John L. Englert, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Gateway Crossing Property Owners Association, Inc., Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2024, John Englert sued Gateway Crossing Property Owners Association Inc. (Gateway) alleging several causes of action. After Englert presented his case-in-chief at the bench trial, the trial court granted Gateway's motion for a directed verdict and dismissed Englert's claims with prejudice. It also granted Gateway's motion for $23,222 in attorney's fees based on a conclusion that Englert's claims were frivolous, groundless, and unreasonable. Englert appeals, arguing the court erred by granting Gateway's motion for directed verdict, failing to enter special findings of fact, and awarding Gateway attorney's fees. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[2] In 2016, Englert bought property in “the Lakes” section of a subdivision developed by Gateway Crossing LLC (Developer). Recorded in 2002, the Declaration for Covenants and Restrictions for the Lakes of Gateway Crossing (Lakes Declaration) provides, in relevant part:

There will be created, under the laws of the State of Indiana, a not-for-profit corporation to be known as The Lakes at Gateway Property Owners’ Association, Inc., hereafter referred to as the “Association”. Every owner of a residential lot in the Development shall automatically be a member of the Association upon the purchase of a lot in the Development.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 123.² The purpose of the Association was to maintain common areas, recreational facilities, street entrances, streetlights, landscaping, and rights-of-way as well as to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations.

[3] Also in 2002, Gateway recorded a Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions for Gateway Crossing (Gateway Declaration), applicable to owners of any real estate within the development. Pursuant to article two of the Gateway Declaration,

[i]n order to provide for the continuing maintenance, operation and administration of the Common Facilities, Developer shall cause a not-for-profit corporation or Association to be formed. All Owners shall become [a] member of the Association ․ and shall continue to be Members for so long as they are an Owner.

Id. at 161. This association's responsibilities included “maintaining the Common Facilities” and enforcing all the covenants and restrictions provided in the Gateway Declaration. Id. at 162. The recorded plat for the Lakes references the Gateway Declaration. Englert's warranty deed contains a clause (which we refer to as the “Subject-to Clause”) providing that his property “is subject to all rights-of-way, easements, agreements, restrictions and limitations of record[.]” Id. at 50.

[4] In 2009, Gateway filed its articles of incorporation with the Indiana Secretary of State. According to its bylaws, Gateway's Board of Directors was tasked with:

[E]stablish[ing] the annual assessment period and fix[ing] the amount of the annual assessment against each member for each Lot owned, ․ all in accordance with the terms of the Declaration and these By-Laws;

․ [F]ix[ing] the amount of any special[ ] assessment against each member for each Lot owned, all in accordance with the terms of the Declaration and these By-Laws;

․

․ [F]oreclos[ing] by action in the same manner as a mortgage the lien against any property for which assessments are not paid within thirty (30) days after due date or ․ bring[ing] an action at law against the Owner or other person personally obligated to pay the same[.]

Id. at 206-07. The bylaws defined “Declaration” as

the Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions for Gateway Crossings Property Owners Association (inclusive of The Valleys, The Lakes and The Woods) filed for record in the office of the Recorder of Hancock County, Indiana on June 30, 2009 and August 22, 2002, as Instrument Numbers 090007186, 0213636, and 020021419[,][3] said Declarations being incorporated herein by reference as if set forth at length herein.

Id. at 203.

[5] From 2016 through 2024, Gateway imposed annual assessments on Englert's property, and Englert paid them. However, in December 2024,⁴ Englert filed a pro-se complaint against Gateway asserting five causes of action: fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, professional incompetence, and negligence. As to fraud, Englert claimed Gateway “purport[ed] itself as the legal entity ․ defined in [the Lakes Declaration], but it is not.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 5. As to breach of contract, he alleged Gateway had violated numerous provisions of its bylaws, Declaration, and the Indiana Code. As to breach of fiduciary duty, Englert claimed Gateway “[f]ail[ed] to operate the Association” in accordance with its governing documents and Indiana law. Id. at 9. As to professional incompetence, Englert listed specific instances which he believed represented Gateway's poor leadership, such as “mak[ing] no effort to raise attendance at annual meetings.” Id. at 10. Lastly, as to negligence, he alleged Gateway failed to operate the Association “in good faith, competently and without harassment.” Id. at 11. As a result, Englert asked the court to “[r]elease [him] and his real property from all ties, liabilities, and encumbrances of [Gateway's] Association” and order that each member of the Board of Directors be removed. Id. at 12. He claimed he was entitled to monetary damages as well as injunctive relief from the annual assessment coming due in January 2025.

