Keaton Compton, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Keaton Compton fired nine gunshots at a truck, endangering the three people inside. He appeals his three convictions of Level 1 felony attempted murder, arguing that the evidence is insufficient. Concluding that the evidence is sufficient, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the evening of November 14, 2023, Compton was with four companions, including a juvenile we refer to as “Teen 1.” They were driving around Lafayette, Indiana, in a Jeep Grand Cherokee. One of the Jeep's occupants was delivering food for an online delivery service. Another member of the group had a .40 caliber handgun.

[3] As the group drove around, Teen 1 argued with Ashton Moffitt via a social media app. They were arguing about “a girl.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 86. Teen 1 told the group that he and Moffitt had agreed to have a fight at a gas station.

[4] Compton texted his half-brother, Lazaro Vega, to see if he wanted to join them for the fight. When Vega expressed reluctance, Compton told him, “It's all good. Imma [sic] crash him for u [sic][.]” Tr. Vol. 4, p. 109. Compton also told Vega, “I'm gonna [sic] slaughter this dude bad[.]” Id. at 114.

[5] The companions stopped at Vega's house to pick up ski masks, and Vega joined them. They drove to the gas station, still in the Jeep. Compton, who was sitting in the back seat, encouraged Teen 1 to fight Moffitt, but if shooting was involved, Compton said that “he would take the charge for a fifteen-year-old because he did not want a fifteen-year-old to waste their life behind bars.” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 54, 75.

[6] Meanwhile, Isaac Ceja, Tiwan Clay, and Giovanny Guzman all worked at the same fast-food restaurant, and they finished their shifts at around nine p.m. Ceja was driving his father's silver Ford Ranger pickup truck, and he took Clay and Guzman to a nearby gas station to buy drinks and snacks. Ceja knew Moffitt, but Moffitt was not with them that night. Upon arriving at the station, Clay realized he did not have his wallet, and they left to go find it.

[7] Compton and the others were parked at the gas station when Ceja and his two companions arrived in the truck. Several of Compton's companions later said that they saw multiple people in the truck. When Ceja drove away, Teen 1 told the group to follow the truck, claiming Moffitt was inside.

[8] Compton and his companions followed the truck into a residential neighborhood. Meanwhile, either Clay or Guzman told Ceja that they were being followed as they left the gas station. When the Jeep caught up to the truck, Compton grabbed the handgun and leaned out of a window. He fired nine shots at the truck. Suddenly, Ceja felt multiple gunshots hit his truck, and he accelerated and drove away. He called his father, who called the police. The driver of the Jeep also sped away from the scene, as Compton bragged to his companions that he “had emptied the clip.” Id. at 58.

[9] A crime scene technician was called to the site of the shooting. He recovered several shell casings from the ground. Later, a technician examined Ceja's truck and found several bullet holes in its rear.

[10] Meanwhile, Compton and his companions returned to Vega's house. The owner of the Jeep took Compton back to his home in a nearby town. He later lent the Jeep to Compton. The owner initially believed that Compton needed the Jeep to help someone move, but he later realized Compton was trying to conceal the Jeep from any police investigation. Several days later, Compton told the owner to clean out the Jeep to make sure there were no “[b]ullet casings [or] gun residue.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 72.

[11] Also, several days after the shooting, Compton told one of his companions from that night that he was going to “get rid of” the handgun. Id. at 89. He sold the handgun to an acquaintance. The police later recovered the gun.

[12] The State charged Compton with numerous felonies and misdemeanors, including three counts of Level 1 felony attempted murder. The State also alleged that Compton was eligible for sentencing enhancements. The jury determined Compton was guilty of the attempted murder charges and other offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence, and this appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Compton challenges his three convictions of attempted murder, claiming that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain them. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Dorsey v. State, 262 N.E.3d 181, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “We will consider only the evidence supporting the verdict and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.” Toles v. State, 151 N.E.3d 805, 808 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “Reversal is warranted only if the defendant can show that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him guilty on the evidence in the record.” Dorsey, 262 N.E.3d at 186.

[14] To obtain convictions for three counts of attempted murder as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Compton, (2) while acting with the intent to kill Clay (Count I), Ceja (Count II), or Guzman (Count III), (3) engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward the killing of Clay, Ceja, or Guzman. Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(1) (2018) (murder), 35-41-5-1(a) (2014) (attempt); Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 16-18. The State further alleged that Compton's conduct that constituted a substantial step was (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) pointing and discharging a firearm multiple times (3) at Clay, Ceja, or Guzman. Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 16-18.

[15] Compton does not dispute that he shot at Ceja's truck. He instead argues that he lacked the required mental culpability to commit attempted murder against the truck's occupants because he did not know them. Compton concludes that his misconduct amounted to criminal recklessness at worst.

[16] “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a) (1977). Intent is a mental state and, without an admission by the defendant, the trier of fact must make reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant had the intent to commit the offense at issue. Griffin v. State, 81 N.E.3d 243, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

[17] In Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 261-62 (Ind. 2020), two groups of people were arguing about a car. Powell and several friends were part of one group, and the second group was sitting in a car, a few feet from Powell. As the car began to drive away, Powell fired five to six shots at the occupants. A jury determined that Powell was guilty of two counts of attempted murder for shooting at the driver and the person in the front passenger seat.

[18] On appeal, Powell claimed that his attempted murder conviction for shooting at the passenger must be reversed because he did not know her and was focusing on the driver. The Indiana Supreme Court rejected Powell's claim. The Court noted that Powell willingly participated in the dispute and argued with the victims. Next, Powell fired multiple shots into the victims’ car from close range. The Court concluded that this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Powell intended to kill both the driver and the passenger. Id. at 270.

[19] In the current case, Compton knew that Teen 1 was going to get into a fight, and Compton's text messages to Vega demonstrated that he intended to participate in the violence. In addition, Compton told Teen 1 that if the dispute escalated to shooting, he would get involved on Teen 1's behalf so that Teen 1 did not go to prison.

[20] After Compton and his companions began following Ceja's truck, and the Jeep's driver maneuvered to follow directly behind the truck, Compton leaned out of the window with the handgun and fired nine rounds at the truck's occupants. Afterwards, he bragged to his companions about the shooting. Compton also hid the Jeep for several days, told the Jeep's owner to clean it out, and sold the handgun, all to conceal his grave misconduct. This evidence is similar to the circumstances in Powell and provided an ample basis for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Compton intended to kill the truck's occupants, regardless of whether he knew the occupants’ identities.

[21] Compton cites to Kiefer v. State, 761 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. 2002), in which the Indiana Supreme Court reversed a conviction of attempted murder, but that case involved different facts. In Kiefer, the purported victim was walking down a county road when he heard an explosion. The victim looked at Kiefer's house and saw black smoke, which caused him to run away. He never accused Kiefer of shooting at him. Other witnesses later said that Kiefer had a gun, but he was shooting at a bush on his own property. The Supreme Court concluded the facts failed to demonstrate an intent to kill.

[22] By contrast, in the current case Compton expressed a willingness to participate in a fight and fired nine shots directly at Ceja's truck. The circumstances presented in Kiefer do not compel us to reverse the trial court's judgment.

Conclusion

[23] The State presented sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Compton intended to kill the truck's three occupants. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the three convictions of attempted murder.

[24] Affirmed.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.