IN RE: the Parent-Child Relationships of So.S. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] S.S. (Mother) and K.S. (Father) [collectively, Parents] appeal the trial court's determination that their daughter, So.S. (Child), is a child in need of services (CHINS). They argue there was insufficient evidence to support the court's conclusions that (1) Child's physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered; and (2) court intervention was necessary. Finding the trial court's judgment was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

1. Prior CHINS & TPR Proceeding

[2] In 2023, before Child was born, Parents were involved in another CHINS case concerning their other child, M.S., whom they adopted. In June of that year, Parents were serving as a pre-adoptive placement for M.S.’s infant half-sibling, Q.P. On June 6, Mother took Q.P. to Peyton Manning Children's Hospital for a fourth time alleging she had a fever, bloody diarrhea, vomiting, a bloody nose, and issues with eating. Mother had previously reported to Q.P.’s pediatrician that the baby had been admitted to the PICU for being critically ill. This had not really occurred.

[3] According to Q.P.’s medical records, Mother took her to several hospitals in May 2023 and reported symptoms that were inconsistent with physicians’ observations of Q.P. Aware of this, hospital staff at Peyton Manning deemed it appropriate to place Mother under covert surveillance during Q.P.’s time at the hospital. During the monitoring period, Mother was observed: (1) pouring formula on the floor and then telling the nurses that Q.P. had vomited; (2) wiping spit-up from Q.P.’s mouth onto her shirt and telling nurses Q.P. had vomited on her; (3) hiding Q.P.’s soiled diapers in the trash and then telling medical staff Q.P. had not urinated; and (4) feeding Q.P. and then telling medical staff Q.P. would not eat. Mother had also posted on Facebook that Q.P.’s blood work was concerning and she was going to undergo a kidney biopsy, neither of which was supported by Q.P.’s medical records. Based on these behaviors, Dr. Cortney Demetris, a child abuse pediatrician at the hospital, diagnosed Q.P. as a victim of medical child abuse. After this incident, the adoption agency removed Q.P. from Parents’ care.

[4] This incident also prompted the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) to remove M.S. from Parents’ care and file a petition alleging that M.S. was a CHINS. Parents stipulated to M.S.’s status as a CHINS, admitting “that there [were] concerns within the household with [M.S.] receiving proper medical care and treatment.” Exhibits at 44. The trial court ordered Mother to complete psychological evaluations. Dr. Linda McIntire performed Mother's evaluation and issued her report in March 2024.¹ She diagnosed Mother with Factitious Disorder Imposed on Self, Medical and Psychiatric given her decade-long history of falsely reporting that she had cancer. Dr. McIntire also diagnosed her with Factitious Disorder Imposed on Another (FDIA), Medical primarily citing factitious behaviors regarding Q.P. However, Dr. McIntire also identified factitious behaviors carried out in relation to M.S., including: (1) an attempt to have her prescribed anti-anxiety medication when she was three years old; (2) her stated concerns about M.S.’s hearing and failure to attend scheduled audiology appointments; and (3) a request for hormone testing due to “a few fine hairs” on M.S.’s genitals despite no such hairs being present. Id. at 114.

[5] Dr. McIntire recommended that Mother participate in individual therapy and in doing so, work through the ACCEPTS ² model, the first step of which involves “honestly and genuinely admit[ting] her behavior ․” Id. at 121. Dr. McIntire also recommended that all medical providers be informed of her factitious history and that there be a safety plan in place in which Mother is “never responsible for a child's medical care.” Id. at 122. Pursuant to the dispositional order, Father was required to ensure that Dr. McIntire's recommendations were followed.

[6] In June 2023, Mother began working through the ACCEPTS model in therapy with Mary Pruitt, a licensed social worker. At a periodic review in September, the trial court found that Mother continued to deny her diagnoses. The court also found that Pruitt was not qualified to treat factitious disorder and ordered Mother to begin therapy with Dr. Tom Barbera, “a pain specialist [who] is well-versed in health psychology.” Id. at 63. Mother participated in a handful of sessions with Dr. Barbera before she terminated therapy with him, and she terminated therapy with Pruitt the following month. As for Father, he had completed a psychological evaluation and was participating in services, but DCS was concerned he also did not believe Mother's diagnoses. The court nonetheless found that Parents were cooperating with DCS and were otherwise engaged in services.

[7] In March 2025, Parents were no longer complying with M.S.’s case plan. That month, the court approved the voluntary termination of Parents’ parental rights to M.S.

