Travis Michael Schirato, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Following a jury trial, Travis Michael Schirato (“Schirato”) was convicted of several criminal offenses, for which he received an aggregate sentence of seven years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. Schirato appeals, raising the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Schirato’ motion to dismiss under Criminal Rule 4(B); and

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence from a vehicle search.

[2] We affirm.

Discussion and Decision

[3] On October 28, 2023, Sergeant Michael Wray (“Sergeant Wray”) of the Valparaiso Police Department (“VPD”) was on patrol when he observed a dark colored SUV. He ran the SUV's license plate which came back expired and registered to a different vehicle. Sergeant Wray conducted a traffic stop and approached the vehicle from the passenger side. After a brief conversation with the front-seat passenger and with Schirato, the driver, he returned to his patrol vehicle to run Schirato's information. Schirato's information returned that he was a habitual traffic violator (“HTV”). Shortly thereafter, another officer, VPD Sergeant Erik Palleson (“Sergeant Palleson”), arrived on scene to assist. Sergeant Wray returned to the SUV, ordered Schirato out of the vehicle, and handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest for operating a motor vehicle while being an HTV.¹

[4] Sergeant Wray then decided to have the SUV towed and impounded and Sergeant Palleson began conducting an inventory search. During Sergeant Palleson's search, he found an “unlabeled orange pill bottle that contained a variety of pills [and] ․ a glass smoking device under the driver's seat.” Tr. Vol. III p. 119. In the center console area of the vehicle, he discovered “a clear plastic baggy with crystal-like white substance in it.” Id. Lastly, he discovered a mushroom in a black bag on the front passenger floorboard. See id. Sergeant Palleson paused the inventory search and showed Sergeant Wray these items.

[5] Sergeant Wray returned to his patrol vehicle and read Schirato his Miranda warnings and Schirato agreed to speak with him. Schirato admitted that all of the items found in the SUV belonged to him and explained that the crystal-like white substance was methamphetamine and that the pill bottle contained Ecstasy, Xanex, and Adderall. See id. at 58–59.

[6] Schirato then asked Sergeant Wray if he could work with the drug taskforce unit as a confidential informant (“CI”). See id. at 108. Sergeant Wray contacted the taskforce unit, which agreed to let Schirato work as a CI as long as he agreed to make a controlled purchase from a specific individual the following week. Schirato agreed, and as a result, he was released from custody at the scene and issued a fictitious citation to maintain his cover, and the SUV was released to his son, Sean Schirato. The officers retained the suspected contraband found in the SUV but did not complete an inventory list or property release form prior to releasing the SUV to Sean Schirato.

[7] Sometime thereafter, the taskforce unit informed Sergeant Wray that Schirato did not honor his agreement to serve as a CI. On November 27, 2023, Schirato was charged with Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine,² Level 6 felony operating a motor vehicle while privileges are suspended,³ Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance,⁴ and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.⁵ See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 22–29.

[8] On November 29, 2023, Schirato appeared in custody on the present case and also on a separate pending criminal matter. On May 31, 2024, Schirato moved for an expedited trial in the instant matter. The trial court recognized this as a requested to have “an expedited trial within the next 70 days” and set a trial date for July 29, 2024. Tr. Vol. II p. 32.

[9] On July 11, 2024, the State filed a motion to continue the trial due to the unavailability of necessary witnesses, namely, Indiana State Police Laboratory Analyst Alexa McConaughey (“Analyst McConaughey”) and Officer Keith Perez (“Officer Perez”). Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 84. The next day, the trial court held a hearing, and the parties addressed the State's motion. Schirato, by counsel, objected to the continuance and explained that he wanted to preserve his client's right to cross-examine the witnesses in person. The trial court noted that Schirato's point “regarding the right to face as well as to confront the witnesses in the presence of the jury is well taken.” Tr. Vol. II p. 40. The trial court then inquired as to the witnesses’ availability if a brief continuance was granted. The State responded that it believed that if a brief continuance were granted that the witnesses would be available prior to expiration of the 70-day time limit, which expired on August 9. The court then discussed with the parties the other criminal trials currently set for trial over the next several weeks. The court determined that the next available trial date that did not conflict with an existing case of equal or higher priority was September 3, 2025. The trial court then granted the State's continuance and reset the jury trial for September 3, 2025. See id. at 41–42.

