Joel S. Cashen, Appellant-Petitioner/Cross-Appellee v. Amanda M. Cashen, Appellee-Respondent/Cross-Appellant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Joel Cashen (“Father”) appeals the Whitley Circuit Court's order granting Amanda Cashen's (“Mother's”) motion for modification of child support. Father presents three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as two issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it modified Father's child support obligation retroactive to February 6, 2026

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Father to pay some of Mother's attorney's fees.

Mother cross-appeals and asks that we increase the amount of the trial court's attorney's fee award and that we award her appellate attorney's fees.

[2] We affirm. However, we deny Mother's request for appellate attorney's fees.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and Mother were married and have two children together, M.C., born March 11, 2007, and H.C., born July 16, 2008. In October 2022, Father filed a petition to dissolve the marriage, and, in October 2024, Father and Mother entered into a settlement agreement whereby Father had physical custody of M.C. and Mother had physical custody of H.C. Father agreed to pay $65 in weekly child support, and he provided health insurance for both children. The trial court adopted the settlement agreement in the final decree.

[4] In February 2026, Mother filed a petition requesting that the trial court find Father in contempt of the dissolution decree due to his failure to provide health insurance for the children and his four missed child support payments. Mother also filed a motion for modification of child support alleging that: M.C. was “almost” nineteen years old; both Father and Mother had changes to their respective incomes; Father had not been exercising regular overnight visits with H.C.; and the cost of insurance had changed. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 56.

[5] In March, after Father's attorney had withdrawn his representation of Father, Mother filed a motion for a protective order alleging in part:

5. During his Pro Se representation, [Father] has contacted Counsel for [Mother], well over 100 times by email communication requesting an excessive amount of information above and beyond what is necessary to address [Mother's] two recent filings with this Court.

6. On or around February 27, 2026, this Counsel notified [Father] that he would no longer accept email communications from [Father] [because] the volume of his email communications has caused [Mother] annoyance, oppression, undue burden and expense.

7. With that notification, [Father] switched communication to written communications being sent by regular and certified mail.

8. As of this date, [Father] has sent this Counsel well over 40 to 60 letters in an approximately 17-day time period.

Id. at 60.

[6] Following a hearing in April, the trial court granted Mother's motion for modification of child support retroactive to February 6, 2026. The trial court found that Father had not exercised overnight parenting time with H.C. for “over one (1) year” and that “[n]either party has an obligation to pay child support for [M.C.] as she has reached the age of 19.” Id. at 32. The court attached a child support worksheet to support its order revising Father's weekly child support obligation to $158. Further, the trial court found as follows:

The Court has already found that [Father's] filings, discovery requests, and correspondence leading up [to] this hearing were “excessive and unreasonable.” Even after the Court made this finding, [Father, pro se,] continues to file documents with the Court which the Court finds to be unhelpful, unnecessary, and largely undecipherable. The Court believes that either 1) [Father] is making these filings in bad faith and for the purpose of vexing the Court and/or opposing counsel, or that 2) [Father] is confused about the law and unwilling or unable to grasp relatively simple legal concepts. [Mother] requests the Court order [Father] to pay $2500 of her legal expenses which were unnecessarily caused by his unreasonable correspondence and findings. The Court now orders [Father] to pay 1/2 that amount ($1250) directly to counsel for [Mother] within the next 60 days to account for unnecessary legal fees incurred. [Father] is further advised that continued litigation which can objectively [be] categorized as unreasonable will lead to additional future costs assessed to [Father].

Id. at 33.

[7] “Within days” of that order, Father “generated roughly a ream of paper (500 pages) in new filings and communication with [Mother's] counsel.” Id. at 206. Following a hearing on May 5 to address pending issues, the trial court issued an order awarding Mother an additional $750 in attorney's fees. The trial court “suspected that [Father] is utilizing Artificial Intelligence to produce an overwhelming and overcomplicated stream of filings.” Id. at 207. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Initially, we observe that, as he did below, Father has chosen to proceed pro se. It is well-settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Id. at 983-84. These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal. Id. at 984. Where the appellant's noncompliance with appellate rules is so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the alleged errors waived. Id. We will not become “ ‘an advocate for a party[ ] or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.’ ” Id. (quoting Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 106 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied).

Issue One: Modified Child Support Order

[9] Father first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the modified child support retroactive to February 6, 2026, which was more than one month before M.C.’s nineteenth birthday. It is within a trial court's discretion to make a modification of child support relate back to the date the petition to modify is filed, or any date thereafter. Quinn v. Threlkel, 858 N.E.2d 665, 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We will reverse a decision regarding retroactivity only for an abuse of discretion or if the trial court's determination is contrary to law. Id.