[6] Gateway filed its answer and affirmative defenses in March 2025. Englert filed a motion to strike Gateway's affirmative defenses as “vague” and “obstructing [his] claims of fraud and breach.”⁵ In the same motion, he sought summary judgment, asserting there was no genuine issue of material fact and Gateway's “defenses [didn't] refute [his] evidence or legal claims.”⁶ The trial court denied Englert's motion to strike and gave Gateway a deadline to respond to the motion for summary judgment. Gateway filed its response in May, arguing summary judgment was inappropriate because there were still genuine issues of material fact. The court did not immediately rule on the summary judgment matter.

[7] Throughout the summer, Englert filed numerous other motions, including a motion to amend his complaint and a motion to compel discovery and sanction Gateway. The trial court denied his motion to compel and sanction Gateway. He filed a motion to reconsider the denial, which the court also denied. In a supplementary response to Englert's motion to compel discovery and impose sanctions, Gateway filed an affidavit and sought $2,022 in expenses and attorney's fees incurred for opposing his motion, arguing Englert's motion constituted an improper filing. Englert then filed a motion to strike Gateway's affidavit filed in support of its attorney's fees request. After a hearing on several of those outstanding motions, the trial court entered an order on August 18 denying Englert's earlier motion for summary judgment and granting his motion to amend his complaint.⁷ The amendments to his complaint are mostly irrelevant to this appeal other than his addition of several fictitious cases that had not been cited in his original complaint.

[8] At the pre-trial conference on November 17, the trial court addressed several outstanding motions including Gateway's motion for attorney's fees. While the court had signed a proposed order (prepared by Englert) on October 21 purportedly denying Gateway's motion, the court clarified that it did not intend to deny the motion but rather “just [to] set the matter for hearing” that day. Transcript at 11. Ultimately, the court granted Gateway's motion and awarded it $1,000 in attorney's fees for Englert's improper motion to compel discovery.

[9] Englert was the only witness at the bench trial on December 9. He offered twenty-seven exhibits into evidence, consisting of:

• The relevant declarations, plats, articles of incorporation, and bylaws;

• His warranty deed;

• Correspondence with the Indiana Attorney General's Office;

• Billing statements and assessments issued to him by Gateway;

• A notice of intent by Gateway to record a lien on his property;

• His correspondence with Gateway;

• Select Gateway budgeting documents;

• Emails written in 2011 by Mark Frost, a former Gateway board member, and his accompanying affidavit;

• Gateway's discovery responses;

• His correspondence with Gateway's counsel; and

• Documents delineating his alleged damages.

Gateway objected to the admission of several of these exhibits including Frost's affidavit and emails, arguing they were inadmissible hearsay. The trial court sustained Gateway's objection, and Englert did not offer any argument in response.

[10] On cross-examination, Englert confirmed that he paid assessments to Gateway from 2016 until 2024. When Gateway's attorney asked, “[W]hat law provides that the [Subject-to Clause] ․ does not bind you and your Deed ․ to the association[,]” Englert said, “That's going to take me a while to find.” Id. at 40. Gateway also cross-examined Englert about his citations to fictitious and inapplicable case law in his amended complaint, and he admitted that he did not read the cases before citing them. Regarding the inaccurate citations, he testified,

I would believe that doesn't make any difference at this point where ․ I'm not even worried about that whole pile of paper that's been filed before because we're here now and ․ there's no recorded declaration binding my property to Gateway ․ because there's nothing that exist[s] that says I belong to them.

