Lesley A. Wiesenberg, Appellant-Petitioner v. Garrett M. Wiesenberg, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Lesley A. Wiesenberg (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order in her custody dispute with Garrett M. Wiesenberg (“Father”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The following facts are taken largely from the trial court's order. Mother and Father were married from 2016 to 2019. Shortly after their divorce, they conceived a child (“Child”), who was born in August 2020. The parties permanently separated that December, and Mother brought a paternity action shortly thereafter. In June 2021, the trial court approved an agreement under which (1) the parties would have joint legal custody, (2) Mother would have primary physical custody, and (3) Father would have parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.

[3] At some point, Father started a relationship with a woman who later became his wife. After this, Mother began to exclude Father from Child's life. She referred to him as a “sperm donor,” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 52, and stopped informing him of Child's activities and medical appointments. The parties stopped communicating effectively regarding Child. When Child was three years old, Mother placed him in counseling without consulting Father, who saw no need for counseling. Mother also scheduled and then canceled medical appointments and other activities for Child without consulting Father. She was very protective of Child and controlling of his life and activities. She would choose her roommate (her former romantic partner) over Father for doing things such as picking Child up from school, even when Father was available and offered to do so. Mother sent letters to Child while he was in Father's care, which included links to videos of Mother and others reading to Child. She did not communicate or interact with Father's new wife. Mother had excessively high expectations of Child, and she exhibited “traits consistent with histrionic and narcissistic personality patterns which negatively impact her co-parenting relationship with Father.” Id. at 51. Her attempts to exclude Father from Child's life caused Child to “show signs of emerging unjustified rejection of Father,” “creating a situation which might significantly impair [Child's] emotional development.” Id. at 50, 52.

[4] In October 2023, Father petitioned to modify custody. The parties agreed to the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) and that Father would pay “[a]ny initial fees” but that “these fees may be reallocated by agreement of the parties or by a future Order of the Court.” Id. at 22. The parties also agreed to temporarily increase Father's parenting time. In June 2024, a custody evaluator was appointed at Mother's request. The evaluation could not be conducted until February 2025, so the court scheduled the final hearing for late March 2025.

[5] On February 28, Mother's attorney moved to withdraw from the case, noting that there had been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and that Mother had “insisted throughout the case upon taking action that I have a fundamental disagreement.” Ex. MM. The trial court granted the motion the same day. The next week, a different attorney appeared for Mother and requested a continuance of the hearing. Father initially objected, but the parties then agreed to a continuance. They also agreed to another temporary increase in Father's parenting time, giving the parties roughly equal time with Child pending the final hearing. The court rescheduled the final hearing for June 23 and 25.

[6] On May 7, Mother's new attorney notified Mother that she would be withdrawing from the case, citing a breakdown in attorney-client communication. That motion was filed on May 21 and granted the next day. On June 16—one week before the rescheduled hearing—a third attorney appeared for Mother and requested a continuance. Father and the GAL objected, and on June 18, the court denied the request. The same day, Mother's third attorney moved to withdraw from the case, with Mother's written consent. The court granted that motion.

[7] The final hearing proceeded as scheduled, with Mother unrepresented. The custody evaluator and GAL both testified, and their reports were admitted into evidence. The trial court summarized the custody evaluator's report and opinion as follows:

[The custody evaluator] identifies Mother as a “restrictive gatekeeper” because Mother does not foster a facilitative relationship with Father. Instead, Mother is hypervigilant and intrudes on Father's parenting time and his ability to parent [Child]. [The custody evaluator] is concerned that Mother, despite no longer being romantically involved with [her roommate], keeps [her roommate] involved with [Child], while not wanting [Father's new wife] involved with [Child]. Mother's actions have instilled in [Child] a fear of being without Mother, an unnatural sense of responsibility toward Mother, and anxiety and concern about Father. Examples of Mother's restrictive gatekeeping behaviors include Mother's prolonged good-byes with [Child], Mother's sending [Child] letters and postcards on a near-daily basis while [Child] is in Father's care, Mother placing an Apple air tag in [Child's] bag that he took to Father's home without informing Father, and Mother's having [Child] wear outfits that match Mother's outfit on any given day. [Child] has reported to the Guardian ad Litem that Mother does not want him to go to his Father's home for parenting time. In [the custody evaluator's] opinion, Mother's actions are unjustified and harmful to [Child], and Mother's continued restrictive gatekeeping will result in greater harm to [Child]. Mother and [Child] have an “unhealthy” bond. The treatment protocol she recommends is to place [Child] in Father's care, and to order that Mother's parenting time be supervised until Mother completes parenting education designed to address this problem.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 52.

