James Daniel Carrico, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] James Daniel Carrico appeals the trial court's order denying his Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Ind. Criminal Rule 4(B). We reverse and remand for dismissal.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 28, 2025, the State charged Carrico with two counts of invasion of privacy as class A misdemeanors. An entry in the chronological case summary (“CCS”) dated February 28, 2025, states: “Order Issuing Warrant for Arrest ․ 24 hour no bond hold from arrest then set bond in the amount of $500 cash.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 3 (italics omitted). On October 28, 2025, Carrico, pro se, filed a Motion for Speedy Trial and requested a speedy trial within seventy days pursuant to Ind. Criminal Rule 4(B). That same day, Carrico filed a Verified Petition for Resolution of Detainer alleging that he was incarcerated at the Plainfield Correctional Facility, he was serving a sentence of two years “for the conviction of criminal recklessness, handgun in the Superior Court of Marion County,” “[a] detainer was lodged against [him] on the 8 day of March, 2025,” and “[t]here has not been any action taken on this detainer since the date mentioned herein.” Id. at 33. He asked “that a hearing be set on these charges or that the charges be dismissed and the detainer removed” pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-33-10-2. Id. at 34.

[3] On October 29, 2025, the trial court entered an order directing the Marion County Sheriff or his deputy to travel to the Plainfield Correctional Facility on or before November 10, 2025, to transport Carrico to the Marion County Jail. In a Transportation Order entered on October 30, 2025, the court ordered the Marion County Sheriff's Department to transport Carrico from the Plainfield Correctional Facility on or before November 7, 2025, and stated that “[f]ollowing the hearing [Carrico] shall be transported back and returned to Plainfield Correctional Facility.” Id. at 37. An entry in the CCS dated November 5, 2025, states, “Warrant or Writ of Attmnt [sic] for the Body of a Person Served.” Id. at 4. Another CCS entry dated November 5, 2025, states, “Party To Be Held In Custody[.] Order Signed: 11/05/2025[․] 24 hour no bond hold from time of arrest; then $500 cash bond.” Id.

[4] On November 10, 2025, the court held an initial hearing at which Carrico appeared. The court appointed a public defender to represent Carrico. The court stated, “Vacate any no bond holds in this case. Bond is set in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) cash ․” Transcript Volume II at 6. The court referenced the motion for a speedy trial, stated, “I'm holding him on this case,” and stated, “I'm not sure what 70 days from October 28th would be, but that really compresses our timeframe.” Id. at 6-7. At one point, the court stated, “that would put our fast and speedy deadline, January 19th.” Id. at 7. The court later stated, “[w]e'll go with January 6th as the fastest speedy deadline at this time,” and scheduled a bench trial for December 22, 2025. Id. at 8. On November 10, 2025, Attorney Leah Endicott filed an appearance to represent Carrico.

[5] On December 17, 2025, the State filed a Motion to Continue indicating that defense counsel asked the deputy prosecutor to provide a link to the discovery folder, the deputy prosecutor did not notice the request until December 17, 2025, and the State was “requesting this continuance to remedy any harm this late disclosure may have caused the Defendant or Defense's ability to prepare for trial.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 46. The State also moved the trial court “to continue the trial setting and keep the December 22, 2025 date for bond review” and asserted that any delay caused by the continuance would be attributed to the State and that “[t]he defense by Counsel objects to the continuance.” Id. at 47. On December 18, 2025, the court granted the motion, scheduled a pretrial conference for January 26, 2026, and found “the time between December 22, 2025 and the new trial date” was attributed to the State “for the purposes of Indiana Criminal Rule 4.”¹ December 18, 2025 Order at 1.

[6] On January 20, 2026, Carrico filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Ind. Criminal Rule 4(B).² Carrico asserted that “[t]he minutes from the November 10, 2025 hearing reflect that the 70-day deadline for trial was January 19, 2026.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 64. The court held multiple hearings and conferences and ultimately denied the Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Carrico “was ․ not in Marion County, he was in the Department of Correction and ․ the spirit of the CR4 is if you're being held in this county then you have to be taken to trial within a certain amount of time.” Transcript Volume II at 28. The trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal, and this Court accepted jurisdiction.

