law by including trust assets ․ as available resources of [Harves].” Appendix Vol. 3 at 25. She also sought attorney fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), for vindication of her civil rights through her Section 1983 claim.

[10] On June 22, 2022, the trial court issued an order addressing only Count I. After reviewing the petition for judicial review, the agency record, and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having oral argument, the trial court entered judgment in favor of FSSA, along with findings of fact and conclusions of law. In agreeing with FSSA that the Trust was an available resource for determining Medicaid eligibility, the trial court looked to 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(2)(A) and observed that Harves's assets were used to form the corpus of the Trust and that a person acting under Harves's direction established the Trust. Accordingly, the trial court denied Harves's request for judicial review and affirmed the final agency action.

[11] A month later, Harves filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to Count II, in which she rehashed arguments that she made in support of judicial review. FSSA filed a cross-motion for summary judgment arguing, in part, that Harves sought only retroactive relief, which is not available under Section 1983 when suing a state official in their official capacity.³ See Melton v. Ind. Athletic Trainers Bd., 156 N.E.3d 633, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (observing that state officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983 except if the official is sued in their official capacity for prospective rather than retrospective relief based on an alleged ongoing violation of federal law), trans. denied. FSSA argued:

Harves asserts she is asking for only prospective relief, but she does not identify what specific action she is asking this Court to enjoin prospectively. But one thing is clear: she wants this Court to conclude that FSSA needs to pay her money. And that kind of relief is not prospective at all. Instead, it is retroactive, and Harves has already acknowledged she is not entitled to that form of relief [with respect to Count II].

Harves asserts that she is now seeking only injunctive relief. Someone seeking injunctive relief must assert an ongoing injury that could be remedied by prospective relief. McDonough Assocs., Inc. v. Grunloh, 722 F.3d 1043, 1051 (7th Cir. 2013). In contrast, what would be barred would be retroactive relief, relief that requires payment of funds from the state treasury. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974). Even if Harves had been injured (and this Court already determined that she had not), there's no allegation of an ongoing injury. The “harm” was FSSA's decision, and that decision of course happened in the past. Harves cannot shoehorn her request for injunctive relief into the prospective relief category just by calling it that—there needs to be some kind of ongoing injury. That would be stopped by a specific order from this Court. Instead, Harves asks this Court to remand the case to come to a different conclusion about the Trust so she would be paid from the state treasury. That is retroactive relief, and it is barred. Harves is not entitled to an injunction or any other relief under section 1983.

Appendix Vol. 3 at 227-28.

[12] In reply, Harves explained that the relief sought in Count II is “to re-determine the [Trust] as an unavailable resource from that re-determination forward into the future.” Id. at 238 (emphases in original). She continued: “That fix will open [Harves] to the nursing home benefits she was seeking and attorney fees under § 1983, which are not retrospective. Retrospective damages against the state (which violates the Eleventh Amendment) are not sought after in [ ] Count II.” Id. Harves clarified that the “ongoing injury” sought to be remedied by the injunction is “unpaid Medicaid bills for the last three years that should be paid.” Id. at 239.

[13] The trial court issued its summary judgment order on March 16, 2023, granting summary judgment in favor of FSSA on Count II. The trial court based its decision on two independent grounds. First, the prior judgment on Count I addressed “the same facts and issues as those underlying [Harves's] § 1983 claim” and such could not be relitigated under Count II. Appendix Vol. 2 at 48. Second, even if it could reconsider whether the Trust was an available resource for determining Medicaid eligibility, the court determined that there was no ongoing injury to remedy through injunctive relief. Relevant to this second ground, the order provides:

8. In addition, as Ms. Harves has passed away, she will not be reapplying for benefits through FSSA. Thus, there are no ongoing injuries or disputed facts material to section 1983, and summary judgment is appropriate.

9. Petitioner asks for injunctive relief against the Secretary of FSSA in his official capacity under section 1983.

10. Section 1983 is a mechanism to enforce federal rights. This Court has already affirmed FSSA's final agency action. Thus, there has been no violation of federal law requiring enforcement.

11. Moreover, that is a question about what happened in the past and there is no allegation of an ongoing injury that could be remedied through an injunction.

* * *

26. Further, Petitioner asserts she is asking for only prospective relief. Someone seeking injunctive relief must assert an ongoing injury that could be remedied by prospective relief. Retroactive relief is relief that requires the payment of funds from the state treasury.

27. Even if Petitioner had been injured, there is no allegation of an ongoing injury. The alleged injury is FSSA's decision, something that happened in the past.

28. Any request for money to be paid from the state treasury or for a remand for a redetermination is a request for retroactive relief, and that is barred.

29. Consequently, Petitioner is not entitled to an injunction and any other relief under section 1983.

Id. at 46, 49 (citations omitted).