[10] On August 29, 2024, Schirato filed a verified motion to continue the September 9 trial setting, contending that “information received on August 29, 2024, requires additional research and performing additional discovery on this matter” and that he “accepts the additional CR 4 time accumulated from this continuance.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 90. The State opposed the motion and filed an objection. The next day, Schirato filed a motion to suppress and that same day, the trial court held a hearing where it granted Schirato's motion to continue over the State's objection and attributed the Criminal Rule 4 time to Schirato.

[11] On October 4, 2024, the trial court held a suppression hearing. Among Schirato's arguments was that the search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. He claimed the search was not justified as an inventory search because “the procedures were not followed to consummate the inventory search.” Tr. Vol. II p. 112. Sergeant Wray testified about the traffic stop and the decision to arrest Schirato for the HTV offense. He explained that the plan was to have the vehicle towed and impounded, but those plans changed after Schirato requested to be considered as a CI for the department's taskforce.

[12] Sergeant Wray described VPD's policy for impounding a vehicle and conducting an inventory search. He explained that the impounding officer conducting an inventory search was required to fill out the necessary paperwork and call for a city tow. See id. at 83. The department's written policy on the impoundment of vehicles is found in VPD General Order 1.2.4, Search and Seizure, Section F. (“Section F”). Section F states in pertinent part:

Search of Seized Vehicles/Property: When a motor vehicle or other personal property is taken into custody or impounded, an officer shall conduct an inventory of the contents of the vehicle/property under department policy without a warrant to authorize the inventory. An inventory is conducted on the basis of policy and involves an examination of the items in a motor vehicle or other property and may include items found in an accessible container, the contents of which cannot be readily ascertained by an examination of the container's exterior. An inventory may extend to locked areas of a vehicle or other property when access may be gained without damage to the vehicle or property. An officer shall prepare a list identifying the various items observed during the examination.

[13] Ex. Vol. V p. 18. Sergeant Wray explained that after the taskforce unit agreed to work with Schirato, he and Sergeant Palleson decided not to impound the SUV and release it Schirato's son. See Tr. Vol. III p. 94 (explaining that officers have discretion to release a vehicle). As a result, Sergeant Palleson did not complete the corresponding paperwork associated with the inventory search and impoundment.

[14] After argument from the parties, the trial court took the matter under advisement, and Schirato and the State both submitted briefs. On October 28, 2024, the trial court issued an order denying Schirato's motion to suppress, stating that:

There was reasonable suspicion for the stop. Mr. Schirato was driving a vehicle with an improper license plate. He was driving while suspended. He was going to be arrested and the car was going to be impounded. What changed? The defendant volunteered to help the drug unit. There were even specific drug deals discussed with Officer Wray. At this point the arrest stopped. The defendant cannot have it both ways: Offer to help, and argue that the VPD did not follow its inventory search policy.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 203.

[15] On October 30, 2024, Schirato filed a motion to stay the proceedings and pursue an interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted Schirato's motion, vacated the November 4 trial date, and charged the delay to Schirato. On January 10, 2025, this court declined to accept jurisdiction over Schirato's interlocutory appeal, and on January 17, 2025, Schirato's jury trial was reset to February 3, 2025.

[16] On January 30, 2025, Schirato filed a motion to dismiss based upon Criminal Rule 4(B) arguing that his jury trial “should have occurred on or before August 9, 2024”; there was “no finding as to Court congestion or emergency”; he “remain[ed] incarcerated under this cause number”; and “no act of [Schirato] delayed the trial past August 9, 2024.” Id. at 211–12.

[17] The next day, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court stated that “to the extent that [it] didn't explicitly say that there was congestion at [the last] hearing, once you indicated that you were exercising your client's right to cross-examine the witnesses in front of the jurors, we then went on and talked at length regarding scheduling.” Tr. Vol. II p. 160. The court denied the motion.

[18] A jury trial was held in February 2025. The jury returned guilty verdicts as to Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony operating while being a habitual traffic violator, and Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. A not guilty verdict was returned for Schirato's Class C misdemeanor charge of possession of paraphernalia. The trial court entered judgment of conviction as to Schirato's three guilty verdicts and an acquittal for the not guilty verdict. Following a sentencing hearing, Schirato was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of seven years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). Schirato now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Criminal Rule 4(B)

[19] Schirato argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss under Criminal Rule 4(B). Schirato confines his challenge to Criminal Rule 4(B) and does not raise separate arguments under the Federal or Indiana constitution. “The broad goal of Indiana's Criminal Rule 4 is to provide functionality to a criminal defendant's fundamental and constitutionally protected right to a speedy trial.” Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1037 (Ind. 2013) (citing Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ind. 2012)). When a defendant moves for a speedy trial under Criminal Rule 4(B), “a trial must be commenced no later than seventy calendar days from the date of such motion ․” Ind. Crim. Rule 4(B). The deadline may be extended only in limited circumstances. See id. (identifying exceptions, including for “delays due to congestion of the court calendar”). The rule further provides that “[i]f a defendant is held beyond the time limit of this section and moves for dismissal, the criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed.” Id.

