Michael Isaac Shields, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In October of 2023, Michael Shields was charged with numerous sex-offense and child-molestation charges. He ultimately went to trial on the following charges: Level 1 felony child molesting, Level 4 felony child molesting, Level 5 felony child solicitation, Level 5 felony incest, and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. After a jury found Shields guilty as charged, the trial court vacated the incest conviction and sentenced him to a fifty-one-year aggregate term of incarceration. Shields contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence, that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting, the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him, and that his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] At all relevant times, Shields had reason to come into contact with Victim 1, Victim 2, Witness 1, and Witness 2 (collectively, “the Children”). Shields spent time with Victim 1 in Monroe County between January 1, 2019, and October 10, 2023. Victim 1 was between nine and thirteen years old at the time. Shields also spent time with Victim 2, Witness 1 and Witness 2.

[3] Shields often shared a bed with Victim 1 and touched her in a manner that “went beyond any normal boundaries[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 44. Shields would touch Victim 1 “between [her] legs” and “on [her] vaginal area[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 44. Victim 1 “would also touch [Shields] between his legs.” Tr. Vol. III p. 44. Shields “would lick [Victim 1's] vaginal area, and [she] would lick his, um, his penis.” Tr. Vol. III p. 44. Shields engaged Victim 1 in “belly bites[,]” which involved “kissing and licking around the abdomen area” and Victim 1's breasts. Tr. Vol. III p. 45. Engaging in “belly bites” often led to other sexual activity. Shields also engaged Victim 1 in a game they referred to as “soap find” during which Shields would make Victim 1's bath water “really soapy and hard to see in” before dropping the soap into the water for Victim 1 to find. Tr. Vol. III p. 46. As Victim 1 searched for the soap, she “would have [her] butt kind of sticking up in the air so [ ] while [she] was in the water like looking for [the soap], he could [ ] lick [her] behind area and [her] vaginal area.” Tr. Vol. III p. 47.

[4] On at least one occasion, Shields attempted “to put, um, his penis inside of” Victim 1 but stopped when she “told him that [ ] it hurt.” Tr. Vol. III p. 47. On another occasion, Shields placed Victim 1 in handcuffs after she “had asked him to be kind of, ah, rough[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 47. On another occasion, while driving together in Shields's pickup truck, Shields began “rubbing on [Victim 1's] thighs” near her vagina in an attempt to “convince [her] to [ ] suck his d[***.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 48. Shields and Victim 1 used the code words “playing with Shopkins” when either “wanted to [ ] do something [sexual] that night or that day.” Tr. Vol. III p. 46. Watching pornography was common in Shields's home, so Victim 1 used the code words that she “was gonna watch boobies” if she wanted to be left alone. Tr. Vol. III p. 46.

[5] Prior to the abuse, Victim 1 had considered Shields to be her “safe space” and had “had no reason not to trust him with anything.” Tr. Vol. III p. 49. He had always been “very nice” to her, had “spoiled [her] a lot with [ ] gifts[,]” and had “always made time [ ] outside of work to spend time with” her. Tr. Vol. III p. 49. According to Victim 1, she and Shields had “always” been “super comfortable and, you know, just touchy with each other even before all the sexual stuff started to happen.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 49–50. Victim 1 indicated that when the abuse had started, she had been

young and I knew that it felt good, and I knew that [Shields] was supposed to be somebody that I could trust. Like there was no reason that [Shields] should be doing anything out of like bad intent. So, I just, I felt like it was okay to be doing it with him. And, um, like I just-, I didn't have a reason not to trust him or to tell him no.

Tr. Vol. III p. 49. Victim 1 further indicated that she loved Shields and

[t]hat's why I let it go on for so long because I trusted him, you know. I just went with everything and because I loved him so much, I just, I didn't want anything to happen to him cause he told me that if we ever told anybody, um, he and also I could get in trouble for it. And I didn't want anything to happen to him.

Tr. Vol. III p. 50.

[6] Initially, the abuse occurred “consistently at least like a few times a week.” Tr. Vol. III p. 44. At some point, “it slowed down to like one time a week.” Tr. Vol. III p. 44. However, “after [Victim 1's] thirteenth birthday, [Shields] started getting ․ more aggressive.” Tr. Vol. III p. 50. When Victim 1 was with Shields, he began to limit her telephone, computer, and television usage, to the point where she “didn't really have anything to do but be with him.” Tr. Vol. III p. 50. The “touching got more persistent” and if Victim 1 “wouldn't let [Shields] touch [her,] he told [her that] he hated [her].” Tr. Vol. III p. 50. This made Victim 1 feel “like [she] had done something wrong for not letting him touch” her. Tr. Vol. III p. 50. Victim 1 described her relationship with Shields as being “really complicated to say the least.․ And so, even though he was doing a lot of bad things to me, he was still the only person that I had to go to. So, [ ] I loved him, but I was also [ ] really afraid of him as well.” Tr. Vol. III p. 52.

