C.S. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Newborn child S.L. (Child) was removed from the care of her mother, C.S. (Mother), after Child was born drug-exposed and Mother admitted to using methamphetamine throughout her pregnancy. Child was deemed to be a child in need of services (CHINS), and Mother was ordered to complete substance abuse treatment, refrain from using illicit substances, and submit to random drug screens. But over the next year, Mother failed to complete multiple treatment programs and repeatedly tested positive for methamphetamine, all while denying that her drug use was an issue.

[2] The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) eventually petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights as to Child, after which Mother completed a 30-day in-patient treatment program and then maintained her sobriety for another month. Mother, however, began testing positive for methamphetamine again, including two weeks before the termination hearing. After the hearing, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights, concluding there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal would not be remedied and that termination was in Child's best interests. Mother now appeals the termination of parental rights, and we affirm.

Facts

[3] DCS became involved with Child upon her birth in January 2024. After Child's umbilical cord blood tested positive for methamphetamine, Mother admitted that she and Child's father, B.L. (Father), used the drug throughout Mother's pregnancy. DCS therefore removed Child from the care of Mother and Father (Parents) on an emergency basis and filed a CHINS petition alleging neglect. The trial court approved Child's placement with her paternal aunt (Aunt), and Child remained in that placement for the duration of the CHINS proceedings.

[4] Parents eventually admitted to the CHINS allegations, after which the trial court issued a dispositional order establishing reunification as Child's permanency plan. Among other things, the court also ordered Parents to undergo substance abuse assessments, follow and complete all treatment recommendations, refrain from using illicit substances, and submit to random drug screens.

[5] Parents completed substance abuse assessments at “Centerstone,” which recommended that they participate in recovery coaching and home-based casework. App. Vol. II, p. 7. They did so only briefly. Meanwhile, Parents tested positive for methamphetamine on multiple occasions, prompting Centerstone to recommend them for intensive outpatient treatment (IOP). Parents participated in IOP sparingly and, by September 2024, had made no real progress. They also continued to test positive for methamphetamine. Centerstone therefore recommended Parents for in-patient treatment, but they declined to participate. Instead, Parents indicated they would undergo further IOP through Advantage Counseling.

[6] By December 2024, Parents had not enrolled in Advantage Counseling and were still testing positive for methamphetamine. Mother was also 29 weeks pregnant with a second child, who was later born drug-exposed. On DCS's petition, the trial court added adoption as a concurrent permanency plan for Child and set the matter for a review hearing on March 13, 2025. Parents thereafter began IOP through Advantage Counseling but continued testing positive for methamphetamine.

[7] On March 5, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights as to Child, alleging, among other things, that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal would not be remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being. At the CHINS review hearing held a week later, the trial court informed Parents that “they needed to get their efforts fully going to avoid the termination path.” Id. at 14.

[8] A termination hearing was set for June 3, 2025. But on May 12, Mother began a 30-day in-patient treatment program at “VOA.” Id. at 15. The trial court therefore continued the hearing until August. Mother completed her treatment on June 11, after which DCS recommended her for follow-up services through “Choices.” Id. at 16. Mother provided multiple negative drug screens through July 11 but tested positive for methamphetamine upon her intake at Choices on July 25. She also tested positive for the drug on August 8, two weeks before the termination hearing.

[9] Father resisted in-patient treatment for a few months longer than Mother and tested positive for methamphetamine multiple times in May, June, and July 2025. He eventually began in-patient treatment at Advanced Recovery Center but checked himself out less than a week later. He, too, then tested positive for methamphetamine on August 8.

[10] On August 22, 2025, the trial court held a termination hearing, at which DCS presented evidence of the above-stated facts. The evidence also showed that Parents had lived together throughout the CHINS proceedings, and though Mother had been continuously unemployed, Father had maintained a job that covered all their expenses. Mother testified that, after her positive drug screen on August 8, she realized that living with Father was impeding her sobriety. She and Father therefore agreed that Father would move out but continue to cover both of their expenses.

