R.P., Appellant-Respondent, v. M.D., Appellee-Petitioner. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] R.P. appeals the trial court's entry of a two-year order of protection that bars him from being near or contacting M.D. He argues that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the court's order. Concluding that the evidence is sufficient, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] M.D. and R.P. were students at a university. They met when M.D. was a freshman because they were both members of a “first aid student team[ ]” (“FAST”). Tr. Vol. 3, p. 21. In the next school year, which began in fall 2024, they both joined an election committee. R.P. asked for her phone number and invited her to lunch. After the lunch, he invited her to an event at a planetarium. M.D. accepted the invitation, but she was engaged to be married. She thought that R.P. was aware of her engagement and told her friends that she hoped R.P.’s intentions were platonic.

[3] During the event, which appears to have been a lecture, R.P. and M.D. were seated next to each other. R.P. reached over and grabbed M.D.’s hand, which made her uncomfortable. He also touched her engagement ring. After the lecture ended, R.P. leaned over to kiss M.D., and she backed away. Believing that R.P. was insufficiently dissuaded by her engagement, M.D. told him she was “gay” and did not “want anything romantic[ ]” with him. Id. at 23. The two did not talk again for several weeks.

[4] In November 2024, M.D. and R.P. were partnered together in the FAST, and they began to socialize more often. R.P. apologized for his earlier conduct, claiming he had misread her “signals.” Id.

[5] From M.D.’s perspective, she and R.P. became “good friends[ ]” by January 2025. Id. at 24. They frequently chatted by text message, and during their university's winter break, they had lengthy phone conversations while they played video games. M.D. disclosed that she was not gay, and she introduced R.P. to her fiancé. Even so, during this period of time, R.P. frequently put his arm around M.D. or touched her hair or hands without asking, which she perceived as “weird” and “strange.” Id. at 26. In addition, when he invited her to spend time together, “he always wanted to go somewhere private.” Id.

[6] In January 2025, M.D.’s fiancé visited her on campus, and M.D. invited R.P. to watch a movie with them and other friends. Later in January, M.D. became concerned after they had conversations in which R.P. sounded “different.” Id. at 28. For example, R.P. told her that they were “not friends.” Id. When M.D. said that she thought they were friends, he responded that he wanted “a friendship that's going to last forever[.]” Id. at 29. M.D. next said, “nothing lasts forever[,]” and R.P. “freaked out.” Id. He told M.D. that he loved her. She characterized the conversation as “strange” and “weird[.]” Id. at 28-29. M.D. did not talk to R.P. for several days.

[7] R.P. subsequently asked to meet with M.D. because he had a gift for her. When they met, he gave her a book called “Rules to be a Knight.” Id. at 19. R.P. had bookmarked a chapter entitled “Death.” Id. M.D. was frightened by the reference to death.

[8] On the night of January 22, 2025, R.P. was walking M.D. back to her dorm after an elections committee meeting. He said that he had “something private” to discuss with her. Id. at 31. She reluctantly allowed R.P. into her room, where they sat on the floor and talked for an hour.

[9] M.D. eventually “realized that [R.P.] wasn't going to go[,]” even though she kept hinting that it was getting late and she wanted to go to bed. Id. at 32. R.P. suddenly grabbed her arms and began “dragging” her toward her bed. Id. at 33. He was not laughing or joking, and he did not say anything. M.D. resisted R.P.’s attempts to move her to her bed, so he took the pillows from her couch and placed them on the floor. Next, he grabbed M.D. by the shoulders and tried to get her to lie down with him. M.D. continued to resist his efforts, repeating that it was late and she needed to go to bed.

[10] M.D. convinced R.P. to allow her to change into sleeping clothes. He went “out of [her] line of sight” while she changed, id. at 36, and then she got into bed. R.P. sat down on the bed close to M.D. and touched her even though she tried to go to sleep. Next, he lay down behind her, underneath the sheets, effectively blocking her from getting off of the bed. M.D. tried to move away from R.P., but he kept “pulling [her] closer to him.” Id. at 37. During this time, she shut her eyes and tried to pretend she was somewhere else.

