RODGERS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Ammiel Rodgers appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony criminal recklessness and Class B misdemeanor public intoxication. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial and in admitting certain evidence. Alternatively, Rodgers argues that fundamental error occurred. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the evening of July 11, 2025, the Sellersburg Police Department was dispatched to an apartment complex in response to a noise complaint. Once Officer Tyler Gregory and Sergeant Jesse Summerfield arrived at the apartment's parking lot, they could hear loud talking or yelling. As the two approached the back of the complex, Officer Gregory found Rodgers sitting at the bottom of the open-air stairwell with his dog. Based on Rodgers's “argumentative” demeanor, slurred speech, and the odor of alcohol, Officer Gregory determined that Rodgers “appeared to be under the influence of alcohol.” Tr. Vol. III p. 45. Officer Gregory found, and Rodgers recalled consuming, at least three “fireball shooters” at the scene. Tr. Vol. III p. 46.

[3] As he spoke to Rodgers, Officer Gregory noticed an empty handgun holster fastened to Rodgers's belt. When Officer Gregory asked Rodgers where his firearm was located, Rodgers denied having a firearm and claimed that he used the holster to leash his dog. However, as Rodgers shifted his weight to stand up, Officer Gregory saw a firearm between his legs on the step below. Officer Gregory quickly secured the gun, and he and Sergeant Summerfield placed Rodgers in handcuffs to secure the scene.

[4] Officer Gregory collected Rodgers's wallet and phone from the steps and asked Rodgers if he wanted these items. After arguing with Officer Gregory, Rodgers eventually responded, “Do you want your life?” Tr. Vol. III p. 61. Once inside the patrol vehicle, Rodgers told Officer Gregory, “I am going to smoke you.” Tr. Vol. III p. 62. The State ultimately charged Rodgers with Level 6 felony criminal recklessness, Level 6 felony intimidation, and Class B misdemeanor public intoxication.

[5] A jury trial was held on November 18 and 19, 2025. At trial, when asked by the State whether Rodgers had made “[a]ny other noteworthy statements” besides the two above, Officer Gregory recalled that Rodgers told him, “you pull up to my house, I'm going to pull up to yours.” Tr. Vol. III p. 63. Rodgers objected to this portion of Officer Gregory's testimony, asserting that the parties had already agreed off-the-record to redact the statement from the bodycam footage. The State acknowledged the agreement, and the trial court admonished the jury.

[6] At the conclusion of Officer Gregory's testimony, Rodgers moved for a mistrial. Rodgers argued that the jury hearing the redacted statement was the “ring of a bell that [the jury] can not [(sic)] unhear,” even after the trial court's admonition. Tr. Vol. III p. 71. The trial court noted that this statement had only been agreed to be redacted in an out-of-court agreement between Rodgers and the State and not in a motion in limine ruled on by the court. Finding that “[t]he testimony was not emphasized, and the jury has been properly admonished,” the trial court denied Rodgers's motion for a mistrial. Tr. Vol. III p. 72.

[7] After Officer Gregory's testimony, and over defense counsel's objection, the jury watched and heard the following exchange from Officer Gregory's bodycam:

Officer Gregory: Why are you out here drinking?

Rodgers: (inaudible).

Officer Gregory: No, but you can't be out here drinking. This is public access. So, you are causing an issue.

State's Ex. 5 at 03:17–03:31. Rodgers argued that this exchange constituted a legal conclusion for the jury, not Officer Gregory, to decide.

[8] The jury found Rodgers guilty of criminal recklessness and public intoxication and not guilty of intimidation. Rodgers was sentenced to an aggregate two and one-half years of incarceration with one year suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

I. The Trial Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Rodgers's Motion for Mistrial

[9] Rodgers contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial after the State's direct examination of Officer Gregory. Specifically, Rodgers contends that Officer Gregory's testimony of Rodgers telling him, “you pull up to my house, I'll pull up to yours,” warranted a mistrial because it “was so prejudicial and inflammatory” that the trial court's admonition was insufficient. Appellant's Br. pp. 15, 16.

[10] We review the denial of a mistrial motion for an abuse of discretion. Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 935 (Ind. 2014). “A mistrial is an extreme remedy that is warranted only when less severe remedies will not satisfactorily correct the error. A timely and accurate admonition is presumed to cure any error in the admission of evidence.” Banks v. State, 761 N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ind. 2002) (citation and quotations omitted).

