IN RE: L.L. and A.C. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.L. (Mother) appeals the trial court's determination that her children, L.L and A.C. (collectively, the Children), are children in need of services (CHINS). We conclude the trial court did not clearly err in its determination and affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and P.J. (Father P.J.) are the parents of L.L. (born October 2018). Mother and B.C. (Father B.C.) are the parents of A.C. (born October 2019). Mother has primary custody of the Children.

[3] In May 2025, Mother contacted Father P.J. and his mother, M.J. (Grandmother), with whom Father P.J. lived, and “asked if [they] would take [the Children] for the summer.” Transcript at 70. The three agreed that until school started in the fall, the Children would stay with Father P.J. and Grandmother more frequently while Mother worked and attended therapy.¹ But when the school year began, the Children continued to live with Father P.J. and Grandmother.

[4] In October, Mother called Grandmother and said she was moving to Oregon. Two days later, Mother delivered “bunk beds, some clothes, books, and some Christmas décor” to Grandmother and left the state. Id. Before Mother left, the three agreed the Children would stay with Father P.J. and Grandmother through winter break and then move to Oregon with Mother.

[5] On November 3 and again on November 11, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received reports alleging the Children were victims of physical abuse and neglect. Specifically, it was alleged Father P.J. excessively disciplined A.C. At the request of family case manager (FCM) Jaylin Coleman, Mother returned to Indiana.

[6] On November 12, Mother, Father P.J., and the Children met at the DCS office to discuss the allegations and create a plan for Mother to take the Children to Oregon. When Father P.J. disagreed with the plan, Mother shoved him into the mounted television, which dislodged and broke the television and put a hole in the wall. Mother was arrested and charged with domestic battery.² To keep the Children together with Grandmother, DCS required Father P.J. to leave the home. Having nowhere else to live, Father P.J. moved to Idaho with a friend. The Children remained with Grandmother under an emergency detention.

[7] On November 13, DCS filed two petitions alleging the Children were CHINS. The petitions contained nearly identical factual allegations based, in relevant part, on (1) the November 3 and 11 reports, (2) the altercation at the DCS office, (3) Mother, Father P.J., and Father B.C.’s failure to provide the Children “with a safe and stable home safe from domestic violence,” and (4) Father P.J.’s “significant DCS and criminal history for physical abuse.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 9.

[8] The following day, the trial court held an initial hearing. Mother, Father P.J., and Father B.C. all denied that the Children were CHINS. When the parties discussed detention and visitation, DCS clarified that the allegations in the November reports were unsubstantiated. Based on this information and DCS's recommendations, the trial court continued the Children's placement with Grandmother, ordered supervised visitation with Mother and Father B.C., and granted unsupervised visitation with Father P.J. The trial court scheduled mediation for December 22, and it set a fact-finding hearing for January 12. At mediation, Father B.C. withdrew his denial and admitted the CHINS allegations.

[9] The fact-finding hearing proceeded as scheduled on January 12, 2026. At the outset, Father P.J. withdrew his denial of the allegations and waived fact-finding. The primary focus of DCS's case in chief was the presence of domestic violence in the Children's lives.

[10] First, the FCM and Father P.J. recounted the details of the physical altercation between Mother and Father P.J. at the DCS office on November 12. Then, Father P.J. described physical incidents between him and Mother where Mother would block him in a room and prevent him from leaving or contacting the police. Further, he noted that Mother also verbally abused him. Later, Mother stated that there were approximately ten domestic violence incidents between her and Father P.J. during their relationship, which ended before L.L. was born. Finally, Father P.J. detailed his criminal history of physical abuse when he admitted he had two prior “counts of domestic,” one of which was for smacking L.L. when she was an infant. Tr. at 62. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

[11] On February 2, the trial court issued an order adjudicating the Children as CHINS. The trial court found, in relevant part: (1) “The November 12, 2025, incident of domestic violence was not the first incident of domestic violence between Mother and [Father P.J.] The domestic violence between Mother and [Father P.J.] began approximately nine years ago”; (2) “Mother has not taken any action or participated in services to alleviate domestic violence in the home”; and (3) “Mother needs to engage in domestic violence services to ensure the [Children] will not continue to be at a heightened risk of exposure to domestic violence.” Appellant's App. at 17, 22. Then, the trial court concluded, in relevant part, (1) the Children's “physical and mental conditions are seriously endangered by [their] exposure to domestic violence ․”; and (2) “the coercive intervention of the court is necessary to ensure that Mother can appropriately care for the [Children], eliminate violence in the family home, and ensure that the [Children are] protected from ongoing domestic violence.” Id. at 18-19, 23.

[12] At the February 25 dispositional hearing, Mother indicated that, in accordance with DCS's recommendations, she was scheduled to continue her individual therapy and to begin homemaker services. Mother objected, however, to participating in the batterers intervention program. The trial court noted Mother's objection, but it ultimately adopted DCS's requested dispositional orders, including orders for Mother to participate in homemaker services, batterers intervention, and individual therapy. It also continued the Children's placement with Grandmother. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] When the State alleges a child needs services, it “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re K.A.H., 119 N.E.3d 1115, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)). On appeal, we defer to the trial court's judgment and “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. “We consider only the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. We will affirm unless “the decision of the juvenile court was clearly erroneous.” Id.

[14] Here, the trial court sua sponte issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. In such a case, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the court's findings. In re K.B., 24 N.E.3d 997, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). First, we “consider whether the evidence supports the factual findings.” Id. “Second, we consider whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. We will reverse an issue covered by the findings only if the court's judgment was clearly erroneous. In re Ar.B., 199 N.E.3d 1232, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or “if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997). For any issue not covered by the findings, we apply “the general judgment standard, which provides that a judgment ‘will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.’ ” Ar.B., 199 N.E.2d at 1237 (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied).