Id. at 46. To explain why he had paid Gateway for so many years without objection, Englert said he “presumed incorrectly [he] was a member” of the association until he read his recorded covenant in 2023. Id. He continued,

This case presents a legitimate documented dispute about real property rights governed by binding Indiana precedent. It required judicial determination because [Gateway] continued issuing bills and threatening [to file] liens without producing any recorded authority. This lawsuit is support[ed] by my chain of title and by Indiana law. It is not frivolous. It was necessary.

Id. at 49.

[11] On re-cross, Gateway's attorney asked Englert whether he was “[t]here to prove that there's been fraud or that the association has breached its contract, that it has breached its fiduciary duty, that it has done any professional incompetence or any negligence[.]” Id. at 51 (cleaned-up). Englert said he was “just focusing on [his] main goal[,]” which was “being released [from the association] and not being harassed by Gateway ․ anymore.” Id. After Englert rested his case, Gateway moved for a directed verdict, arguing Englert “ha[d] not established any of the claims for fraud, bre[a]ch of contract, bre[a]ch of fiduciary duty or professional incompetence and negligence.” Id. at 54. It pointed out that, “in his own words[, he] basically said that he wasn't even here to discuss those matters.” Id. Gateway also requested attorney's fees on account of the “frivolous and unreasonable nature” of the case. Id. The trial court orally granted the motion for a directed verdict, took the motion for attorney's fees under advisement, and instructed Gateway to submit a proposed order memorializing the court's ruling.

[12] Later that same day, Englert filed a motion to correct error based on the trial court's oral ruling. Thereafter, on December 10, the court received and signed Gateway's proposed order, but the order was not entered on the chronological case summary (CCS). However, the court did enter an order denying Englert's motion to correct error and granting Gateway's “motion for attorney's fees pursuant to IC 34-52-1-1 for [Englert's] frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless claims ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 23. The court awarded Gateway $23,222.00 in attorney's fees. After the denial of his motion to correct error, Englert appealed.

Discussion and Decision

1. Jurisdiction

[13] Preliminarily, we find it necessary to address certain procedural issues that occurred below and their impact on our jurisdiction over this appeal. “The only two prerequisites under our appellate rules are (i) the trial court must have entered an appealable order, and (ii) the trial clerk must have entered the notice of completion of [the] clerk's record on the CCS.” In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). The issues in this appeal stemmed from the first requirement.

[14] First and as noted above, although the trial court signed its December 10, 2025 order granting Gateway's motion for a directed verdict, that order was never entered onto the CCS. Consequently, when Englert filed his motion to correct error, there was not yet a judgment, let alone a final judgment, on the record. See Ind. Trial Rule 58(A) (“[U]pon a decision of the court, the court shall promptly prepare and sign the judgment, and the clerk shall thereupon enter the judgment in the Record of Judgments and Orders and note the entry of the judgment in the [CCS] and Judgment Docket.”). Because Englert's motion to correct error was filed before final judgment had been entered, it was premature. See T.R. 59(C) (“[A] motion to correct error, if any, must be filed not later than thirty (30) days after the entry of final judgment is noted in the [CCS].”) (emphasis added).

[15] And though the trial court subsequently entered an order denying Englert's motion to correct error and addressing Gateway's motion for attorney's fees, there was still no order on the CCS that addressed Gateway's motion for a directed verdict. In other words, the court's order on the motion to correct error was not a final judgment because the directed verdict issue remained unresolved per the CCS. See Brooks v. USA Track & Field, Inc., 272 N.E.3d 490, 494 (Ind. 2025) (to be “final,” a judgment must “dispose[ ] of all issues as to all parties, to the full extent of the court to dispose of the same, and put[ ] an end to the particular case as to all of such parties and all of such issues.” (emphasis added) (quoting Bueter v. Brinkman, 776 N.E.2d 910, 912-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002))), reh'g denied.

