C.C. (Father), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) removed four-year-old P.C. (Child) from the care of his mother, K.C. (Mother), due to recurring unsanitary conditions at Mother's home. DCS did not place Child with his father, C.C. (Father), because Father was incarcerated for possession of methamphetamine. DCS was also concerned by Father's history of substance abuse, which had led to prior convictions and periods of incarceration for other drug offenses. Child was determined to be a child in need of services (CHINS), and Mother eventually agreed to the voluntary termination of her parental rights as to Child. Meanwhile, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights involuntarily.

[2] By the time of the termination hearing, Father's release from incarceration was imminent. The trial court, however, was unpersuaded by Father's stated efforts to better himself while incarcerated and terminated his parental rights as to Child. On appeal, Father primarily challenges the trial court's conclusion that the conditions that led to Child's non-placement with him were unlikely to be remedied. Father emphasizes his uncontested testimony that he resolved his substance abuse issues while incarcerated. But the trial court was not required to credit this testimony and did not clearly err in finding it outweighed by Father's long history of substance abuse and related incarcerations. We affirm.

Facts

[3] Father's contact with the criminal justice system began when he was 18 years old, long before Child was born. In 2012, Father was charged with Class D felony possession of chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. That charge was ultimately dismissed, but later that year, Father was charged with Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine. In April 2013, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eight years in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), with two years suspended to probation.

[4] In March 2015, Father was charged with Class B misdemeanor reckless driving. A week later, he was charged in two separate cases with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine. Father pleaded guilty to reckless driving and to one count of possession of methamphetamine, and in 2017, all three cases were resolved after Father successfully completed the Kosciusko County Drug Court Program. As part of this program, Father underwent Moral Reconation Therapy, which we understand to be an intensive cognitive-behavioral program that seeks to decrease recidivism by increasing moral reasoning. See Juvenile Programs, Ind. Dep't Corr., https://www.in.gov/idoc/divisions/re-entry/ programs/juvenile-programs/#Moral_Reconation_Therapy [https://perma.cc/G5YE-3DMY] (last visited Sept. 4, 2026).

[5] Across three cases in the spring of 2019, Father was charged with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Class A misdemeanor theft, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Father failed to appear in two of these cases and was further charged with two counts of failure to appear, a Class A misdemeanor and a Level 6 felony. In July 2019, he pleaded guilty to all six charges and received varying jail sentences. All but 180 days were suspended to probation.

[6] In July 2020, while Mother was pregnant with Child, Father was charged with committing Level 5 felony domestic battery against Mother. This charge was dismissed by the State in February 2021, and Child was born two weeks later. A little more than a year after that, in March 2022, Father was charged with committing Class A misdemeanor domestic battery against Mother. He pleaded guilty that September and was sentenced to one year in jail, with 361 days suspended to probation.

[7] In March 2024, Father was charged in one case with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated. That same month, Father was charged in another case with Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine. Father pleaded guilty to all three charges, and the trial court sentenced him to a total of six years in DOC, with two years suspended to probation.

[8] DCS first became involved with Child in March 2022, when it received a report of Father's domestic battery against Mother. DCS's concerns were resolved through an Informal Adjustment Plan with Father and Mother. But a couple years later, in April 2024, DCS again became involved with Child when it received a report of unsanitary conditions at Mother's home. Father was incarcerated at the time, and DCS's concerns were resolved through an Informal Adjustment Plan with Mother alone. However, in March 2025, DCS became involved with Child for a third time when it received another report of unsanitary conditions at Mother's home. Child was then four years old.

[9] DCS soon filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS based on the conditions at Mother's home as well as Father's incarceration and history of substance abuse. With the trial court's approval, Child was removed from Mother's care and placed with his maternal aunt and uncle (Relatives). Mother and Father later admitted to the CHINS allegations, and Child was determined to be a CHINS. After a hearing, the trial court issued a dispositional order establishing reunification as Child's permanency plan and requiring, among other things, that Father complete any services to which DCS referred him, provide DCS with records of any programming he completed while incarcerated, and contact DCS within 48 hours of his release from DOC. Due to his incarceration and general difficulty communicating with DOC, DCS did not refer Father to any services while he was incarcerated.

[10] In January 2026, Father was released from DOC to a Kosciusko County work-release program. He contacted DCS as required, and two weeks later, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights as to Child. In February 2026, Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights, after which the trial court granted DCS's motion to add adoption as Child's concurrent permanency plan. A termination hearing was then held on March 20, 2026.

