James Kenney-Prentiss, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Stephanie Hoffer, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] James Michael Kenney-Prentiss (Father), appearing pro se, appeals the trial court's order denying his motion for relief from judgment under Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) and the denial of his motion for the trial court judge to recuse herself in a custody dispute regarding the child that he shared with Stephanie Reneee Hoffer (Mother), who also appears pro se. Father argues that his T.R. 60(B) motion should have been granted because his failure to appear at the final hearing amounted to excusable neglect, and he “proffered meritorious claims and defenses.” Appellant's Brief at 5. Father further contends that the trial judge should have recused because of her “impartiality” that included alleged “legal irregularities that benefited Mother.” Id.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother and Father, who were never married to each other, are the biological parents of TKP (Child), born in June 2017, in Columbus, Ohio. Mother—a professor at the McKinney School of Law (the Law School) in Indianapolis—and Child have resided in Zionsville since 2020, following Mother's acceptance of employment as the tax chair professor at the Law School. Father is an attorney in Ohio and lives in Cleveland. Child, who was diagnosed with autism, has resided with Mother his entire life. Father has never paid child support.

[4] Before Mother relocated to Zionsville, Father lived briefly with Mother, Child, David Perry, and two other children that were born to her and Perry. Although Father moved from that residence after a short time, he again lived at Mother's guest house after she relocated to Zionsville. Father, however, left that residence sometime in 2023 and relocated to Cleveland.

[5] On July 22, 2024, Father filed a petition to establish paternity of Child in the Boone Circuit Court. Three weeks later, Father filed petitions and motions to establish custody, parenting time, and child support. Father also requested an expedited hearing regarding those matters. The trial court took judicial notice of Father's paternity in light of the paternity affidavit that was executed the day after Child's birth.

[6] On November 18, 2024, the parties appeared in court for the first time where parenting time and future court dates were established. At a subsequent hearing on December 23, 2024, the trial court scheduled a hearing for March 13, 2025, on “all pending matters,” including Father's request that the trial judge recuse herself in the matter. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 23. That hearing was canceled by the trial court, and Father made further requests for hearings that were unsuccessful. The trial court then scheduled a final custody hearing for July 10, 2025.

[7] On May 30, 2025, Father filed a praecipe in accordance with Ind. Trial Rule 53.1 ¹ to have the cause removed from the presiding trial judge, claiming that she had failed to timely rule on pending motions and petitions. Father erroneously believed that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over the case “the moment the praecipe was filed.” Appellant's Brief at 11. In light of that mistaken belief,  ² Father did not appear for the July 10, 2025 final hearing, although he had received notice of it and was involved in scheduling the date.

[8] Father informed the trial court's staff the day before the hearing that he was “not going to drive five hours from out of state to a hearing that could not legally occur.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. VIII at 193. Father also filed an “original action” with the Indiana Supreme Court (the Supreme Court) that same day, seeking “a writ withdrawing the matter from the trial judge under T.R. 53.1 and vacating any orders issued after May 30, 2025.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 9 at 150; Appellant's Appendix Vol. 11 at 35.

[9] The trial court conducted the final hearing as scheduled. Mother testified along with Perry, and Dr. Bart Ferraro, Ph.D., HSPP, who was appointed as the custody evaluator. Dr. Ferraro, who had over thirty years of experience in custody evaluations, testified that Father experienced frequent emotional disruptions that hindered his rational thought processes. Dr. Ferraro's psychological data suggested that Father was severely depressed rendering him incapable of functioning in a normal environment and putting him at risk for suicidal behavior. In fact, Dr. Ferraro's evaluation revealed that Father has a history of suicide attempts that began when he was in eighth grade. Father has been hospitalized and placed on Prozac and Risperdal on occasion for his depression and suicide attempts. In December 2024, Father made plans to commit suicide in a hotel room following a hearing with Mother.

[10] The evidence at the hearing also demonstrated that Father's time with Child was marked by “uncontrollable” and “recurrent and complete emotional ․ collapse.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 125. Dr. Ferraro testified that on many occasions, Father's mental health “disrupted Parenting Time plans.” Id. Father admitted to Dr. Ferraro that his mental health episodes lasted from days to several weeks. Mother testified that Father drank heavily and would stay in bed for days when he was under stress.

[11] Father told Dr. Ferraro that throughout these proceedings, his physical and mental health was the worst it had been in a decade. Dr. Ferraro had concerns about Father's abuse of stimulant medication for his anxiety and other disorders, and Father acknowledged his noncompliance with his use of Adderall, a powerful and habit-forming drug.