[16] Thus, upon receipt of this appeal, there was no final judgment on the CCS and we lacked jurisdiction over Englert's appeal. See In re Adoption of S.L., 210 N.E.3d 1280, 1283 (Ind. 2023) (appellate “jurisdiction ‘is generally limited to appeals from final judgments.’ ” (quoting Ramsey v. Moore, 959 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ind. 2012))). However, it seemed that the trial court's failure to enter a final judgment on the CCS was an oversight given its unambiguous oral ruling at trial and the judge's signature on Gateway's December 10 proposed order.

[17] In the interest of judicial economy, we issued an order on August 31, 2026, instructing the trial court to enter the order signed on December 10, 2025, nunc pro tunc to that date.⁸ That same day, the trial court entered its nunc pro tunc order granting Gateway's motion for a directed verdict and taking its attorney's fees motion under advisement, making those rulings effective as of December 10, 2025. Subsequently, the Clerk filed an amended notice of completion of the clerk's record reflecting these additional procedural actions. Because the August 31 nunc pro tunc order resolved the outstanding issue before the trial court, and the Clerk filed an amended notice of completion of the clerk's record, Englert now appeals from a final judgment and our jurisdiction is secure. See Town of Ellettsville v. Despirito, 87 N.E.3d 9, 11 (Ind. 2017) (noting that appellate jurisdiction is secure where final judgment is entered prior to the notice of completion of the clerk's record). We therefore proceed to the merits.

2. Gateway's Motion for a Directed Verdict

[18] We first note that Englert proceeds in this matter pro se. As a self-represented litigant, he is “held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied. Englert is bound to follow our Rules of Appellate Procedure “and must be prepared to accept the consequences of [his] failure to do so,” including “waiver for failure to present a cogent argument on appeal.” Id. at 984.

[19] Englert argues “the trial court erred by terminating the bench trial before [Gateway] was required to present evidence establishing its claimed authority.” Appellant's Brief at 13. Essentially, Englert contends the trial court erred by granting Gateway's motion for a directed verdict. Because motions for a directed verdict are inapplicable in bench trials, we review them as motions for involuntary dismissal under Indiana Trial Rule 41(B). Vega v. City of Hammond, 80 N.E.3d 904, 909 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). That rule provides:

(B) Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. After the plaintiff or party with the burden of proof upon an issue, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence thereon, the opposing party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the weight of the evidence and the law there has been shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff or party with the burden of proof, the court, when requested at the time of the motion by either party shall make findings if, and as required by Rule 52(A). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision ․ operates as an adjudication upon the merits.

T.R. Rule 41(B).

[20] A motion to dismiss under Rule 41(B) “tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff's case in chief.” Vega, 80 N.E.3d at 909 (quoting Brown v. Guinn, 970 N.E.2d 192, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). In our review of the trial court's decision to grant Gateway's motion below, we will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. McLean v. Trisler, 161 N.E.3d 1259, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), reh'g denied, trans. denied. We will affirm unless the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous, considering only “the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Id.

[21] Englert claims he “presented a prima facie case by introducing the specific governing documents for the Lakes subdivision, which demonstrated the absence of any grant of authority to [Gateway].” Appellant's Br. at 14. Relatedly, he asserts “the trial court applied the wrong legal framework by evaluating tort elements instead of determining the recorded authority governing plaintiff's property.” Id. at 20. The upshot of Englert's argument is that the trial court erred by analyzing the elements of the claims he asserted instead of focusing on whether Gateway lacks any authority over him or his property.

