Nancy L. Ball, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Nancy Ball appeals her conviction for battery resulting in bodily injury as a Class A misdemeanor, arguing the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce evidence of the victim's statements to law enforcement officers. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 28, 2023, Ball physically attacked Tia Reisz while they were at Steven Steinbicer's property in Elkhart County. Reisz called 911, and Officer Rebecca Graybill arrived approximately ten minutes later. Reisz, although hysterical, identified Ball as the perpetrator. Reisz was still upset and emotional when Officer Austin Loucks arrived a few minutes later to assist with the investigation. Both officers, whose body-worn cameras captured the interaction, remained at the scene until a third officer arrived to take Reisz's statement.

[3] In the months following the altercation, there were several times that Ball provided Reisz with basic necessities. Then, on December 1, the State charged Ball with battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor,¹ and interference with reporting of a crime, a Class A misdemeanor.² The trial court scheduled an initial hearing for January 5, 2024, but Ball failed to appear. The court issued a warrant for her arrest, and Ball was ultimately apprehended on February 1.

[4] While she was incarcerated, Ball made a series of eight phone calls to her acquaintances, Robert Hawkins and Adam Motheral. In one of the first calls, Ball asked Motheral if he could “look at” her charges because “[he] know[s] a lot of people.” State's Exhibit 9 at 01:44-01:44, 01:48-01:49. Motheral agreed, stating “[he] could make that go ․ no problem” and “[he] could make [Reisz] very happy.” Id. at 02:12-02:15, 02:25-02:27. Ball noted “[she didn't] mean anything mean.” Id. at 02:20-02:23.

[5] Several calls later, Hawkins told Ball he reached out to Reisz, who was willing to tell the prosecutor “she wasn't injured and she doesn't want any ․ charges pressed against ․ [Ball].” Id. at 05:55-06:09. In another call, Hawkins said that Reisz received victim assistance paperwork from the prosecutor's office, part of which asked for her opinion on the case. Reisz was planning to ask for “time served” and to let the prosecutor know Ball had helped Reisz, and the pair had “worked everything out.” Id. at 08:20-08:47. Hawkins also said Reisz “was not going to show up to court either.” Id. at 08:47-08:48. In the next call, Hawkins indicated he was taking the day off work to drive Reisz to the courthouse so she could file the paperwork.

[6] Hawkins posted Ball's bond on February 28. On the same day, Reisz filed a petition ³ and letter with the trial court. In the letter, Reisz stated Ball should receive a time served sentence because Ball provided her with food, a cell phone, and other necessities after discovering she was homeless. Reisz also indicated Ball had apologized and Reisz forgave her. While out on bond, Ball continued to provide Reisz with “[c]lothing, food, [and] shelter” and even “did her laundry for her, gave her [rides], [and] fed her dog.” Transcript at 75.

[7] The case proceeded to jury trial on September 11, 2025. The State first called Officer Loucks and moved to admit his body camera footage as State's Exhibit 8. When Ball objected, the trial court removed the jury from the courtroom and heard arguments on the matter. Specifically, Ball objected “to any statements made on the body cam footage as being testimonial in nature.” Id. at 56. In response, the State “indicated that [the statements] fall under the hearsay exception under excited utterance, and thus, would not be testimonial.” Id.

[8] In support of its argument, the State questioned Officer Loucks about the emergency level of the situation. Officer Loucks first noted Steinbicer's heavily wooded property was very large and included several buildings. He expressed that his level of concern heightened when Reisz informed him that Ball and Steinbicer were present during the altercation because their whereabouts were unknown.

[9] After reviewing State's Exhibit 8, the trial court ruled that “all of the statements made at the very beginning of State's Exhibit 8 up to one minute and 40 seconds fall within the hearsay exception of [Rule] 803(2) as an excited utterance, are non-testimonial in nature, and [are] therefore admissible under a hearsay exception.” Id. at 68 (first alteration in original). Then the court admitted the first one minute and forty seconds of State's Exhibit 8 over Ball's objection.