[11] At one point during the night, R.P. said, “[I]f you really want me to leave, I'll leave.” Id. at 39. M.D. told him that she wanted him to leave, but he did not. “[H]e just didn't care.” Id. at 40. He stayed overnight in M.D.’s room, in violation of a university rule that barred nonresidents from staying in dorm buildings after midnight on weeknights.

[12] M.D. eventually went to sleep. When she woke up around 8:00 or 8:30 the next morning, R.P. was kissing her on her face and neck and was touching her breasts. He was smiling. M.D. “wanted to think about anything else” other than the current circumstances, so she turned on the television. Id. at 43. They stayed in bed until 9:15, when R.P. got up and left because he had to go to class.

[13] M.D. was upset and felt like she “didn't want to talk to [R.P.] ever again.” Id. at 46-47. She told her fiancé and friends what had happened, and she spent the night in a friend's room. That night, R.P. texted M.D. to ask if she was “all right.” Id. at 48. She did not respond.

[14] The next day, M.D. and R.P. both attended an elections committee meeting. He texted her during the meeting about different issues the committee was discussing. After the meeting, R.P. invited M.D. to hang out that night. She declined, saying that she wanted to go to sleep. R.P. offered to work at M.D.’s desk while she slept, but she declined again. Later that evening, M.D. asked a friend to take her to the hospital to be examined, and hospital staff collected a rape kit.

[15] R.P. texted M.D. “a lot” over the next few days, asking if she wanted to get dinner or watch a movie. Id. at 57. She did not respond. Eventually, he said that if she did not respond, he would go to her dorm room. M.D. was “freaking out” because she did not want R.P. in her room again. Id. She told R.P. that she was fine, just busy.

[16] After sending that text, M.D. continued to ignore R.P.’s text messages. On the evening of the next Saturday, R.P. arrived at M.D.’s dorm room and started “pounding” on the door, “[l]ike SWAT team level noise.” Id. at 58. M.D. looked out of her door's peephole, saw that it was R.P., and yelled at him to go away. She yelled at him for about ninety seconds until he left. Next, M.D. texted a friend, Luke, who stayed with M.D. in her room for an hour after R.P. left. During this period of time, R.P. texted M.D. to say that he did not “know if I scared you or something, but was visiting a friend and stopped by[.]” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 36. He also said that her behavior had been “weird” lately. Id.

[17] The next day, a Sunday, M.D. ignored a text message from R.P. about astronomy. On Monday, Luke told M.D. about receiving a disturbing email from R.P., asking about M.D.’s mental health. R.P. also contacted another of M.D.’s friends via text message.

[18] Later that Monday, R.P. sent an email to the elections committee's faculty advisor (“the advisor”), M.D., and another person, stating that he was resigning from the elections committee. M.D. felt “relieved” because she thought that he was going to leave her alone. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 69. But later that day, the university's counseling center notified M.D. that someone had filed a report about her. The person who filed the report, who was later revealed to be the advisor, stated that he had been told that M.D. had stolen drugs from a university lab with the intention of killing herself.

[19] The advisor's report was spurred by an email from R.P. In the email, R.P. alleged that M.D. had discussed suicidal ideations with him over the last several weeks and had said that she could obtain drugs from a university lab. R.P. further said that she had stopped communicating with him, and he did not know why. R.P. alleged that M.D. was mentally unwell and had been abused as a child, but he asked the advisor not to tell her that he was the source of this information. Finally, R.P. told the advisor that M.D. “genuinely hate[d]” the advisor and his wife and would ignore any wellness check emails from him. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 38. M.D. disputed the report, and university authorities determined that the report lacked merit.

[20] After that incident, R.P. did not contact M.D., but she saw him in passing on campus. In February 2025, she and others received a group email from R.P., notifying FAST volunteers about a FAST event. M.D. was “scared” and startled to receive R.P.’s email because he was not a coordinator of the event and had no reason to send it. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 73.

[21] In March 2025, R.P. texted M.D. He said, “I know you told me to, like, F off, but I would appreciate it if you would let me know if you would actively oppose my nomination for VP of elections.” Id. at 74. M.D. was bothered by the email and decided that R.P. was “just not going to exit [her] life.” Id. at 75. She obtained a six-month no-contact order against R.P. from the university. The no-contact order was not absolute, allowing R.P. to be in the same room as M.D. if they were in the same class or participating in the same extracurricular activities.

