Gia D. Guines, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Gia D. Guines (“Guines”) appeals the trial court's order revoking her direct placement in community corrections. She raises one issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to serve the executed portion of her sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”) as a sanction for violating the terms of her placement. Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 10, 2025, Guines delivered methamphetamine to a Fort Wayne police officer, and the State charged her with dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony. On November 5, 2025, Guines pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that capped any executed portion of her sentence at two years.

[3] On December 3, 2025, the trial court sentenced Guines to two years, with one year executed and one year suspended, and placed her on one year of active adult probation. The court ordered that Guines serve the executed portion of her sentence in the Allen County Community Corrections Residential Services program (“Residential Services”), telling her that she was “getting a break by going in there.” Tr. Vol. 1 p. 23.

[4] Guines signed the General Rules and Special Conditions of Allen County Community Corrections on November 13, 2025, and again on December 16, 2025, and she was advised that a violation of those rules could result in revocation. Under those rules, a participant who obtained a pass to leave the facility was required to identify her destination, her purpose, and her mode of transportation, and to travel directly to the approved location and back. The rules advised Guines that “if [she] d[id] not follow the pass policy,” her “pass privileges may be limited, and [she] may be sanctioned, violated, and / or terminated.” Ex. Vol. 1 p. 8.

[5] On January 23, 2026, following allegations that Guines had been loitering and had failed to abide by the facility's dress code, the trial court held an informal adjustment hearing. The court permitted Guines to remain in Residential Services but placed her on “zero tolerance,” warning her that any further violation would result in her commitment to the DOC. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 29.

[6] On February 5, 2026, Allen County Community Corrections filed a verified petition to revoke Guines's placement, alleging three violations: (1) that on February 3, 2026, she made an unauthorized stop at a Kroger on North Clinton Street and used a mode of transportation other than the one she had declared; (2) that on February 4, 2026, she made multiple unauthorized stops, loitering in different parking lots while on an approved pass; and (3) that she had failed to pay program fees.

[7] The trial court held a revocation hearing on March 3, 2026. Without objection, the trial court admitted into evidence the General Rules and Special Conditions. The State presented testimony from Guines's case manager, Rodolfo Flores. The case manager testified that on February 3, 2026, Guines made an unauthorized stop at Kroger and admitted that she traveled in a rental vehicle although the mode of transportation she declared was the bus, and that on February 4, 2026, she made four unauthorized stops, loitering in different parking lots while on an approved pass. There was also testimony about nonpayment of fees.

[8] Guines testified in her defense. She stated that she has been disabled since 2008 and that a 2023 stroke left her partially paralyzed on her right side and limited her mobility. Guines claimed that she stopped in the parking lots to rest and catch her breath as she made her way to the bus stop, that she telephoned Residential Services each time she stopped, and that she wore an ankle monitor that disclosed her location. Guines admitted, however, that her mode of transportation on February 3, 2026, did not match the transportation identified in her pass. She asked the court to allow her to serve the remainder of her sentence on home detention rather than in the DOC.

[9] The trial court found that the State had proven the first two allegations but had not proven that Guines willfully failed to pay program fees. In selecting a sanction, the trial court expressed skepticism that Guines had actually stopped to rest, pointing out: “It's interesting that they're always parking lots and not just right on the sidewalk on the way, but they're at parking lots.” Id. at 56. The court explained that the program's ability to track Guines through her ankle monitor did not authorize her to make unapproved stops, and that when a participant deviates from an approved pass, the program cannot know what she is doing. The court revoked the placement in Residential Services, ordered Guines to serve the one-year executed portion of her sentence in the DOC with 175 days of jail credit, and ordered that she complete the previously imposed one year of active adult probation upon her release. Guines now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Guines contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve the executed portion of her sentence in the DOC. She challenges only the court's selection of a sanction, not its finding that she violated the conditions of her placement in Residential Services. For the purposes of appellate review, we treat the revocation of placement in a community corrections program the same as we do the revocation of probation. State v. Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d 775, 777 (Ind. 2015); Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999).

[11] Placement in a community corrections program is an alternative to the DOC and is ordered within the sole discretion of the trial court. Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 549. A defendant is not entitled to participate in such a program. Id. Rather, placement in community corrections is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right. Id. If a person violates the terms of community corrections, the State may ask the court to revoke the placement and commit the person to the county jail or the DOC for the remainder of the person's sentence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-5(b). A revocation hearing is civil in nature, and the State need only prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. McQueen v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1237, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[12] Revocation is a two-step process: the court first makes a factual determination that a violation occurred and then determines whether the violation warrants revocation. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). We apply a deferential standard of review, recognizing that when a court extended its grace by allowing an alternative placement, the court “should have considerable leeway” in deciding how to proceed upon a violation. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). We review the trial court's selection of a sanction for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the court misinterpreted the law. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). Proof of a single violation is sufficient to support revocation of an alternative placement. Beeler v. State, 959 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. On review, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, without reweighing the evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses. Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 639.

[13] Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the alternative placement and ordering Guines to serve the executed portion of her sentence in the DOC. Guines violated the conditions of her placement two days in a row, and did so after an informal adjustment hearing where she was warned that any further violation would result in her commitment to the DOC. On February 3, 2026, she made an unauthorized stop at a Kroger and, by her own admission, traveled by a mode of transportation that she had not identified in her pass. The next day, she made four additional unauthorized stops while out on a pass.

[14] Guines argues that revocation was unreasonable because of her disability, the alleged technical nature of her violations, her ongoing contact with Residential Services, and the fact that in-home detention might have been available as an alternative to commitment to the DOC. A person may present “mitigating evidence” suggesting that revocation is not warranted under the circumstances. Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640. At the same time, in choosing a sanction, “trial courts are not required to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

[15] In this case, the court heard Guines's testimony about her stroke, her limited mobility, and her explanation that she stopped on four occasions to rest. The court also expressed skepticism about Guines's explanation for repeatedly stopping in parking lots. Guines's contention that revocation was unreasonable under the circumstances amounts to an invitation to reweigh evidence, which we will not do. See Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 639. The court's decision not to keep Guines on a placement whose conditions she had repeatedly failed to satisfy was not clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. As the trial court explained, the pass conditions exist so that Residential Services is aware of a person's whereabouts and actions. Guines's unapproved stops defeated that purpose regardless of whether her ankle monitor disclosed her location.

[16] In arguing the sanction was unreasonable, Guines asserts that “a less severe alternative was specifically proposed” and claims the court should have considered “the availability of a less restrictive alternative such as home detention.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. Guines also likens her case to Ripps v. State, where this court identified an abuse of discretion in revoking the entire suspended sentence of a sixty-nine-year-old probationer who suffered from terminal cancer, had registered his new address, was taking steps to correct a residency violation for being within 1,000 feet of a public library, and had exceeded the residency restriction by only about twenty feet where there was “some ambiguity” in how the distance was measured. 968 N.E.2d 323, 327–28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Guines points out that, like in Ripps, she had a medical condition, and she argues that “the conduct that triggered revocation was not willful defiance but rather the physical inability of a disabled woman to navigate an unfamiliar city on foot without stopping to rest.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. However, unlike in Ripps, the trial court did not view Guines's explanation for the violation as credible. Moreover, Guines did not exceed a condition by a slight and uncertain margin; she deviated from the express terms of her passes, two days in a row, after being warned that any further violation would result in revocation and placement in the DOC. The trial court was well within its discretion in determining that Guines was not a suitable candidate for a community-based program that required ongoing supervision and compliance.

[17] The sanction imposed was not an abuse of discretion.

[18] Affirmed.

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur.