Demarcus Cortez Williams, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Demarcus Cortez Williams pleaded guilty to Level 3 felony attempted rape, Level 4 felony burglary, and Level 4 felony child molesting. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of forty years, all executed at the Indiana Department of Correction. Williams appeals his sentence, raising the following issues: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its finding of mitigators; and (2) Is Williams’ sentence inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In the early morning hours of July 9, 2020, Williams was “very intoxicated” from consuming alcohol, marijuana, and ecstasy. Tr. Vol. 2 at 15. He came across Victim 1 as she walked home, “picked her up, carried her to a different place, [and] removed her underwear and [his] pants[.]” Id. at 16. Williams fled when Victim 1's yelling drew the attention of nearby residents. Shortly after, Williams removed a window air conditioning unit and broke into Victim 2's house with intent to commit “some sort of felony.” Id. at 17. While in the house, Williams touched Victim 2 and her roommate without their consent and tried to lift their nightgowns. They were eventually able to push him out the front door. And finally, Williams broke into a house where ten-year-old Victim 3 lived and got into bed with her and her four-year-old sister. He hugged the sister for a few moments and then kissed Victim 3's neck and face. Victim 3 was able to push Williams off the bed, and he left the residence after asking the girls if they wanted to see his penis. Williams’ DNA was found under Victim 1's fingernails, in Victim 2's house, and on Victim 3's face, and all three victims identified Williams.

[3] The State initially charged Williams with crimes related only to Victim 1. The information was later amended to charge Williams with a total of eleven crimes related to all five victims. Three times—in 2021, 2022, and 2023—Williams was evaluated for competence to stand trial and was found unable to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of his defense. The third time, one of the three appointed examiners concluded Williams understood the proceedings and was able to assist counsel but “will likely attempt to present as ‘incompetent[.]’ ” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 245.

[4] The fourth and final competency evaluation occurred in January 2024. The examiner made three diagnoses: malingering, antisocial personality disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning. The diagnosis of malingering was based on evidence Williams had “repeatedly feigned a lack of understanding of his legal proceedings and an inability to assist his attorney in his defense ․ for the clear purpose of avoiding prosecution[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 37. The diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder was based on Williams’ “history of a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since at least early adolescence.” Id. And the borderline intellectual functioning diagnosis was based on “past clinical assessment and intelligence testing” demonstrating deficits in intellectual and adaptive functioning. Id. at 38. The deficits “do not appear to reach the threshold of an intellectual disability.” Id. The examiner concluded:

Based on his past and current behavior, the Court should have no expectation that Mr. Williams will voluntarily cooperate with his proceedings [or] with his attorney․ [T]his lack of cooperation is not based in mental illness or defect. It is a knowing and voluntary refusal to cooperate in proceedings that could result in a substantial criminal penalty.

Id. at 41.

[5] Williams’ jury trial was set for October 6, 2025. With potential jurors already assembled that morning, the parties filed a Statement of Plea Agreement, and the trial court held a change of plea hearing instead. Williams pleaded guilty to Level 3 felony attempted rape as to Victim 1, Level 4 felony burglary as to Victim 2, and Level 4 felony child molesting as to Victim 3. Sentencing was left open to the trial court's discretion. The State would move to dismiss the eight remaining counts at sentencing.

[6] The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) indicated Williams was thirty years old when he committed the offenses. He has an extensive history with the criminal justice system. He had twelve referrals as a juvenile, beginning when he was thirteen. As an adult, Williams has been arrested and/or charged nearly forty times and has twenty-two convictions, including for offenses against persons and property. He has been sentenced to jail, community corrections, and probation, with probation revoked on at least three occasions. He was on bond when he committed these offenses, and he was charged in two additional cases while awaiting trial in this case. Williams reported being diagnosed with “Mild Retardation, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and Bipolar Disorder that started in his childhood.” Id. at 178. He reported regular use of alcohol and marijuana beginning at age thirty, and suffering hangovers and blackouts while drinking. His risk assessment score placed him at a high risk to reoffend.