[22] In September 2025, M.D. requested an extension of the no-contact order. University officials rejected her request, stating that an extension was granted only if the recipient of the original order violated its terms, and R.P. had not committed any violations.

[23] Meanwhile, M.D. went to a FAST meeting, assuming that R.P. would not be there, but he was present. She told Luke that R.P.’s presence scared her.

[24] Next, she filed a formal complaint against R.P., which caused the university to extend the no-contact order while an investigation was conducted. The order would remain in place until R.P. graduated in May 2026. As noted above, the order did not bar R.P. from being in the same classes or extracurricular activities with M.D. In addition, the order did not prevent R.P. from coming back on campus after graduation. And M.D. was concerned that if R.P. was expelled from the university as a result of the investigation, the no-contact order would lapse.

[25] On January 16, 2026, M.D. petitioned the trial court for an order of protection. She alleged that R.P. had committed both a sex offense and a stalking offense against her. She also claimed that R.P. had physically harmed her and placed her in fear. M.D. attached a history of her contacts with R.P.

[26] On January 23, the trial court issued a temporary ex parte protection order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing.

[27] On March 26 and 27, the court presided over an evidentiary hearing, at which both parties appeared and testified. After the hearing, the court issued findings of fact and an order of protection. The court found as follows, in relevant part:

f. [R.P.] represents a credible threat to the safety of [M.D.] or a member of [M.D.’s] household.

g. [M.D.] has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a sex offense or repeated acts of harassment has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of this Order.

h. [R.P.] does not agree to the issuance of the Order for Protection.

i. The following relief is necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the threat of violence.

Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 83.

[28] Among other requirements, the court imposed the following restrictions on R.P.:

With the exception of court proceedings or Title IX proceedings at the [university] at which they are ordered to be present together, Respondent shall remain no less than 300 feet from Petitioner and all protected persons, her residence, and her vehicle at all times. Should Respondent inadvertently observe Petitioner in a public place or public road, he shall depart immediately with no verbal or nonverbal communication with Petitioner. Respondent shall have no contact or communication with Petitioner via any internet sites, social media sites, texting, etc. Any violation of these provisions or any other terms of this Protective Order may be enforced through contempt of court.

Id. The court stated that the order would remain in effect for two years. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[29] Civil orders of protection are governed by the Civil Protection Order Act (“CPOA”), Indiana Code Chapter 34-26-5. F.P. v. D.R., 277 N.E.3d 107, 111 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). A person may petition a trial court for a protection order if they have experienced domestic or family violence, stalking, a sex offense, or harassment. Ind. Code § 34-26-5-2 (2021). “To obtain an order of protection under the [CPOA], the petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence at least one of the allegations in the petition.” A.S. v. T.H., 920 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[30] Protective orders are similar to injunctions, and a trial court must make special findings of fact and conclusions thereon. P.D. v. D.V., 172 N.E.3d 306, 310 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). When a party appeals a trial court's issuance of a protective order, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 497 (Ind. 2023). “[W]e consider whether the evidence supports the court's findings and, if so, whether those findings support the judgment.” Id. “[W]e neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses, and we consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's decision.” Id. “[T]he party appealing the issuance of the protective order must establish that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, meaning a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” J.T. v. A.H., 255 N.E.3d 512, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[31] R.P. challenges the evidence supporting the trial court's findings that: (1) he posed a credible threat to M.D.; (2) he harassed M.D; and (3) he committed a sex offense against M.D. We address each point in turn.

I. Credible Threat

[32] R.P. argues that there is insufficient evidence that he posed a threat of harm to M.D. Under the CPOA, “A finding that domestic or family violence or harassment has occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this section means that a respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of a petitioner or a member of a petitioner's household.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(h) (2024).