Discussion

[7] Carrico cites Ind. Criminal Rule 4(B) and argues that “[b]y virtue of his bond hold, [he] was ‘held’ on the pending charge.” Appellant's Brief at 9. He contends that the trial court's view that his incarceration in the Department of Correction exempted the State from its speedy trial obligations has been repeatedly rejected by the Indiana Supreme Court. The State agrees and acknowledges that, “[b]ecause Carrico was held on bond in the present case, even though he was returned to the DOC, he was entitled to discharge.” Appellee's Brief at 8. The State requests that we remand with instructions to grant Carrico's motion.

[8] Ind. Criminal Rule 4(B) provides:

A defendant held in jail on a pending charge may move for an early trial. If such motion is filed, a trial must be commenced no later than seventy calendar days from the date of such motion except as follows:

(1) delays due to congestion of the court calendar or emergency are excluded from the seventy-day calculation;

(2) the defendant who moved for early trial is released from jail before the expiration of the seventy-day period; or

(3) an act of the defendant delays the trial.

If a defendant is held beyond the time limit of this section and moves for dismissal, the criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed.

[9] “The broad goal of Indiana's Criminal Rule 4 is to provide functionality to a criminal defendant's fundamental and constitutionally protected right to a speedy trial.” Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1037 (Ind. 2013). “[F]or Rule 4(B) to apply, the defendant must be incarcerated on the charge for which he seeks a speedy trial, and as long as that requirement is met, the availability of Rule 4(B) is not affected if the defendant is also incarcerated on other grounds.” Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind. 2012). Criminal Rule 4 “places an affirmative duty on the State to bring the defendant to trial, but at the same time is not intended to be a mechanism for providing defendants a technical means to escape prosecution.” Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1037. See also Jackson v. State, 663 N.E.2d 766, 769 (Ind. 1996) (“The onus is on the State, not the defendant, to expedite prosecution.”). “[I]n cases where the issue is a question of law applied to undisputed facts, the standard of review – like for all questions of law – is de novo.” Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1039. In those cases where a trial court makes a factual finding of congestion or emergency under Criminal Rule 4 based on disputed facts, the standard of review for appellate courts is the clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 1040.

[10] The State concedes and the record reveals that the trial court had ordered Carrico to be held in this case on a $500 bond. Based upon Criminal Rule 4(B), the seventy-day period had expired by the time Carrico filed his Motion to Dismiss on January 20, 2026.³ Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Carrico's Motion to Dismiss.

[11] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's order and remand.

[12] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not contain a copy of the December 18, 2025 order, but it is available on Indiana's Odyssey Case Management System.

2.   The Motion to Dismiss in the Appellant's Appendix is stamped as filed on February 20, 2026. See Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 64. On appeal, Carrico notes that, “[w]hile the file stamp on [his] motion to dismiss and corresponding memorandum reflect a filing date of February 20, 2026, both were originally filed and served on opposing counsel on January 20, 2026”; “[d]ue to a technical error, the trial court did not docket the initial filings”; and “[w]hen [he] alerted the court to this error, it instructed [his] attorneys to refile the documents.” Appellant's Brief at 4 n.2 (citing Transcript Volume II at 50). The State agrees that “[o]n January 20, 2026, Carrico filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B).” Appellee's Brief at 6. At the February 20, 2026 conference, defense counsel stated that the Motion to Dismiss “was filed on January 20th and it shows up on my end that it was filed.” Transcript Volume II at 49. The court stated, “I see it now. I do see it.” Id.

3.   The State notes that “[t]he CCS lists the 70-day deadline as January 19, 2026, and Carrico agreed in his motion to dismiss (App. Vol. II 5, 64-65), while Carrico argued that it was January 5, 2026, during the initial hearing and in his Appellant's Brief, (Tr. Vol. II 7; Appellant's Br. 11)” and “Carrico would have been entitled to discharge when he filed his motion to dismiss on January 20, 2026, under either calculation.” Appellee's Brief at 9 n.3. In his brief, Carrico does not mention January 5, 2026, as noted by the State, but he states that, “[s]eventy days from [October 28, 2025,] on January 6, 2026, [he] had not been brought to trial.” Appellant's Brief at 11. In any event, we agree with the State in its assertion that Carrico was entitled to discharge when he filed his motion to dismiss on January 20, 2026.

Brown, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and Scheele, J., concur.