[14] Harves appealed both the June 2022 order on Count I (the Judicial Review Order) and the March 2023 summary judgment order on Count II (the Section 1983 Order). In Harves I, this court reversed the Judicial Review Order, holding that remand was necessary because FSSA (and the trial court) failed to consider a necessary element before including the Trust as an available resource. We explained:

The ALJ concluded that the corpus of the Trust must be considered resources available to Harves after finding that (1) Harves's assets were used to form the corpus of the Trust and (2) the Trust was established by a person with legal authority to act on behalf of Harves. Those two findings were correct․. But as noted above, a third element must be satisfied before the corpus of an irrevocable trust can be counted as available resources. That is, there must be circumstances under which payment from the trust could be made to or for the benefit of the individual. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3)(B)(i). In her order, the ALJ did not mention that element or discuss any language from the trust agreement that might satisfy it. Similarly, the trial court did not address the element in denying Harves's petition for judicial review.

The parties address this third element in their appellate briefs, disputing whether certain provisions in the trust agreement mean that payment from the Trust could be made to Harves or for her benefit. But the agency, not this Court, must adjudicate this issue in the first instance․. Therefore, we must reverse the denial of the petition for judicial review and remand to the trial court with instructions to grant the petition and return the matter back to FSSA for further proceedings on the third element.

Harves I, 219 N.E.3d at 171-72 (footnotes and record citations omitted).

[15] Despite reversing the Judicial Review Order, this court affirmed the Section 1983 Order:

Harves's petition for judicial review also included a claim for “42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights Relief” and a corresponding request for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The trial court granted summary judgment to FSSA on those issues. On appeal, Harves makes a three-sentence argument that she is entitled to attorney's fees under Section 1988 but doesn't address the merits of the trial court's summary-judgment order on the underlying Section 1983 claim. We therefore affirm the trial court on these issues.

Id. at 172 n.4 (record citation omitted).⁴

[16] Harves petitioned for rehearing and argued that Count II “sought relief under [Section 1983] for ‘Common Nucleus of Operative Facts’ as in Count I, which was the wrongful determination of [the Trust] as an available resource.” Pet. for Reh'g at 3, Haves I, No. 23A-PL-671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). She reasoned, therefore, that this court's reversal of the Judicial Review Order necessarily entitled her to attorney fees under Count II as a prevailing party. FSSA responded that Count I and Count II were not one in the same and that because Harves abandoned her Section 1983 claim on appeal by not directly challenging the grant of summary judgment on Count II, she was not a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees.

[17] Rehearing was denied on November 27, 2023, and Harves did not seek transfer. Accordingly, only Count I remained alive on remand. As directed in Harves I, the trial court granted the petition for judicial review and returned the matter to the administrative law judge for further proceedings to determine whether there were any circumstances under which payment from the Trust could be made to or for the benefit of Harves.

[18] On October 17, 2024, FSSA issued a Notice of Eligibility Action approving Harves's May 2019 application and awarding full coverage from July 2019 through December 2019, ending due to her death. FSSA paid these benefits in full in November 2024.

[19] Immediately after receiving payment, Harves filed in the trial court a motion entitled Petitioner's Motion to Relieve Dismissal and Motion to Correct Error and Motion for Summary Judgement Against FSSA (Motion for Relief from Judgment), along with a corresponding brief. Despite confusing references to nonexistent dismissal orders,⁵ Harves's aim in these filings was clear; she sought to resurrect Count II to obtain attorney fees. Harves argued that FSSA's change in position regarding eligibility after Harves I amounted to a significant and substantial change in the circumstances upon which the Section 1983 Order was based. And she asserted that the “nucleus of new facts are operative in both Counts in the Second Amended Petition.” Appendix Vol. 4 at 72. Harves sought relief from judgment pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(7).

[20] On October 10, 2025, after briefing and oral argument, the trial court denied the Motion for Relief from Judgment. The court determined that Harves had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her Section 1983 claim on summary judgment and in Harves I. The court further provided in its order:

20. Moreover, the recent developments in this case on remand do not impact the Court's decision regarding her Section 1983 claim. Whilst it is true, as Petitioner argues, the Court did grant summary judgment in Respondents’ favor on the Section 1983 claim as a result of its prior order in the judicial review portion of this action in which it had found that FSSA had properly denied Petitioner's application for Medicaid benefits.․ If this were the sole basis for the Court's denial of Petitioner's Section 1983 claim, then a reversal of that decision regarding the Medicaid benefits might warrant re-evaluation of the Section 1983 claim. But it was not the sole basis for the Court's decision nor the Court of Appeals’ decision to affirm the trial court.

21. The Court also ruled that Petitioner did not have a claim for attorney's fees under Section 1983 for which relief could be granted because the parties were not subject to Section 1983 and/or were immune from requests for attorney's fees under Section 1983. The Agency's decision on remand does not create a remedy under Section 1983 that did not exist before.

Appendix Vol. 2 at 26-27. The court then, as it did on summary judgment, detailed the failings of Harves's Section 1983 claim on the merits, including that the relief sought was not prospective.