[12] Dr. Ferraro's report indicated that Father was “overtly abusive or paranoid” at times, screamed at Mother because she allegedly abused him, and smashed a lamp into the ceiling on one occasion. Transcript Vol. 2 at 154-157; Transcript Vol. 3 at 70, 71. At some point, Father believed that Mother behaved deceptively, had evil motives, and purposefully served him unsanitary food. Father blames Mother for his own mental state and for Child's autism diagnosis.

[13] While Father was living in Cleveland, he and Mother could not amicably co-parent. Father's use of “Our Family Wizard”³ when communicating with Mother was “abnormal and erratic.” Transcript Vol . 3 at 126. Dr. Ferraro noted that Father “accuses, abuses, attacks, blames, badgers, berates, belittles, digresses, degrades, and derides [Mother]” in his texts to her.  ⁴ Id. Dr. Ferraro labeled Father's communications with Mother as recurrent verbal and emotional abuse.

[14] After reviewing the documents that the parties had submitted for evaluation, Dr. Ferraro concluded that Father projects his own issues onto others, creates difficulties for Mother, behaves irrationally, and repeatedly misstates Mother's communications. Dr. Ferraro was concerned that Father declined parenting time after his constant and unsubstantiated allegations that Mother would not allow him to see Child during the pendency of these proceedings.

[15] Dr. Ferraro was also concerned about the risks that Child would encounter if he moved, given his age and the disruption of his meaningful parental attachment to Mother and his half-siblings. Dr. Ferraro believed that relocating would be severely detrimental to Child's mental health.

[16] The evidence showed that Mother implemented a fixed and needed routine for Child at mealtime and at bedtime. Mother provides Child with regular structured play dates that involve children his own age, and she has worked with a school counselor to help Child with transitions and adjustments. Mother manages Child's daily care and takes him to therapy and other medical appointments and extracurricular activities. Various accommodations that were implemented for Child have reduced his aggression, and such behaviors directed at Mother and his half siblings continued to surface only when Child returns home from parenting time with Father.

[17] Mother also made sure that Child was available for FaceTime visits with Father. She has been solely responsible for Child's pediatric care, and there were no concerns about Mother's ability to care for Child's continued medical needs. Although Mother has been diagnosed with depression, she is in psychotherapy so she can remain functioning at an optimal level.

[18] The evidence at the final hearing also demonstrated that Father permits Child to stay up late at night during parenting time, and he does not feed him on a regular schedule. Child has no or very little interaction with anyone his own age when he is with Father, and Father is unpredictable in implementing scheduled parenting time.

[19] In early 2024, Mother—overwhelmed and frightened of Father—filed for an order of protection because of Father's abuse toward her. The order was granted ex parte and then later dismissed with an order that Father was to communicate with Mother only through counsel and only about legal matters.

[20] Perry testified that Child has flourished under Mother's care and that she has been primarily responsible for making sure he can thrive. Perry described Mother as having “a strong sense of her duty as a mother and always putting the kids first.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 102. Although Perry helped Mother raise the children, Father resented Perry and at one point, Father told Perry that he “should kill [himself], that he was a terrible person and that [he] should just ․ leave and die.” Id. at 100. After that episode, Father refused to engage with Perry. Perry also testified that Child and his half-brothers spend a lot of time together and get along well.

[21] The evidence further established that Father lacks stable housing, does not have financial ability to own a home, and that he has no contractual rights to the residence where he is living. Father resides with two single men, and the girlfriend of one of those men often spends the night. Father sleeps in the basement with Child and the room has no door and lacks sleeping accommodations for two people. Father does not financially support himself, and he relies upon others to pay his living expenses.

[22] Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court requested the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Five days after the final hearing, the Supreme Court dismissed Father's original action. Father, however, filed two additional original actions seeking a writ of mandamus and removal of the trial court judge. Those actions were also dismissed. The Supreme Court determined, among other things, that Father's “own filings resulted in the delay of ruling on pending matters that were set for hearing.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 11 at 37. The Supreme Court also denied Father's praecipe that sought removal of the trial judge.