[10] After ruling Reisz's initial statements fell under a hearsay exception, the trial court then examined whether Reisz's remaining statements in State's Exhibit 8 were admissible through forfeiture by wrongdoing. The State called Amanda Jones, the logistics lieutenant at the Elkhart County Sheriff's Office, who took all the phone calls Ball made while she was incarcerated and put them onto one disc. The court admitted the calls as State's Exhibit 9 without objection. Then, at the State's request, the court took judicial notice of the subpoena served on Reisz and her failure to appear for trial.

[11] In response, Ball admitted she did favors for Reisz and provided her with various necessities after she posted bond. Then, she argued “there's nothing in [State's Exhibit 9] suggesting that there [were] any threats or other attempts to get [Reisz] not to cooperate.” Id. at 77. The trial court disagreed, reasoning that “[t]he conduct and natural consequences support the inference that [Ball] made attempts to have [Reisz] unavailable, at [Ball's] direction to other individuals, and had a purpose of making [Reisz] unavailable.” Id. at 79. It thus concluded “the State ha[d] proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [Ball]’s acts ․ made [Reisz] unavailable for testimony ․” Id. The court then admitted the entirety of State's Exhibit 8 over Ball's objection.

[12] Later, when the trial resumed, the State called Officer Graybill and moved to admit her body camera footage as State's Exhibit 6. Ball raised the “[s]ame objection” she made for State's Exhibit 8, and again the trial court admitted the exhibit over the objection. Id. at 101. Ultimately, the jury found Ball guilty of battery and not guilty of false informing. The court sentenced her to thirty days in the Elkhart County Jail. Ball now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Testimonial vs. Nontestimonial Statements

[13] Ball raises three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce evidence of Reisz's statements to law enforcement officers. Specifically, Ball argues the admission of the statements violated her right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

[14] We generally “review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court's discretion,” which occurs when “the decision [was] clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances ․” Taylor v. State, 278 N.E.3d at 1221, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). “However, when a claim of error in the admission of evidence is based upon the violation of a constitutional right, our standard of review is de novo.” Doyle v. State, 223 N.E.3d 1113, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), reh'g denied.

[15] First, Ball contends the statements were testimonial and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. This clause states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ․ to be confronted with the witnesses against [her].” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “This right allows the admission of an absent witness's testimonial out-of-court statement only if the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.” Scott v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1148, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis added), trans. denied.

[16] Statements “are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ․ ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the [police] interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). Conversely, “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Id. The Davis Court considered several factors to determine whether a statement was testimonial, including:

(1) whether the declarant was describing past events or current events, (2) whether the declarant was facing an ongoing emergency, (3) whether the questions asked by law enforcement were such that they elicited responses necessary to resolve the present emergency rather than learn about past events, and (4) the level of formality of the interrogation.

Collins v. State, 873 N.E.2d 149, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. But these factors are not exhaustive. Id. at 154 n.2.

[17] Here, Reisz's statements to Officers Graybill and Loucks were captured in State's Exhibits 6 and 8, respectively.⁴ We begin by analyzing the statements under the four-factor test outlined above.

[18] When Officer Graybill arrived on scene, Reisz immediately began rattling off events which had occurred moments earlier. Namely, she said, “Ball just beat me up” and explained that Ball attacked her while Reisz was there to pack her own belongings. State's Ex. 6 at 00:14-00:16. Then, Officer Graybill asked several questions to elicit responses necessary to resolve the present emergency. Specifically, she asked Reisz for her name and date of birth and if she lived on the property. She also asked Reisz who attacked her. The questioning was informal; Officer Graybill was ascertaining the nature of the emergency and gathering information about who was involved.

[19] Throughout this portion of questioning, Reisz was facing an ongoing emergency. As Officer Loucks testified at trial, Steinbicer's property was very large, with a long driveway leading to a heavily wooded area. Reisz mentioned that, in addition to Ball, Steinbicer was present on the property during the altercation, and he had previously threatened to kill her. And at that time, Steinbicer's and Ball's exact whereabouts were unknown. Based on these facts, we see no error in the trial court's conclusion that Reisz's statements in the first portion of the interrogation ⁵ were nontestimonial and thus not subject to the Confrontation Clause.