[20] Although Criminal Rule 4 “places an affirmative duty on the State to bring the defendant to trial” within the specified timeline, the rule “is not intended to be a mechanism for providing defendants a technical means to escape prosecution.” Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1037 (citing Cundiff, 967 N.E.2d at 1028). As the Indiana Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen a defendant makes a motion under [Criminal Rule] 4(B), he is required to maintain a position which is reasonably consistent with his speedy trial request.” Stone v. State, 531 N.E.2d 191, 194 (Ind. 1988) (citing Rutledge v. State, 426 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ind. 1981)). “Failure to do so at any point constitutes an abandonment of the request and the motion ceases to have legal viability.” Id. (citing Utterback v. State, 310 N.E.2d 552, 553 (Ind. 1974)). Furthermore, as this court has held, “[a] motion for continuance is hardly consistent with a speedy trial request.” Covelli v. State, 579 N.E.2d 466, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied.

[21] In Bradley v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court reiterated the standard of review for decisions on Criminal Rule 4 motions. 248 N.E.3d 563, 567 (Ind. 2024). “When the issue involves a question of law applied to undisputed facts, the standard of review—like for all questions of law—is de novo, with the ultimate reasonableness of the trial court's findings dependent on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Id. (citing Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1039 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, “[w]hen the trial court makes factual findings (of congestion or emergency to justify a deadline extension), appellate courts show reasonable deference to those findings and reverse only for clear error.” Id. (quoting Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1040) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[22] On appeal, Schirato argues that he should have been tried within the original seventy-day deadline, which was August 9, 2024, claiming the trial court did not enter a formal finding of court congestion to support setting the trial outside the deadline. The State defends the trial court's decision on grounds that they were “entitled to a continuance to secure the attendance of its necessary witnesses.” Appellee's Br. p. 17. In support of its position, it relies on Indiana Code section 35-36-7-2, which provides that the State may postpone a criminal trial due to the absence of a necessary witness under certain limited circumstances.

[23] However, because Schirato abandoned his request for an early trial through his request to continue the trial, we affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss on those grounds. Schirato did not immediately move for dismissal when the August 9, 2024, deadline passed. See Crim. R. 4(B) (“If a defendant is held beyond the time limit of this section and moves for dismissal, the criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed.” (emphasis added)). Instead, on August 29, 2024, he moved for a continuance of the September 9 trial date. Schirato next pursued an interlocutory appeal. Only after the Court of Appeals declined to accept jurisdiction of the interlocutory matter did Schirato move for dismissal on January 30, 2025, 174 days after the expiration of the 70-day time period.

[24] Schirato's decision to move for a continuance was inconsistent with his request for an early trial. See Covelli, 579 N.E.2d at 470. Therefore, Schirato was deemed to have abandoned his request for a speedy trial. See Stone v. State, 531 N.E.2d 191, 194 (Ind. 1988). The trial court properly denied the motion for dismissal, which lacked legal basis.⁶

II. Admission of Evidence

[25] Schirato challenges the admission of evidence obtained as a result of the search of the SUV. Schirato argues the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. See Appellant's Br. p. 29. At times he argues that the trial court “erred when it denied [his] motion to suppress” and the trial court “erred when it permitted the [S]tate to offer the evidence at trial[.]” Id. at 26. Because Schirato appeals following a completed trial, the relevant inquiry is whether the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of evidence at trial. Stokes v. State, 276 N.E.3d 681, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. denied; Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 586–87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We review a trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). “When, however, admissibility turns on questions of constitutionality relating to the search and seizure of that evidence, our review is de novo.” Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 849 (Ind. 2017) (citing Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40–41 (Ind. 2014)). “To encourage compliance with the Fourth Amendment, the evidence seized in violation of the Constitution must be excluded at trial unless an exception to this ‘exclusionary rule’ applies.” Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719, 723 (Ind. 2010) (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009)). “Furthermore, evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search or seizure has to be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.” Sanchez v. State, 803 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963)), trans. denied.

