Thomas A. Armfield, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Lisa M. Armfield, Appellee-Respondent. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Thomas A. Armfield appeals from the trial court's judgment dissolving his marriage with Lisa M. Armfield. Thomas argues that the court failed to include all marital assets in the marital estate, resulting in an erroneous division of the estate. Concluding that Thomas has not demonstrated reversible error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Thomas and Lisa married in 2011.¹ He moved into her house, which she had owned since a prior divorce proceeding. Thomas was never formally added as a co-owner of the house, but he performed substantial renovations over the years.

[3] Thomas owns a sole proprietorship handyman business. Lisa works at Stellantis, a vehicle manufacturing company. She has a pension through her employer. In addition, she began contributing to a 401(k) retirement account at the start of her employment, seventeen years prior to the parties’ marriage.

[4] The parties separated in November 2022 and split their bank accounts. In December 2022, Thomas petitioned to dissolve the marriage. The court gave Thomas full possession of the marital home during the pendency of the case, subject to his payment of all related costs. In May 2024, Lisa filed a counter-petition.

[5] In August 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. During the hearing, both parties discussed Lisa's pension. Both parties also provided proposed valuations of Lisa's 401(k) account, and Lisa calculated a coverture fraction based on increases in the account's value during the marriage.²

[6] On December 8, 2025, the trial court issued a decree of dissolution, including findings of fact. The trial court ruled as follows on the parties’ major assets:

[B]alancing the equities in this matter the house should be considered marital property. Husband's business and the tools and equipment associated with that business is [sic] preexisting property and Wife's 401K accumulated prior to the marriage should be set aside to her.

Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 15. The court chose a coverture fraction for Lisa's 401(k) account and determined that Thomas and Lisa were each entitled to fifty percent of the value of the account that accrued during the marriage.

[7] Thomas timely filed a motion to correct error. Lisa filed a response in opposition. The motion was deemed denied, and this appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Thomas argues that the trial court erroneously excluded Lisa's pension and 401(k) account from the marital estate, resulting in an unjust division of the estate. Neither of the parties asked the court to issue findings of fact and conclusions, but the court did so on its own. Where the trial court enters findings of fact sua sponte, “the specific findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013). “A finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom which support it.” Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71, 76-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied.

[9] The specific findings control only with respect to the issues they cover, and we apply a general judgment standard to all issues on which there are no findings. Bock v. Bock, 116 N.E.3d 1124, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Under a general judgment standard, we may affirm on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Hickey v. Hickey, 111 N.E.3d 242, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[10] Whether we are reviewing specific findings or applying a general judgment standard, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d at 761. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the court's decision. Cleary v. Morlan, 278 N.E.3d 809, 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).

[11] Further, the trial court has broad discretion in dividing the marital estate, and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Goodman v. Goodman, 94 N.E.3d 733, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. “A party who challenges the trial court's division of marital property must overcome a strong presumption that the court considered and complied with the applicable statute.” Wanner v. Hutchcroft, 888 N.E.2d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[12] “The division of marital property involves a two-step process.” Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 226 (Ind. 2022). “First, the trial court must identify the property to include in the marital estate.” Id. at 226-27. The estate consists of both assets and liabilities. Id. at 227. The estate also includes property acquired both before the marriage and during the marriage, whether purchased separately by either spouse or jointly. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a) (1997).

[13] Second, once the court identifies the marital estate, it must divide the property. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227. By statute, the trial court “shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable[,]” but a party may rebut the presumption with evidence. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5 (1997). When considering an unequal division of the marital estate, the court may consider factors including:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

Id.

[14] Thomas argues that the trial court erroneously excluded Lisa's pension account from the marital estate, noting that the decree of dissolution does not mention the pension. The parties have the burden to produce evidence as to the value and existence of marital assets. Conner v. Conner, 666 N.E.2d 921, 926 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Thomas and Lisa both testified generally about her pension, and Lisa provided a pension statement reflecting her potential monthly benefits if she had retired in August 2024. But neither party included Lisa's pension on their lists of marital assets and liabilities. And although Thomas asked the trial court to award him fifty percent of the pension account's value that accrued during the marriage, he did not present a coverture fraction calculation, or any other evidence, to support his claim. By comparison, the parties provided valuations for Lisa's 401(k) account, which we discuss below. Based on Thomas's failure to provide any evidence as to the value he claimed he was owed, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by omitting the pension as a marital asset. Cf. Bock, 116 N.E.3d at 1126-27 (determining trial court did not err in including survivor's pension benefit in marital estate; Wife provided extensive valuation evidence for pension benefit and survivor's benefit).

[15] Thomas next argues that the trial court erroneously excluded the full value of Lisa's 401(k) account from the marital estate and considered only the value derived from the coverture fraction. We disagree because we read the paragraph quoted above in paragraph [6] as including the 401(k) account in the marital estate, setting aside to Lisa the value that accrued prior to the marriage, and equally dividing between the parties the amount that accrued during the marriage.

[16] Even if the trial court included only the coverture fraction in the marital estate, any error is not grounds for reversal. The parties presented evidence regarding the full value of the 401(k) account, and Lisa provided a coverture fraction calculation. Further, the trial court considered the full value of the 401(k) account in context with other marital assets and liabilities, including the marital residence and Thomas's business. Although the required practice is to include the full value of a retirement account in the marital estate, the trial court's findings were sufficient to explain its division of marital assets and liabilities, and any error does not require reversal for further proceedings. See Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 229 (concluding trial court did not abuse discretion in dividing marital estate; trial court may have erroneously excluded premarital values of retirement accounts from marital estate, but court expressly considered full value of accounts along with all other assets and liabilities).

Conclusion

[17] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We use the parties’ first names to avoid confusion. Lisa testified that she wanted the trial court to allow her to revert to a previous last name, but the decree of dissolution does not address this issue.

2.   “The ‘coverture fraction’ formula is one method a trial court may use to distribute pension or retirement plan benefits to the earning and non-earning spouses.” In re Marriage of Preston, 704 N.E.2d 1093, 1098 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Under this methodology, the value of the plan is multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the period of time during which the marriage existed (while pension rights were accruing) and the denominator is the total period of time during which pension rights accrued. Id.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.