IN RE: the Unsupervised Estate of Joan Lee Marvin (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Joan Lee Marvin died in January of 2023, and Lee Ebert was appointed as the personal representative of her estate. Before her death, Marvin had added Ebert to a bank account containing approximately $57,000.00 (“the Account”), which meant that the Account passed to Ebert instead of to Joan's estate. In September of 2025, Joan's granddaughter Rachel Marvin, a beneficiary of a testamentary trust (“the Trust”) established in Joan's will, petitioned the probate court to be appointed as a special administratrix for the purpose of recovering the Account, which Rachel alleged had been intended to fund the Trust. Following a hearing, the probate court denied Rachel's petition. Rachel contends that the probate court abused its discretion in denying her petition. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 16, 2019, Joan executed her last will and testament, in which she named her husband as her estate's personal representative with Jeffrey Marvin and Ebert as joint personal representatives in the event her husband predeceased her. Joan died on January 9, 2023. On February 8, 2023, because Joan's husband and Jeffrey had already died, Ebert petitioned to probate Joan's will, to be appointed personal representative, and for letters testamentary.

[3] On September 22, 2025, Rachel petitioned the probate court to appoint her as special administratrix of Joan's estate to collect and preserve the Account. Rachel alleged that the Account's sole purpose had been to fund the Trust, Ebert had failed to fully account for other assets, and the estate was at risk of improper dissipation of funds. At a hearing on February 25, 2026, Rachel declined to present evidence supporting her petition, stating that she would present it “at the appropriate time at a hearing, but first she has to be appointed before we can attempt to do that.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. On March 5, 2026, the probate court denied Rachel's petition to be appointed as a special administratrix and directed Ebert to close Joan's estate. On March 18, 2026, Rachel appealed the probate court's order, designating it as an appeal from a final judgment.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Rachel contends that the probate court abused its discretion in denying her petition for the appointment of a special administratrix, and Ebert argues that Rachel's appeal is not properly before us as it is not from a final, appealable order. We address Ebert's argument first.

I. Rachel's Appeal is Properly Before Us

[5] Ebert contends that the probate court's denial of Rachel's petition is not a final, appealable order and that it does not fit into any of the nine types of interlocutory appeals as a matter of right. Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(H) provides, in part, that a “judgment is a final judgment if [․] it disposes of all claims as to all parties[.]” The probate court's denial of Rachel's petition did precisely this and, therefore, is a final, appealable order. In addition to denying Rachel's request to appoint a special administratrix, the probate court also ordered Ebert to close Joan's estate, which foreclosed any other claims or potential claims between Rachel and the estate. Because the probate court's order was a final, appealable order, Rachel's appeal is properly before us.

II. The Probate Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Rachel's Petition to Appoint a Special Administratrix

[6] “The trial court has complete discretion in the appointment of special administrators.” In re Est. of Hutman, 705 N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Matters of statutory interpretation, however, are reviewed de novo. Brown v. G'ship of Brown, 775 N.E.2d 1164, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Indiana Code section 29-1-13-16 provides as follows:

Whenever any interested person files with the court having jurisdiction of an estate a petition showing that such person has reason to believe and does believe that the personal representative of the estate or any other person is indebted to the estate, or that any property is in the possession of the personal representative of the estate or of any other person, and that diligent effort is not being made to collect such indebtedness or to secure possession of such property for the estate, the court shall hold a hearing upon such petition and shall determine what action, if any, shall be taken. Should the court decide that there is sufficient merit in the petitioner's claim to warrant action, it shall direct the personal representative to take such action as the court deems necessary; provided, however, where the person claimed to be indebted to the estate or having in his possession property belonging to the estate is the personal representative or where the court is of the opinion that the personal representative would not or could not for any reason prosecute such action with sufficient vigor, it shall appoint a special administrator to take such action as it shall direct.

[7] Rachel's specific argument is that she should have been appointed as special administratrix to collect and maintain the Account, which she contends was created with the intent to fund the Trust. As mentioned, the Account was in both Joan's and Ebert's names, and, as a general rule, any sums on deposit at the date of death of a party to a joint account belong to the survivor as against the estate of the decedent. Ind. Code § 32-17-11-18(a). This general rule, however, can be rebutted if “there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created.” Id.

[8] Ebert notes that Rachel's allegations regarding Joan's alleged intent are not supported by any actual evidence. Rachel does not dispute this, effectively arguing (as she did below) that the evidence supporting her appointment as special administratrix either could not be, or need not be, presented until after her appointment. Either way, Rachel provides no authority for either proposition, and we ultimately agree with the probate court's characterization of this argument as “putting the cart before the horse[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 10.¹ In the end, Rachel had the opportunity to present evidence at the hearing on her petition but did not, whatever her reasons. In light of this lack of evidentiary support, the probate court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rachel's petition to be appointed special administratrix.

[9] We affirm the judgment of the probate court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We also agree with Ebert's counsel's observation thatwe've got a little bit of a circularity issue in that the position of the petitioner is that they need to be appointed because there's this asset that it appears they're not willing to prove exists today, but they'll prove that it exists only after they're appointed because the asset exists.Tr. Vol. II p. 10.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.