[10] The trial court made several findings to support the modification of Father's child support obligation. The court found that: Father's gross weekly income was $1,232.81, and Mother's gross weekly income was $874.78; Father was currently paying $15 per week for the children's health insurance (down from $30 per week in 2024); and Father had not exercised overnight visits with H.C. for more than a year. The court also found that “[n]either party has an obligation to pay child support for [M.C.] as she has reached the age of 19.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 32.

[11] On appeal, Father argues that the trial court's finding that M.C. “has reached the age of 19” does not support the February 6, 2026, retroactivity date because M.C. did not turn nineteen until March 11, 2026. Id. Father maintains that the trial court was required to prepare or adopt two child support worksheets—one to include both children prior to M.C.’s nineteenth birthday and one to include only H.C. thereafter. Father acknowledges the evidence that M.C. had moved out of Father's house well before February 6, 2026. But he maintains that, without any findings on that evidence, the court's order is erroneous.

[12] We hold that any error was harmless under Appellate Rule 66(A), which provides:

No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.

As Mother points out, the trial court heard undisputed evidence that M.C. had “moved out” of Father's house in October 2025 and had been living on her own since then. Tr. p. 15. Thus, Father cannot show that the probable impact of any error, in light of all the evidence in this case, warrants relief on appeal. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's child support modification order.¹

Issue Two: Attorney's Fees

[13] Father's argument on this issue is extremely difficult to discern. Father's argument opens as follows:

The fee, IWO, arrearage, MSA, paper-review, counsel-access, and IFP/transcript-access issues follow the support-path issue. If the support path is not reviewable, consequences built on that path should not harden before correction.

The denial or mootness of filings did not cure the math. A procedural ruling may close a motion, but it does not identify the child-count path, income-source path, insurance derivation, parenting-time-credit treatment, in-kind-benefit treatment, fee causation, or arithmetic basis for the April 21 support result.

Appellant's Br. at 9. We understand Father's argument to be that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay some of Mother's attorney's fees. We do not agree.

[14] In proceedings to modify a child support award, a determination regarding attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion. See Whited v. Whited, 859 N.E.2d 657, 665 (Ind. 2007). The trial court is in the best position to consider the parties’ respective resources, economic condition, and ability to engage in gainful employment. Id. The trial court need not cite the reasons for its determination. Id. Further, Indiana Code section 34-52-1-1(b) provides that, in any civil action, the court may award attorney's fees to the prevailing party if the court finds that either party brought the action or defense on a claim or defense that is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or if the claim or defense is litigated in bad faith.

[15] Here, even after the trial court had found that his “filings, discovery requests, and correspondence” were “ ‘excessive and unreasonable,’ ” Father continued to generate more of the same. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 33. “Within days” of that order, Father “generated roughly a ream of paper (500 pages) in new filings and communication with [Mother's] counsel.” Id. at 206. And the court found that Father was either litigating in bad faith or he was “confused about the law” and either “unwilling or unable to grasp relatively simple legal concepts.” Id. at 33. Those findings, without more, are sufficient to show that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Father to pay only some of Mother's attorney's fees she incurred in dealing with Father's excessive filings. We affirm the trial court's orders on this issue.

Cross-appeal

[16] Mother cross-appeals and asks that we remand with instructions that the trial court increase its attorney's fee awards. But Mother does not support that request with cogent argument, and we therefore decline to address it. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

[17] Mother also asks this Court for an award of appellate attorney's fees. This Court may assess damages if an appeal is frivolous or in bad faith. Ind. Appellate Rule 66(E). However, “we must use extreme restraint when exercising this power because of the potential chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to appeal.” Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). It is not obvious that Father's appeal was made in bad faith. With respect to the trial court's orders in this extremely contentious matter, we cannot say that Father's appeal was either frivolous or in bad faith. We therefore deny Mother's request for appellate attorney's fees.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father purports to raise a second issue regarding the amount of the revised child support obligation. But Father's argument is extremely difficult to understand, and we therefore do not address it. See Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984; see also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Father appears to be using language associated with coding, and the language is not appropriate in this context. While a cogent argument does not require “legalese,” it does require that the reader can understand it. As an example, Father states that[t]he April 21 order and attached CSOW do not provide a reviewable source path. The order lists Joel[’s] income of $1,232.81/week, Amanda[’s] income of $874.78/week, [H.C.’s] insurance of $15/week, zero parenting-time credit, and $158/week support retroactive to February 6. The order does not identify the accepted source records, date ranges, divisors, conversion method, insurance derivation, PTCW method, in-kind treatment, or reason for rejecting alternative preserved lanes.Appellant's Br. at 8 (emphases added, citations omitted). To the extent Father argues that the evidence does not support the revised child support obligation order, Father appears to ask that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do on appeal. To the extent Father argues that the trial court was required to do anything more than listen to the evidence, make findings, and support the order with a child support worksheet, the court has done so.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.