2. Current CHINS Case

[8] Child was born on June 13, 2025. She was born with a duplicated ureter and hydronephrosis, which put her at a greater risk for urinary tract infections (UTIs). On September 4, Parents took Child to the emergency room and Mother reported that Child was fussy, spitting up, and had a fever. Child was transferred to Cincinnati Children's Hospital where she stayed for four days as she was treated for a UTI and sepsis. Parents did not disclose Mother's diagnoses to any members of the medical staff. And while Child was still in the hospital, Mother posted on her Facebook page that “a loved one was fighting for her life.” Appellants’ Appendix Vol. 2 at 41.

[9] On September 17, and as later amended, DCS filed a petition alleging her three-month-old Child to be a CHINS based on the events above. On October 3, DCS took Child into emergency custody because

[i]t [was] nearly impossible to ensure that Mother [was] not exaggerating symptoms or delaying treatment of [Child's] medically diagnosed condition while remaining in the care of Mother and Father. Father [was] unable or unwilling to accept Mother's diagnosis and take the recommendations seriously to protect his child. Both parents refute the diagnosis and have not engaged in the treatment recommended further putting [Child] at increased risk of harm up to and including death, per Dr. Demetris.

Id. at 64. That same month, Mother started individual therapy again with Pruitt. And a week before the fact-finding hearing, she also started therapy with Stephanie Whiteside, a licensed social worker who had experience treating individuals diagnosed with factitious disorder.

[10] At the four-day fact-finding hearing beginning on November 14,³ several individuals testified, including Parents, Dr. McIntire, medical providers, social workers, DCS personnel, Stephanie Whiteside, Mother's therapist, and Dr. Bart Ferraro, a clinical psychologist. DCS introduced M.S.’s CHINS and termination records, Mother's psychological evaluation, and Child's case records into evidence.

[11] Mother testified that she “had issues with the truth and exaggerating” in the past. Transcript Vol. 2 at 155. In response to whether she “believe[d] herself to be a truthful person,” Mother said, “Yes and no.” Id. When asked whether she lied to medical providers about Q.P.’s symptoms,⁴ Mother said, “I don't believe so.” Id. at 161. She did not recall throwing Q.P.’s diapers away and explained that she “threw formula on the floor out of frustration.” Id. DCS asked Mother about her diagnosis, at which point the following colloquy occurred:

Q: So at this time, do you believe that you have Factitious Disorder Imposed on yourself?

A: Um I'm kind gonna say the same thing, that I received that diagnosis in [2020] ․

Q: It's a yes or no. Do you believe that at this time, currently, do you have it?

A: I honestly can't say yes or no.

Q: Okay do you believe that you ․ have Factitious Disorder Imposed on Another?

A: Again, I'm not a medical professional.

Q: Again, I'm asking for your belief.

A: In [2023], when I was diagnosed, I mean possibly. But it's been, you know, two (2) years, circumstances have changed, I've changed a lot, um and I haven't had a current psych eval so I don't know if that diagnosis is still valid.

Q: So you believe that this is just a diagnosis that can go away?

A: From research that I have done, yes. It is possible.

Q: And it can go away in a very short time?

A: From research that I have done, um yes.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 163 (sic throughout).

[12] Mother also confirmed that despite Dr. McIntire's recommendation that Parents inform Child's medical providers about Mother's psychological evaluation and diagnosis, neither had done so. Mother explained, “It's a recommendation․ [Y]ou know, I can recommend that you go to a restaurant and get this dish but that doesn't mean that you have to order it or that you would do it.” Id. at 164.

[13] Father testified that he “take[s] care of anything that needs to be done for [Child's] medical care[,]” and he didn't have a problem making the decision if he and Mother disagreed on something. Id. at 237. He described their safety plan as follows:

[W]e have a family calendar that has appointments on everything for everyone so that all of us can see it so we can make sure that we schedule appropriate time to go take care of everything. We make sure that we go together for everything ․ I'm present for all of the doctor's visits. If I can't be there ․ [Mother's] mother, who is a pharmacist ․, attends ․ in the case that I am unable to attend for whatever reason.

Id. at 225. He also testified that he believed Mother's diagnoses were accurate at the time she was diagnosed but that her behaviors had since changed.