[33] The CPOA does not define the term “credible threat.” Our Supreme Court has stated that when considering whether a respondent poses a credible threat, a court must “determine whether the respondent's actions—viewed objectively at the time the petitioner seeks relief—provide reasonable grounds to believe the threat of violence persists.” S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 499. A threat is credible when it is “plausible or believable.” R.H. v. S.W., 142 N.E.3d 1010, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[34] Relevant circumstances to consider include: (1) lapses in time or intervening events; (2) the parties’ history and relationship; (3) the nature of the respondent's actions; and (4) the respondent's demeanor in court.¹ S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 499. And the General Assembly has stated that a court may not deny a petition for a protective order “solely because of a lapse of time between an act of domestic or family violence or harassment and the filing of a petition.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-13 (2019).

[35] In the current case, soon after M.D. and R.P. met, he attempted to kiss her against her will during an astronomy event. Although he later apologized, and he was aware that she had a fiancé, he engaged in behaviors that disturbed and confused M.D., including touching her hair, attempting to speak with her in isolated locations, and telling her that he loved her and wanted a friendship that lasted forever.

[36] R.P. then escalated his behavior by giving M.D. a book in which he had marked a chapter about death, which frightened her. This led directly to the events of the night of January 22, 2025, when R.P. refused to leave M.D.’s room. Instead, he attempted to drag her, first to her bed, and then to pillows on the floor. When M.D. climbed into bed, R.P. followed her, repeatedly pulling her close to him throughout the night. He rejected her request that he leave, and when she awoke the next morning, he was kissing her and touching her breasts. M.D. was deeply upset, to the point that she spent the next night in a friend's room and went to the hospital the following day, where she underwent a rape examination.

[37] M.D. concluded that she never wanted to talk to R.P. again, and she mostly ignored his numerous texts over the following days, responding only when he said he would show up at her dorm room. The idea of having R.P. in her room again caused her to “freak[ ] out[.]” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 57. On a subsequent Saturday, R.P. did come to her room, where he loudly and repeatedly struck her door. M.D. was terrified and yelled at him through the door to go away. Another friend came to her room after R.P. left and stayed with her for an hour. R.P. soon texted to say that he did not mean to scare her.

[38] R.P. and M.D. did not come into direct contact again until March 2025, when R.P. texted M.D. about his candidacy for vice-president of the elections committee. M.D. believed that R.P. was not going to exit her life. This is ample evidence that supports the trial court's finding that R.P. objectively posed a credible threat of physical harm to M.D. See A.S., 920 N.E.2d at 807 (concluding trial court's finding of credible threat was supported by evidence; subject of order physically attacked petitioner once, came to petitioner's residence uninvited, and repeatedly contacted petitioner, making him feel intimidated).

[39] R.P. argues that he complied with the university's no-contact order, which proves that he did not pose a credible threat to M.D. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment, we disagree. R.P.’s conduct after the university issued the no-contact order is relevant to the credible threat analysis. But the university's order did not require R.P. to avoid the same extracurricular activities as M.D. And R.P. chose to continue his involvement in the FAST and the elections committee, despite knowing that M.D. would still be involved. In September 2025, at the beginning of the school year, M.D. unexpectedly encountered R.P. at a FAST meeting, and she was scared by his presence. She explained that after the trial court issued the preliminary order of protection, which fully barred R.P. from being near M.D., it was the first time “since all this has happened [that] I'm not scared to leave my room anymore.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 84. R.P.’s compliance with the university's no-contact order, which failed to completely bar R.P. from being around M.D., does not undermine the trial court's credible threat finding.

[40] Next, R.P. argues that the trial court failed to note that R.P. graduated from the university in spring 2026 and was moving to California to begin a job. He claims that this is a changed circumstance that demonstrates that he is no longer a credible threat to M.D. But during the evidentiary hearing, R.P. stated that if the trial court issued an order of protection after the hearing, his job offer would be withdrawn. The trial court was not obligated to believe that R.P. was moving to California, particularly if the court concluded that issuing an order of protection was otherwise necessary, which would have allegedly ended R.P.’s job plans. And M.D. testified that she was leaving Indiana for summer break, but she intended to return to campus in the fall for her senior year.