[11] The DCS family case manager (FCM) assigned to Child's case testified that terminating Parents’ parental rights was in Child's best interests due to Parents’ continued drug use and Child's need for permanency. According to the FCM, Child was thriving in her placement with Aunt, who had expressed a desire to adopt her. Child's court-appointed special advocate (CASA) similarly testified that termination and adoption were in Child's best interests, though she recognized Mother's “potential” to remain sober if Mother and Father truly went their separate ways. Tr. Vol. II, p. 94.

[12] After the hearing, the trial court issued an order terminating Parents’ parental rights as to Child. The order contained 216 enumerated paragraphs, including numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law. Among the latter, the court concluded: (1) there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal would not be remedied; (2) there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being; and (3) terminating Parents’ parental rights was in Child's best interests.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights as to Child.¹ Before parental rights can be terminated, DCS must prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) the existence of one ․ or more of the circumstances described in [IC 31-35-2-4(d) (“subsection (d) circumstances”)];

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2025)² ; In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (clear and convincing standard).

[14] Here, DCS alleged the existence of two subsection (d) circumstances:

(3) That there [was] a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents [would] not be remedied.

(4) That there [was] a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship pose[d] a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d).

[15] The trial court concluded that DCS sufficiently proved the existence of both alleged subsection (d) circumstances, as well as the other two termination elements. Because the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its decision, we generally apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009). “First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second[,] we determine whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. We do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility and look only to the evidence supporting the judgment. Id. “We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.” Id.

[16] Though Mother purports to challenge all but the conclusion that there was a satisfactory plan for Child's care, see Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2), we find she has waived any arguments against the court's remedying-conditions and best-interests conclusions. Left unchallenged, those conclusions support the trial court's judgment. And notwithstanding Mother's waiver, they are supported by the court's unchallenged findings of fact.

I. Mother Has Waived Any Arguments Against the Remedying-Conditions and Best-Interests Conclusions

[17] Mother purports to challenge the trial court's conclusions that the two alleged subsection (d) circumstances existed and that termination was in Child's best interests. But in her appellate brief, she only develops an argument against the conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being. See id. § 4(d)(4). Beyond a few conclusory statements, Mother does not argue that the trial court erred by concluding there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal would not be remedied, see id. § 4(d)(3), or that termination was in Child's best interests. See id. § 4(c)(3).

[18] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) requires the appellant's brief to include an “Argument” section that “contain[s] the appellant's contentions [as to] why the trial court ․ committed reversible error.” The rule also provides that “the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented” must be “supported by cogent reasoning” and “the authorities ․ relied on[.]” App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). “We demand cogent argument ․ because it promotes impartiality in the appellate tribunal.” Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “A court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator.” Id. Therefore, “[w]e will not ․ address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Such arguments are waived. Id.

[19] Because Mother did not develop arguments against the trial court's remedying-conditions and best-interests conclusions, she has waived those issues for our review. And because the unchallenged conclusions support the termination of Mother's parental rights, we may affirm the court's judgment on that basis without considering Mother's argument against the court's threat-to-well-being conclusion. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1) (requiring only “one” subsection (d) circumstance to support termination).

II. The Trial Court's Unchallenged Findings Support Its Remedying-Conditions and Best-Interests Conclusions

[20] Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact support its remedying-conditions and best-interests conclusions. When a trial court's findings are unchallenged on appeal, we accept them as true. Matter of C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). And even when successfully challenged, “erroneous findings ․ are superfluous” and do not constitute reversible error if the remaining valid findings and conclusions support the judgment. Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E.2d 380, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

A. Remedying Conditions

[21] To determine whether the conditions that led to a child's removal are not likely to be remedied, trial courts engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, they identify the conditions that led to the child's removal; second, they determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. In making the latter decision, courts “must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding,” considering “evidence of changed conditions” and “balancing [the] parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id.

[22] Here, Child was removed from Mother's care due to Mother's drug use. The following unchallenged findings support the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that this condition would not be remedied:

163) Since the inception of this case it is apparent that both parties are severe drug users and abusers.

164) Not only was the child in this case born with drugs in her system, but the parents[’] use has continued almost every single month of the life of this case and when her sibling was born in December of 2024 drugs were also in that child's system.