[22] Throughout this section of his brief, Englert fails to support these naked assertions with cogent reasoning or proper legal authority. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning” and “citations to the authorities[ and] statutes ․ relied on[.]”). Critically, two of the primary “cases” Englert relies on, Greeson v. Seketa, 134 N.E.3d 523, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) and Bennett v. Hidden Valley Lake Property Owners Association, 166 N.E.3d 908, 917 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), do not exist. And most of the other cases Englert cites are either wholly irrelevant to his primary contention or do not stand for the proposition for which he offers them. See Appellant's Br. at 14 (citing Brown v. Guinn, 970 N.E.2d 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)), 17 (citing Johnson v. Dawson, 856 N.E.2d 769, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)), 20 (citing Little Beverage Co., v. DePrez, 777 N.E.2d 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). He provides nothing in the way of legal authority to support his argument that the trial court erred by denying his request for a declaratory judgment and granting Gateway's motion based on his failure to present any evidence in support of his causes of action.

[23] Therefore, Englert has waived appellate review of the Rule 41(B) dismissal of his complaint. Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“A party waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide[ ] adequate citation to authority ․”).

3. Exclusion of Evidence

[24] Next, Englert argues the trial court erred by excluding the Frost emails as inadmissible hearsay. He claims the emails did not constitute hearsay because they “were not offered to prove the truth of any statement contained in them[,]” but rather “to establish that [Gateway] ․ had actual knowledge of the governing document discrepancy at the heart of this dispute.” Appellant's Br. at 28. He thus claims the emails were not hearsay as defined by Evidence Rule 801(c) as they “show[ed] a party's knowledge or awareness of a fact[.]” Id. And in the event the emails did constitute hearsay, Englert argues they fall into the exception under Rule 803(3) regarding a “declarant's then-existing state of mind ․” Ind. Evidence Rule 803(3).

[25] Englert did not present either of these arguments to the trial court. “Issues raised for the first time on appeal are waived[.]” Holtswarth v. Oliver, 279 N.E.3d 360, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). And “[t]o preserve an issue for appeal with respect to the exclusion of evidence, a defendant must make an offer of proof at trial regarding the excluded evidence.” Angulo v. State, 191 N.E.3d 958, 968-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Because Englert did not make a proffer at trial after the court sustained Gateway's objection to the admission of the emails and presents these arguments for the first time on appeal, he has waived them for appellate review.

4. Findings and Conclusions

[26] Englert also argues the trial court erred by failing to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law under Trial Rule 52(A). He claims that Rule 52(A) “requires that in all actions tried without a jury, the court ‘shall find the facts specially and state its conclusions thereon.’ ” Appellant's Br. at 30. However, Englert has neglected key language in Rule 52(A), which provides that except for certain circumstances not applicable here, a court need only issue findings and conclusions “[u]pon its own motion, or the written request of any party filed with the court prior to the admission of evidence[.]” T.R. 52(A). Likewise, when dismissing a case under Rule 41(B), the court need only enter findings if and as required by Trial Rule 52(A) “when requested at the time of the motion by either party ․” T.R. 41(B).

[27] At no point did the trial court here indicate that it would act sua sponte and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, and neither Englert nor Gateway filed a written request that the court do so before trial. Moreover, when Gateway moved for a “directed verdict” at trial, neither Englert nor Gateway asked the court to enter findings under Rule 41(B). Englert's argument therefore is not well taken, and the absence of special findings and conclusions from the trial court was not error.

[28] Similarly, Englert claims the court was required to enter findings and conclusions to support its attorney's fees award, contending that “without findings[,] this Court cannot conduct meaningful appellate review of whether the frivolousness standard was properly applied.” Appellant's Br. at 32. Again, Englert is mistaken. Findings are not required to support an award of attorney's fees. See R.L. Turner Corp. v. Town of Brownsburg, 963 N.E.2d 453, 460-61 (Ind. 2012) (rejecting argument that special findings are required under the General Recovery Rule). As discussed in Part 5, we are still capable of conducting meaningful appellate review of the court's conclusion that Englert's claim was frivolous, groundless, or unreasonable in the absence of special findings. See Williams v. Kirsch, 268 N.E.3d 284, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (reviewing the court's conclusion on that issue absent special findings)