[23] In dismissing Father's second original action on October 2, 2025, the Supreme Court issued an order noting that the CAO had “declined to withdraw the case from the trial judge.” Id. at 39. Thus, it was determined that Father sought “a remedy that is not permitted.” Id. The Supreme Court then dismissed Father's third original action on October 8, 2025, determining that Father has failed to show that he is entitled to the relief sought. The Supreme Court concluded that “while [Father's] request for relief is styled somewhat differently than the previous petitions ․ the core remedy sought is the same: removing the underlying proceedings from the trial judge.” Id. at 40.

[24] On October 6, 2025, the trial court issued extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law and awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Child to Mother. In relevant part, the trial court determined:

Legal Custody

171. The Court, based upon the findings above, and being duly advised, now concludes as a matter of law, that it is in [Child's] best interests that Mother be awarded sole legal custody of [Child].

172. Joint legal custody is not appropriate due to the distance between the parties’ residences and the inability of the parties to effectively communicate in advancing [Child's] welfare.

173. Mother's history of providing all support for [Child], including all financial and educational support, together with the positive emotional and physical environment provided by Mother at her residence justify a grant of sole legal custody to Mother.

174. Father's significant untreated mental health issues; the current physical environment of Father's residence; and considerable risk to [Child] if [Child] relocates away from Mother, all justify not awarding Father sole legal custody.

Physical Custody

175. The Court, based upon the findings above, and being duly advised, now concludes as a matter of law, that it is in [Child's] best interest that Mother be awarded primary physical custody of [Child].

176. This decision is based upon the overwhelming evidence of [Child's] positive adjustment to his current home, school and community together with strong evidence that [Child] is emotionally bonded with Mother and his half-brothers at Mother's residence.

177. Although both Mother and Father have a history of mental health issues, only Mother is consistently managing her mental health concerns and has consistently been in treatment/counseling for same. This factor favors Mother having primary physical custody.

178. Father's mental health, which includes recent suicidal ideations and possible misuse of stimulant medication for ADHD, works against Father being awarded primary physical custody.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. III at 65-66.

[25] The trial court awarded Father supervised parenting time with Child and ordered Father to undergo mental health treatment. Father was also ordered to pay child support, a portion of Mother's attorney's fees, and the custody evaluation fees.

[26] On October 13, 2025, Father filed a combined “Verified Motion for Relief, for Recusal, and to Vacate” (the Motion). Appellant's Appendix Vol. 9 at 105. Father claimed that he was entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60 (B) due to “mistake, surprise, and excusable neglect.” Father alleged that his failure to appear at the final hearing was for “good cause” because of his “good faith belief that the trial judge lost their authority the moment the praecipe was filed.” Id. at 119. Father further claimed that he was entitled to relief from judgment in light of Mother's “years of intimate partner violence and abuse,” her alienation of the father-child relationship, and her pattern of “systemic dishonesty and manipulation of court proceedings.” Id. at 123.

[27] Father maintained that the trial judge was obligated to recuse from the case because she was not impartial due to “an undisclosed conflict of interest” in light of the fact that she and Mother “are professors at the [Law School]” and the trial judge “never commented on the open and notorious conduct by both Mother and Mother's counsel.” Id. at 134, 140. Father further alleged that Mother's counsel “regularly made demonstrably false claims to the court” and the trial judge “never uttered a single negative word about [that] pattern of behavior.” Id. Father also maintained that the “trial judge acted ․ [as] an advocate for Mother.” Id. at 143. The trial court summarily denied the Motion on October 21, 2025.

[28] Father now appeals. Additional information will be supplied as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

I. Relief From Judgment

[29] Father argues that the trial court erred in denying his T.R. 60(B) motion to set aside the default judgment. Specifically, Father maintains that his motion should have been granted because his failure to appear “resulted from an objectively understandable good faith mistake,” and that Mother's “silence about the final hearing ․ reinforced Father's non-appearance and thereby constitutes misconduct.”  ⁵ Appellant's Brief at 17-18.

[30] A trial court may relieve a party from a default judgment pursuant to T.R. 60(B)(1) for “mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect” if the party filed a motion within one year of the judgment and alleges a meritorious claim or defense. T.R. 60(B)(1). The decision whether to set aside a default judgment is given substantial deference on appeal. Nwannunu v. Weichman & Associates, P.C., 770 N.E.2d 871, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Our standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Kmart Corp. v. Englebright, 719 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[31] In reviewing the trial court's determination, we will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Nwannunu, 770 N.E.2d at 876. A party seeking to set aside a default judgment under T.R. 60(B)(1) must demonstrate that the judgment was entered as a result of mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect. Id. The trial court's discretion in this area is necessarily broad because any determination of mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect must turn upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Id. In addition to showing sufficient grounds for relief, the moving party must also make a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense. Baxter v. State, 734 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). A meritorious defense is one demonstrating that, if the case were retried on the merits, a different result probably would be reached. Id. Any doubt as to the propriety of a default judgment is resolved in favor of the defaulted party. Nwannunu, 770 N.E.2d at 876.

