Kenosha Rowe, Appellant-Plaintiff v. A & M Beauty Supply & Grocery, Inc., Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Kenosha Rowe appeals the trial court's order setting aside a default judgment that had been entered in her favor against A & M Beauty Supply & Grocery (A & M). Though the parties address several issues on appeal, we find the following dispositive: Was the default judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction due to inadequate service of process?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On June 14, 2020, Rowe allegedly sustained personal injuries while patronizing a beauty store on Main Street in East Chicago, Indiana. Upon leaving the store, she was struck by the security gate used to secure the front entrance when the store was closed.

[4] Rowe filed a negligence complaint on May 26, 2022, against “Angel Beauty d/b/a Angel Beauty Beauty Supply and Unknown Owners of Angel Beauty d/b/a Angel Beauty Beauty Supply” (collectively, Angel Beauty), located at 3714 Main Street. Appendix at 16. On February 2, 2023, Rowe moved for default judgment against Angel Beauty, which the trial court granted with respect to liability the following day.

[5] Before the scheduled damages hearing, Ashraf Abdelrazzaq, the owner and registered agent of the beauty store at 3714 Main Street, learned of the complaint and immediately filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The motion indicated that the correct legal entity at that location was Beautiful Angel Two, Inc., not Angel Beauty, and that such entity was not even in existence at the time of the alleged injury.¹ Further, Rowe never served the complaint and summons on Abdelrazzaq; she simply sent a certified mailing to the store addressed to Angel Beauty without specifying the person who should receive the mailing.

[6] On May 22, 2023, the trial court set aside the default judgment. Beautiful Angel Two pursued summary judgment in July 2023 on the basis that it was not in existence and had no connection or control over the property located at 3714 Main Street at the time of the alleged injury. It also designated evidence that A & M, which had been in operation since 2018, had a store directly next door at 3712 Main Street. Rowe obtained an extension but then never responded to the summary judgment motion.

[7] On November 29, 2023, Rowe filed a motion to amend her complaint, noting that through discovery she had learned that the wrong defendant was named in the original complaint. She sought to amend the complaint to name A & M rather than Angel Beauty and to change the address where the alleged negligence occurred from 3714 to 3712 Main Street. The trial court permitted the amendment on January 29, 2024.

[8] Thereafter, Rowe sent a certified mailing of the amended complaint addressed generally to A & M, with no specific recipient identified. Rowe received the following return receipt:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

Id. at 84.

[9] Meanwhile, on February 1, Rowe also sent a certified mailing of the amended complaint to Mohammad Musa, A & M's president and registered agent,² at the address registered with the Indiana Secretary of State, which was an apartment in Crown Point, Indiana. This mailing was returned about a week later as undeliverable.

[10] Without making any other attempts to serve A & M,³ Rowe filed a motion for default judgment against A & M on March 15, 2024. The motion did not include a certificate of service. The trial court granted a default judgment against A & M on March 19, 2024,⁴ and set the matter for a damages hearing.

[11] The damages hearing was held on June 11 and 17, 2024. Having no notice of the action or hearing dates, A & M did not appear. At the conclusion of Rowe's presentation of evidence, the trial court entered a $400,000 judgment in her favor against A & M.

[12] Nearly a year later, on June 6, 2025, Rowe initiated proceedings supplemental to enforce the judgment. By this time, A & M had been administratively dissolved for about six months. Rowe thus pursued as garnishee defendants Musa and Abu Ross, Inc., another company incorporated by Musa. The trial court set the matter for hearing for August 21 and ordered the garnishee defendants to answer interrogatories.

[13] On August 20, 2025, A & M, Musa, and Abu Ross appeared by counsel and obtained a continuance of the hearing. Then on September 23, A & M filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, along with a supporting memorandum and Musa's affidavit. Musa averred, among other things, that A & M was administratively dissolved in December 2024 with no knowledge of Rowe's action for personal injuries against it. A & M argued in its memorandum that Rowe's action against it was barred by the statute of limitations and thus the default judgment was “void and/or voidable.” Id. at 116.

