NORRIS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

 Case Summary

[1] Natasha Norris appeals her conviction for Level 6 felony assisting a criminal, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction. Finding sufficient evidence, we affirm.

 Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 31, 2024, a warrant was issued for Norris’ boyfriend, Delancy Brown, who was charged with a Level 4 felony. The following month, officers received a tip that Brown was staying at Norris’ home. On the morning of January 30, 2025, officers with the St. Joseph County Police Department began surveilling the home. Among them were Officers Terry Beck and Nicholas Youngs.

[3] Beck and Youngs arrived at Norris’ home at around seven o'clock that morning. Beck surveilled the front of the house, while Youngs surveilled the back. The officers watched the home for about two hours, and neither Beck nor Youngs saw anyone enter or exit during that time. Eventually, the officers decided to knock on Norris’ front door. Their subsequent interaction with Norris was recorded by Youngs’ body-worn camera.

[4] As shown on the body-camera footage, Youngs commanded Norris to open the front door. Through the closed door, Norris replied, “Okay. Hold on. I'm naked. I just got out of the shower.” State's Exhibit 3 at 00:02-00:05. About forty seconds later, Norris opened the door and stepped out onto her front porch. Her hair and body were wrapped in towels, though neither appeared to be wet. Youngs asked her, “Who else is in there?” and she replied, “Nobody.” Id. at 00:53-00:55. Youngs asked the question a second time, and Norris gave the same answer.

[5] When the officers asked Norris where Brown was, she said, “He left.” Id. at 01:22-01:24. She explained that shortly after seven o'clock that morning, “the neighbors said ․ y'all were watching us, so he left out the back.” Id. at 01:25-1:31. She reiterated that Brown was not there and claimed, “He said he was going to the bus station to go to ․ Illinois or something. His brother was going to get him.” Id. at 01:39-01:44.

[6] After speaking with Norris, the officers entered the home to search for Brown. As they searched the first floor, Norris sat on a couch in the front room. Finding nothing downstairs, the officers tried to open a door that appeared to lead to the second story, but it was locked. Unprompted, Norris said, “Excuse me, ․ this door right here ․, it don't open.” Id. at 04:42-04:48. She explained that it led upstairs but hadn't been open for over a year and a half. The officers opened the door with a crowbar and found Brown standing behind it on a stairwell. They took Brown into custody and searched the second floor, which was cluttered with clothes and other items and appeared to be lived in.

[7] On January 31, 2025, the State charged Norris with Level 6 felony assisting a criminal ¹ and Class B misdemeanor false informing.² A jury trial was held on April 9, 2026, at which the parties stipulated to the following facts:

(1) On December 31st, 2024, the Elkhart Superior Court issued a warrant for Delancy Martez Brown․

(2) The charged count ․ was a Level 4 felony.

(3) The warrant was active on January 30th, 2025.

(4) As of January 30th, 2025, Natasha Norris and Delancy Brown were not married.

Transcript at 14. During the State's presentation of evidence, Beck and Youngs testified to the facts outlined above, and Youngs’ body-camera footage was admitted into evidence.

[8] Norris called Brown to testify in her defense. According to Brown, he spent “quite a bit” of time at Norris’ house, and he was there without her knowledge on January 30, 2025. Id. at 37. That morning, he received a text message from a friend telling him the police were outside, and he remained upstairs “because [he] was confused” and wanted to call the lawyer representing him in his criminal case. Id. During cross-examination, Brown clarified that he drove his car to Norris’ house that morning, arrived at around eight o'clock, and parked in a detached garage. He then went inside and climbed upstairs “to hang out” in what he described as his “mancave.” Id. at 39.

[9] Ultimately, the jury found Norris guilty as charged, and the trial court merged the charges before convicting Norris of assisting a criminal. At the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Norris to thirty months suspended to probation. Norris now appeals.

 Discussion and Decision

[10] When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are mindful that it is the jury's role, not ours, “to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). As such, “[w]e consider only the evidence most favorable to” the conviction, together with any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable jury could have found “the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[11] The assisting a criminal statute provides, in part:

A person not standing in the relation of parent, child, or spouse to another person who has committed a crime or is a fugitive from justice who, with intent to hinder the apprehension or punishment of the other person, harbors, conceals, or otherwise assists the person commits assisting a criminal, a Class A misdemeanor. However, the offense is:

(1) a Level 6 felony, if:

(A) the person assisted has committed ․ a Level 4 ․ felony ․

Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-5(a) (2016). As charged here and in light of the parties’ stipulated facts, all the State had to prove to convict Norris of Level 6 felony assisting a criminal was that she concealed Brown with the intent to hinder his apprehension. In this context, “[c]onceal ․ means to hide, secrete, to keep out of sight, or prevent the discovery of ․” Clements v. State, 808 N.E.2d 198, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Dennis v. State, 102 N.E.2d 650, 653 (Ind. 1952)), reh'g denied.