[14] Dr. Demetris also testified. She oversaw portions of Q.P.’s medical care and had implemented the video surveillance that revealed Mother's factitious behaviors. Dr. Demetris ultimately diagnosed Q.P. as a victim of medical child abuse. And based on Mother's history, psychological evaluation, and a review of Child's medical records, Dr. Demetris testified that Child “would be in imminent danger to be a victim of medical child abuse” if she were returned to Parents’ care. Id. at 34. She explained that Child's underlying ureter condition and a lack of demonstrated “successful treatment” of Mother's mental illness put Child “at an increased risk.” Id. Dr. Demetris further testified that Child's condition subjects her to more frequent interaction with the healthcare system which, in turn, “provides more opportunities where the child abuse will be perpetrated and can occur.” Id. And while she agreed disclosure of Mother's diagnoses to medical providers was important, Dr. Demetris testified that it would not protect Child if she was in Parents care because

it's never possible for health care providers to know for sure if what a parent is saying is[ ] falsifi[ed] ․ or whether it's accurate[,] [w]hich puts the child at risk [of] either not getting help that they [need] if it is true or getting help that they don't need if it isn't true.

Id. at 39-40. Dr. Demetris confirmed on cross-examination that she had only reviewed Child's medical records and had not observed Child in person.

[15] Dr. McIntire testified about how she conducted Mother's psychological evaluation and determined her diagnoses. She then explained her recommendations, the first being that Mother engage in treatment “with a therapist that ․ is trained” to treat Factitious Disorder. Id. at 69. She said treating that disorder “requires ․ far more than just attending sessions, but actually meeting clinical goals, demonstrating clinical change, [which] includes ․ taking ownership and ․ admitting that she has this disorder, acknowledging that to her team, and making full disclosure to ․ medical providers ․” Id. at 71. Dr. McIntire testified that factitious disorder cannot go away on its own and, without evidence that Mother has met clinical goals, her recommendations still applied in this case.

[16] Emily Maus, a DCS assessment family case manager, testified about DCS's investigation before it filed the CHINS petition. Specifically, she recounted her interactions with Parents at Cincinnati Children's Hospital during her initial assessment. When she arrived, Maus explained the allegations to Father, and he expressed frustration with DCS's involvement. He believed DCS handled M.S.’s case incorrectly and that Dr. McIntire misdiagnosed Mother, claiming instead that Mother “has anxiety that causes her to do stupid things and that she is an oversharer and an overpreparer ․” Id. at 128. Maus observed that Parents were not following Dr. McIntire's recommendations: they had not disclosed Mother's diagnosis to the medical providers; Mother told her it was “pointless for her to engage in therapy”; Mother had direct access to Child's medical information; and Mother was “the main source” of information when Child's medical needs were being discussed. Id. at 130, 133.

[17] Dr. Jonathan Light, a hospitalist physician at Schneck Medical Center, oversaw portions of Child's medical care in the few days after her birth in June 2025. He testified that he didn't recall having any concerns that Child was being abused at that time. However, he had not been provided with Mother's psychological evaluation or informed of her diagnosis. He testified that if he'd been informed of Mother's diagnosis, he “would have needed more detail about the history” and “definitely would've needed to give more attention to” it. Id. at 188.

[18] Dr. Samuel Borcherding, Child's primary care doctor, testified as well. Since Child's birth, he had seen her seven times, most of which were for well-child visits. He testified that both Mother and Father provided the child's information during appointments. He had not seen any signs of medical child abuse or observed any neglect. Dr. Borcherding further testified that he had been unaware of Mother's diagnosis and Q.P.’s medical child abuse diagnosis until October 2025. He explained that information would have been relevant to his treatment of Child given the “higher risk of recurrence[,]” but he would not have done anything different during appointments with this information in mind. Id. at 222.

[19] Dr. Michael Papacostas testified about his treatment of Child's UTI and sepsis at Cincinnati Children's Hospital. He testified that he was not provided with Mother's psychological evaluation or informed of Mother's diagnosis, but he was unable to answer whether having that information would have impacted his medical treatment of Child.

[20] Dr. Bart Ferraro, a clinical psychologist, testified that “it is more advantageous” to reassess an individual's psychological status “around six (6) months” after initial test results.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 38. This is because “any number of life circumstances ․ related to the diagnosis and treatment of a condition ․ can impact both the presence of a diagnosed condition and how that condition might or might not then consistently appear over time ․” Id. at 39. Dr. Ferraro testified that one could not likely rely upon a two-year-old diagnosis without performing a reassessment. When pressed, he conceded he had never encountered a scenario in which someone who had initially met the criteria for factitious disorder no longer met those criteria without receiving treatment. When asked about a patient's general need to accept her factitious disorder diagnosis, Dr. Ferraro answered that “the behavior a person exhibits and the risks it poses[ ] are generally deemed more important than the label put on it.” Id. at 43.