[7] In July of 2023, Shields became upset at Victim 2 and “confronted him about some bad behavior.” Tr. Vol. III p. 60. When Victim 2 refused to admit to having committed the alleged bad behavior, Shields “slapped him.” Tr. Vol. III p. 60. Shields took Victim 2 “to the back yard and kind of beat on him[,]” punching him in the stomach with enough force to cause Victim 2 to fall to the ground “from pain.” Tr. Vol. III p. 60. Shields punched Victim 2 “right below [his] sternum[,]” leaving Victim 2 “winded” and “heaving.” Tr. Vol. III p. 122.

[8] In the late-summer or fall of 2023, Victim 1 reported Shields's actions to her mother because Shields “had been getting aggressive” and had been acting as if she was engaging in “bad behavior.” Tr. Vol. III p. 52. Victim 1's mother reported Shields's conduct to law enforcement.

[9] During their investigation into Victim 1's allegations, law enforcement obtained search warrants for evidence connected to the search of Shields's home, including his smartphone and Google account. Law enforcement discovered several photos of adult pornography that had been “manipulated” using an application called “Photoroom.” Tr. Vol. IV pp. 55, 106. In the images, Victim 1's head had been “superimposed” on the female body to replace the female performer's head and Shields's head had been superimposed on the male body to replace the male performer's head. Tr. Vol. IV p. 108. The result was pornographic images appearing to depict Shields and Victim 1 engaged in various sex acts. The pornographic images in the Google account were recovered from a file folder named “my demons[,]” which contained numerous images that were “primarily photos of” Victim 1. Tr. Vol. IV pp. 119, 184. The latest access dates on the images ranged from September 17, 2023, to October 8, 2023. Additionally, Shields's smartphone had been “factory reset eight times between” August 10, 2023, and September 27, 2023. Tr. Vol. IV p. 185.

[10] On October 11, 2023, the State charged Shields with Level 1 felony child molesting, Level 4 felony child molesting, Level 5 felony child solicitation, Level 5 felony incest, and Level 4 felony vicarious sexual gratification. Following amendments to the charging information, the case ultimately proceeded to trial on the following charges: Level 1 felony child molesting, Level 4 felony child molesting, Level 5 felony child solicitation, Level 5 felony incest, and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury.

[11] Prior to the start of trial, Shields argued that the images recovered from his Google account should be excluded from evidence because the images were “far more prejudicial than they are probative” and depicted “uncharged criminal conduct.” Tr. Vol. II p. 7. The State argued that the images were admissible because they had been created or accessed during the timeframe alleged in the charging information and were “intrinsic to the crime[s]” because the State has to prove as an element of the Level 4 felony child molesting charge “that he did this with the intent to arouse sexual desires. This shows that he had sexual desires towards” Victim 1. Tr. Vol. II p. 8. The trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court ultimately ruled that the prejudice to Shields from the admission of the images did not outweigh the images’ probative value and that any question of whether the images were sufficient to prove Shields's intent was a question for the jury. Shields renewed his objection to the images when they were introduced during trial. The trial court overruled Shields's objection and reaffirmed its prior ruling that the images were admissible.

[12] The jury found Shields guilty as charged. At sentencing, the trial court vacated the conviction for incest. The trial court found that no mitigating circumstances applied. The trial court found the facts that Shields's acts were committed “over an extended period of time[,]” and by “someone in whose care and custody” the Children had been placed to be aggravating circumstances. Tr. Vol. V p. 79. The trial court further found that

the major aggravating factor is the harm, injury, loss and damage suffered by the victims. And I'm not just talking about [Victim 1]. I think that it affected [Victim 2, Witness 1, and Witness 2] also in ways that are so profound, so long-lasting, so enduring. You said that you're gonna think about them, ah, every day of, of your life and I hope that they do not think about you every day of your life. I sincerely hope that they can somehow compartmentalize that and move on with their lives because I think the damage that you did was so significant and so great and so much greater than the elements necessary to prove your commission of these crimes that it's, quite frankly, almost beyond comprehension for the Court.