5. Trial Attorney's Fees

[29] Lastly, Englert asserts the trial court erred in awarding Gateway attorney's fees pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-52-1-1. Specifically, he argues his claims were not frivolous. Absent an agreement, statute, or rule to the contrary, Indiana adheres to the “American Rule” under which parties are expected to pay their own attorney's fees. Smyth v. Hester, 901 N.E.2d 25, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), reh'g denied, trans. denied. The statutory “General Recovery Rule” permits a court to

award attorney's fees as part of the cost to the prevailing party, if the court finds that either party;

(1) brought the action or defense on a claim or defense that is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless;

(2) continued to litigate the action or defense after the party's claim or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; or

(3) litigated the action in bad faith.

Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b) (1998).

[30] “[W]here, as here, the court awards attorney's fees without entering findings of fact, we review the court's legal conclusion—that a party litigated in bad faith or pursued a frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless claim—de novo.” Williams, 268 N.E.3d at 287 (emphasis added); see also S. Ind. Propane Gas, Inc. v. Caffrey, 56 N.E.3d 1216, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). The court's decision to award attorney's fees and the amount it awarded are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Williams, 268 N.E.3d at 287.

A claim is ‘frivolous’ if it is made primarily to harass or maliciously injure another; if counsel is unable to make a good faith and rational argument on the merits of the action; or if counsel is unable to support the action by a good faith and rational argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. A claim is ‘unreasonable’ if, based upon the totality of the circumstances, including the law and facts known at the time, no reasonable attorney could consider the claim justified or worthy of litigation. A claim or defense is groundless if no facts exist which support the legal claim relied on and presented by the losing party.

Cnty. Materials Corp. v. Ind. Precast, Inc., 187 N.E.3d 253, 261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Dunno v. Rasmussen, 980 N.E.2d 846, 850-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[31] In our consideration, “we look to the basis of the prevailing party's [attorney fee request] and view the court's order as an implicit legal conclusion consistent with the main thrust of the [request] ․” Caffrey, 56 N.E.3d at 1220 (quoting Gillock v. City of New Castle, 999 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)) (alterations in original). Here, Gateway made an oral motion for attorney's fees at trial which was intertwined with its directed verdict motion, stating,

Your Honor[,] at this time [we] move for a directed verdict with prejudice․ [T]he Plaintiff has not established any of the claims for fraud, bre[a]ch of contract, bre[a]ch of fiduciary duty or professional incompetence and negligence․ [A]nd in his own words ․ basically said that he wasn't even here to discuss those matters․ [S]o at this time we request a directed verdict and ․ we also have a motion for attorney[’]s fees for the ․ frivolous and unreasonable ․ nature of this Court [sic] in the number of pleadings that ․ have been addressed in this case.

Tr. at 54.

[32] A review of the record reveals ample support for the conclusion that Englert's claim was frivolous, as he was “unable to make a good faith and rational argument on the merits of the action.” Cnty. Materials Corp., 187 N.E.3d at 261 (quoting Dunno, 980 N.E.2d at 850). As Gateway noted at trial and on appeal, Englert did not pursue any of the five causes of action laid out in his complaint. For his part, Englert apparently agrees that at trial, he abandoned the claims asserted in his complaint. See Appellant's Br. at 25 (arguing the court erred in dismissing his complaint based on his “fail[ure] to prove the elements of unpursued tort claims”) (emphasis added). Indeed, he presented no argument to the trial court on those causes of action, testifying, “I don't care about [them] ․ I'm just focused on ․ being released and not being harassed by Gateway ․ anymore.” Tr. at 51. And even on that issue, he failed to connect the dots to show that Gateway had no authority over him under Indiana law. Indeed, he offered no legal authority to the trial court or this Court on appeal to show why the entity to which he paid assessments for eight years no longer has authority over him.

