IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: K.M.K. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On June 14, 2024, K.M.K. (“Child”) was adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”) after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received reports that Child was the victim of neglect and had been born drug positive. K.K. (“Mother”) and A.L. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) were ordered to complete certain services. Mother did not fully comply with the case plan and failed to make meaningful progress towards reunification with Child. Eventually, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child.¹ Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. Mother contends that the juvenile court's findings are insufficient to sustain its order terminating her parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to Parents on April 8, 2024. Child tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Three days later, DCS petitioned to have Child adjudicated a CHINS, alleging that Child was the victim of neglect. In addition to Mother's admitted methamphetamine use during pregnancy, DCS alleged that Mother had received minimal prenatal care and had tested positive for methamphetamine both during a prenatal visit and at the time of Child's birth.

[3] In June of 2024, Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS. Following a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered Mother to maintain contact and keep all appointments with the DCS family case manager (“FCM”); notify the FCM of any criminal charges as well as changes in address, household composition, telephone number, or employment; allow the FCM to make announced and unannounced visits to Mother's home; participate in any services or programs recommended by the FCM; complete all assessments recommended by the FCM; sign any necessary releases; maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; secure and maintain a legal source of income; refrain from using illegal drugs; obey the law; complete a substance-abuse assessment and complete all treatment recommendations; submit to random drug screens; attend all scheduled visits with Child; provide Child with a safe, secure, and nurturing environment that is free from abuse and neglect; participate in an aftercare program such as AA/NA or Celebrate Recovery; and follow any protective or no-contact orders.

[4] Mother completed a substance-abuse assessment with Bowen Health, which recommended that Mother participate in Matrix substance-abuse therapy and Moral Recognition Therapy (“MRT”) once per week, and engage in individual therapy two to four times per month. Mother's participation in these services was “sporadic.” Tr. Vol. II p. 54. In addition, Mother inconsistently reported for drug testing and tested positive for methamphetamine thirty times between May 14, 2024 and May 28, 2025. Mother also only occasionally attended DCS team meetings and inconsistently attended her visits with Child.

[5] Meanwhile, on September 24, 2024, DCS received a report that Parents had “neglected/sexually abused a child that [had been] left in their care.” Ex. Vol. III p. 195. Parents “were both alleged to be perpetrators” of the sexual abuse of a then-four-year-old child. Tr. Vol. II p. 42. During their investigation, DCS learned that Parents “used to be babysitters for the child” at issue. Tr. Vol. II p. 45. DCS “substantiated [Parents] both as perpetrators of sexual abuse in the assessment[,]” meaning that DCS believed that it had “found the preponderance of evidence to support the original allegations being true.” Tr. Vol. II p. 43. In connection to her alleged conduct involving that child, on June 7, 2025, Mother was arrested and charged in Cause Number 43D01-2506-F3-302 with Level 3 felony vicarious sexual conduct and Level 6 felony performing sexual conduct in the presence of a minor. At some point, the CHINS court modified Child's permanency plan to include adoption, finding that Mother had not complied with the case plan.

[6] Mother posted bond and was released from jail on June 19, 2025. As part of her pretrial release, Mother was ordered to submit to drug testing. Mother violated the conditions of her pretrial release by failing “to drug test on June 26, 2025.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 74. However, she has since made “her drug screening for probation ․ a priority because she ․ could go to jail if she does not drug screen.” Tr. Vol. II p. 65. These drug screens largely returned positive results for her prescribed Suboxone but negative for any illegal drug.

[7] In late June of 2025, DCS substantiated an additional report against Father for the sexual abuse of one of Child's siblings. The sibling disclosed multiple incidents of abuse. The abuse was disclosed after the sibling's removal from Parents’ care but had occurred while the sibling had lived with Parents. Mother continued to have contact with Father despite the allegations against him.²

[8] DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights on July 29, 2025. In August of 2025, Mother began staying three or four nights a week with her new boyfriend (“Boyfriend”). She moved in with him in October of 2025. When Mother informed DCS of this new living arrangement, she claimed that she did not know Boyfriend's full name. Boyfriend had been convicted of sexual battery and, at the time Mother moved in with him, he was required to register as a sex offender.

[9] The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on December 9, 2025. At the hearing, the juvenile court heard evidence that Mother had not started MRT until September 17, 2025, and that her participation in therapy services had been sporadic. Mother claimed that she had attended some sessions with Celebrate Recovery but failed to provide any documentation to support her claim. Mother's visits with Child never progressed beyond supervised visits and Child has never been returned to Mother's care since removal.