[21] Harves now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

 Discussion & Decision

[22] Harves appeals the trial court's denial of the Motion for Relief from Judgment, in which she sought relief under T.R. 60(B)(7). This rule provides that “upon such terms as are just” a court may relieve a party from a judgment if “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” Such a motion must be filed within a reasonable time. Further, T.R. 60(B)(7) is concerned only with exceptional circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time the prior judgment was entered. City of Indianapolis v. Tichy, 122 N.E.3d 841, 845 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[23] It is well established that the propriety of relief under T.R. 60(B) is a “matter entrusted to the trial court's equitable discretion.” Id. at 845 (quoting Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barabas, 975 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Ind. 2012)). Thus, our review is only for an abuse of discretion, which occurs where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law. Id.

[24] T.R. 60(B) motions “address only the procedural, equitable grounds justifying relief from the legal finality of a final judgment, not the legal merits of the judgment.” Id. (quoting In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. 2010)). In other words, they are not a substitute for direct appeal and cannot be used to revive an expired attempt to appeal. P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d at 740.

[25] Boiled down, Harves argues that Harves I’s reversal on Count I and FSSA's new eligibility determination on remand, changed the facts and legal foundation on which the Section 1983 Order was based. Appellant's Brief at 19. Further, she asserts, as she did in her petition for rehearing in Harves I, that Counts I and II were based on a “common nucleus of operative facts” and that the “[w]rongful denial of federal statute § 1396p Medicaid benefits is also wrongful denial of § 1983 Civil Rights.” Id.

[26] We need not get into the weeds of addressing the differences between a judicial review action regarding a Medicaid eligibility determination and a Section 1983 action, or the type of relief that would be available in the latter as against the Secretary in their official capacity. See P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d at 740. Suffice it to say, these questions were fully litigated in the summary judgment proceedings. And the trial court, in the Section 1983 Order determined, in relevant part, that FSSA was entitled to summary judgment on the Section 1983 claim because Harves alleged no ongoing injuries to be remedied by an injunction. In other words, the trial court determined that Harves improperly sought retroactive relief, not prospective relief, in Count II.

[27] Harves appealed the Section 1983 Order, along with the Judicial Review Order, but she did not advance arguments in that appeal regarding why summary judgment on Count II was improper. She essentially treated Count II as an afterthought, arguing simply: “Establishing that the FSSA wrongfully denied [ ] Medicaid benefits is proving that [Harves] was wrongfully denied a federal right under the Civil Rights Act and is entitled to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” Appellant's Brief at 29, Harves I, No. 23A-PL-671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). And even after FSSA noted Harves's failure to directly address the propriety of the Section 1983 Order, Harves did not develop in her reply brief an argument on the merits of her Section 1983 claim, particularly with respect to the type of relief sought against the Secretary.

[28] In Harves I, this court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment against Harves on Count II. She suggests that our affirmance of the Section 1983 Order was because she had not yet fully prevailed on Count I, since FSSA did not redetermine eligibility until after the cause was remanded. But that is not a fair reading of our opinion. The Section 1983 Order was affirmed because Harves did not meaningfully address Count II on appeal. In her petition for rehearing, she advanced some of the arguments that she now raises. Rehearing was denied, but she did not seek transfer.

[29] As the trial court observed, Harves had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims on Count II, which were resolved adversely to her on summary judgment in the trial court and on appeal. Further, FSSA's later change of course regarding eligibility did not alter one of the bases upon which the trial court granted summary judgment—that Harves sought, in substance, only retrospective rather than prospective relief.

[30] Harves did not establish exceptional circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable when the Section 1983 Order was entered or Harves I was decided. The time to litigate the propriety of the Section 1983 Order has passed, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Motion for Relief from Judgment and rejecting her attempt to relitigate those issues.

[31] Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of the Motion for Relief from Judgment. And while the parties go on to address the merits of Harves's Section 1983 claim against the Secretary, we need not consider them. See Tichy, 122 N.E.3d at 846

[32] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Secretary has changed over the life of this case from Jennifer Walthall to Daniel Rusyniak and, now as of January 2025, to E. Mitchell Roob.

2.   For purposes of this appeal, we need not delve into the details of the Trust or the other contemporaneously executed documents. Those details are set out in Harves I, 219 N.E.3d at 167-68.

3.   Although Harves captioned her action as against the Secretary in their individual capacity, Harves acknowledged that this was erroneous and that Count II was against the Secretary in their official capacity.

4.   We note that in its appellate brief, FSSA responded to Harves's rather bald request for attorney fees and argued: (1) Harves failed to present cogent argument on that issue; (2) she failed to address any of the grounds upon which the trial court based the grant of summary judgment on Count II; and (3) she sought payment for benefits before her passing, not future Medicaid benefits, and thus her requested relief was only retrospective.

5.   Harves refers at various times to dismissal orders on March 21, 2022, and March 21, 2024. She also refers to a dismissal order on March 21, 2021. While there was a dismissal on March 17, 2021, Harves later amended her petition and that order was no longer operational. Because Count II was conclusively resolved in the Section 1983 Order, issued March 16, 2023, and affirmed on appeal, we will consider that to be the relevant order here.

Altice, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.