[20] As the questioning progressed, however, Officer Graybill asked Reisz to “start at the beginning on what happened [that day].” Id. at 04:33-04:35. At that point, Officer Graybill's questions were such that they inquired about past events, and Reisz began describing what happened leading up to the point of the altercation. Officer Loucks joined the conversation and asked additional questions about events before the attack. On the whole, the interrogation became more formal and segued into Reisz providing a statement to a third officer who arrived later. Based on these facts, we agree with the trial court that Reisz's statements made in the second portion of the interrogation ⁶ were testimonial.

2. Excited Utterance

[21] Although the first portion of Reisz's statements were not inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, our analysis does not end there. Specifically, the nontestimonial statements still must satisfy the rules of evidence to be admissible. To that point, Ball argues the nontestimonial “statements did not satisfy the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule ․” Appellant's Brief at 9. We disagree.

[22] Under Indiana Rule of Evidence 803(2), “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused[,]” is “not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness.” We consider several factors to determine whether a statement was an excited utterance, “including the declarant's physical and emotional condition, the nature of the startling event, whether the declarant had the opportunity to cool down, and whether the statement was made spontaneously.” Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 459 (Ind. 2026). “The logic behind admitting excited utterances is that the startling event and absence of opportunity for cool reflection make statements more reliable and reduce the likelihood of fabrication.” Id.

[23] Here, Ball attacked Reisz, which amounts to a startling event. And when Reisz called 911, Ball doubled down on the attack and continued to hit Reisz. Officer Graybill arrived just ten minutes later to find Reisz crying, breathing heavily, and pacing back and forth. She had multiple scratch marks on her face, arms, and back. In between sobs, she blurted out, “Ball just beat me up.” State's Ex. 6 at 00:14-00:16.

[24] As Officer Graybill began asking questions, Reisz talked swiftly through deep breaths. Reisz remained in this excited state for several more minutes, until shortly after Officer Louck's arrival. In total, Reisz's statements occurred within just fifteen minutes of Ball's attack. Reisz was still under the stress of the attack and had no opportunity for cool reflection. Based on these facts, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that Reisz's nontestimonial statements met the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. Thus, the trial court did not err when it admitted the statements over Ball's objection.

[25] Even if the trial court erred in admitting Reisz's statements to the officers, the error was harmless. “When reviewing an alleged error that is not of constitutional dimension, the error is harmless if its ‘probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.’ ” Carr, 274 N.E.3d at 460 (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A)). “Ultimately, the error's probable impact is sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied, cert. denied.

[26] Here, the State provided significant evidence of Ball's guilt, including the audio and computer aided dispatch (CAD) notes from Reisz's 911 call wherein Reisz states that Ball attacked her. In addition, Officer Graybill testified “the first thing that [Reisz] said to [her] was something to the effect of, ‘Nancy Ball did this to me. Nancy Ball did this to me[.]’ ” Tr. at 100. And in one of the jail calls to Hawkins, Ball admitted “I just got f*****g heated” when describing her interaction with Reisz during the altercation. State's Ex. 9 at 17:56-17:57. Moreover, the State admitted photos of Reisz which showed scratch marks on her face, arms, and back, consistent with a physical altercation. Because of this independent, cumulative evidence, we cannot say that the admission of Reisz's statements to the officers undermined our confidence in the outcome in this case. Thus, any error in their admission was harmless.

3. Forfeiture by Wrongdoing

[27] Finally, Ball claims that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Ball committed forfeiture by wrongdoing as to the testimonial statements. We disagree. As previously noted, under the right to confrontation, “a witness's out-of-court testimonial statements may be admitted at trial only if (1) the declarant is unavailable to testify and (2) the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” Carr, 274 N.E.3d at 455. But a defendant may forfeit her right to confrontation “when [her] own wrongdoing causes the witness to be unavailable to testify at trial.” Id. This doctrine, known as forfeiture by wrongdoing, is encompassed by Indiana's rules of evidence. Specifically, under Indiana Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), “[a] statement offered against a party that has engaged in or encouraged wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness for the purpose of preventing the declarant from attending or testifying” is “not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.” This doctrine “protects the integrity of judicial proceedings.” Carr, 274 N.E.3d at 455.

[28] Here, Ball does not argue that Reisz was available. To the contrary, Ball acknowledges “[t]he State ․ established ․ that a subpoena had been issued for Reisz, that service was returned, and that Reisz was not present in the courthouse at 1:05 p.m. on the day of trial.” Appellant's Br. at 10. Rather, Ball claims she did not cause Reisz's unavailability.