[7] At the sentencing hearing on November 6, 2025, Williams denied writing the statement included in his PSI which states, “I'm so so sorry for what I did to [those] people. I did not mean to hurt them[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 181; see Tr. Vol. 2 at 44 (Williams stating, “I didn't write the Defendant version on Page 15. I did not write that․ Somebody filled it out for me[.]”). When given the opportunity to speak in allocution, Williams said, “I don't deserve this. I don't deserve [any] of this because I [have] been locked up a long time already.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 50.¹

[8] The State filed a sentencing memorandum before the hearing in which it listed the aggravators it believed applied: the harm, injury, loss, or damage the victims suffered was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the crimes; Williams has a history of criminal or delinquent behavior; Victim 2 was over sixty-five and Victim 3 was less than twelve; Williams knowingly committed the child molesting offense in the presence of another child under the age of eighteen; and Williams had recently violated the conditions of probation. The State also noted the three crimes to which Williams pleaded guilty were crimes of violence and should be served consecutively. At the hearing, the State requested maximum, consecutive, fully executed sentences totaling forty years.

[9] Williams’ counsel generally agreed with the aggravators the State advanced but argued in mitigation that Williams pleaded to the three most serious crimes and has “severe mental health problems and cognitive issues.” Id. Counsel pointed out Williams “was crying as he laid out the factual basis” at the change of plea hearing and “his statement [in the PSI] about his regret ․ is a better reflection of [his] actual feelings and thoughts ․ as opposed to his conduct in court.” Id. at 51. Counsel asked the trial court to suspend a portion of whatever sentence it imposed to “some form of step-down services” so Williams “is able to have a better chance of getting on his feet[.]” Id.

[10] The trial court found the following aggravators: Williams’ extensive criminal history; the age of the victims; the crimes were crimes of violence “perpetrated upon separate victims in separate homes”; the harm to the victims was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the offenses; an offense was committed in the presence of a child less than eighteen years of age; Williams is a high risk to reoffend; and Williams was on bond when these offenses occurred. Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 231. The trial court found one mitigator: Williams pleaded guilty, saving the State “some of the time and expense of a trial.” Id. The trial court made a record of the findings regarding malingering from the fourth and final competency evaluation and did not find Williams’ mental health problem or cognitive issues to be a mitigator.

[11] The court sentenced Williams to maximum sentences of sixteen years for Level 3 felony attempted rape,² twelve years for Level 4 felony burglary,³ and twelve years for Level 4 felony child molesting.⁴ The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total sentence of forty years.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Williams.

[12] We review a trial court's sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). A trial court may abuse its sentencing discretion in a number of ways, including if it (1) fails to enter a sentencing statement; (2) relies on aggravators or mitigators unsupported by the record; (3) fails to find aggravators or mitigators that are supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) relies on reasons that are improper as a matter of law. See Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1223 (Ind. 2008).

[13] A court is not required to accept the defendant's view of what constitutes a mitigator. Mehringer v. State, 152 N.E.3d 667, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Nor is a court required to explain why it did not find a circumstance to be significantly mitigating. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 493, clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “An allegation that the trial court failed to ․ find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id.

[14] Williams argues the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to find his “mental health issues and borderline intellectual functioning” as a mitigator. Appellant's Br. at 14. He argues his mental health issues were well documented, as he was found incompetent to stand trial for these charges on three occasions. He further argues his mental illness “was very apparent by his behavior in the sentencing hearing, which showed an inability to control his behavior and included a threat to commit suicide.” Id. at 16.

[15] “Mental illness is not necessarily a significant mitigating factor; rather, [it] is a mitigating factor to be used in certain circumstances, such as when the evidence demonstrates longstanding mental health issues or when the jury finds that a defendant is mentally ill.” Townsend v. State, 45 N.E.3d 821, 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. “[I]n order for a [defendant's] mental history to provide a basis for establishing a mitigating factor, there must be a nexus between the defendant's mental health and the crime in question.” Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied. Our Supreme Court has outlined several factors for courts to consider in weighing the mitigating force of a defendant's mental health issues, including the extent of the defendant's inability to control his behavior, the overall limit on function, the duration of the illness, and the nexus between the illness and the crime. Covington v. State, 842 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ind. 2006). The Court has also emphasized “the need for a high level of discernment when assessing a claim that mental illness warrants mitigating weight.” Id.