[8] The GAL's opinion, based in part on the custody evaluator's report, was that Mother doesn't want Father to have a relationship with Child. The GAL said that when she visited Child at his school, he said he didn't want to go to Father's house anymore. When the GAL asked why, Child said Mother told him she doesn't want him to go. The GAL recommended that Father have primary physical custody and sole legal custody.

[9] In its final order, the trial court granted Father primary physical custody and sole legal custody of Child. The court ordered that Mother would have parenting time on alternating weekends during the school year, from Friday afternoon through Tuesday morning, plus extended time during summer break. The court also ordered each party to pay half of the GAL's fees of $9,208 ($4,604 each).

[10] Mother, still pro se, now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The trial court did not violate Mother's due-process rights by denying her request for a continuance

[11] Mother contends that the trial court violated her due-process rights by denying her request for a continuance because that denial prompted her third attorney to withdraw from the case, leaving her unrepresented for the final hearing. Mother waived this constitutional argument, first by failing to make it in the trial court and second by failing to include any constitutional analysis in her briefs on appeal. Waiver notwithstanding, we see no due-process violation.

[12] This proceeding began in October 2023, when Father petitioned for a modification of custody. Eight months later, in June 2024, the court scheduled the final hearing for March 2025. A few weeks before the hearing, Mother's attorney withdrew from the case, citing a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and noting that Mother had “insisted throughout the case upon taking action that I have a fundamental disagreement.” A different attorney appeared for Mother and requested a continuance. The court granted a three-month continuance, rescheduling the final hearing for June 23. On May 7, Mother's new attorney notified Mother that she would be moving to withdraw from the case, citing a breakdown in communication. That motion was filed on May 21 and granted on May 22. Not until June 16 did a third attorney appear for Mother and request another continuance. By that point, only a week remained before the rescheduled hearing, and the matter had been pending for almost 20 months. Given the age of the case, Mother's role in the withdrawal of her first two attorneys, and Mother's delay in retaining a third attorney after learning that her second attorney would be withdrawing, Mother did not have a due-process right to a second continuance.¹

II. The trial court's findings are sufficient to support the modification of custody

[13] Next, Mother argues that the trial court's findings are legally insufficient to support the modification of custody. A court may not modify a child-custody order unless (1) the modification is in the best interests of the child and (2) there is a substantial change in one or more of the factors the court may consider under Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8. Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21(a). Those factors include:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parent or parents;

(B) the child's sibling; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.

(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:

(A) home;

(B) school; and

(C) community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

․

I.C. § 31-17-2-8.

[14] Here, the trial court found a substantial change in most of these factors. Mother purports to challenge all of those findings. We need to address only three. The court found a substantial change in Child's age. Child was just 10 months old at the time of the original custody agreement in June 2021. By the time of the final hearing, he was almost five years old. The court also found a substantial change in Father's wishes. He originally agreed that Mother would have primary physical custody and that the parties would share legal custody, but he later decided to pursue primary physical custody and sole legal custody for himself. Finally, the court found a substantial change in the interaction and interrelationship of Mother, Father, and Child. Specifically, Mother made efforts to exclude Father from Child's life after Father entered into a new relationship, and Father's relationship with Child improved as a result of Father's increased parenting time while this litigation was pending. Mother asserts that none of these changes, standing alone, is sufficient to support a custody modification. We are skeptical of that claim, but even if she is right, each change does not stand alone. Taken together, these developments clearly constitute a substantial change in circumstances since the original custody agreement.