[41] Finally, R.P. cites to S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214 (Ind. 2020) to support his claim that he did not pose a credible threat, but that case is factually dissimilar to the current case. In S.H., a petitioner sought to extend a two-year protective order for another two years. The trial court granted the extension, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed. The Court stated that there was inadequate evidence that the subject of the order posed a credible threat at the time the petitioner requested the two-year extension. In particular, the subject had fully complied with the original order and, in the interim, had moved more than two hundred miles away from the petitioner. The Court concluded that the subject's full compliance with the original order could not be a basis for extending it. Id. at 221.

[42] In this case, R.P. complied with the university's no-contact order, but as we have discussed, that order still allowed him to be in close proximity to M.D. And, unlike the subject of the order in S.H., R.P. did not absent himself from M.D.’s presence but instead continued to participate in the same extracurricular activities as M.D., causing her to be afraid and bothered. The outcome in S.H. does not compel reversal of the trial court's credible threat finding here.

II. Harassment

[43] R.P. claims there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that he harassed M.D. For purposes of the CPOA, harassment is defined as “conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continuing impermissible contact ․ that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress; and ․ that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” Ind. Code § 34-6-2.1-80 (2025) (previously codified at 34-6-2-51.5(a) (repealed 2025)). And “impermissible contact” is defined as follows:

(1) Following or pursuing the victim.

(2) Communicating with the victim.

(3) Posting on social media, if the post:

(A) is directed to the victim; or

(B) refers to the victim, directly or indirectly

Ind. Code § 35-45-10-3(a) (2022). This list is nonexclusive. I.C. § 35-45-10-3(b).

[44] In the days leading up to January 22, 2025, M.D. noted that R.P. was behaving strangely. He told her that they were not friends, that he wanted something more long-term, and that he loved her. R.P. also gave M.D. a book in which he had marked a chapter entitled “Death,” which scared her.

[45] After the night of January 22, when R.P. stayed in M.D.’s room against her will and kissed her and touched her breasts while she slept, he asked to hang out with her and repeatedly texted her. M.D. did not want to communicate with R.P. again and chose not to respond to most of his texts. She sent a brief answer only after he said he would stop by her room, which frightened her.

[46] Next, on a Saturday evening, R.P. arrived at M.D.’s dorm room and pounded on the door until she yelled at him to leave. This terrified M.D. to the point that she had another friend come stay with her in her room for at least an hour.

[47] Two days later, M.D. learned that R.P. had contacted two of her friends, asking at least one of them about her mental health. He also emailed the advisor, claiming that she intended to harm herself using drugs she had allegedly stolen from a university lab. R.P. later claimed that he had sent the email out of a good-faith concern for M.D.’s well-being, but M.D. thought he was trying to get her attention. And R.P. made extraneous statements in the email, including that M.D. hated the advisor's wife and had been abused as a child. These statements demonstrate that the email was intended to cause M.D. emotional distress by damaging her standing with the advisor.

[48] Finally, R.P. continued to be active in the same extracurricular activities of M.D., and his appearance at a FAST meeting caused M.D. to be afraid. M.D. testified that R.P.’s attempts to contact her, attempts to contact her friends and the advisor to raise questions about her mental health, and appearances at extracurricular events caused her to be distressed. Further, we conclude that a reasonable person would have suffered emotional distress from R.P.’s behavior. See F.P., 277 N.E.3d at 113 (determining there was sufficient evidence to sustain harassment finding in protective order case; subject of order repeatedly contacted petitioner, monitored her departures from her residence, and contacted police to allege petitioner had committed wrongdoing). There is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that R.P. harassed M.D.

III. Sex Offense 2

[49] R.P. claims there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that he committed a sex offense against M.D. For purposes of the CPOA, a “sex offense” is defined as one of the offenses set forth in Indiana Code section 35-42-4-1 to -14 (2025). I.C. § 34-26-5-2(a).

[50] The General Assembly has defined sexual battery, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) A person who, with intent to arouse or satisfy the person's own sexual desires or the sexual desires of another person:

(1) touches another person when that person is:

(A) compelled to submit to the touching by force or the imminent threat of force; or

(B) so mentally disabled or deficient that consent to the touching cannot be given; or

(2) touches another person's genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breast when that person is unaware that the touching is occurring;

commits sexual battery, a Level 6 felony.

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-8(a) (2014).

