Amadou Diallo, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Amadou Diallo appeals his domestic battery conviction, arguing the trial court erred in excluding evidence at trial about the victim's immigration status. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In February 2024, Diallo and M.C. were in a relationship and had two children together, including a two-year-old son. On the 21st, M.C. asked Diallo to drive her and their son to enroll him in daycare. Diallo did not want to drive them but eventually agreed to do so. After they left the daycare facility and started driving home, M.C. asked Diallo to drop her off at her English class. The only way Diallo would agree is if they could pick up his brothers so they could attend the class too. M.C. did not want to pick them up, which upset Diallo, and he started cursing at M.C.

[3] At one point, Diallo turned up the volume on the car radio and M.C. turned it down. The pair went back and forth, arguing and turning the volume up and down, until M.C. finally blocked the volume dial. When she did, Diallo punched her arm. M.C. pushed his arm away, and Diallo started hitting M.C. in the head. Diallo punched her in the face multiple times, hitting her in the eye and mouth and causing her cut lip to bleed. During this altercation, their son was in the backseat and began to cry.

[4] Eventually, Diallo pulled into a strip-mall parking lot, and M.C. got out of the car. She called her brother-in-law and told him Diallo had “hit [her] again.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 160. Then, M.C. called 911, and paramedics and two IMPD police officers arrived shortly after. The officers asked M.C. what happened, and she told them Diallo hit her. When one of the officers talked to Diallo, he said he and M.C. had been arguing and turning the radio on and off, and after he pushed her hand away from blocking the volume dial, she hit his side and face. See State's Exhibit 3R at 00:57-01:06. The officers arrested Diallo at the scene. Later that same day, the State charged him with Level 6 felony domestic battery ¹ and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury.²

[5] Diallo's jury trial was held on March 11, 2026. Before jury selection, the trial court addressed a motion in limine filed by the State. As relevant to this appeal, the State sought to exclude “[a]ny mention of or reference to [M.C.]’s [i]mmigration status” or her “seeking or applying for [a]sylum,” contending both were irrelevant and “any probative value [was] substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 189-90. Diallo objected, arguing this information was relevant. He explained,

[M.C.] originally had been calling me expressing her desire to have this case dismissed. I informed her that she had to speak to the Prosecutor's Office ․ At some point, her position changed when her immigration attorney became involved and then contacted the Prosecutor's Officer to relay that. And so based on that, my position is [M.C.] directly injected her immigration status into this proceeding ․ And I believe that the possibility of obtaining a U-visa[3] is a potential motive for her testimony in this case ․

Tr. Vol. 2 at 19. The State reiterated its arguments that the information was irrelevant to the alleged battery and would confuse the jury. The court overruled Diallo's objection on the grounds that M.C.’s immigration status was irrelevant to the case and determined there would be “[n]o mention of asylum or immigration status ․ during th[e] trial.” Id. at 20.

[6] M.C. and the two responding police officers testified consistently with the facts above. Also, footage from one of the officers’ bodycams depicting his conversation with Diallo at the scene was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. See State's Exhibit 3R. After M.C.’s testimony, Diallo made an offer of proof as to “the testimony [he thought] would have been entered but for the motion in limine.” Id. at 168. Specifically, he argued

I believe if [M.C.] had testified regarding information excluded by the motion in limine, she would have testified that when the case initially began, she repeatedly contacted myself and I ․ believe the Prosecution as well, in order to drop the case or have the case dismissed. This went on for multiple months.

At some point, [M.C.]’s immigration attorney contacted the prosecutor ․ and expressed a change of opinion about the case. [M.C.], after speaking to her immigration attorney, now wishes to pursue prosecution of this case. I believe testimony from her would elicit that being a victim of domestic violence would help her immigration situation. And [that] would show a bias or motive for her testimony.

Id. at 170-71. The trial court “st[ood] by its previous ruling” and the trial continued. Id. at 172.

[7] Diallo testified in his own defense and denied punching M.C. He testified that M.C. was “yelling and screaming” at him on the drive home from the daycare facility, prompting him to turn on the radio so he didn't have to listen to her. Id. at 207. At some point, M.C. “start[ed] hitting [him].” Id. at 208. Worried he would “lose control of the car,” Diallo said he swung his arm at her to get her to stop. Id. On cross-examination, Diallo denied “telling [one of the officers] that [he] hit her first.” Id. at 212. The State refreshed Diallo's recollection by playing the officer's bodycam footage in which Diallo tells the officer he hit her hand away from the radio before claiming she started hitting him. See State's Ex. 3R at 01:04-01:06. Diallo testified that he “push[ed] her hand” but “did not hit her.” Id. at 213. And as for M.C.’s bloody lip, he testified that he had his hand raised to “block her blows” and the car swerved, but he “didn't even know how she got that busted lip[ ].” Id. at 214.

[8] The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. At sentencing, the trial court vacated the Class A misdemeanor conviction and imposed a two-year executed sentence on the Level 6 felony conviction. Diallo now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Diallo argues the trial court erred by excluding evidence of M.C.’s immigration status. “ ‘The admission or exclusion of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and is afforded great deference on appeal.’ ” Montgomery v. State, 250 N.E.3d 478, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Singh v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1116, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)), trans. denied. We review a court's ruling to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the ruling “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before [the court].” Blattert v. State, 241 N.E.3d 29, 37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.

