James A. Alexander, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Savannah Dickey, Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] James A. Alexander filed a small claims action against Savannah Dickey for abuse of process. Following an evidentiary hearing, at which only Alexander appeared and presented testimony, the trial court entered an order denying him relief. Alexander appeals pro se, arguing that the uncontradicted evidence sufficiently established his claim and resulting damages.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On December 16, 2024, Dickey filed a verified petition for a protective order against Alexander. She claimed that Alexander had been harassing her over the past ten months through thousands of text messages, phone calls, and social media messages. When Dickey blocked his phone number, Alexander would create new ones. Dickey alleged that she was fearful of Alexander, who knew where she lived, so she moved from Fort Wayne, Indiana, to San Antonio, Texas in July 2024. Alexander eventually discovered where Dickey was living in Texas and sent her messages informing her of his knowledge. Dickey moved back to Fort Wayne in the beginning of November, and the harassment allegedly continued. Dickey alleged in her petition that she had photos and screenshots as evidence and that she was very fearful of Alexander.¹

[4] The next day, Allen Superior Court issued an ex parte order of protection (the Order) against Alexander. Based on the petition, the court determined that Dickey had shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that stalking had occurred and that Alexander represented a credible threat to her safety. Accordingly, the court enjoined Alexander from threatening to commit or committing acts of stalking against Dickey; prohibited him from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or communicating with her; and ordered him to stay away from her residence, school, or place of employment.

[5] After some apparent difficulty serving Alexander, who lived in Virgina, Alexander was served with the Order ² by mid-January 2025. He then requested a hearing, which the court granted later that month, and an evidentiary hearing was set for April 3, 2025. Alexander was granted permission to appear telephonically. When Dickey failed to appear at the April 2025 hearing, the court dismissed the Order.

[6] On August 11, 2025, Alexander initiated the instant small claims action against Dickey in Allen Superior Court. He sought $4500 in damages, alleging:

[Dickey] knowingly misused the protective order process against me despite not being in any legitimate fear for their safety. This is evidenced by their repeated, anonymous phone calls to me and their complete failure to appear at the scheduled hearing. These mediocre drug addicts were allowed to misuse this process multiple times, thereby depriving me of my rights and causing me distress for nearly a year.

Appendix Vol. 2 at 17. A bench trial was scheduled for March 18, 2026.

[7] Meanwhile, on January 18, 2026, Alexander filed a motion for limited discovery, seeking permission to subpoena AT&T for call records from August 8, 2024, for two phone numbers. He claimed the records were necessary to identify the party or parties responsible for the calls made to him on that date and to prove that the calls occurred as alleged. On February 3, 2026, the trial court granted this motion for limited discovery.

[8] The bench trial was held as scheduled on March 18, 2026. Alexander appeared telephonically; Dickey did not appear. Before testifying, Alexander initially expressed reluctance to take the oath but eventually responded, “well sure, yeah,” when asked if he would testify truthfully. Transcript at 6. Alexander then attempted to ask the trial court about protective orders generally, and the court made clear that its role was not to answer questions or provide legal advice. The court told Alexander that it was his responsibility to testify and present evidence in support of the facts alleged in his notice of claim.

[9] Alexander provided very brief and confusing testimony regarding his claim for abuse of process. Summarized, he testified: Dickey had no reason to label him as “the perpetrator for anything that she was claiming”; she had no facts to back up her allegations; she filed “based on her feelings” and “intuition”, which “should never be enough to ․ request a protective order”; and she failed to pursue the matter through the police and file a police report. Transcript at 8. He also made a passing reference to “spam calling me over 40 plus times in a span of maybe 15, 20 minutes while a protective order was active” but it is unclear whether he was saying that Dickey should have reported this to the police or whether she was the one making those calls. Id. Alexander also noted that the protective order was dismissed when Dickey failed to appear at the hearing in that matter.

[10] When Alexander indicated that he was finished with his testimony, the trial court turned his attention to damages. Alexander explained that the Order was in place between December 17, 2024, and April 3, 2025. He also made vague references to two other protective orders against him that were obtained by others and dismissed around the same time. Alexander claimed that the three protective order matters caused him not to be able to focus as much as he wanted on his work or craft, which remained undefined at trial. And he presented financial documents into evidence, purportedly showing that he makes about $370 per month and that his income went down during the months in question.

[11] The trial court took the matter under advisement and then issued its judgment about a month later. The order provided in relevant part:

1. Plaintiff alleged Defendant previously filed a false protective order against him, and he requested damages for emotional distress.

2. Based upon the evidence submitted by Plaintiff, he has failed to meet his burden of proof that Defendant committed a legal misconduct by filing the previous protective order request against him and that as a result he suffered emotional distress for which he may recover damages.