[16] Although the record demonstrates Williams suffers from mental health issues and has cognitive deficits, he has not established a nexus between those attributes and the offenses. In fact, rather than arguing either of those things contributed to his conduct on July 9, 2020, he argues he has “very limited memory” of the offenses because he was intoxicated from alcohol, marijuana, and ecstasy. Appellant's Br. at 16. And the trial court emphasized at sentencing the evaluator's finding that Williams was malingering, noting “[h]e feigned lack of understanding of his legal proceedings and an inability to assist his attorney in his defense. These feigned inabilities have been for the clear purpose of avoiding prosecution for his serious legal charges.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 37. Williams was able on three occasions over five years to successfully feign incompetence and postpone facing consequences for his conduct. The record does not support a finding that Williams’ mental health issues or intellectual functioning rendered him unable to control his behavior. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider Williams’ mental health issues as a mitigating factor.

[17] Even if the trial court had abused its discretion in this way, any error was harmless. When the trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing, we will remand only if we cannot say with confidence the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it considered the proper reasons. Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 194 (Ind. 2016). Here, the trial court found multiple aggravators, including Williams’ “extensive criminal history[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 231. Because of the presence of these significant aggravating factors, we conclude the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had found Williams’ mental health to be a mitigating factor. See Scott v. State, 840 N.E.2d 376, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that although the trial court erred in failing to find the defendant's mental illness to be a mitigating factor, the error was harmless in light of multiple valid aggravating factors), trans. denied.

Williams’ sentence is not inappropriate.

[18] Williams also asks us to revise his sentence. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[19] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[20] Williams received the maximum sentence for each conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively. He asks for his sentence to be reduced or partially suspended. But Williams does not present an argument that the nature of his offenses renders his sentence inappropriate, and we note his senseless offenses terrorized five women across three locations. He physically picked up a woman from the sidewalk as she was walking home, carried her into a nearby yard, and attempted to rape her. He broke into two homes and assaulted the older women and young children he found inside. He showed no restraint, regard, or lack of brutality when committing these offenses. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[21] Willams’ sole argument about his character is that his mental health issues and borderline intellectual functioning are a mitigating factor that make his forty-year sentence inappropriate. See Appellant's Br. at 17–18. As explained above, Williams’ mental health and cognitive functioning is not a significant mitigator, and the fact he intentionally and repeatedly used those characteristics to delay the proceedings does not reflect well on him. His outbursts and behavior toward the court at the sentencing hearing paint a picture of a manipulative person rather than a seriously mentally ill individual.

[22] And we are not persuaded Williams’ character warrants a revised sentence after analyzing his “age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Williams was thirty years old when he committed these offenses and already had a lengthy juvenile and criminal history. When this occurred in July 2020, he was out on bond, and he was charged in two new cases while this one was pending. As the trial court stated, this shows a disdain for the law and others, and an unwillingness “to comport himself appropriately in the community.” Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 232. Although the PSI contained a written apology to the victims, Williams expressly disclaimed having written it and claimed at sentencing that he didn't “deserve ․ this.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 55. Williams has not presented compelling evidence of “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of his good character” portraying him in a favorable light. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[23] In sum, Williams has not persuaded us his forty-year sentence is an outlier warranting revision.

Conclusion

[24] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Williams, and his sentence is not inappropriate.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Williams repeatedly and disruptively claimed throughout the hearing that he was pressured to sign the plea agreement and did not know what he was signing. The trial court, concluding Williams was requesting to withdraw his plea, stated it was “not going to allow him to do that.” Id. at 47.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b) (2014) (Level 3 felony sentence is between three and sixteen years, with an advisory sentence of nine years).

3.   I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5 (2014) (Level 4 felony sentence is between two and twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years).

4.   Id.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.