[11] At the termination hearing, Father testified that he would complete his work-release program and begin probation on April 9, 2026. He acknowledged making no effort to communicate with Child during the two years he was incarcerated but expressed his desire to reunite with Child. According to Father, things would be different this time because:

Um, I'm away from [Mother]. And that's, I made the decision to use, so I'm not trying to hold her to, you know, for me using, uh, but, uh, just, I've, I've been clean and sober long enough, um, I don't, I don't need the stimulance [sic]. Um, I, I just, I want to be a parent, be there for my son.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 29. Father also named certain programs in which he engaged while incarcerated.

[12] The DCS family case manager (FCM) assigned to Child's case testified that termination was in Child's best interests based on Father's history of substance abuse and domestic violence and his two-year absence from Child's life while incarcerated. The FCM also testified that Child was thriving with Relatives, who had expressed a desire to adopt him. Child's court appointed special advocate (CASA) also testified that termination and adoption were in Child's best interests.

[13] After the hearing, the trial court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights as to Child. In its order, the court made the following findings of fact:

2. [Father] has a substantial criminal history highlighted by the use and abuse of controlled substances and occasional domestic violence. He received varying sentences of incarceration in some of the following cases [identifying the 12 cases discussed above].

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5. [Father] has been continually incarcerated since March of 2024. He did not see [Child] from March of 2024 until the beginning of 2026 when DCS facilitated three supervised visits. For roughly two years, [Father] did not communicate with [Child] nor did he attempt to establish meaningful contact.

6. Back in the mid-2010s, [Father] participated in Drug Court and went through a Moral Reconation Therapy course. These formal and drastic steps, though, did not stop [Father's] involvement with illegal drugs and criminal activity.

7. While incarcerated over the last two years, [Father] has engaged in “Breaking Free,” “Parenting While Incarcerated,” and “Therapeutic Community” courses at [DOC]. He is currently doing the “24/7 Dad” course.

8. [Father] is due to be released on April 9, 2026. He will be on probation. His plan is to live with his grandfather in South Whitley. He has employment in Bourbon, Indiana.

App. Vol. II, pp. 29-31.

[14] In addition to these findings, the trial court explained:

15. [Father's] lawyer points the Court to K.E. v Ind. DCS, 39 N.E.3d 641 (Ind. 2015). That case found that K.E.’s rights should not have been terminated simply because his incarceration prevented him from parenting. In that case “Father made substantial efforts to better himself by learning parenting skills, addressing his problems with substance abuse, and establishing a bond [with his child while incarcerated].” Id. at 643.

16. This Court finds K.E. to be distinguishable from [Child's] case. Specifically, the Court is unimpressed with [Father's] efforts to improve his and [Child's] situation while incarcerated. While [Father] tells the Court he has engaged in a handful of courses during his incarceration time, his situation does not compare to that of K.E.’s father who completed twelve different programs to address his substance abuse problem. Nor are the contents, requirements, and results of [Father's] programs explained to the Court. The Court would have preferred to hear [Father] recite some of the lessons learned and the changed ways to which he looked forward. Instead, the Court heard merely the mention of the titles of a small number of courses in which [Father] involved himself.

17. The K.E. decision found error by the trial court in that K.E.’s father's “recent improvements at the time of the termination hearing were not balanced against his ․ criminal and substance abuse history.” Id. _at 649. Here, [Father's] “recent improvements” are merely words. While the Court sincerely hopes that [Father] means what he says, and that he intends and is able to change his behaviors, the Court finds his prior actions to be more convincing than his self-serving statements. Actions speak louder than words, and [Father] has spoken loudly and plainly about where [Child] fits into his priorities.

18. It is reasonably probable that [Father] will be unable to amend his behavior so as to avoid future incarceration and/ or other barriers to serving as a proper parent.

19. In K.E., the “healthy bond” between [the f]ather and child[,] which had been developed by communication initiated by K.E.’s father[,] was an important factor in the Appellate Court's decision. Here, [Father] has not exerted himself to maintain contact with [Child] while incarcerated. No letters, no gifts, no attempts at phone calls. The Court concedes that maintaining contact with a child while serving a sentence of incarceration is difficult, but the lack of effort on [Father's] part is an important point of distinction between this case and that of K.E.

20. The K.E. decision also found that it was important that K.E.’s father was going to be guaranteed a relationship with the child. That is not true in [Child's] case, and thus the Court is less compelled to maintain the parent/ child relationship.

