Phillip Philizaire, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Phillip Philizaire appeals his conviction and sentence for robbery, as a Level 5 felony. He contends that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his conviction and that his sentence is inappropriate and should be revised pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We affirm.

Facts 1 and Procedural History

[3] On July 13, 2022, three men dressed in all black and wearing ski masks and gloves entered Moyer Fine Jewelers in Carmel. One of the men held the door open while the other two, armed with sledgehammers, began smashing jewelry cases and removing merchandise. Customers and employees ran outside and gathered behind the store, and several people called 911. Meanwhile, the men left the store and drove away, taking “[j]ust a little bit under $593,000” worth of merchandise with them. Tr. v. 2 at 227.

[4] Police responding to the scene spoke to the witnesses who had been present during the robbery and reviewed video footage from the store's security cameras. They were unable to identify the men themselves but determined that the men had left the store in a dark blue Jeep Cherokee with Illinois license plates. That same day, a resident in a nearby neighborhood called the police and reported that she had seen a car drive into the neighborhood and pull over next to another parked vehicle on the side of the street, and that men in black hoodies had jumped out of the car and into the parked vehicle looking “kind of frantic.” Tr. v. 3 at 57. Police went to the neighborhood and found the blue Cherokee there, parked off Viking Lair Road. They towed the vehicle to secure storage and obtained a warrant to search it.

[5] Inside the Cherokee, police found a sledgehammer, broken glass, and an earring, as well as bloodstains on the back seat and floorboards. They ran the VIN number of the Cherokee and found that it had been reported stolen in Illinois. A Carmel Police detective who lived on the street where the Cherokee had been found reviewed footage from his home security cameras and was able to identify the blue Cherokee as well as a white Chevrolet Equinox that passed through the neighborhood several times around the time of the robbery. The security footage showed both cars stopping on the street next to each other shortly after the time of the robbery and several individuals exiting the blue Cherokee and going toward the white Equinox. Police were able to determine the license plate of the white Equinox using FLOCK cameras and found that it was an Enterprise rental car, and it had been rented to Philizaire in Hammond on June 17.

[6] Police analyzed DNA from bloodstains that were found in the jewelry store and in the blue Cherokee, as well as DNA from the sledgehammer. All three DNA samples were matched to a man named DeAngelo McEwen. Cell phone records showed that Philizaire's phone had placed several calls to McEwen's phone on the day of the robbery, including two calls within minutes of when the robbery occurred. It also had placed calls to another phone number; the return data from the latter phone included screenshots of inventory on the Moyer Fine Jewelers website.

[7] Cell phone location data showed that a cell phone registered to Philizaire had traveled from the Chicago area to the neighborhood of the jewelry store immediately before the robbery. The location data also showed that Philizaire's phone had been in the area of the Moyer jewelry store on June 13, just over a month before the robbery, and that it had been at Enterprise car rental on June 17, the day that the white Equinox was rented to Philizaire.

[8] The State charged Philizaire with robbery, as a Level 5 felony, conspiracy to commit robbery, as a Level 5 felony, and theft, as a Level 5 felony. Philizaire's jury trial took place on December 8-10, 2025. At trial, the State presented testimony about the cell phone location data from FBI analyst Nicole Robertson, who explained that during the robbery, Philizaire's phone stayed around the location on Viking Lair Road where the blue Cherokee was ultimately recovered and that it placed several calls to McEwen's phone during that time. The State argued to the jury that Philizaire had been the driver of the white Equinox, which had been the “getaway car[.]” Tr. v. 4 at 210.

[9] Philizaire called McEwen to testify as a defense witness. McEwen had also been charged in connection with the robbery, and he had pleaded guilty but had not yet been sentenced at the time of Philizaire's trial. McEwen testified that he had pleaded guilty to the Moyer robbery and that Philizaire had not been involved in the robbery. On cross-examination, McEwen testified that he knew Philizaire but did not speak to him regularly and had not spoken to him on the day of the robbery. He also testified that he had gotten in the car in Chicago with two strangers who had driven to Westfield and robbed the jewelry store but that he had not known that was what they intended to do. He said that he “typically” wore all black with a ski mask and gloves in July because his “hands get cold” and that he thought the car they had all jumped into to drive back to Chicago was an Uber. Id. at 179.

[10] After deliberation, the jury found Philizaire guilty of all charges. At the January 9, 2026, sentencing hearing, the trial court vacated Philizaire's convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery and theft to avoid double jeopardy concerns and sentenced him only on the robbery conviction. The court identified as an aggravator Philizaire's “substantial criminal history” that included five felony and two misdemeanor convictions, as well as multiple probation violations. Tr. v. 5 at 21. The court acknowledged Philizaire's argument that imprisonment causing hardship on his dependents should be a mitigating factor but noted that Philizaire's two children lived “primarily with their mothers” and that Philizaire himself lived with his parents. Id. The court sentenced Philizaire to six years, with four and one-half years executed in the Department of Correction and one and one-half years on community corrections work release. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Sufficiency of the Evidence

[11] Philizaire challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of robbery, as a Level 5 felony. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction,

we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. We only consider the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence. A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the [fact-finder's] ruling.

Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066-67 (Ind. 2015) (citation modified).