[51] With respect to sexual battery by compelling a victim to submit to touching by force or the imminent threat of force, we apply a subjective test that looks at the victim's perception of the circumstances surrounding the incident in question. McCarter v. State, 961 N.E.2d 43, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Tobias v. State, 666 N.E.2d 68, 72 (Ind. 1996)), trans. denied. And force may be implied from the circumstances. McCarter, 961 N.E.2d at 46 (quoting Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). But the fear experienced by the victim must precede the touching to allow the finder of fact to infer that the victim was compelled to submit. Perry v. State, 962 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[52] In the current case, M.D. reluctantly allowed R.P. into her dorm room on the night of January 22, 2025. They talked for a while, and then R.P. did not leave even after M.D. hinted that she was tired and needed to go to sleep. R.P. then tried to drag M.D. to the bed, and then to pillows on the floor, but she resisted being moved. After she convinced him to allow her to change clothes and get into bed, R.P. climbed into the bed behind her, effectively trapping her against a wall, and repeatedly pulled her closer to him in the night after she tried to roll away. He rejected her request for him to leave, and M.D. testified that she was trying to pretend she was somewhere else. She was afraid, but she eventually fell asleep. When she awoke the next morning, R.P. was already awake and touching her breasts. M.D. reasonably did not feel free to resist his groping because R.P. had repeatedly pulled her closer to him in the night and had refused to leave after repeatedly being asked to do so.

[53] This is sufficient evidence to establish that R.P. committed a sex offense, specifically sexual battery, on M.D. using force or the threat of force. See Hutton v. State, 190 N.E.3d 413, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (sustaining conviction for sexual battery; defendant grabbed victim by hips, pressed her against a sink, and then touched her crotch), trans. denied; cf. Perry, 962 N.E.2d at 158 (reversing conviction for sexual battery; victim woke up to discover defendant touching her vagina, but there was no prior contact by defendant to put victim in fear). Alternatively, R.P. touched M.D.’s breast while she was asleep and unaware that the touching was occurring, which meets the definition of sexual battery under Indiana Code section 35-42-4-8(a)(2).

[54] R.P. argues that evidence he presented to the trial court proved indisputably that he was not in M.D.’s dorm room that night. He cites Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2017), in which the Indiana Supreme Court held that certain kinds of evidence can so “complete[ly] and indisputably contradict[ ]” other evidence to the point that the evidence may not be ignored on appellate review, even if the evidence does not support the verdict.

[55] Love is distinguishable from this case. In Love, the Indiana Supreme Court focused exclusively on video evidence, concluding that there must be “a narrow failsafe built into our standard of review” for sufficiency of the evidence “where the video evidence indisputably contradicts the trial court's findings[.]” Id. at 699. In the current case, R.P. presented numerous documents that purported to show that, at the time M.D. claimed he was in her dorm room overnight, he was in his own room playing games, working on school projects, and communicating with family and friends. We decline to extend the holding in Love to R.P.’s documentary evidence and related testimony. R.P.’s reference to his documents and testimony amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence.

Conclusion

[56] There is sufficient evidence to sustain the following findings of fact: (1) R.P. posed a credible threat to M.D., (2) R.P. harassed M.D., and (3) R.P. committed a sex offense against M.D. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[57] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   M.D. argues that if a petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic or family violence or harassment has occurred, then it automatically follows that the respondent represents a credible threat to the petitioner for purposes of Indiana Code section 34-26-5-9(h). As a result, M.D. concludes that a petitioner does not need to present evidence to specifically establish the credible threat element. Appellee's Br. p. 14. We disagree. A petitioner is obligated to prove a credible threat “by a preponderance of the evidence.” E.W. v. J.K., 253 N.E.3d 1111, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (determining petitioner presented sufficient evidence of credible threat in harassment case), trans. denied. Thus, M.D. was obligated to present evidence to support the credible threat element. And we conclude that there is sufficient evidence that R.P. posed a credible threat to M.D.M.D. further argues that because harassment is one of the grounds for which she sought a protective order, she did not need to prove a credible threat of physical harm. She instead claims that she needed to prove only that R.P. posed a threat of emotional harm. We do not need to address this claim because the evidence is sufficient to conclude that R.P. posed a threat of physical harm in any event.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.