[15] Mother also takes issue with the fact that the trial court's order states that modification is in Child's best interests but does not include a “separate best-interests analysis.” Appellant's Br. pp. 22-23. But she doesn't cite any authority requiring such an analysis, and the trial court's findings clearly support its best-interests determination. Again, the court found that after Father entered into a new relationship, Mother attempted to exclude Father from Child's life. She wouldn't inform him of Child's activities and medical appointments, or she would cancel activities or appointments without notifying Father. She allowed her roommate to help with Child even when Father was available. Mother also became very protective and controlling of Child. She put Child in counseling without consulting Father, who thought counseling was unnecessary. She inserted herself into Father's parenting time with letters and videos. She refused to communicate or interact with Father's new wife. She exhibited “traits consistent with histrionic and narcissistic personality patterns.” Overall, Mother's actions caused Child to “show signs of emerging unjustified rejection of Father” and created a situation “which might significantly impair [Child's] emotional development.” These findings were supported not only by Father's testimony and exhibits but also the independent opinions and recommendations of the custody evaluator and the GAL. Mother has not shown any error in the trial court's conclusion that the modification of custody is in Child's best interests.²

III. The trial court did not restrict Mother's parenting time, so it was not required to make a finding supporting a restriction

[16] In the alternative to her custody argument, Mother contends that the trial court improperly restricted her parenting time. As she notes, a court cannot restrict a noncustodial parent's parenting time unless it explicitly finds that such time would endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional development. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 762-65 (Ind. 2013). Mother argues that the trial court didn't make such a finding. But the court didn't restrict Mother's parenting time, so the finding wasn't required. Under the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, the default parenting time for the noncustodial parent of a school-aged child is every other weekend (two overnights) plus one evening visit every week, up to four hours. Ind. Parenting Time Guideline II(D). Here, the trial court awarded Mother parenting time from Friday afternoon until Tuesday morning every other weekend (four overnights). Mother emphasizes that she won't have an additional evening visit each week as contemplated by the Guidelines, but she ignores the fact that she will have double the overnights. Mother's parenting time is enhanced, not restricted. She hasn't shown any error in this respect.

IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Mother to pay half of the GAL fees

[17] Finally, Mother argues that the trial court shouldn't have ordered her to pay half—$4,604—of the GAL fees. Trial courts have broad discretion in allocating guardian ad litem fees, and we review a court's decision only for an abuse of that discretion. N.R. v. A.R., 273 N.E.3d 1118, 1129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[18] Mother bases her argument on two facts: she paid the custody evaluator's fees ($10,500), and Father's income ($150,000) is higher than hers ($53,000). The fact that Mother paid the custody evaluator's fees should not be held against Father, since it was Mother who requested that a custody evaluator be appointed, and she did so after the trial court had granted the parties’ joint request for the appointment of a GAL. Similarly, the income disparity is counterbalanced by the fact that Mother's conduct is what led to this litigation and the appointment of the GAL. Also, the court took the parties’ incomes into consideration in other parts of its order. Namely, Father was ordered to maintain health insurance for Child and to pay 74% of Child's uninsured medical expenses. Mother has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to pay half of the GAL fees.

[19] Affirmed.³

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother purports to raise a second due-process claim. While this appeal was pending, Mother filed a Verified Motion to Correct or Supplement the Record. She claimed that a bailiff barred certain supporters of hers from entering the courtroom for the final hearing, noted that this is not reflected in the transcript, and argued that it was a “material event” that should be included in the appellate record. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 70-72. The trial court denied the motion. Mother asserts that the denial of the motion “impaired meaningful appellate review” and therefore separately violated her due-process rights. Appellant's Br. pp. 13-15. Her argument is vague, conclusory, and unconvincing. We also note that the reason there is nothing in the transcript about Mother's supporters allegedly being barred from the courtroom is that Mother didn't say anything about it to the judge when the hearing began.

2.   Mother argues that the opinions of the custody evaluator and the GAL “lacked an adequate evidentiary foundation.” Appellant's Br. p. 27. She doesn't contend that the trial court erred by allowing them to testify or by admitting their reports into evidence. Rather, she challenges the “reliability” of their opinions. Id. at 27-32. This is a request for us to judge witness credibility and reweigh evidence, which we do not do. See Ellenburg v. Kropp, 175 N.E.3d 1208, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

3.   In a single sentence in the Conclusion section of his brief, Father “requests an award of appellate attorney fees pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E).” Appellee's Br. p. 45. Because he didn't support this request with cogent reasoning, he waived it. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.