[33] Moreover, we find it critical to our analysis that Englert's filings below were filled with case law that either does not exist, was cited incorrectly, or was plainly irrelevant to the statement it was offered to support. For example, in his amended complaint, Englert cited Sunset Sailboat Sales, Inc. v. Trautman, 855 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) to support his fraud claim, but that case does not exist. In that same section—and in numerous other filings—he cited River Ridge Development Authority v. Outfront Media, LLC, 146 N.E.3d 906, 912 (Ind. 2020) to support his assertion that his “Warranty Deed's vague ‘subject to’ clause does not bind” him. Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 20. While that case exists, it has nothing to do with restrictions on property, but rather solely addresses “three grounds that permit a court to shift attorney's fees under Indiana law ․” See River Ridge, 146 N.E.3d at 911.

[34] In Englert's motion to compel discovery, he again cited the non-existent “Sunset Sailboat Sales” case as well as Towne & Terrace Corporation v. City of Indianapolis, 142 N.E.3d 458, 465 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), Spangler v. Bechtel, 958 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2011),⁹ Fetner v. Maury Boyd & Assoc., Inc., 563 N.E.2d 1334, 1337 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), and Wright v. Miller, 989 N.E.2d 792, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We first note that neither Towne & Terrace Corporation nor Wright can be found at those citations.¹⁰ Second, and more importantly, none of those cases even marginally support the assertions for which Englert cited them. And this was a recurring theme throughout his filings, as he incorrectly cited these same cases and their propositions in those as well. And in Englert's supplement to his motion to correct error, he cited two more cases that do not exist: St. Vincent Carmel Hosp., Inc., v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 838 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) and Villa De Este Condo. Ass'n v. McKibben, 31 N.E.3d 978, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[35] Englert's practice of citing fictitious cases also extended to the proposed orders he filed with the trial court—a few of which were signed and entered by the court. For example, on May 9, 2025, the trial court signed an order granting several of Englert's requests, including his Motion to Compel Earlier Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. The order incorrectly cited Wright v. Miller, and it referenced a purported case entitled Kroger Co. v. Blanke, 508 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), but no such case exists. Similarly, on July 7, the trial court adopted another proposed order submitted by Englert that contained three non-existent cases and numerous other citations that had nothing to do with the assertions for which they were cited. The trial court's order of October 21 denying Gateway's motion for attorney's fees was also one of Englert's proposed orders. There, Englert again incorrectly cited both Towne & Terrace Corporation and Wright as well as Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014),¹¹ neither of which supported the proposed findings. The trial court had the ultimate responsibility to review and ensure the accuracy of the orders it signed—and it appears the trial court failed to recognize or call attention to these issues—but Englert also had a responsibility to present legitimate legal authority to the court in the first place.

[36] Englert argues the attorney's fees award should be reversed because the trial court's prior rulings and statements conflict with its later decision to impose attorney's fees. For example, Englert points to the court's October 21 order, one which Englert proposed. On its face, it appeared that the court adopted Englert's findings of fact and denied Gateway's earlier motion for attorney's fees. However, at trial, the court clarified that it intended to address the attorney fee issue at the pre-trial conference. The court said, “[W]e'll show that should have been corrected․ [T]hat was your language and the Court just set the matter for hearing today.” Tr. at 11. Moreover, after the hearing, the court awarded Gateway $1,000 in attorney's fees. Despite the initial confusion about what the court intended by signing the October 21 order, the court's clarification and subsequent award show the court's actions did not conflict with its ultimate conclusion that Englert's claims were frivolous.

[37] Englert also alleges inconsistency between the court's finding of frivolousness and the court's statement at the pre-trial conference reserving the determination of Englert's membership in the property association for trial. Id. at 13. We find no conflict. The court was merely differentiating between the matters it intended to address at the pre-trial conference and matters appropriate for the bench trial. It was not commenting on the legitimacy of Englert's claims. Similarly, and contrary to Englert's contention, the court's statement to him at the end of trial that “it[ was] a difficult issue” does not evince inconsistency. Id. at 55. There, the court was commenting to Englert about the dangers of relying on artificial intelligence when doing legal research and acknowledging the complexity of the issues at hand and the difficulty involved with legal research. The court's statements do not contradict the attorney's fee award.