[15] Here, DCS alleged the Children were CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Our Supreme Court has summarized the statute as “requir[ing] three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287.

[16] “The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to ‘protect children, not punish parents.’ ” In re A.B., 245 N.E.3d 644, 649-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106). “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child” and “is not a determination of parental fault but rather is a determination that a child is in need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without intervention of the court.” Ar.B., 199 N.E.3d at 1238 (quoting N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105).

[17] The crux of Mother's argument on appeal is that DCS's CHINS petitions and, in turn, the trial court's findings, “rested primarily on a single, isolated incident which ultimately did not lead to a criminal conviction, and was not witnessed by the [C]hildren.” Appellant's Brief at 11. She refers to her altercation at the DCS office where, with the FCM present, Mother pushed Father P.J., broke the mounted television and caused a hole in the wall, resulting in her arrest and domestic battery charge. However, DCS presented evidence of, and the trial court found, much more than this single incident of domestic battery. To the contrary, the trial court noted that this was the most recent incident in a nine-year history of domestic violence.

[18] It is well settled that “[a] child's exposure to domestic violence can support a CHINS finding.” A.B., 245 N.E.3d at 650. Notably, “a single incident of domestic violence in a child's presence may support a CHINS finding, and it need not necessarily be repetitive.” In re D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). And though here the Children were not present in the same room with Mother and Father P.J. when the incident at DCS occurred, this Court has long held that a child's exposure to domestic violence may endanger their mental health. In re L.T., 145 N.E.3d 864, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “[T]he CHINS statute does not require the juvenile court and DCS to wait until a child is physically or emotionally harmed to intervene; rather, a child may be determined to be a CHINS if his or her physical or mental condition is endangered.” A.B., 245 N.E.3d at 650.

[19] Nevertheless, Mother argues that this case is controlled by In re Ad.M., 103 N.E.3d 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), and is analogous to D.P. But neither case is directly on point. First, Ad.M. involved “a single incident of domestic violence between” the parents. Id. at 714 (emphasis added). Moreover, by the time of the CHINS adjudication, Mother had moved away from and filed for a protective order against Father. Id. at 714-15. This Court therefore concluded there was “[in]sufficient evidence to show that the single incident of domestic violence seriously endangered [Ad.M.]” and reasoned “the domestic violence [in that case] was neither ‘ongoing’ nor over ‘several incidents.’ ” Id.

[20] Similarly, in D.P., Father was charged with an instance of domestic battery against Mother. 72 N.E.3d at 984. However, “there was no evidence that domestic violence ever occurred in D.P.’s presence[,]” or “evidence as to the impact of the incident upon D.P.” Id. To the contrary, all this Court had before it was “the fact that Father was charged.” Id. Accordingly, this Court reversed, reasoning that it could not “conclude that one arrest for that crime automatically makes the accused and alleged victim's child a CHINS without any evidence as to the details of the alleged incident.” Id. at 984-85.

[21] The case here is distinguishable. While Ad.M. and D.P. addressed single instances of domestic violence, they failed to show a pattern of domestic violence supporting an inference of harm to the children. And unlike D.P., DCS presented evidence of the altercation at the DCS office, namely FCM Coleman's and Father P.J.’s testimony. While the Children may not have witnessed the altercation, the fact that Mother and Father P.J. fought at the DCS office while the Children were present is concerning. Moreover, there is ample evidence that the altercation was not an isolated occurrence. Specifically, Father P.J. described times when Mother blocked him in a room and prevented him from leaving or contacting the police. Similarly, Mother estimated that she was the victim in approximately ten different domestic violence incidents between the pair.

[22] The pattern of domestic violence in this family is not limited to Mother and Father P.J. Notably, Father P.J. explained that he smacked L.L. when she was an infant, which led to a domestic violence conviction. He also admitted to a second domestic violence conviction, although the details of that offense are unclear from the record. In total, the facts point towards a pattern of domestic violence. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that the Children's physical and mental conditions are seriously endangered and their needs are unmet by their exposure to domestic violence. We now address whether the coercive intervention of the court was required.

[23] The coercive intervention requirement “is a separate and distinct element of a CHINS action” and cannot be inferred from the fact that a child is seriously endangered or impaired and needs services. Id. at 985. The requirement “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.’ ” In re S.V., 276 N.E.3d 652, 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017)). The relevant inquiry “is whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child.” In re E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Because the goal of a CHINS proceeding is to protect the child rather than punish parents, “courts ‘should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.’ ” D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 580 (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290).

[24] Here, we acknowledge that at the time of the dispositional hearing, Mother was scheduled to continue individual therapy and to begin homemaker services, both of which had been recommended by DCS and ultimately ordered by the trial court. But she objected to participating in batterers intervention, a program designed to remedy the domestic violence issues that are the primary reason for the CHINS adjudications in this case. Without coercion, Mother is unlikely to complete the treatment necessary for the benefit of the Children. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that the Children's needs were unlikely to be met without the coercive intervention of the court.

Conclusion

[25] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment that the Children are CHINS.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although A.C. is not related by blood to Father P.J. and Grandmother, she was included in the arrangement so she could spend the summer with L.L., and because Father B.C. was unable to exercise his visitation at that time due to his homelessness.

2.   We take judicial notice that under Cause Number No. 48H02-2511-CM-4198, Mother's domestic battery case was dismissed. See Ind. Evidence Rule 201(b)(5) (“A court may judicially notice ․ records of a court of this state.”).

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.