Hannah Martin and Raphael Martin, Appellants-Plaintiffs v. Andrea McComb, Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Hannah Martin and Raphael Martin (together, “the Martins”) appeal from the trial court's order dismissing their complaint against Andrea McComb (“McComb”). The Martins raise two issues which we consolidate and restate as: whether the trial court erred when it dismissed their complaint under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 6, 2025, the Martins filed a pro se civil complaint against McComb alleging negligence and related claims arising from events that resulted in the death of their minor daughter. The complaint alleged that McComb “wrongfully, intentionally, and/or negligently allowed her grandson to possess and give drugs” to the Martins’ minor daughter, causing her to overdose.¹ Compl. p. 2, June 6, 2025.

[3] McComb, also appearing pro se, filed her answer on June 16, 2025. On the same date, she also filed a motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6), asserting that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court set the motion for a hearing to be held on August 12, 2025. On July 11, 2025, the Martins filed a response to the motion to dismiss, asserting that their complaint stated a valid claim for which relief could be granted. The Martins also filed a motion to seal the records of the case on July 17, 2025.

[4] A hearing on both pending motions was held on August 25, 2025.  ² Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order granting McComb's motion to dismiss and denying the Martins’ motion to seal the records of the case. The Martins now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Initially, we note that the Martins have chosen to proceed pro se. A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his or her pro se status. Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted).

[6] We also note that McComb ³ did not file an appellee's brief. In such a case, we need not develop an argument for her but instead will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error. Hetty Inc. v. Weems, 237 N.E.3d 701, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing In re Adoption of E.B., 163 N.E.3d 931, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). “Prima facie error means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). To determine whether reversal is required, we are still obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d at 352.

[7] The Martins argue that the trial court erred when it granted McComb's motion to dismiss their complaint under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim. We review the trial court's grant or denial of such a motion to dismiss pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6) de novo. Snyder v. Town of Yorktown, 20 N.E.3d 545, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Kephart, 934 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (Ind. 2010)), trans. denied. A motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) “ ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint: that is, whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief.’ ” Veolia Water Indpls., LLC v. Nat'l Tr. Ins. Co., 3 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Nw. Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ind. 2006)), clarified on reh'g, 12 N.E.3d 240. When reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion, we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, and only consider the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draw every reasonable inference in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 4–5. We will affirm a dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) only if it is apparent that the facts alleged in the complaint are incapable of supporting relief under any set of circumstances. Id. at 5.

[8] Indiana Trial Rule 8(A), this state's notice pleading provision, requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although plaintiffs need not set out in precise detail the facts upon which the claim is based, they must still plead the operative facts necessary to set forth an actionable claim. Trail, 845 N.E.2d at 135 (citing Miller v. Mem'l Hosp. of South Bend, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1329, 1332 (Ind. 1997)).

[9] The Martins assert that, in granting the motion to dismiss, the trial court erroneously “required [them] to establish facts and conclusions beyond what is required at the pleading stage.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. They contend that their complaint alleged facts that, when accepted as true, were “sufficient to place the defendant on notice of the claims asserted and the conduct at issue.” Id. However, the Martins do not set out what their claims actually were or what factual allegations they made in their complaint. They do not set out under which theory of liability they were seeking to hold McComb accountable. In their brief, they mention negligence but do not point to what factual allegations in their complaint support a negligence claim. Beyond stating that their complaint was sufficient to put McComb on notice of the claims asserted, the Martins do not elaborate as to what those claims were.

[10] The Martins also argue that the trial court improperly weighed the evidence and “effectively reject[ed] the plaintiffs’ factual allegations and [drew] inferences against them.” Id. at 10. However, they again do not elaborate as to what those factual allegations were and how the trial court improperly weighed the evidence. They also assert that the trial court “failed to draw reasonable inferences in [their] favor” and “construed the allegations in a manner adverse to them.” Id. Again, the Martins do not make any specific arguments as to how the trial court erred in its drawing of inferences and construing of allegations.

[11] Looking to their brief and arguments on appeal, the Martins have not demonstrated that the trial court's order was erroneous on the face of it, and therefore, there is no prima facie error. See Hetty Inc., 237 N.E.3d at 704. Thus, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing the Martins’ complaint pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6).

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Martins did not include the June 6, 2025 complaint in their appendix on appeal. Indiana Appellate Rule 50(A)(1) states that the purpose of an appendix in civil appeals is to present the court with copies of those parts of the record on appeal that “are necessary for the [c]ourt to decide the issues presented.” Further, under the appellate rules, the appendix shall contain a copy of “pleadings and other documents ․ that are necessary for resolution of the issues raised on appeal.” Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(f).

2.   We note that the Martins filed an amended complaint on August 26, 2025, which was the day after the hearing was held on the parties’ motions. However, this amended complaint did not meet the requirements for an amended complaint under either Trial Rule 15(A) or Trial Rule 12(B). See Ind. Trial Rule 15(A) (“A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or ․ [o]therwise ․ by leave of court[.]”); T.R. 12(B) (“When a motion to dismiss is sustained for failure to state a claim ․ [,] the pleading may be amended once as of right pursuant to Rule 15(A) within ten (10) days after service of notice of the court's order ․ and thereafter with permission of the court pursuant to such rule.”).

3.   On February 2, 2026, a “Notice of Death and Intent to Establish Successor Representative” was filed with this court, informing the court that McComb died on September 27, 2025, and that, at the time of the filing, no personal representative had been appointed for McComb's estate. No further filings were received regarding a personal representative.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.