Tr. Vol. V pp. 79–80. The trial court noted Shields's claim that he loved the Children but stated that “[n]o one that loves [someone] could do what you did to those children.” Tr. Vol. V p. 80.

[13] The court imposed a fifty-year sentence for Level 1 felony child molesting, an eight-year sentence for Level 4 felony child molesting, a five-year sentence for Level 5 felony child solicitation, and ordered those sentences served concurrently. The trial court also imposed a one-year sentence for Class A misdemeanor battery, and ordered that it be served consecutively, for an aggregate fifty-one-year sentence. The trial court also found Shields to be a credit-restricted felon.

Discussion and Decision

I. The Trial Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting the Challenged Evidence

[14] The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260. “We will not reweigh the evidence and will resolve all conflicts in favor of the trial court's ruling.” Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Furthermore, “we will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[15] Relevant evidence is generally admissible. Ind. Evid. Rule 402. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Ind. Evid. Rule 403. As for evidence relating to the defendant's other acts, Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

(Emphases in original).

[E]vidence may be admissible for a permitted purpose under Rule 404(b) contingent upon the following requirements: first, the court must determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act; and second, the court must balance whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by prejudicial effect.

Schnitzmeyer, 168 N.E.3d at 1046.

[16] Shields contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the pornographic images that had been altered to depict him engaging in sexual activity with Victim 1. He claims that the images were “far more prejudicial than they are probative” and depicted “uncharged criminal conduct.” Tr. Vol. II p. 7. For its part, the State argued that the images were admissible because they tended to “make it more probable that” Shields had acted with the intent to arouse his sexual desires when he had touched Victim 1. Appellee's Br. p. 19. In admitting the images, the trial court determined that the images were relevant to prove Shields's intent to arouse his sexual desires and that the probative value of the images was not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. We need not determine whether the trial court erred in reaching this determination, however, because even if we assume that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged images, such error was at most harmless given the other, independent evidence of Shields's guilt.

[17] Generally, errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. In viewing the effect of the evidentiary ruling on a defendant's substantial rights, we look to the probable impact on the fact finder. The improper admission is harmless error if the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction. Moreover, any error in the admission of evidence is not prejudicial, and is therefore harmless, if the same or similar evidence has been admitted without objection or contradiction.

Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 2012) (internal brackets, citations, and quotation omitted).

[18] The State presented substantial independent evidence of Shields's guilt, mainly through Victim 1's testimony. Victim 1's testimony detailed Shields's acts, describing multiple years of sustained sexual abuse. Shields cross-examined Victim 1 about her testimony and prior statements that she had made to investigators, allowing the jury to judge her credibility. In finding Shields guilty as charged, the jury necessarily found Victim 1 to be credible and believed her testimony regarding Shields's actions. In addition, Victim 2, Witness 1, and Witness 2 corroborated Victim 1's testimony regarding Shields's home, inappropriate touching of Victim 1 by Shields, the presence of an “adult toy” in a closet, and that Shields would go into the bathroom with Victim 1 while she was taking a bath. Tr. Vol. III p. 136. Given the substantial independent evidence of Shields's guilt, we are convinced that there is no substantial likelihood that the images contributed to Shields's convictions for Level 1 felony child molesting, Level 4 felony child molesting, or Level 5 felony child solicitation.

II. The Evidence is Sufficient to Sustain Shields's Conviction for Level 1 Felony Child Molesting

[19] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[20] Shields only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting. A person who, is at least twenty-one years of age, and “with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, knowingly or intentionally performs or submits to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct” commits Level 1 felony child molesting. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a). “ ‘Other sexual conduct’ means an act involving: (1) a sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (2) the penetration of the sex organ or anus of a person by an object.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5. “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). “Because knowledge is the mental state of the actor, the trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences of its existence.” Leonard v. State, 80 N.E.3d 878, 883 (Ind. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). “It is generally presumed that a person intends the natural, necessary, and probable consequences of his or her acts.” Book v. State, 880 N.E.2d 1240, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

[21] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting, Shields argues that Victim 1's testimony was incredibly dubious. “Appellate courts may impinge upon a jury's function to judge the credibility of a witness [․] by applying the ‘incredible dubiosity’ rule.” Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211, 1221 (Ind. 2015). “Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is limited to cases with very specific circumstances because we are extremely hesitant to invade the province of the jury.” Id. “[T]o warrant application of the incredible dubiosity rule, there must be: 1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Applying this rule to evidentiary challenges on appeal, “[w]e will reverse a conviction if the sole witness presents inherently improbable testimony and there is no circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt.” Feyka v. State, 972 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is rare and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