App. Vol. II, pp. 32-33 (footnote omitted).

Discussion and Decision

[15] Father appeals the termination of his parental rights as to Child. To terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) termination is in the child's best interests; (2) there is a satisfactory plan for the child's care; and (3) one or more of the circumstances enumerated in Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) exist. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2026) (elements for termination); In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (clear and convincing evidence standard). Here, DCS alleged that two subsection (d) circumstances existed:

• a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) (2026).

• a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(4) (2026).

[16] The trial court determined that both subsection (d) circumstances existed and that all three termination elements were proven by clear and convincing evidence. Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its determination, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009). “First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second[,] we determine whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. We do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility and look only to the evidence supporting the judgment. Id. “We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.” Id.

A. Subsection (d) Circumstances

[17] Father first challenges the trial court's conclusion that an Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) circumstance exists. Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, proof of one qualifying circumstance is sufficient to support termination. In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. We address only subsection (d)(3), finding it dispositive. That subsection requires a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the child's removal will not be remedied. But because Father did not have custody of Child at the time of removal, the inquiry shifts: we look to the reasons why Child was not placed with Father upon removal, then determine whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. See In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind. 2010).

[18] DCS did not place Child with Father upon Child's removal from Mother's care because Father was incarcerated. DCS also had concerns about Father's history of substance abuse, which had led to his repeated incarceration. To determine whether these conditions were likely to be remedied, the trial court had to consider any evidence of changed conditions and balance any recent improvements against “habitual patterns of conduct.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id.

[19] Here, the evidence showed that Father had a history of substance abuse and was charged with drug-related offenses in seven different criminal cases in the ten years before Child's birth. One of the earlier cases resulted in a six-year executed prison sentence, but Father's involvement with drugs resumed upon his release. The three cases that followed were resolved through a drug court program, during which Father underwent Moral Reconation Therapy. These “formal and drastic steps” did not end Father's substance abuse, however. App. Vol. II, p. 31. And the last three cases led to a 180-day executed jail sentence.

[20] Child's birth also did not deter Father's involvement with drugs or the criminal justice system in general. A year after Child was born, Father was charged with domestic battery against Mother. And eighteen months after pleading guilty to that charge, Father was charged with drug-related offenses in two additional cases. These resulted in the four-year executed prison sentence Father was serving when DCS removed Child from Mother's care and later petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights. That Father returned to drugs after Child's birth confirmed that his substance abuse issues remained unresolved.

[21] Against this habitual pattern of conduct, Father argues that he bettered himself while incarcerated by engaging in “Breaking Free,” “Parenting While Incarcerated,” and “Therapeutic Community” courses through DOC. But as the trial court observed in its termination order, Father offered no evidence connecting this coursework to the alleged betterment of his substance abuse issues. Instead, Father suggested that he simply resolved those issues by getting “clean and sober” while incarcerated. Tr. Vol. II, p. 29. Father also suggested that his desire to “be a parent” and “be there” for Child simply overcame his substance abuse issues. Id.

[22] While Father's engagement in DOC programming is commendable, those vague efforts spanned a short period compared to his long history of substance abuse—a history that includes completion of a drug court program that did not keep Father sober. Father's stated desire to be there for Child is also juxtaposed with the fact that he made no effort to communicate with Child for roughly two years while incarcerated. In the end, the trial court was not required to credit Father's self-serving testimony that he resolved his substance abuse issues while incarcerated, and the court was entitled to find Father's efforts to resolve those issues outweighed by his history of substance abuse and drug-related incarceration. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[23] The trial court did not clearly err by concluding that the conditions that led to Child's non-placement with Father were unlikely to be remedied.

B. Best Interests and Satisfactory Plan

[24] Father also challenges the trial court's conclusions that terminating his parental rights was in Child's best interests and that DCS had a satisfactory plan for Child's care. On both issues, Father essentially argues that he bettered himself enough while incarcerated to warrant additional time to better himself further. This argument, however, is simply a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260.

[25] Moreover, the recommendations of both the FCM and the CASA, together with the trial court's conclusion that the conditions resulting in Child's non-placement with Father are unlikely to be remedied, are sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in Child's best interests. See In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). And this Court has previously held that “adoption is a ‘satisfactory plan’ for the care and treatment of a child.” In re B.M., 913 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).

[26] The trial court did not clearly err by concluding that terminating Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests and that DCS had a satisfactory plan to care for Child.

Conclusion

[27] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment terminating Father's parental rights as to Child.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.