[32] Father asserts that his mistaken belief that the praecipe automatically divested the trial court of its jurisdiction at the time of filing amounts to excusable neglect for not attending the final hearing. In support of that contention, he directs us to Walker v. Kelley, 819 N.E.2d 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), where a panel of this court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted mother's request for a new custody hearing. There, the mother failed to appear at the original hearing because she misread the court's order and mistakenly believed that the hearing had been set for a different date. The Walker court observed that scheduling a new hearing aligned with the trial court's duty “to consider all relevant factors regarding the best interest of the child” as the statute requires. Id. at 837.

[33] Unlike the circumstances in Walker, the undisputed evidence shows that Father knew the date of the final hearing. To be sure, Father was involved in scheduling that date, and he did not fail to appear because of a mistake about the date. Rather, Father—an attorney—relied on erroneous research he had conducted regarding the significance of his praecipe filing. In other words, Father's absence from the final hearing was not accidental, and he did not face unforeseen or unexpected circumstances that were beyond his control. Rather, Father misread the law, and he made a conscious and deliberate choice not to appear based on his erroneous legal conclusion. See, e.g., Oberlander v. Handy, 913 N.E.2d 734, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that T.R. 60(B) affords relief “in extraordinary circumstances which are not the result of any fault ․ on the part of the movant”) (emphasis added). We therefore cannot say that Father's erroneous legal assumption amounts to excusable neglect under T.R. 60(B). See, e.g., Baker v. Paschen, 188 N.E.3d 486,491 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“simply not knowing the rules is insufficient to establish excusable neglect under Trial Rule 60(B)”), trans. denied.6

[34] In sum, Father's conduct did not establish excusable neglect under T.R. 60(B). Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying his motion to set aside the default judgment on this basis.⁷

II. Trial Judge Recusal

[35] Father claims that his motion for the trial judge's recusal—embedded in his motion for relief from judgment—should have been granted. Father asserts that the “combination of the judge's undisclosed conflict of interest, different treatment of Mother and Father, and legal irregularities results in a rational basis for doubting judicial impartiality.” Appellant's Brief at 30. Thus, Father argues that the matter should have been assigned to a different judicial officer and that all “decisions made by the current judge” should have been vacated. Id. at 45.

[36] At the outset, we note that this issue is not properly before us, in that T.R. 60(B)(1) is limited to procedural and equitable grounds for relief from finality. In re Paternity of P.S.S., 934 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. 2010). Here, Father has launched several previous attacks on the trial court's authority, including the present attempt to use T.R. 60(B) as a substitute for a direct appeal, which our courts uniformly prohibit. See, e.g., State v. Mooney, 51 N.E.3d 281, 285 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (the legal merits of a judgment are reviewable by way of a timely appeal or motion to correct error).

[37] Even more compelling, our Supreme Court's prior dismissal of Father's original actions seeking removal of the judge and its ultimate denial of his praecipe on the issue of recusal further reinforces that the judicial bias issue has been resolved. To be sure, we will not revisit a question that our Supreme Court has already declined to address through the appropriate original action means. See Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[38] Finally, even Father's claims were properly before us, we review a judge's decision about whether to recuse for an abuse of discretion. Cheek v. State, 79 N.E.3d 388, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). An abuse of discretion occurs when the judge's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.

[39] It is presumed that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced. S.E. v. State, 929 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (Ind. 2010). To overcome this presumption, the moving party must establish that the judge has a personal prejudice for or against a party. L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1073 (Ind. 2018). Such bias or prejudice exists only where there is an undisputed claim or the judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the controversy before the court. Id. Upon review of a judge's failure to recuse, we will assume that a judge would have complied with the obligation to recuse had there been any reasonable question concerning impartiality, unless we discern circumstances which support a contrary conclusion. Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Adverse rulings are not sufficient reasons to believe the judge has a personal bias or prejudice. Thomas v. State, 486 N.E.2d 531, 533 (Ind. 1985). That is, prejudice is not derived from judicial rulings. Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 433 (Ind. 2003).