[22] Shields points to alleged discrepancies between Victim 1's testimony at trial and her prior statements to the forensic investigator. “The fact that a witness gives trial testimony that contradicts earlier pre-trial statements does not necessarily render the trial testimony incredibly dubious.” Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 409 (Ind. 2002). Both Victim 1 and the forensic investigator testified at trial and Shields was given the opportunity to, and did, cross-examine both about any potential discrepancies. The jury was therefore aware of the claimed discrepancies and could consider them in determining Victim 1's credibility.

[23] Shields also claims that Victim 1's testimony that he had handcuffed her at one point and provided her with an adult sex toy was inherently contradictory because neither of these objects had been recovered during the search of his home. While law enforcement may not have recovered either object, Witness 2 testified and corroborated Victim 1's claim that Shields had provided her with what Witness 2 referred to as “adult toy” that had been stored in a closet. Tr. Vol. III p. 136. Again, the jury could consider the alleged contradiction between Victim 1's (and Witness 2's) testimony and the list of items recovered from Shields's home when determining Victim 1's credibility.

[24] Shields further claims that Victim 1's mother coerced her to make the allegations against him. The record, however, does not support this claim, as Shields did not present evidence of coercion but rather merely expressed his belief that Victim 1 had been coerced. Victim 1 testified that she had decided to report Shields's behavior after he “had been getting aggressive” with her and had been acting as if she was engaging in “bad behavior.” Tr. Vol. III p. 52. Victim 1 explained that she had delayed reporting Shields's behavior because she loved him and did not want him to get into trouble. Again, both Victim 1 and her mother testified at trial and Shields was given the opportunity to, and did, cross-examine both. As was the case for the alleged discrepancies in Victim 1's testimony and her prior statements to the forensic investigator, Shields's questions to Victim 1 and her mother relating to their motive for reporting him to law enforcement was squarely before the jury, which ultimately found Victim 1 to be a credible witness.

[25] Victim 1's testimony regarding Shields's actions was clear, concise, and consistent. It was not so improbable that no reasonable person could believe it. As such, based on the record before us, we cannot say that Victim 1's testimony was inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion. Her testimony was also corroborated by Victim 2, Witness 1, and Witness 2 as to the layout of Shields's home, inappropriate touching by Shields, and the presence of what Witness 2 referred to as an “adult toy.” Tr. Vol. III p. 136. The incredible dubiosity rule, therefore, does not apply.

[26] Victim 1's testimony detailed multiple instances where Shields had engaged her in other sexual conduct, i.e., conduct “involving: (1) a sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of another person[.]” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5. Victim 1 detailed instances of oral sexual activity, both committed on her by Shields and by her on Shields. Specifically, she testified that Shields “would lick [her] vaginal area, and [she] would lick his, um, his penis.” Tr. Vol. III p. 44. She further testified that these instances typically followed instances of inappropriate touching by Shields. Victim's 1's testimony is sufficient to sustain Shields's conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting. See Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1238 (“The testimony of a sole child witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for molestation.”). Shields's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence effectively amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

III. The Trial Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Sentencing Shields

[27] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quotation omitted).

We review for an abuse of discretion the court's finding of aggravators and mitigators to justify a sentence, but we cannot review the relative weight assigned to those factors. When reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified by the trial court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.

Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citation and quotation omitted), trans. denied. Moreover,

[a] single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to enhance a sentence. When a trial court improperly applies an aggravator but other valid aggravating circumstances exist, a sentence enhancement may still be upheld. The question we must decide is whether we are confident the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had not found the improper aggravator.

Id. at 417 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

[28] The trial court imposed an aggregate fifty-one-year sentence. With regard to Shields's conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting, the trial court imposed a fifty-year sentence. Indiana Code section 35-50-2-4(c) provides that “[a] person who commits a Level 1 felony child molesting offense ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and fifty (50) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years.”¹ With regard to Shields's conviction for Class A misdemeanor battery, the trial court imposed a one-year sentence. Indiana Code section 35-50-3-2 provides that “[a] person who commits a Class A misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one (1) year[.]” Thus, Shields received an enhanced sentence which represents the maximum sentence permitted for each offense.

A. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Finding the Significant Harm Suffered by the Victims to be an Aggravating Circumstance

[29] The trial court found that

the major aggravating factor is the harm, injury, loss and damage suffered by the victims. And I'm not just talking about [Victim 1]. I think that it affected [Victim 2, Witness 1, and Witness 2] also in ways that are so profound, so long-lasting, so enduring.․ I think the damage that you did was so significant and so great and so much greater than the elements necessary to prove your commission of these crimes that it's quite frankly, almost beyond comprehension for the Court.

Tr. Vol. V pp. 79–80. Shields argues that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion in considering the harm suffered by [Victim 1] as a ‘major aggravating factor.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 35. Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(a), however, provides that “[i]n determining what sentence to impose for a crime, the court may consider the following aggravating circumstances: (1) The harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by the victim of an offense was: (A) significant; and (B) greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense.”

[30] The evidence before the trial court supported its determination that Shields's actions caused all of the Children to suffer profound, long-lasting harm. At sentencing, both Victim 1 and Victim 2 gave statements detailing the long-lasting harm they suffered as a result of Shields's actions. Victim 1 expressed that Shields had been her “hero” and an “idol” but that she now fears “becoming like him.” Tr. Vol. V p. 62. She expressed a “deep, unsettling fear towards men” that began at a young age, that that she “always felt like every man around [her] was staring[,] waiting for an opportunity to hurt [her] or get between [her] legs.” Tr. Vol. V pp. 62–63. Victim 1 indicated that she “had to walk around eggshells with [Shields]. It was hard telling what would set him off and when he would snap.” Tr. Vol. V p. 63. Victim 1 explained that

when I got out of the house, I walked on eggshells around every other adult too. If I felt like I had made a mistake, I'd freeze. I'd get a thick lump in my throat and I would wait. I'd wait for the adult to snap or even punish me physically. Sudden movements with my coaches, mom and even friends would make me flinch. Sometimes it was subtle and other times I would just instinctively turn away and shut my eyes. Always bracing for impact. It's a hard habit to break, and I still struggle with that even now.

Tr. Vol. V p. 63

[31] Victim 1 stated that she had been “dragged into reality and harsh truths” and had had to mature quickly. Tr. Vol. V p. 63. She struggled with setting boundaries, stating that she

couldn't whine or pout with [Shields] or there was a threat of being punished. So, I quickly learned to accept things even if they pushed my boundaries or I didn't like them because I felt like if I expressed anything other than acceptance towards people, mostly adults, it would come off as back talk and lead to punishment. Slowly, I have learned to establish my own boundaries and not care if they align with other people's wants. But something in the back of my mind still tells me to be cautious. So, I'm often overly careful and gentle while discussing boundaries.

Tr. Vol. V p. 63. As a result of Shields's abuse, Victim 1 struggled to build connection with others, admitting that “[m]aking friends has always been hard[,]” because it is “hard to find anyone [her] age who actually understands reality, harsh truths, or the world in general.” Tr. Vol. V pp. 63–64. Victim 1 has also struggled to have age-appropriate romantic relationships, stating that kissing became a trigger of bad memories.

[32] Victim 1 suffered from bad memories and nightmares. Describing her nightmares, Victim 1 stated that

[s]ometimes it would be exaggerated versions and memories when [Shields] would touch me, hurt me, or yell in my face. And other times, it was worse. I'd get sleep paralysis. I was frozen and trapped while I felt or heard [Shields] nearby. I've even woke up yelling before.․ I was so used to keeping his actions a secret.

Tr. Vol. V p. 64.

[33] Victim 1 suffers from “serious self[-]doubt issues” and questions herself “on everything” she does. Tr. Vol. V p. 64. Victim 1 holds herself “to impossible standards” and is “so hard on [herself] to the point it made [her] question if [she] even deserved to live.” Tr. Vol. V p. 64. These self-doubt issues led Victim 1 to attempt to commit suicide. She stated that

even now, it feels like I am being punished for his actions. And that is the most unfair feeling I've ever experienced. I have all this trauma, all of these issues, all of these problems, which are mostly stemmed from the things I've gone through with him and I hate it. But that was another thing [Shields] taught me at a young age, life is not fair.

Tr. Vol. V p. 65.