[21] The final witness was Stephanie Whiteside, Mother's therapist who estimated she'd worked on approximately twenty cases in which an individual had been diagnosed with factitious disorder. Whiteside testified she started treating Mother on November 17, and they had completed two therapeutic sessions before the last day of the fact-finding hearing. Before Mother's intake session, Whiteside reviewed Mother's psychological evaluation, notes from Mother's therapy with Pruitt, Child's medical records, and some DCS records. Based on Pruitt's notes, Whiteside believed Mother had been making progress in the ACCEPTS model, and she intended to continue working through it with Mother. Her treatment plan consisted of weekly sessions to work on emotional regulation and communication, communicating with Father about Mother's progress, and refining their safety planning to reduce risk. Whiteside testified that she'd seen Mother make positive progress, evidenced by more frequent communication with Father and her mother, implementing coping strategies, and challenging irrational thoughts. She also testified that it's possible that a parent struggling with FDIA who medically abuses one of their children may not reoffend later with another child. Whiteside said she was “not seeing any presenting issues to immediately address [with] the [f]actitious [d]isorder” and, with the information she had at the time, she was not concerned about factitious behaviors as to Child. Id. at 76 (cleaned up).

[22] On January 17, 2026, the trial court entered an order adjudicating Child a CHINS. The court included detailed findings of fact consistent with the facts above and concluded that Child's

physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or endangered as a result of the inability, refusal[,] or neglect of [Parents] to provide the Child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision, when they are able to do so and is unlikely to do so ․ without the coercive intervention of the Court.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 33. After a hearing, the court entered a dispositional order requiring Parents to engage in services, including to complete new psychological evaluations. Parents now appeal.

Discussion and Decision 5

[23] Parents argue there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment that Child is a CHINS. We review a CHINS determination for clear error. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). When the court sua sponte enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tier standard of review pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). Id. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and if so, we determine whether those findings support the court's judgment. Id. Our role is not to weigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. at 577-78. We accept any unchallenged findings as true. Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “As such, if the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment, we will affirm.” Id.

[24] The State must prove a child is a CHINS by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. Here, DCS alleged that Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, meaning it had to prove that Child is under eighteen and:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent ․ to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent ․ is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent ․ to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[25] The trial court concluded DCS met its burden of proof on each element. On appeal, Parents challenge two of those conclusions, namely that: (1) Child's physical or mental condition was seriously endangered; and (2) court intervention is necessary. They also challenge three findings of fact, which we address first.

1. Findings

[26] Parents challenge Findings 4, 7, and 25.⁶ First, Finding 7 is comprised of the pertinent facts from M.S.’s CHINS case. Parents argue this finding “lacks an evidentiary connection” to the question of whether Child is a CHINS and “does not support the trial court's conclusion that” judicial intervention is necessary. Appellants’ Brief at 20. We disagree. The facts from M.S.’s case provide context for Mother's psychological evaluation, her diagnosis, and the events that contributed to DCS's decision to file a CHINS petition for Child. M.S.’s CHINS records were admitted into evidence at the fact-finding hearing—a ruling Parents do not challenge on appeal, and the trial court could therefore consider those records and enter findings accordingly. Parents have failed to show Finding 7 is clearly erroneous.

[27] Parents also challenge Findings 4 and 25, which provide:

4. On or about September 6, 2025, [DCS] received a report alleging abuse or neglect identifying the Child as the victim. The report alleged Mother made a concerning post on Facebook, and the family had a prior case with DCS in which Mother was diagnosed with [FDIA].

․

25. Dr. Demetris believes the Child is still at a high risk despite the fact that there are no other children in the home. She reports the diagnosis is directly related to the caregiver, not the sibling.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 15, 24. Parents argue these findings “seem[ ] to hold Mother responsible for [Child's] UTI.” Appellants’ Br. at 20. However, neither finding does so, either explicitly or implicitly. Finding 24 discusses Child's heightened risk for a UTI due to her duplicated ureter and “Mother's diagnosis.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 24. Context reveals its Mother's diagnosis (not Child's UTI diagnosis) that directly relates to Mother as the caregiver rather than a particular child. Parents have failed to show these findings are clearly erroneous.