[14] Rowe responded to the motion to set aside by arguing that Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(6) only provides for relief from judgments that are void and that the expiration of the statute of limitations does not make a judgment void, only voidable. Thus, Rowe asked the trial court to deny the motion.

[15] In reply, on November 7, A & M reaffirmed its argument based on the statute of limitations, but A & M added that this was not its sole ground for relief. A & M detailed in its reply memorandum why the default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction due to insufficient service of process.

[16] On November 13, Rowe filed a motion to strike A & M's reply, arguing that it had raised a new ground for relief and citing Ind. Appellate Rule 46(C).⁵ Notably, at that time, Rowe did not seek leave, as she could have, to file a surreply to the new argument raised by A & M. See I-65 Plaza, LLC v. Ind. Grocery Grp., LLC, 167 N.E.3d 1161, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that trial court abused its discretion by striking defendants’ surreply, which provided a detailed response to “new evidence and arguments” raised in plaintiff's reply filed only minutes before the hearing). In response to the motion to strike, A & M argued that striking the reply would be improper and that, instead, Rowe should have filed a motion for leave to supplement her response together with her proposed response.

[17] Thereafter, on December 5, 2025, A & M requested a hearing on its motion to set aside the default judgment. On December 8, the trial court scheduled the hearing for January 15, 2026.

[18] Less than a week before the scheduled hearing, on the afternoon of January 9, a Friday, Rowe moved for a ninety-day continuance to allow her to depose A & M and the garnishee defendants. A & M objected to the motion as untimely and without good cause. On January 13, the court denied the continuance motion.

[19] A brief hearing on the motion to set aside was held as scheduled on January 15. At the hearing, Rowe proffered evidence – testimony from a private investigator and exhibits – for the purpose of establishing that Musa had moved from his apartment in Crown Point and no longer resided there when service was attempted by certified mail in February 2024. A & M objected to admission of such evidence on the basis of relevance. The trial court agreed with A & M and refused to consider the proffered evidence.

[20] During the argument portion of the hearing, Rowe requested that the court confine its evaluation to the statute of limitations ground asserted by A & M in the memorandum supporting its motion to set aside the default judgment. That is, she continued to ask the court to strike any new arguments asserted in A & M's reply. If the court was inclined to deny the motion to strike and to consider the issue of personal jurisdiction, however, Rowe requested an opportunity to file a surreply on that issue. A & M objected, noting that it had filed the reply on November 7, more than two months before the hearing, and that Rowe had ample opportunity to file a surreply prior to the hearing.

[21] The trial court took the matter under advisement and then, on January 21, 2026, issued an order setting aside the default judgment entered against A & M. The trial court explained that A & M had a meritorious defense based on the statute of limitations, with issues of tolling of the statute of limitations and relation back of the amended complaint to be addressed at a future hearing on the merits. In any event, the court determined that the default judgment was void due to improper service of process upon A & M.

[22] Rowe now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion & Decision

[23] A trial court's decision whether to set aside a default judgment is generally given substantial deference on appeal. Huntington Nat. Bank v. Car-X Assoc. Corp., 39 N.E.3d 652, 655 (Ind. 2015). Where a judgment is void, however, a trial court has no discretion and must grant a motion based on T.R. 60(B)(6). Anderson v. Wayne Post 64, 4 N.E.3d 1200, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[24] “A judgment issued without personal jurisdiction is void, and a court has no jurisdiction over a party unless that party receives notice of the proceeding.” Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barabas, 975 N.E.2d 805, 816 (Ind. 2012). As personal jurisdiction is a question of law, we do not defer to a trial court's legal conclusion in this regard. Anderson, 4 N.E.3d at 1205. That said, if the determination regarding personal jurisdiction turns on disputed facts, the trial court's findings in this regard are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 1205-06.

[25] The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a party to provide notice “reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Anderson, 4 N.E.3d at 1206. In Indiana, whether a judgment is void turns on whether the defendant was served with process effective for that purpose under our trial rules. See Anderson, 4 N.E.3d at 1206.