[38] In light of these facts, we find support in the record to conclude that Englert's claims were frivolous.¹² And given that Englert does not dispute Gateway's affidavit and ledger supporting the amount of attorney's fees sought, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Gateway $23,222.00 in attorney's fees.¹³

Conclusion

[39] Finding the trial court did not err by granting Gateway's motion for directed verdict, by failing to make special findings of fact, or by awarding Gateway attorney's fees, we affirm.

[40] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   There are two other plats in the Gateway Crossing development, called “the Woods” and “the Valleys,” whose respective declarations also provide for the creation of individual property owners associations.

3.   These instrument numbers refer to the Declarations for the Woods, the Valleys, and the Lakes, respectively.

4.   Englert originally filed a complaint in February 2024 under Cause No. 30D01-2402-MI-406, but it was dismissed in June 2024 due to numerous violations of Trial Rule 12.

5.   Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Affirmative Defenses and for Summary Judgment at 3, Englert v. Gateway Property Owners Association, Inc., No. 30C01-2412-MI-2839 (Mar. 11, 2025).

6.   Id. at 4.

7.   Between the time Englert moved to amend his complaint on May 14 and the pre-trial conference on November 17, he filed numerous motions with the court in addition to the motions to amend his complaint and compel discovery. He renewed his motion for summary judgment, sought a temporary restraining order against Gateway to prevent it from recording a lien against his property, sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Gateway from imposing the 2025 and 2026 assessments against him, and filed a demand for a jury trial. And after Gateway filed its answer and affirmative defenses to Englert's amended complaint, Englert filed a motion to strike its affirmative defenses. The court denied Englert's motion for summary judgment and motion to strike. It reserved the matters of Englert's preliminary injunction and his jury trial demand for determination at the pre-trial conference on November 17, both of which were ultimately denied.

8.   August 31, 2026 Order, No. 26A-MI-133.

9.   In his motion, Englert attributed Spangler to this Court, but it is an Indiana Supreme Court decision

10.   There is a 2020 Indiana Court of Appeals opinion entitled Towne & Terrace Corp. v. City of Indianapolis that can be found at 156 N.E.3d 703, not 142 N.E.3d 458. And there is a 2013 opinion entitled Wright v. Miller found at 989 N.E.2d 324, not 989 N.E.2d 792, which was decided by our Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals.

11.   We also note that, in the proposed order, Englert attributed Zavodnik to this Court when it is in fact an Indiana Supreme Court decision.

12.   Because Indiana Code section 34-52-1-1(b)(1) is written in the disjunctive, to affirm, we need only find that Englert's claims were “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless[.]” (emphasis added).

13.   In the conclusion of its appellate brief, Gateway requests that we award it appellate attorney's fees pursuant to Appellate Rule 66(E) based on Englert's “continued harassment of the Court and actions to appeal this matter, despite the absence of any objectively supportable basis for doing so, and [his] continued improper use of fabricated case law[.]” Appellee's Br. at 25. Gateway does not provide the applicable standard for awarding appellate attorney's fees under Rule 66(E) and does not delineate whether it alleges substantive or procedural bad faith. Our discretion in this arena “is limited ․ to instances where an appeal is permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay.” Tipton v. Est. of Hofmann, 118 N.E.3d 771, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). And aside from one sentence in its conclusion, Gateway fails to develop an argument or provide evidence of specific behavior on Englert's part, other than the citation to two fictitious cases in his brief, to support its request. “A strong showing is required to justify an award of appellate damages and the sanction is not imposed to punish mere lack of merit but something more egregious.” Troyer v. Troyer, 987 N.E.2d 1130, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Ballaban v. Bloomington Jewish Cmty., Inc., 982 N.E.2d 329, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Gateway had not made the necessary showing here. Therefore, its request for appellate attorney's fees is denied.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.