[12] The evidence showed that while Brown hid behind the locked door leading to the second floor, Norris told Youngs that Brown left earlier that morning and was traveling to meet his brother in Illinois. Norris likens these facts to those at issue in Taylor v. State, 445 N.E.2d 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). There, officers arrived at a home jointly owned by Peggy Taylor and her aunt to serve an arrest warrant on a man named Louis Jordan. Id. at 1026. Both Taylor and another resident were present when the officers arrived, and they each said they did not know Jordan or his whereabouts. Id. When officers searched the home, they found Jordan hiding in a storage trunk in the living room. Id. The State charged Taylor with assisting Jordan under a prior version of the assisting a criminal statute. Id.

[13] After being convicted at a bench trial, Taylor appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence that she knew Jordan was hiding in the trunk when she spoke to the officers. Id. A panel of this Court agreed with the State's argument that

it was reasonable for the trial court to view Taylor's statement she neither knew Jordan nor his whereabouts as an affirmative act constituting assistance to a fugitive but only if the trial court could also reasonably infer Taylor knew of Jordan's presence in the house at the time she denied knowledge of his whereabouts.

Id. at 1027. The panel found insufficient “evidence from which the fact finder could reasonably make that inference” because Taylor's possession and presence in the home were nonexclusive. Id.

[14] Under those circumstances, the Taylor court held it was “unreasonable ․ to infer knowledge of Jordan's presence within the residence without other indicia of knowledge.” Id. The panel provided “[e]xamples of such indicia,” none of which were present in Taylor's case:

1) the length of time the defendant and the fugitive were within the dwelling before the officer's presence was known, 2) the place the fugitive was hidden (e.g., in a room in which the defendant was located or to which the defendant had sole access); 3) the fugitive's secretion in a room where his presence and activity were available to defendant's senses of sight or sound; 4) the existence of a relationship between or among the parties (e.g., a familial or romantic relationship between Taylor and Jordan); 5) the reasons the police officers had for going to the house where the fugitive was found; 6) the length of time the dwelling was under surveillance by the law enforcement authorities; or 7) the physical layout of the house (e.g., openness of the dwelling or open doors).

Id. (footnote omitted). This Court therefore reversed Taylor's conviction. Id. at 1028.

[15] Here, Norris argues her conviction cannot stand under Taylor. We disagree. Taylor’s “other indicia of knowledge” apply when the defendant's possession and presence are nonexclusive. Id. at 1027. Here, the evidence showed Norris had exclusive possession of her home, and only she and Brown were there on January 30, 2025. Moreover, even if the State had to prove other indicia of Norris’ knowledge, the factors listed in Taylor are instructive but not controlling. Indeed, the Taylor panel clarified that its factors were merely “examples” of circumstances that could prove knowledge and were “not exhaustive but merely illustrative.” Id.

[16] Taylor merely stands for the general proposition that there would be sufficient evidence to convict Norris under the assisting a criminal statute if the jury could reasonably infer she knew Brown was in her home when she told the officers he had left. The act of lying to officers about Brown's presence would show that Norris acted with intent to prevent Brown's discovery and thus concealed him. And because knowledge is “a mental state ․ [,] ‘the trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences of its existence.’ ” Vanderveer v. State, 182 N.E.3d 893, 898 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Leonard v. State, 80 N.E.3d 878, 883 (Ind. 2017). That requires an examination of “all the surrounding circumstances.” Id. (quoting Villagrana v. State, 954 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)).

[17] Here, the surrounding circumstances showed that Norris and Brown were in a romantic relationship. After getting a tip that Brown was at Norris’ house, officers started surveilling it at around seven o'clock in the morning and saw no one enter or exit after that time. When they knocked on the front door, Norris claimed to have been in the shower and emerged nearly a minute later, wrapped in towels but dry. She then told officers that Brown left shortly after seven o'clock, which the officers knew was not true since they had the home under surveillance at that time. As officers searched the first floor, Norris said, unprompted, that the door to the second story did not open, apparently trying to dissuade them from going upstairs. And once the officers opened the door, the lived-in condition of the second story contradicted Norris’ claim that no one had gone upstairs in the past year and a half. Norris’ statements to police were also inconsistent with Brown's testimony that he spent a lot of time at Norris’ home and had a “mancave” on the top floor. Tr. at 39.

[18] In short, Norris’ relationship with Brown, exclusive possessory interest in the home, and statements to police before and during the search support a reasonable inference that Norris knew Brown was hiding behind the locked door. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that Norris assisted a criminal by telling police Brown was not there in an attempt to prevent his discovery.

 Conclusion

[19] For these reasons, we affirm Norris’ conviction.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-5(a)(1) (2016).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-3 (d)(1) (2024) (amended 2025).

DeBoer, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.