[26] Indiana Trial Rule 4.6 ⁶ provides in relevant part:

(A) Persons to be Served. Service upon an organization may be made as follows:

(1) In the case of a domestic or foreign organization upon an executive officer thereof, or if there is an agent appointed or deemed by law to have been appointed to receive service, then upon such agent.

* * *

(B) Manner of Service. Service under subdivision (A) must be made on the proper person in the manner provided by these rules for service upon individuals ․.

(C) Service at Organization's Office. When shown upon an affidavit or in the return, that service upon an organization cannot be made as provided in subdivision (A) or (B) of this rule, service may be made by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at any office of such organization located within this state with the person in charge of such office.

[27] In turn, Ind. Trial Rule 4.1 addresses service on individuals and permits service by, as relevant here, “sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail ․ to his residence, place of business or employment with return receipt requested and return showing receipt of the letter.” T.R. 4.1(A)(1).

[28] The undisputed evidence reveals that Rowe unsuccessfully attempted to serve Musa at the address listed for him with the Secretary of State.⁷ Regardless of whether Musa had moved from that location or whether Rowe failed to address the certified mailing to Musa expressly in his capacity as registered agent for A & M, the fact remains that the attempted service failed. The certified mailing was returned to Rowe on February 9, 2024, marked as undeliverable.

[29] Rowe took no steps after that date to serve A & M's registered agent. That is, she did not, as provided in T.R. 4.6(C), “leav[e] a copy of the summons and complaint at any office of such organization located within this state with the person in charge of such office.” We recognize that Rowe sent a certified mailing to A & M's store at the beginning of February, but such was not mailed to Musa's or any other person's attention, and it did not reach Musa. T.R. 4.6(B) expressly requires service to be made on the proper person; service addressed only to the organization is inadequate where it does not reach the proper person. See Volunteers of Am. v. Premier Auto Acceptance Corp., 755 N.E.2d 656, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that service to organization was ineffective because certified mailing was not addressed to the registered agent or an executive officer and no executive or registered agent for the organization ever became aware of the garnishment proceeding before a default judgment was entered); cf. Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (observing that Ind. Trial Rule 4.15(F) excuses minor, technical defects in the method of service where actual service has been accomplished and holding that although addressed to the company, and not to any specific individual or title, service was sufficient because the summons and complaint were delivered directly to a director of the defunct company at his residence, and the director acknowledged receipt of them).

[30] Because service of process was inadequate, the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over A & M to enter the default judgment, making it void. The trial court properly set aside the default judgment on this basis.⁸

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Beautiful Angel Two was created in November 2020 and did not open its storefront until June 2021.

2.   The mailing was addressed only to Musa, with no reference to A & M.

3.   We note that A & M's articles of incorporation, which were filed with the Secretary of State in June 2018, listed an email to use for service of process. There is no indication in the record that Rowe sent any filings to A & M by electronic means.

4.   The day prior, Angel Beauty was dismissed from the action with prejudice.

5.   This appellate rule provides that no new issues shall be raised in an appellant's reply brief. This rule has no application to trial court filings.

6.   The rule was amended effective December 31, 2025, shortly after the default judgment was entered against A & M, but the portions that we quote here remained unchanged.

7.   The trial court incorrectly indicated in its order setting aside the default judgment that service was “not even attempted” upon Musa at this address. Appendix at 152.

8.   Rowe claims that the trial court prohibited her from being heard on the issue of whether service was sufficient. On the contrary, she had ample opportunity to be heard at the hearing, and she could have filed a surreply in the two months before the hearing after being put on notice that this was an issue. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rowe's belated request for a continuance or to file a surreply. Further, the evidence she proffered at the hearing would not have helped her case. It was irrelevant because, even assuming Musa moved and did not update his address with the Secretary of State, Rowe still had an obligation to provide adequate service upon return of the certified mailing as undeliverable. See Munster, 829 N.E.2d at 59 (“Unclaimed service is insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the defendant received adequate notice and to confer personal jurisdiction.”).

Altice, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.