In determining whether a mistrial was warranted, we consider whether the defendant was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. The gravity of the peril is determined by the probable persuasive effect on the jury's decision. When a motion for mistrial has been denied, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate both that he was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected and that no other remedy can cure the perilous situation in which he was placed.

Brooks v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1234, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied. “Moreover, a reviewing court accords great deference to the trial court's ruling on a mistrial motion.” Id. “Reversible error is seldom found when the trial court has admonished the jury to disregard a statement made during the proceedings.” Owens v. State, 937 N.E.2d 880, 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (brackets and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[11] Here, after Officer Gregory relayed this statement, the trial court admonished the jury, stating, “I am going to ask the jury to disregard the statement and testimony with regard to a statement that was ‘you pull up on my house, I'll pull up on yours.’ That is going to be stricken. You may proceed.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 65–66. “A timely and accurate admonishment is presumed to cure any error in the admission of evidence.” Owens, 937 N.E.2d at 895. Although Rodgers argues that “the trial court's generic admonishment could not possibly cure the prejudice to [him],” nothing in the record indicates that the jury was unable to disregard the statement. Appellant's Br. p. 15. Rodgers merely presumes that the jury improperly considered the statement when convicting him of the other charges. However, “[j]urors are presumed to follow a trial court's instructions.” Ward v. State, 138 N.E.3d 268, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citation omitted). Rodgers has not established that the trial court's admonition was insufficient to cure any prejudice that may have resulted from Officer Gregory's testimony.

[12] Rodgers also alleges that he was placed in a position of grave peril because “the State ․ ambushed [him] with this very uncharged offense in the middle of trial.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. In support of this assertion, Rodgers cites Lehman v. State, 777 N.E.2d 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). While Lehman was on trial for child molesting, the investigating officer, despite being advised of a motion in limine, testified that his initial investigation had led him to “nine other victims.” Id. at 71. The trial court denied Lehman's motion for mistrial but struck the officer's response and admonished the jury. Id. We reversed, holding that the officer's testimony had violated the court's prior ruling and had subjected Lehman to grave peril because the jury would likely have been inflamed upon learning about nine other alleged victims. Id. at 73.

[13] Lehman is distinguishable from these facts. Here, the trial court had not ruled on a motion in limine to exclude the statement from evidence. More importantly, the jury had already heard two other statements that Rodgers had made to Officer Gregory: “Do you want your life?” and “I'm going to smoke you.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 61, 62. Unlike the exposure of nine additional child victims in Lehman, the risk of prejudice from a third, similarly threatening statement from Rodgers was minimal. Because Rodgers has failed to prove that Officer Gregory's testimony both placed him in a position of grave peril and could not be adequately cured by the trial court's admonition, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial.

II. Fundamental Error did not Occur

[14] Rodgers also argues that the admission of Officer Gregory's statement constituted fundamental error. Specifically, Rodgers contends that the challenged statement was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and improper character evidence in violation of Indiana Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 404(b), subjected him to an “entirely new uncharged offense,” and “deprived [him] of the due process right to the presumption of innocence.” Appellant's Br. p. 18. At trial, Rodgers objected to the challenged statement only on the grounds of the out-of-court agreement with the State to exclude the statement from the bodycam footage. It is well-settled that “[a] defendant may not raise one ground for objection at trial and argue a different ground on appeal.” Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind. 2000). In an attempt to avoid the effects of his waiver, Rodgers argues that these grounds should be reviewed for fundamental error.

A claim that has been waived by a defendant's failure to raise a contemporaneous objection can be reviewed on appeal if the reviewing court determines that a fundamental error occurred. The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process. The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process. This exception is available only in egregious circumstances.

Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quotations and citations omitted).

[15] In support of his argument that the trial court committed fundamental error in admitting the challenged statement, Rodgers cites Oldham v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). However, we recently “conclude[d] that our Supreme Court's subsequent clarification of fundamental error in Brown and Durden supersedes the Oldham panel's analysis.” Artis v. State, 226 N.E.3d 235, 2023 WL 8596499, *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. In Brown, our Supreme Court recognized that “fabrication of evidence,” investigators’ “willful malfeasance,” or evidence being “not what it appears to be” were claims that could constitute fundamental error. 929 N.E.2d at 207.