Appendix Vol. 2 at 7.

[12] Alexander filed a timely motion to correct error on April 27, 2026, arguing that the trial court ignored his uncontradicted testimony establishing that Dickey's fear was fake and that she used the protective order process for a purpose other than protection. Further, he argued that the constant stress from her legal harassment affected his ability to work. The trial court summarily denied the motion to correct error.

[13] Alexander now appeals. Additional information will be provided as needed.

Discussion & Decision

[14] Alexander argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his abuse of process claim despite uncontradicted evidence that Dickey “acted with an intent to harass, lacked the requisite statutory fear to secure an ex parte Protective Order, and caused $1,200 in uncontradicted damages.” Appellant's Brief at 4. But the trial court did not dismiss Alexander's claim; it considered his testimony and evidence and then entered final judgment on the merits against him.

[15] Because Alexander had the burden of proof below, he now appeals a negative judgment. “When a party appeals from a negative judgment, we will reverse only if the decision of the trial court is contrary to law.” Martin v. Ramos, 120 N.E.3d 244, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). That is, we will reverse “if the evidence and reasonable inferences lead to but one conclusion and the trial court [ ] reached the opposite conclusion.” Id. On review, we give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to assess witness credibility. Muldowney v. Lincoln Park, LLC, 83 N.E.3d 130, 132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[16] Although the method of proof may be informal in small claims proceedings, the relaxation of evidentiary rules is not the equivalent of relaxation of the burden of proof. Martin, 120 N.E.3d at 249. “Thus, it remains incumbent upon the party who bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that it is entitled to the recovery sought.” Id.

[17] Alexander's principal argument is that the trial court “arbitrarily disregard[ed]” his uncontradicted testimony and documentary evidence and that the court was “required to accept [this evidence] as fact” because Dickey failed to appear or offer a defense. Appellant's Brief at 5, 6. Generally, however, “factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.” Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); see also Gemmer v. Anthony Wayne Bank, 391 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting appellant's contention that “because his evidence was not met by any contradictory evidence, it must be accepted as true by the trier of facts” and observing that “the evidence as a whole and the circumstances of trial may justify rejection of evidence not directly controverted”). We will not reconsider the court's credibility determination or remove the burden of proof from Alexander.

[18] To establish an abuse of process, Alexander was required to prove two elements: (1) an ulterior purpose or motive and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. See Reichhart v. City of New Haven, 674 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. “A party may not be held liable for abuse of process if the legal process has been used to accomplish an outcome which the process was designed to accomplish.” Watson v. Auto Advisors, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 1017, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[19] The testimony and evidence Alexander presented at the evidentiary hearing was exceedingly slim. He opined that Dickey filed the petition for a protective order not out of fear, but to harass him. As support, he argues that Dickey “launched dozens of masked phone calls to him” while at the same time seeking a protective order against him. Appellant's Brief at 5. But he presented no evidence at trial that she made such calls or that they were made during the protective order process. He directs us to the “formal subpoena for phone records filed with the trial court” that he claims shows Dickey was “concurrently initiating over forty (40) anonymous, masked spam calls to [him] during the month of August 2024.” Id. at 4 (citing Appendix Vol. 2 at 18-20). This motion establishes nothing, and Alexander did not present any evidence at trial that may have been obtained through the subpoena. Further, the motion itself references an undefined number of calls from two numbers made only on August 8, 2024, four months before Dickey initiated the legal proceedings.

[20] Alexander also asserts that Dickey made “unverified statements of fact” in her petition. Id. at 6. On the contrary, she verified the truth of the representations that she made in her petition. See Appendix Vol. 2 at 13. And his claim that she “intentionally abandoned the Protective Order hearing” is not necessarily born out in the record. Appellant's Brief at 6.

[21] In sum, the trial court was not required to credit Alexander's assessment of Dickey's motive or rule in his favor simply because Dickey failed to appear at the small claims hearing. While we need not delve into the issue of damages, we note that the trial court had discretion to reject Alexander's casual attribution of lost income to stress over the Order. Because the trial court's judgment was not contrary to law, we affirm.

[22] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Dickey also checked boxes in the petition indicating that, in addition to committing stalking and repeated harassment, Alexander “threatened to cause physical harm to me” and “placed me in fear of physical harm.” Appendix Vol. 2 at 9.

2.   On appeal, Alexander asserts that he was served with the Order but not the underlying petition, which he claims was a violation of Ind. Code § 35-26-5-9(b). Leaving aside the impropriety of such a collateral attack on the Order, we observe that the cited statutory provision does not even address service or support Alexander's claim of a due process violation.

Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.