[26] “Both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 protect ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’ against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 374 (Ind. 2016) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11). “Although Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 questions require independent analyses, their answers turn on the same factor—reasonableness. The State bears the burden of proving warrantless impoundments and inventory searches are reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11.” Id. (citing Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ind. 1993) (Fourth Amendment); Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 334 (Ind. 2006) (Article 1, Section 11)).

A. Fourth Amendment

[27] “The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable search and seizure and this protection has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 330 (citing U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 464–65 (Ind. 1998)). “The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings.” Id. (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)).

[28] “A valid inventory search is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 330 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976)). “An inventory search is an exception because it serves an administrative, rather than an investigative, purpose.” Deaton v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1107, 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 374), trans. denied. “[T]he rationale for an inventory search is three-fold: (1) protection of private property in police custody; (2) protection of police against claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protection of police from possible danger.” Id. (citing Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 330–31). “In determining the propriety of an inventory search, the threshold question is the propriety of the decision to impound the vehicle, as it is the impoundment that gives rise to the need to conduct the inventory.” Id. (citing Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 331; Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 431). “If the decision to impound was reasonable, then a court must consider whether the scope of the search itself was reasonable.” Id. (citing Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 431). “As in all Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the test of constitutionality in inventory cases is reasonableness.” Deaton, 203 N.E.3d at 1112 (citing Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 431).

[29] Here, Schirato does not challenge the reasonableness of law enforcement's decision to impound the SUV upon his arrest. Rather, he challenges the scope of the search. Schirato raises three arguments: (1) that VPD's procedures for conducting searches are “excessively broad[,]” (2) that the officers deviated from those policies, and (3) that the search was pretextual. Appellant's Br. p. 29.

[30] “Even the lawful custody of an impounded vehicle does not of itself dispense with the constitutional requirement of reasonableness in regard to the searches conducted thereafter. Instead, to pass constitutional muster, the search itself must be conducted pursuant to standard police procedures.” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 435 (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987)). In Fair, the Indiana Supreme Court held an inventory search violated the Fourth Amendment where the State failed to provide sufficient detail on the police department's inventory search policy. The Court also considered the manner in which the search was conducted and identified what it characterized as “indicia of pretext[.]” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 436; see also Stokes v. State, 276 N.E.3d 681, 692 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. denied. The Court identified the following facts that it considered to be indicia of pretext:

(1) “The search was conducted not at the impoundment lot but at the scene of the crime[;]” (2) “[t]he inventory was conducted by an officer responsible for criminal investigations and not the custody of impounded property[;]” (3) “formal inventory sheets were [not] completed[;]” (4) “the officer ․ did not make note the [defendant's] personal effects ․ but instead focused only on the contraband[;]” (5) “the car [was never] actually impounded[;]” and (6) police department policy and compliance therewith was “not established in sufficient detail by the record.”

Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 436. The Court also noted that while any of the individual facts may not have rendered the search unconstitutional, taken collectively, they may suggest pretext. See id. “[T]o defeat a charge of pretext the State must establish the existence of sufficient regulations and that the search at issue was conducted in conformity with them.” Id. at 435. There are “three basic types of inventory cases: the minor deviation from policy cases, the major deviation from policy cases, and the no policy cases.” Sams v. State, 71 N.E.3d 372, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the no policy cases, the State “always loses” because “the search is totally, and therefore excessively, discretionary.” Id.

[31] Schirato first challenges VPD's procedures for conducting inventory searches, arguing that these procedures were excessively broad. Schirato argues that VPD's procedures were “so broad that [they were] effectively no policy[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 30 (internal quotation mark omitted). Schirato argues that the policy does not specify “what items in the vehicle should be searched and documented” and vests the officers with too much discretion as to what can be searched. Id. at. 31.

[32] We disagree with Schirato's contention that the policy fails to specify what items in the vehicle should be searched and documented or gives the officer too much discretion. First, Section F is a mandatory direction, it requires an inventory search be conducted when a vehicle is impounded. Next, the policy clearly directs that an inventory of the contents of the vehicle be conducted, which clearly directs the officer to search and inventory all items or other property found in a vehicle. The policy does provide officers discretion to search locked areas of a vehicle, but prohibits them from damaging the vehicle or property when doing so. The policy provides that containers in the vehicle may be opened and searched, but only if the contents of the container are not readily ascertainable through an examination of the exterior of the container. Finally, the policy requires that an officer prepare an inventory list of items observed during the search. While the policy does provide officers some discretion concerning the search of locked areas of the vehicle, it is not overly broad such that is effectively no policy.