[34] Additionally, Victim 2 described long-lasting mental trauma as a result of Shields's actions, stating

before these events, I was a teen who expected safety and protection from [adults]. And not only did I not receive either, I was constantly put in harm's way. After being watched and recorded while I slept, it was let-, it has left me with the fear of being stalked that I struggle with to this day. In therapy, I was diagnosed with PTSD because I flinch when people raise their voi-, their hands. I shut down when people raise their voice and I dissociate when I'm confronted with stress. And all of these symptoms affect my ability to feel safe or secure in any environment. These experiences continue to affect myself and my life. They have warped my sense of safety, my relationships, and my mental health. The impacts of his abuse did not end when the abuse did. And I will have to spend a significant portion of my life to mentally recover to the traumatic physical and mental damage he has caused.

Tr. Vol. V p. 62.

[35] Victim 1 and Victim 2's statements support the trial court's determination that the harm suffered by Victims 1 and 2 was both significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the charged offenses. As such, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding this fact to be an aggravating circumstance in sentencing Shields.

B. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Failing to Find Certain Allegedly Mitigating Circumstances

[36] “The determination of mitigating circumstances lies within the trial court's discretion.” Howard v. State, 266 N.E.3d 304, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “A trial court is not obligated to accept a defendant's claim as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance.” Id. “[A] claim that the trial court failed to find a mitigating circumstance requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id.

[37] Shields argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find the following allegedly mitigating circumstances: Shields had obtained a GED, owned his own home, was employed, and worked to support his dependents. Shields, however, has waived his argument in this regard because he did not advance these circumstances for consideration during the sentence hearing. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492 (“[T]he trial court does not abuse its discretion in failing to consider a mitigating factor that was not raised at sentencing.”).

[38] Shields also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find the fact that his incarceration would be a hardship to his mother to be a mitigating circumstance. Where, as here, “the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.” Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993). Shields's mother spoke on Shields's behalf at sentencing, stating that he had assisted her with caring for her father. Shields's mother did not expand on how Shields had been assisting in his grandfather's care, and the record demonstrates that he had been incarcerated for approximately seventeen months prior to sentencing. The trial court was not required to, and apparently did not, find that the hardship that would allegedly be suffered by Shields's mother as a result of his incarceration warranted significant mitigating weight. See generally Smoots v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1279, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“[A] trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's argument as to what constitutes a mitigating factor, and the court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as does a defendant.”). Shields has failed to convince us that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.

IV. Shields's Sentence is not Inappropriate

[39] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “concentrate less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[40] Shields contends that his fifty-year sentence for his conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting is inappropriate. Again, Indiana Code section 35-50-2-4(c) provides that “[a] person who commits a Level 1 felony child molesting offense ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and fifty (50) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years.” Thus, with respect to this conviction, Shields received a maximum sentence.

[41] Shields argues that the nature of his offenses does not warrant a maximum sentence, claiming that “there is no allegation that [he] brutalized [Victim 1] with a weapon or resulting in physical injury.” Appellant's Br. p. 38. He further claims that there is no evidence that he committed “rape by penetration.” Appellant's Br. p. 38. As such, he asserts that his actions do not justify a maximum sentence as they do not represent the “ ‘worst’ in the class of child molest offenses[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 38. In support of his claim, Shields cites to Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973–74 (Ind. 2002), in which the Indiana Supreme Court revised a defendant's maximum fifty-year sentence, finding that the defendant's actions had not fallen within the worst class of offenders when the defendant had not engaged in a “protracted episode of molestation but a one-time occurrence.” Unlike the situation in Buchanan, however, Shields did not engage in a single, one-time occurrence of child molestation, but rather a protracted episode of abuse. While Shields may not have physically brutalized Victim 1, he repeatedly molested her, violating her sense of trust in him and causing her to suffer prolonged mental anguish.

[42] As for his character, Shields argues that he had obtained a GED, had worked to support his dependents, and had only a minor criminal history. Shields does not explain why his obtaining his GED reflects positively on his character, and we are unconvinced of such. While Shields may have worked to support his dependents, such a factor does not reflect well on his character given the nature of his relationships with the Children. Shields had also threatened Victim 1, telling her that bad things would happen if she ever reported the abuse, which also reflects poorly on his character. See Hessler v. State, 213 N.E.3d 511, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (providing that the defendant's act of threatening his victims reflected poorly on his character), trans. denied. Furthermore, while Shields's criminal history may have been somewhat remote in time, “[e]ven a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Shields has failed to persuade us that his aggregate fifty-one-year sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez, 891 N.E.2d at 176.

[43] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Again, Shields's sentences for his other felony convictions were ordered to run concurrent to his conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting. He does not claim that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing any of these other sentences on appeal.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.