[12] In conducting our review of a criminal conviction, “we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). Moreover, a conviction may be supported by circumstantial evidence and “need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. It is sufficient if an inference drawn from the circumstantial evidence reasonably tends to support the conviction.” Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citation modified).

[13] To support Philizaire's conviction of robbery, as a Level 5 felony, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Philizaire or an accomplice (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) took property (4) from another person or from the presence of another person (5) by using or threatening the use of force on any person or (6) by putting any person in fear. Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(a). To support the robbery conviction under a theory of accomplice liability, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Philizaire (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) aided, induced, or caused (4) another person (5) to commit robbery as a Level 5 felony. See I.C. § 35-41-2-4; see also, e.g., Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 338 (Ind. 2006) (citation modified) (“[O]ne may be charged as a principal yet convicted on proof that he or she aided another in the commission of a crime.”); Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1198 (Ind. 1999) (“In Indiana[,] there is no distinction between the responsibility of a principal and an accomplice.”).

[14] Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Philizaire aided McEwen to commit robbery as a Level 5 felony.² The State's evidence showed that Philizaire's phone had traveled down from Chicago to the neighborhood of Moyer Fine Jewelers on the day of the robbery and that it had remained in the area where the getaway car, which Philizaire had rented, was positioned until McEwen and the other two men returned from the robbery with the stolen merchandise. And, not only did Philizaire rent the getaway vehicle from Enterprise, but his phone location records also showed that he came down to Westfield a month before the robbery and spent around an hour in the area of Moyer Fine Jewelers. Philizaire's phone had placed multiple calls to McEwen's phone during the time that the robbery was happening, and McEwen was connected to the robbery by DNA evidence. Philizaire's phone had also contacted another individual, whose phone contained screenshots of the Moyer website with images of the very items that were subsequently stolen. This was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Philizaire was involved as an active participant in the planning of the robbery and in its execution as the driver of the “getaway car.” Tr. v. 4 at 210.

[15] Philizaire's contentions to the contrary are simply assertions that we should reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility, which we may not do. See, e.g., Willis, 27 N.E.3d at 1066. For example, Philizaire points out that McEwen testified that Philizaire was not involved in the robbery. However, the jury was under no obligation to believe McEwen's testimony, particularly in light of the other unlikely and contradictory claims that he made, such as his assertion that he did not speak to Philizaire despite phone records showing multiple calls between them on the day of the robbery and his claim that he “usually” wore a black ski mask, hoodie, and gloves around town in July. Tr. v. 4 at 179.

[16] The State provided sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Philizaire committed robbery as a Level 5 felony by knowingly or intentionally aiding McEwen and two others to commit robbery as a Level 5 felony. Therefore, we affirm his conviction.

Review under Appellate Rule 7(B)

[17] Philizaire asks that we revise his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) because it is inappropriate. However, Philizaire has waived our review of that claim by failing to comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure.

[18] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that each contention in an appellant's brief must be “supported by cogent reasoning” and “by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal.” When a party refers to facts without citation to the record in support, “we need not consider those facts.” Reed v. City of Evansville, 956 N.E.2d 684, 688 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Similarly, when an appellant provides no citation to legal authority supporting his contentions, those contentions are waived. E.g., Shields v. Town of Perrysville, 136 N.E.3d 309, 312 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). And when an appellant provides no cogent argument for a contention, that contention is waived. See, e.g., Burnell v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1167, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (noting the presentation of the appellant's contentions must contain a clear showing of how the issues and contentions relate to the particular facts of the case under review, and we will not review undeveloped arguments). Thus, under our Appellate Rules, “[i]t is not sufficient for the argument section that an appellant simply recites facts and makes conclusory statements without analysis or authoritative support.” Kishpaugh v. Odegard, 17 N.E.3d 363, 373 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[19] Philizaire's only argument in support of his Rule 7(B) claim is the statement, “The Court's sentence of Mr. Philizaire was inappropriate considering the mitigat[ing] circumstances described by his attorney at trial,” followed by a lengthy direct quotation of his attorney's argument at sentencing. Appellant's Br. at 16. The latter argument contained no citations to the record or to legal authority. And, while Philizaire does state our standard of review of a Rule 7(B) claim, he does not even attempt to provide any reasoning—much less cogent reasoning—showing how the alleged facts ³ as contained in his trial counsel's sentencing argument meet that standard. Instead, he merely concludes, “The sentence is inappropriate when consideration is given for the nature of the offenses [sic] in this matter and due consideration is given to Philizaire's mitigating circumstances as described above.” Id. at 17. Such a recitation of alleged facts with no citations to the record and “conclusory statements without analysis or authoritative support” are insufficient under our Appellate Rules. Kishpaugh, 17 N.E.3d at 373 n.3. Philizaire's Rule 7(B) section of his brief is so deficient as to impede our review; therefore, he has waived our review of that claim. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).

Conclusion

[20] The State provided sufficient evidence to support Philizaire's conviction for robbery, as a Level 5 felony. And Philizaire has waived his Appellate Rule 7(B) claim by failing to comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Philizaire admits that the State proved that McEwen committed Level 5 felony robbery; he alleges only that the State failed to prove he was an accomplice to the robbery.

3.   Of course, statements by trial counsel are not evidence. See, e.g., Bradford v. State, 675 N.E.2d 296, 301 (Ind. 1996).

Bailey, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.