[10] Court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Robin Dellinger opined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests, noting that she questioned Mother's judgment and whether Mother could provide Child with a stable home. FCM Lisa Abberger also opined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. FCM Abberger testified that Child was “very bonded” to foster parents, who were willing to adopt her. Tr. Vol. II p. 67. FCM Abberger opined that being adopted by foster parents was in Child's best interests because foster parents “can provide [Child with] a safe, secure[,] and stable environment and permanency. [Child] can obtain permanency.” Tr. Vol. II p. 67. FCM Abberger further testified that she believed that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child and the conditions that had resulted in Child's removal from Mother's care were not likely to be remedied, noting that services had not been completed and, while Mother had obtained housing and employment, she still demonstrated a lack of lasting stability.

[11] On March 9, 2026, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. The juvenile court concluded that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from Mother's care would not be remedied, that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests, and that DCS had a satisfactory plan for Child's future care.

Discussion and Decision

[12] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[13] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[14] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[15] In order to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3).³ Of relevance to this case, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) further provides that DCS must also prove “[t]hat there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). Mother does not argue on appeal that DCS failed to prove that termination of her parental rights is in Child's best interests or that DCS has a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of Child, with that plan being adoption. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination of her parental rights to Child, Mother argues only that DCS failed to prove that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal would not be remedied.

[16] When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[17] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the juvenile court's conclusion that the conditions leading to Child's removal from her care would not be remedied, Mother claims that while she has not been “completely compliant with the dispositional order,” she has taken steps to comply. Appellant's Br. p. 10. Mother also claims that while she “did have several drug screens that were positive for methamphetamine,” she has, in large part, tested negative for all non-prescribed substances since her pre-trial release in June of 2025, “which shows [that she is] making progress in overcoming her addiction.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. Mother additionally points to testimony indicating that she was employed, had secured stable housing, and was attending her visits and was bonded with Child. (Appellant's Br. p. 10)

[18] The juvenile court considered the evidence indicating that, since June of 2025, Mother had consistently tested negative for methamphetamine, but concluded that

20. Here, Mother's past behavior weighs heavily, and the Court finds it best predicts her long-term future behavior, notwithstanding her current employment and her demonstrated ability to remain free of illicit substances with the assistance of Suboxone and with pretrial bond conditions and the threat of returning to jail looming over her.

21. Although Mother has demonstrated her ability to abstain from illicit substances since her release from jail with the assistance of Suboxone and under pretrial bond conditions, and there are indications she has a bond with [Child] and demonstrates some parenting skills, she has failed to follow through and complete any of her ordered services that would put her in the best position to avoid a relapse and/or further neglect of [Child].

22. Unfortunately, Mother's demonstrated neglect of [Child], beginning even in the womb with a lack of prenatal care and use of Methamphetamine as well as recent indication that reunification is not her ultimate priority; her continued unwillingness to engage in therapeutic services that would give her the best chance of addressing the underlying causes of that neglect and substance use; her substantiation for child sexual abuse of another child during the pendency of the CHINS case; her decision to move in with a sexual offender who only very recently was removed from the sexual offender registry; and her general lack of consistency in fulfilling the dispositional orders of the Court including her inability to progress beyond minimal supervised visits with [Child] indicate a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 79–80.

[19] In support of these conclusions, the juvenile court made numerous unchallenged factual findings, which we accept as correct. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (providing that unchallenged findings must be accepted as correct). The evidence and unchallenged factual findings demonstrate that prior to Mother's arrest, she had tested positive for methamphetamine on thirty occasions. The juvenile court noted that Mother's motivation for refraining from using methamphetamine since June of 2025 was that she did “not want to go back to jail” and not reunification with Child. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 74. Mother has failed to complete the court-ordered therapy and substance-abuse services and her participation in services and case-management meetings has been sporadic. Mother has also been charged with serious criminal acts involving the sexual abuse of a minor who had been entrusted to her care, and those charges remained pending on the date of the evidentiary hearing. Mother was also residing with a convicted sex offender, raising concern that the potential for sexual abuse in Mother's home had not been remedied.

[20] We have previously concluded that “simply going through the motions of receiving services alone is not sufficient if the services do not result in the needed change, or only result in temporary change” and “[w]here there are only temporary improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court might reasonabl[y] find that under the circumstances, the problematic situation will not improve.” In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). DCS presented evidence demonstrating that Mother has failed to complete the court-ordered services or make meaningful progress towards reunification. While Mother points to evidence which she claims shows that she had made some progress in treating her addiction and establishing stability, she has failed to prove that she has made the necessary, permanent improvements towards remedying the underlying reasons for Child's removal from her care. The juvenile court's determination that the conditions resulting in Child's removal from Mother's care have not been, and are not likely to be, remedied is supported by the record. Mother's argument to the contrary effectively amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[21] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father voluntarily terminated his parental rights to Child and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother admitted to speaking to Father the day before the evidentiary hearing.

3.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective March 11, 2024, and again effective July 1, 2025. DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child on July 29, 2025. Although Mother cites a prior version of the statute in her appellate brief, we apply the version of the statute in effect at the time DCS petitioned to terminate her parental rights.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.