[33] Schirato also argues that Sergeant Palleson's testimony describing VPD's impoundment and inventory search policy contradicts the written policy set forth in Section F. Schirato claims the contradiction means that officers have excessive discretion to choose which protocol to follow. See Sams, 71 N.E.3d at 379. We disagree. Sergeant Palleson testified that the purpose of an inventory search is “[t]o locate notable items of value and/or property for an itemized list to be generated.” Tr. Vol. III p. 149. Sergeant Palleson also acknowledged that the VPD policy required him to make an itemized list of the items found in an inventory search. Id. We do not find Sergeant Palleson's description of the policy to be in contradiction to VPD's written policy contained in Section F.

[34] Next, we address Schirato's argument that Sergeants Wray and Palleson deviated from VPD's procedures for conducting searches. Schirato argues that the officers deviated from the policy in two major ways: (1) by terminating the inventory search and releasing the vehicle and (2) by failing to complete an inventory list. See Appellant's Br. p. 31. Our court has previously stated that “major deviation[s] are difficult to generalize about[,]” but these cases “turn[ ] on whether the search nonetheless fulfilled its administrative purposes and on whether the State can dispel inferences of pretext.” Sams, 71 N.E.3d at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted).

[35] It is undisputed that the officers discontinued the impoundment process and failed to complete the required paperwork that accompanies an inventory search. However, the termination of the impoundment was the result of Schirato's request to serve as a CI. The decision to release Schirato from custody and release his SUV to his son was made in an effort to conceal his participation as a CI. But for Schirato's intervening request to serve as a CI, the inventory procedures would have continued. Cf. Stokes, 276 N.E.3d 681. Therefore, any deviation from the impoundment and inventory search policy that occurred after Schirato requested to serve as a CI cannot be used by Schirato to claim that the search was unreasonable.

[36] Lastly, we determine if there is any indicia of pretext for the stop. First, as noted above, because Schirato directly intervened and caused the impoundment and inventory search process to be discontinued, we will not consider any deviation from the VPD policy or the acts or omissions of the officers thereafter as evidence of pretext. We will only consider those indicia of pretext that may have been present prior to the discontinuation of the search process.

[37] As to the first factor (location of the search), the search of Schirato's SUV was completed at the scene of the traffic stop, rather than the impound lot. The location of the search did not violate VPD policy, and we do not conclude that under the circumstances, the roadside inventory search was suggestive of pretext. We note that here, the search process was discontinued once Schirato was confronted with the discovery of the contraband and his request to serve as a CI.

[38] As to the second factor, (which officer was responsible for inventorying the vehicle), Sergeant Wray and Sergeant Palleson both worked as patrolmen in the patrol division of the VPD. The officer's actions here are not per se indicative of pretext, but rather, under the circumstances, the VPD policy required that when a vehicle was taken into custody, the officer shall inventory the vehicle pursuant to department policies. See Ex. Vol. V p. 18. We also note that Sergeant Wray placed Schirato under arrest while Sergeant Palleson conducted the search. Additionally, the decision to accept Schirato as a CI was made by officers on the taskforce, and not either Sergeant Palleson or Sergeant Wray. Because the inventory search and the decision to accept Schirato as a CI were made by officers other than the arresting officer, Sergeant Wray, we do not conclude that the identity of who conducted the search was suggestive of pretext.

[39] The third factor (whether the formal inventory paperwork was completed), the fourth factor (the content of the paperwork), and the fifth factor (the car never being actually impounded), all concern actions that would have taken place after the decision to release Schirato from custody and discontinue the impoundment were made. As set forth above, because of Schirato's intervening request to serve as a CI, we do not consider the failure to complete these tasks to be indicia of pretext.

[40] As to the sixth and final factor, (the department's policy and compliance therewith), as previously explained, Sergeant Wray testified at length about the VPD's policy regarding the impoundment of vehicles. Sergeant Wray explained that it was VPD policy for the impounding officer conducting an inventory search to fill out the necessary paperwork and call for a city tow. Further, Section F, the department's written policy for the impoundment of vehicles, requires an inventory search be conducted when a vehicle is impounded; it clearly directs that an inventory of the contents of the vehicle be conducted; it clearly directs the officer to search and inventory all items or other property found in a vehicle; it provides officers discretion to search locked areas of a vehicle, but prohibits them from damaging the vehicle or property when doing so; it provides containers in the vehicle may be opened and searched, but only if the contents of the container are not readily ascertainable through an examination of the exterior of the container; and lastly, it requires that an officer prepare an inventory list of items observed during the search. Here, the officers adhered to VPD policy until Schirato interjected and offered to work as a CI.