2. Serious Endangerment

[28] Next, Parents argue there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Child's physical or mental condition was seriously endangered. They assert there was “no evidence” that Child was “seriously endangered by [Parents], specifically, in the form of medical child abuse.” Appellants’ Br. at 16. They further claim that any inference that she was seriously endangered “rest[ed] on speculation and conjecture.” Id. at 22. First, we don't accept Parents’ premise. DCS did not have to prove Child was a victim of medical child abuse; it had to show Child was seriously endangered. Second, we disagree that the court's conclusion rested on speculation. The record and the court's findings support an inference that Child was seriously endangered in Parents’ care:

7. [Dr. McIntire recommended that] [f]or the safety of M.S. and any other child which may be in [Mother's] care in the future, DCS is urged to stand firm on insisting that these treatment goals are successfully met ․ “Successfully met” requires far more than just attendance at sessions. Success is demonstrated by identifiable, genuine gains in treatment, acknowledgement to the entire team, and full disclosure to involved medical providers.

․

22. Dr. Demetris reviewed parents’ psychological evaluations and the Child's medical records. [She] determined that the Child was not safe in [P]arents[’] care as there was a high level of risk that could impact the Child's imminent health and safety leading to death due to Mother's significant mental health concerns and lack of engagement in her own treatment. Dr. Demetris indicated that Father was not a protective factor. Child was further at risk due to underlying medical diagnoses as it would be difficult to identify falsified medical claims compared to expected associated symptoms.

23. Dr. Demetris reports that children with an underlying medical condition are at a higher risk of harm under the care of someone with FDIA because the child ․ is going to be required to seek medical attention. This gives the caregiver with FDIA the opportunity to either withhold medical care or have unnecessary medical care imposed.

24. The Child is at a higher risk of UTI due to her urological abnormality. Dr. Demetris believes the Child is at high risk of the consequences of a UTI due to her urological abnormality and ․ Mother's diagnosis.

․

29. Parents testified that they did not provide any medical provider for the Child[ ] Mother's [e]valuation and that the Child's medical providers were not apprised of Mother's diagnoses.

․

33. Dr. Light did not receive Mother's [e]valuation

34. [He] was not informed of Mother's diagnosis.

35. [He] report[ed] [that] if he was informed of Mother's diagnosis[,] he would have given more attention to the potential for medical child abuse․ FDIA was not “on his radar” and would not have been unless he was told it existed.

․

40. Parents explained their safety plan. It is that Father would be the parent who provided information to medical providers as it pertains to the Child. This was not practiced while at Cincinnati Children's Hospital.

․

45. Mother continues to not accept her diagnosis of [FDIA]. Mother merely acknowledges that she was diagnosed by Dr. McIntire in November 2023.

․

53. Mother stopped therapy in October 2024 and did not start seeing a therapist until after the filing of the current CHINS petition in November 2025.

․

58. Mother has only met with Ms. Whiteside three times, with the first meeting being an initial intake.

59. Ms. Whiteside testified that she still has not received and/or reviewed all of Mother's medical records or spoken to all of Mother's supports.

․

62․ Ms. Whiteside testified that Mother was able to acknowledge the incident with spilling the formula. Mother admitted it was an exaggerated instance and acknowledged it was fictitious to Ms. Whiteside and that she lacked coping strategies. However, in Mother's own testimony in this cause, she does not admit that she poured the formula out and reported it to be vomit. She reports she spilled it out of frustration.

․

75. Father works outside of the home. Mother would be the primary caregiver to the Child while Father works. Father would have to rely on Mother's report for anything that occurs to the Child while he is as work.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 18-19, 23-28, 30.

[29] And as discussed in Part 1, the trial court also made findings about the manifestation of Mother's mental illness during M.S.’s case which reveal the behavior Mother engages in because of her FDIA diagnosis. The trial court's unchallenged findings reveal Mother's unwillingness to acknowledge and treat her FDIA and the serious risk posed to Child as a result. We therefore find there was ample support for the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Child was seriously endangered.