[29] A defendant will be found to have caused a witness’ unavailability “where, in undertaking the actions that rendered the witness unavailable, the defendant had in mind the particular purpose of making that witness unavailable.” Doyle, 223 N.E.3d at 1121. “We may infer a defendant's intent to silence a witness ‘from [her] conduct and the natural consequences thereof.’ ” Id. (quoting Smoots v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1279, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The act of making a witness unavailable for trial may be direct or indirect through the recruitment of others to act on the defendant's behalf. See Smoots, 172 N.E.3d at 1287 (inferring the defendant prevented the victim from testifying at trial by directing others to threaten the victim). “The timing of a defendant's actions is probative of ․ her intent on this issue.” Doyle, 223 N.E.3d at 1122. The State has the burden to show “by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant forfeited [her] right to confrontation ․” Smoots, 172 N.E.3d at 1287. To determine whether the State met its burden, “[w]e consider evidence from the forfeiture hearing and the trial ․” Id.

[30] In the months following the altercation, Ball provided Reisz, whom she knew was homeless, with necessities several times. Then, while Ball was incarcerated, she asked Hawkins and Motheral to help Ball. First, she asked Motheral to investigate her charges, to which he agreed and responded “[he] could make [Reisz] very happy.” State's Ex. 9 at 02:25-02:27. Next, Ball relied on Hawkins to communicate with Reisz, which culminated in Hawkins driving Reisz to the courthouse so she could file the letter with the trial court. Notably, Reisz's letter describes exactly what Hawkins communicated to Ball: Reisz asked that Ball be sentenced to time served, detailed everything Ball had done for her after the attack, and stated the two had since made up. And after Ball posted bond, she continued to provide Reisz with various necessities and favors.

[31] In sum, Ball's conduct was both direct and indirect. Specifically, before and after incarceration, Ball provided items to and completed tasks for Reisz. While she was incarcerated, she relied on Hawkins and Motheral to do her bidding. Throughout, Ball knew Reisz was homeless, a particularly vulnerable state which made her more prone to accept Ball's gratuities. As a natural consequence of Ball's actions, Reisz did not comply with the subpoena to testify at Ball's trial. From these actions, we may infer Ball's intent to silence Reisz. See Doyle, 223 N.E.3d at 1121 (inferring intent to silence from conduct and natural consequences thereof). In other words, Ball “engaged in or encouraged wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of [Reisz] as a witness for the purpose of preventing [Reisz] from attending or testifying.” Ind. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). We therefore find no error in the trial court's conclusion that Ball forfeited her right to confront Reisz, and the trial court did not err by admitting the statements over Ball's objection.

[32] Even if Ball did not forfeit her confrontation rights, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A violation of the Confrontation Clause will be affirmed if “the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Carr, 274 N.E.3d at 458 (quoting Koenig v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (Ind. 2010)). “To determine whether the State met its burden, we consider several factors such as the significance to the State's case of the allegedly improperly admitted evidence, whether that evidence was ‘merely cumulative,’ and ‘whether it was corroborated or contradicted by other evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Taylor v. State, 271 N.E.3d 559, 563 (Ind. 2025)).

[33] Here, there was significant evidence to support Ball's battery conviction besides Reisz's statements to the officers. As noted above, the State introduced Reisz's 911 call and Officer Graybill's testimony wherein Reisz named Ball as her attacker; Ball's admission that things were heated between her and Reisz at the time of the altercation; and photos of Reisz post-attack. Based on this independent, cumulative evidence, we conclude that any violation of Ball's confrontation rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conclusion

[34] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[35] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (d)(1) (2020) (amended July 1, 2023).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-45-2-5(1) (2002).

3.   Reisz's petition simply states “[she was] giving the judge a letter [she] personally wrote,” because she believed Ball was innocent. Appellant's Appendix Volume 2 at 20.

4.   We note that the footage in the exhibits overlaps when Officer Loucks arrives on scene.

5.   Ending at 4:35 in State's Exhibit 6 and 1:50 in State's Exhibit 8.

6.   Beginning at 4:35 in State's Exhibit 6 and 1:50 in State's Exhibit 8.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.