[40] Here, Father has engaged in mere speculation regarding the trial judge's alleged misconduct and bias. For instance, Father claims that Mother “had power in influencing the judge's role at [the Law School].” Appellant's Brief at 30. Father further maintains that “once the judge learned of [Mother's ] position at the law school, the judge acted as her advocate, ignored misconduct, and fully adopted all her requests.” Id. at 31. Father thus asserts that the “judge's advocacy for Mother [and his unequal treatment of him] demonstrate[ed] bias.” Id. at 35-36.

[41] Our review of the record shows that the trial judge did not express any opinion on the merits of the controversy, and she made no disparaging comments to Father. Moreover, the trial judge's decision recited in the custody order reflects a thorough, unbiased consideration of all evidence that was presented. In short, there is an absence of facts that would support a rational inference of actual bias or prejudice, and Father has failed to show that the trial judge's demeanor or actions crossed the barrier of impartiality and prejudiced his case. Thus, for this additional reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's motion to recuse.

[42] Judgment affirmed.⁸

FOOTNOTES

1.   T.R. 53.1 provides a mechanism for parties to seek the withdrawal of a case from a trial judge who has not timely ruled on pending motions. The primary purpose of this rule is to expedite litigation and prevent undue delay. See Jolly v. Modisett, 275 N.E.2d 780, 781 (Ind. 1971).

2.   Since 2011, the filing of a praecipe does not automatically and immediately end a trial judge's jurisdiction or authority over the case at the moment of filing. See T.R. 53.1. Rather, the praecipe is a formal written request that sets the withdrawal process in motion. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) of the Indiana Office of Judicial Administration makes the determination as to whether a ruling has been delayed, who then provides notice to the trial judge, the Clerk of the trial court, and the Supreme Court if submission of the case has been withdrawn from the judge. T.R. 53.1 (E)(1), (2).

3.   “Our Family Wizard” is a secure co-parenting platform that is designed to help separated or divorced parents manage shared custody, communication, and expenses.

4.   For instance, from February 17-20, 2024, Father sent the following texts to Mother over the “Our Family Wizard” site: “Go take your abusive bulls*it and fu*k yourself.” Exhibit 4 at 18. “Your narcissism is just truly disgusting.” “You are a child and more emotionally immature than our six-year-old. Just despicable and disgusting.” Id. “You can't even be a decent person. Committed to bring [sic] a total piece of sh*t?” “No decenxy [sic] or niceness. Fu*k you.” Id. at 1. “Seriously, what the fu*k is wrong with you?” Id. at 2. “Whomever is giving you advice through this is giving you terrible, dumbfu*k, (probably self-interested), destructive, and toxic advice. Stay clear. Or, if it's just you, you're an idiot.” Id. at 7. “You are mentally unfit and aberrant.” Id. at 3. “You cannot be a fit mother or parent or person with your current mental state. Go fu*k yourself.” Id. at 4.

5.   Father only makes a conclusory allegation that Mother committed misconduct that “reinforced [his] mistaken belief about the effects of the praecipe that helped induce him not to appear.” Appellant's Brief at 18. Father has failed to develop this argument and it is unsupported by cogent reasoning. Thus, Father has waived this contention. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Gingrinch, 274 N.E.3d 1269, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (observing that pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a)-(b), a party waives an issue, for appeal purposes, where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record).

6.   As an aside, we note that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law demonstrate consideration of each provision of Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.3, the requirements that the trial court must consider when determining the best interest of Child as they relate to custody. The trial court acknowledged those factors including the “age and sex of the child, the wishes of the parents, the interactions and interrelationships of the child with parents, siblings and others, Child's adjustment to home, school and community, and the mental and physical health of all individuals.” See id. Portions of the trial court's order address these factors and point to the relevant evidence that was presented at the hearing in determining Child's best interest in deciding to award primary physical custody and sole legal custody of Child to Mother.

7.   Because we have determined Father failed to establish excusable neglect under T.R. 60(B)(1), we need not discuss whether he had a meritorious defense. See, e.g., Biodynamic Extraction, LPLC v. Kickapoo Creek Botanicals, LLC, 187 N.E.3d 295, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (declining to address the movant's claim of meritorious defense because it failed to establish that excusable neglect would warrant setting aside the default judgment).

8.   Father has filed a “Verified Motion for Judicial Notice,” a “Motion for Sanctions,” and a “Motion for Oral Argument.” We have considered these motions and deny them by an order issued contemporaneously with this opinion.

Altice, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.