[10] Diallo claims he was entitled to question “M.C. about the benefits she may receive regarding her immigration status by testifying ․ because such was relevant evidence for the jury to consider when evaluating her credibility.” Appellant's Brief at 11. Diallo argues that his and M.C.’s credibility was “paramount” to the determination of the case, making this information all the more relevant to bring before the jury. Id. at 12. The State contends the information wasn't relevant to M.C.’s credibility and, even if it was, its introduction would have “confuse[d] the issues and create[d] a risk of unfair prejudice,” making exclusion proper under Evidence Rule 403. Appellee's Br. at 11.

[11] “Evidence is relevant if ․ it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence,” and it is admissible unless deemed otherwise by law or rule. Ind. Evidence Rule 401(a); see also Evid. R. 402. “[E]vidence of bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives is relevant at trial because it may discredit the witness or affect the weight of the witness's testimony.” Friend v. State, 134 N.E.3d 441, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied, cert. denied; see also Evid. R. 616. However, under Evidence Rule 403, a “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

[12] While evidence of M.C.’s immigration status may have been relevant, we find no abuse of discretion in its exclusion under Rule 403. At trial, defense counsel explained that he would've elicited testimony from M.C. “that being a victim of domestic violence would help her immigration situation.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 171. The defense “believe[d] that the possibility of obtaining a U-visa [was] a potential motive for [M.C.’s] testimony in th[e] case.” Id. at 19 (cleaned up). We first note there was no evidence M.C. knew what a U-visa was, let alone that she had applied for one in relation to this incident. Defense counsel simply speculated about “potential” immigration benefits for which M.C. might be eligible if she was considered a victim of domestic violence. However, counsel did not elicit any such testimony on the issue when making his offer of proof. Moreover, the motion in limine did not prevent Diallo from inquiring as to whether M.C. generally stood to benefit from testifying against Diallo without specifically mentioning her immigration status.

[13] As expressed by our Supreme Court, evidence of a party's “[u]nauthorized immigration status presents a significant risk of confusing the issues because it would flood the courtroom with arguments and evidence on immigration status and deportation risk, resulting in a ‘collateral mini-trial’ on immigration.” Escamilla v. Siel Sexton Company, 73 N.E.3d 663, 670-71 (Ind. 2017) (quoting State v. Buccheri-Bianca, 312 P.3d 123, 127 (Ariz. App. 2013)). We see that same risk in the case before us; discussing M.C.’s immigration status and the impact domestic violence has in that context would have required the jury to consider “evidence about ever-shifting government polices and priorities.” Id. at 671. In other words, these complicated topics stood to confuse the issues that were before the jury. Diallo has therefore failed to prove the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of M.C.’s immigration and asylum status.⁴

[14] But even if the trial court erred in excluding such evidence, that error was harmless. An “error is harmless if its ‘probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.’ ” Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 460 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A)). “Ultimately, the error's probable impact is sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.” Id. (quoting Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied, cert. denied).

[15] Here, the jury heard testimony from both responding officers, one of whom specifically testified that M.C. “disclose[d] that she was a victim of an incident of domestic violence” at the scene—long before she consulted her immigration attorney and decided to cooperate with the case. Tr. Vol. 2 at 177. Additionally, M.C. testified that Diallo punched her in the face several times, one of which busted her lip and caused it to bleed. Both officers testified about M.C.’s injuries, and photographs were admitted into evidence showing her injured and bleeding mouth. See Exhibits at 3-4. In both the bodycam footage and in his testimony, Diallo admitted to touching M.C. first when he pushed her hand away from the radio. Diallo told officers at the scene that M.C. hit him twice, once in his face and once on his side. At trial, he testified that she hit him “numerous times.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 213. At one point, he admitted to swinging his arm toward M.C. to stop her from hitting him. Later, he testified that M.C. busted her lip when her face ran into his raised hand while he was swerving on the road.

[16] We agree with Diallo that his and M.C.’s credibility were important in this case. Nonetheless, considering the evidence described above, we find that the probable impact of M.C.’s immigration status would be sufficiently minor to not affect the jury's credibility determination. Thus, any error in the trial court's exclusion of evidence regarding M.C.’s immigration status does not undermine our confidence in the jury's verdict.

Conclusion

[17] Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (b)(2) (2021).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (d)(1) (2023) (amended 2024).

3.   “U-visas are residency visas for victims of violent crime and human trafficking.” In re Moreno, 222 N.E.3d 948, 949 n.1 (Ind. 2023).

4.   Diallo argues for the first time on appeal that the exclusion of evidence regarding M.C.’s immigration status violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In an attempt to overcome his waiver of this argument on appeal, he asserts the court's ruling amounted to fundamental error. See Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 460 (Ind. 2026) (noting that fundamental error is an exception to waiver for a failure to raise an issue below). However, Diallo fails to present a cogent argument as to how the court's decision here “made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process ․” Id. (quoting Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018)). He has therefore waived his argument for appellate review. Martin v. Brown, 129 N.E.3d 283, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“Failure to present a cogent argument results in waiver of the issue on appeal.”).

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.