[41] Therefore, we conclude, based on all the aforementioned factors, that there was no pretextual intent and the search was reasonable under the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Any deviation from VPD policy, or failure to complete the necessary documentation to accompany the inventory search, occurred only after Schirato requested to serve as a CI.

B. Article 1, Section 11

[42] Schirato argues that the search was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which states “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated[.]” Ind. Const. art. I, § 11. “Article 1, Section 11 involves independent analysis, requiring this Court to determine whether impoundment and inventory are reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 378 (citing Taylor, 842 N.E.2d at 334). “When we determine whether a search was reasonable under Article 1, Section 11, we look to ‘the totality of the circumstances,’ applying the framework from Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).” Cobb v. State, 222 N.E.3d 373, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. In general, the reasonableness of a search and seizure under the Indiana Constitution depends on balancing the following factors: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361.

[43] However, some panels of our court have struggled with applying the factors to inventory search cases. One recent panel noted the difficulty in applying the Litchfield factors to inventory searches, stating:

[T]he very first factor—degree of suspicion—is not relevant to an inventory search. While an initial stop requires some degree of suspicion, an inventory search does not; rather an inventory search is conducted for the purposes of (1) protection of private property in police custody; (2) protection of police against claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protection of police from possible danger.

Deaton, 203 N.E.3d at 1116 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ector v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1053, 1058 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied). The Deaton court then applied the Litchfield factors and determined that the inventory search was reasonable.⁷

[44] Here, Sergeant Wray had a high degree of suspicion to stop Schirato because he was operating a vehicle in violation of Indiana Code section 9-18.1-4-5, which makes it a Class C infraction to operate a vehicle on a highway if it displays a plate belonging to another vehicle. Also, Schirato does not challenge the authority of the officers to impound the SUV. The degree of intrusion, like in Deaton, was “no more than was necessary to inventory the vehicle per [department policy.]” Deaton, 203 N.E.3d at 1116. As set forth above, VPD had a written policy directing officers on how to conduct the search. The officers were conducting the inventory search in compliance with the VPD policy when the contraband was discovered. To the extent the officers thereafter deviated from the policy by releasing the vehicle to Schirato's son and not completing the inventory paperwork, they did so as a result of Schirato's invitation to serve as a CI. Lastly, law enforcement needs were significant, as demonstrated by the purpose of the inventory search (protection of private property in police custody, protection of police against claims of lost or stolen property, and protection of police from possible danger). Here, the officer's actions were consistent with established VPD policy and the department's need to secure property inside the vehicle when impounding vehicles. Balancing these factors, we conclude that the vehicle search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances such that the search did not violate Schirato's rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

[45] Having determined that the search complied with the state and federal constitutions, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence obtained from the search.

Conclusion

[46] The trial court did not err in denying Schirato's motion to dismiss and did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence obtained from the inventory search.

[47] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16.

2.   I.C. § 35-48-4-6.1(c).

3.   I.C. § 9-30-10-16.

4.   I.C. § 35-48-4-7(a).

5.   I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(b).

6.   Since we resolved Schirato's speedy trial claim on alternative grounds, we do not address his argument that the State failed to establish grounds for a continuance under Criminal Rule 4(D). See Appellant's Br. pp. 24–26.

7.   Our supreme court has decided inventory search cases without reference to the Litchfield factors. See, e.g., Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 374 (Ind. 2016); Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 334 (Ind. 2006) (holding unreasonableness of inventory search under Fourth Amendment analysis supported the conclusion that the requirements of Article 1, Section 11 were also violated). This court has also adjudicated the validity of an inventory search under Section 11 without applying the Litchfield factors. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 64 N.E.3d 903, 906–08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); Jackson v. State, 890 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Lewis v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1116, 1126–27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Stokes v. State, 276 N.E.3d 681, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (declining to individually analyze the Litchfield factors), trans. denied.; cf. Smith v. State, 116 N.E.3d 1107, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (applying the Litchfield factors to an inventory search), trans. denied. Nonetheless, we elect to analyze the reasonableness of the inventory search by applying the Litchfield factors. Watkins v. State, 85 N.E.3d 597, 600 (Ind. 2017).

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.