[16] Rodgers does not advance any of the fundamental error arguments discussed in Brown. Instead, Rodgers argues that, in the trial court's admission of the challenged statement, the State “injected an entirely new uncharged offense which forced [him] to defend against the implications raised by this offense.” Appellant's Br. 18. This argument ignores the fact that Rodgers was charged with intimidation. Although the charging information for intimidation only included “Do you want your life?” and “I am gonna smoke you[,]” the omission of the challenged statement did not alter the charges against Rodgers or his defense strategy. See Daniels v. State, 957 N.E.2d 1025, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the variance between information and evidence at trial was not fatal when defendant's defense was not prejudiced). More crucially, the challenged statement was not admitted; it was struck and the jury was promptly admonished. As such, we cannot accept Rodgers's argument that fundamental error occurred.

III. The Trial Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting the Bodycam Footage

[17] As to his public intoxication conviction, Rodgers challenges the trial court's admission of bodycam footage that included Officer Gregory telling him, “[Y]ou can't be out here drinking. This is public access. So, you are causing an issue.” State's Ex. 5 at 03:17–03:31. Rodgers specifically contends that these statements were a legal conclusion and violated Evidence Rule 704(b). A trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion that results in prejudicial error. Williams v. State, 43 N.E.3d 578, 581 (Ind. 2015). A trial court's evidentiary decision will be reversed for an abuse of discretion only where the court's decision is clearly against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances, or when the court misinterprets the law. Id.

This discretion means that, in many cases, trial judges have options. They can admit or exclude evidence, and we won't meddle with that decision on appeal. There are good reasons for this. Our instincts are less practiced than those of the trial bench and our sense for the rhythms of a trial less sure. And trial courts are far better at weighing evidence and assessing witness credibility. In sum, our vantage point—in a far corner of the upper deck—does not provide as clear a view.

Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177 (Ind. 2017) (quotations and citations omitted). Indiana Rule of Evidence 704(b) provides that “[w]itnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.” To be a legal conclusion, the statement must be “sufficient to satisfy every element of the” offense, leaving nothing for the jury to decide. Hunt v. State, 269 N.E.3d 1223, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[18] Even assuming that the admission of the challenged exchange captured on Officer Gregory's bodycam footage was erroneous, it could only be considered harmless. “An error is harmless when it results in no prejudice to the ‘substantial rights’ of a party.” Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1197 (Ind. 2021).

Factors considered in a harmless error analysis include the presence or absence of other, corroborating evidence on material points; whether the impermissibly admitted evidence was cumulative; the overall strength of the prosecution's case; the importance of the impermissible evidence in the prosecution's case; and the extent of cross-examination or questioning on the impermissibly admitted evidence.

Id. (quotations omitted). The State presented corroborating and cumulative evidence to support Rodgers's public intoxication conviction, so “any error in evidence admission would not have affected [his] substantial rights.” Id.

[19] Even omitting the challenged audio portion of the footage, the jury could see Rodgers's body language in the open-air stairwell of his apartment complex. A few moments later, the jury could see miniature bottles of alcohol scattered on the steps. Independent testimony from Officer Gregory and Sergeant Summerfield confirmed that Rodgers had appeared intoxicated based on his slurred speech and demeanor, and both officers recalled having seen the miniature bottles of alcohol. Rodgers had also admitted that he had consumed at least three “fireball shots” before the police arrived. Tr. Vol. III p. 167. Audio and visual evidence had shown Rodgers loudly arguing with officers in the stairwell and parking lot of his apartment complex. The jury had also heard the 911 call placed by Rodgers's neighbor, who had claimed she had heard “screaming outside of our door ․ for the last 30–40 minutes” and did not “feel safe right now to ․ go outside.” State's Ex. 1 at 00:14–00:19; 00:40–00:46. Considering the totality of other evidence presented against Rodgers, the erroneous admission of the challenged portion of the bodycam footage was harmless. Williams, 43 N.E.3d at 583–84 (holding that “substantial, independent evidence of guilt” was sufficient to support a conviction despite erroneously admitted evidence).

[20] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.