3. Coercive Intervention

[30] The purpose of CHINS proceedings “is to ‘protect children, not [to] punish parents.’ ” D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 580 (alteration in original) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2016)). The coercive intervention element is intended to “guard[ ] against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.’ ” Id. (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied). “The same evidence used by the court to determine that a parent's acts or omissions injured or endangered a child may also support that coercive intervention is necessary to safeguard the child.” In re N.E., 198 N.E.3d 384, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[31] Parents present the same argument here, namely that DCS failed to prove this element because Child “is not [by definition] a victim of medical child abuse.” Appellants’ Br. at 18. Again, DCS was not required to prove Child was a victim of medical child abuse or had suffered actual harm; it was required to prove Child's serious endangerment. Nonetheless, Parents point to numerous facts they believe weigh in their favor: (1) “Dr. Light did not have any concerns of abuse for [Child], nor were there any major or parental concerns reported”; (2) “Whiteside[ ] was not seeing symptomatic F[D]IA at the time of the February [h]earing”; (3) Mother's diagnosis may be out of date; (4) Parents had a safety plan; and (5) Mother previously participated in therapy. Id. at 22, 25.

[32] However, Parents’ portrayal of these facts omits important details as evidenced by the trial court's findings listed in Part 2. We will not reweigh the evidence to view it in a light most favorable to Parents’ contentions. The trial court's findings show Parents were not adhering to their safety plan or the recommendations of Mother's evaluation; Mother refused to acknowledge her diagnosis; Mother did not participate in therapy or any other treatment without DCS involvement; and Child was at an increased risk for medical child abuse given her more frequent interaction with the medical system. Moreover, Dr. McIntire testified that her recommendations still applied throughout Child's case given that Mother had not consistently engaged in treatment. Viewing these facts in a light most favorable to the court's judgment, we conclude they support the court's conclusion that coercive intervention was necessary.

[33] Parents argue the court's conclusions “are based on speculation that the [e]valuation is still a current diagnosis for Mother.” Id. at 22. This is not supported by the record. Dr. McIntire explained that “[p]eople don't get better without treatment” and “without successful completion of the [ACCEPTS] model, there's not been any clinical gain.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 72. Even Dr. Ferraro testified that he'd never encountered a scenario in which the requisite criteria to make a factitious disorder diagnosis went away without treatment. Although Mother attended therapy with Pruitt for a little over a year, the court subsequently determined that she was not qualified to treat factitious disorder. And until approximately a week before the fact-finding hearing, Mother had not participated in any treatment for over a year. The court was well within its authority to credit Dr. McIntire's testimony and evaluation and find that Mother's diagnosis was still valid.

[34] Parents are correct in noting “that a parent's mental illness, without more, is not sufficient to support a CHINS determination.” In re B.P., 190 N.E.3d 995, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). However, the trial court's conclusion here is not based solely on Mother's diagnosis; it is equally rooted in Mother's failure to acknowledge and engage in treatment to address it as well as Child's need for more frequent medical attention, providing Mother more opportunities to engage in factitious behavior. Moreover, Mother's FDIA has specifically manifested as subjecting her children to unnecessary medical care. The trial court was correct to note the well-established principle that “the CHINS statute does not require [it] and DCS to wait until a child is physically or emotionally harmed to intervene.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 32 (citing In re R.P., 949 N.E.2d 395, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) and In re K.B., 24 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)).⁷ Given these specific circumstances, while Child had yet to suffer abuse in this case, the court was not required to wait until she did to intervene. And its findings support its conclusion that DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that court intervention was necessary.

Conclusion

[35] Finding the trial court did not clearly err by adjudicating Child a CHINS, we affirm its judgment.

[36] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father later completed a psychological evaluation with a different psychologist, but his evaluation was not admitted into evidence in this case.

2.   The acronym “ACCEPTS” stands for Acknowledge, Coping, Empathy, Parenting, Taking Charge, and Support.

3.   The fact-finding hearing was held on November 14, 24, and 25, and December 8, 2025.

4.   At this point in the transcript, it appears Q.P. was mistakenly referred to by a different name. However, the fictitious behaviors referenced by DCS are those previously ascribed to incidents with Q.P.

6.   Mother also purports to challenge Findings 27, 47, and 48, but she fails to develop an argument as to why they are erroneous. Thus, she has waived her arguments of error as to those findings. See In re A.B., 277 N.E.3d 98, 105 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (failing to provide a cogent argument waives the issue on appeal (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a))).

7.   Parents take issue with the court's citation to these two cases, providing extensive argument as to how they are distinguishable from this case. See Appellants’ Br. at 21. However, it is clear the trial court did not cite the cases to draw factual parallels but rather to support its recitation of this well-established legal principle. See Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 32.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J. and Kenworthy, J. concur.