165) That from the very start of this case and only until over a year into it, both parents only half-heartedly were involved in treatment for awhile [sic], simply missed appointments after a time[,] and eventually were kicked out of multiple treatment providers.

166) For most of the life of this case both parents denied that their drug use was a problem[,] and clearly this consistent belief is proven time and again as they failed to address these issues with multiple providers.

167) Both parents maintained the same track of consistent use and abuse of normally methamphetamine and amphetamine and at times were positive for THC and or alcohol use as well.

168) That the parents were provided multiple chances to get help from providers but would simply not get clean in order to adequately tackle their abuse issues.

169) That both parents worked with multiple drug rehabilitation service providers[,] and both were even given the chance to place themselves into facilities and programs of their choice.

170) Even with this choice, the parents failed their own selected programs as well.

171) That both parents were involved sporadically with home-based case services and other entities trying to help them[,] but the simple fact is they never could stop using drugs to ever make those other programs work.

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173) That while the mother did eventually attend and complete an inpatient treatment service, upon returning home she did not get immediately involved in aftercare services, but instead went back to her old ways in failing a drug test one more time in early August.

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175) That throughout the life of this case the mother has remained jobless, has lost her license and has no ability to provide stability or a home for the child without the father.

176) That while the father has worked throughout the life of this case, it is evident and was even admitted to by both parents, that he is the catalyst that causes mother's use more often than not.

177) That while the court has spoken to parties about being a “poison pill” to the other party[,] where one gets clean and the other does not, the parties took no steps, until recent weeks, to allegedly separate.

178) That mother and father testified in recent weeks that they are going to live apart and hopefully this will help the mother in her sobriety quest.

179) Still, it is clear that mother has no ability to pay for the home, her food or anything without a job, will still be reliant on the father for all of those things, and only when faced clearly with this final termination hearing did they separate from one another as was discussed earlier in this case.

180) That these last ditch efforts in recent weeks fail miserably when looked at as part of the fact that this termination matter was continued for three months when it looked like the parties were trying to finally do the right thing, and yet here we are once more with a failed inpatient attempt by father and continued drug use by both.

181) That without need for much more of a review than all of the failed screens, recent failed screens, and failures to address the drug use over the life of this case, it is clear that the issues for this case have not and will not be remedied.

182) These parties simply refused to acknowledge their drug abuse problems for most of the life of this case and when given their last chances, have squandered them.

183) The child here deserves permanency and people that choose the child over their drugs[,] and it is clear beyond all doubt that these parents will never choose the child first.

App. Vol. II, pp. 17-19.

[23] We note that, in her appellate brief, Mother argues against the trial court's threat-to-well-being conclusion by claiming it “minimize[d] the progress [she] had made during the weeks prior to the [t]ermination [h]earing.” Appellant's Br., p. 15. But even if we assume this argument was made against the trial court's remedying-conditions conclusion, it is a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. For these reasons, the trial court's remedying-conditions conclusion was not clearly erroneous.

B. Child's Best Interests

[24] In determining whether termination is in a child's best interests, a trial court is required to look at the “totality of the evidence.” Z.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The court “must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child” and “need not wait until [the] child is harmed irreversibly before terminating the parent-child relationship.” In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “Recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” Id.

[25] Here, both the FCM assigned to Child's case and Child's CASA testified that termination was in Child's best interests due to Mother's continued drug use and Child's need for permanency. As discussed above, the trial court's unchallenged findings also support its conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that conditions that led to Child's removal—Mother's drug use—would not be remedied. For these reasons, the trial court's best-interests conclusion was not clearly erroneous. See id.

Conclusion

[26] As the trial court did not clearly err by concluding there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal would not be remedied and that termination was in Child's best interests, we affirm the court's termination of Mother's parental rights as to Child.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father challenged the termination of his parental rights in his own appeal, and another panel of this Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. In re S.L., No. 25A-JT-2385 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2026) (mem.).

2.   After DCS filed its termination petition but before the termination hearing, an amended version of Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 went into effect. See P.L. 179-2025, § 25 (eff. July 1, 2025). This amendment did not change the statutory provisions applicable to this appeal, and neither party argues that it has any bearing on the outcome.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.