Timothy D. Weinley, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Timothy D. Weinley appeals the finding that he is an habitual offender. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 14, 2018, the State charged Weinley under cause number 35C01-1809-F3-225 (“Cause No. 225”) with: Count I, rape as a level 3 felony; Count II, rape as a level 3 felony; Count III, rape as a level 3 felony; Count IV, rape as a level 3 felony ¹ ; and Count V, intimidation as a level 6 felony. The State also alleged that Weinley was an habitual offender. On May 13, 2019, the State filed an amended information with respect to the habitual offender allegation. It alleged that Weinley had accumulated at least three prior unrelated felony convictions including: (1) possession of methamphetamine as a level 6 felony under cause number 35D01-1712-F6-291 (“Cause No. 291”) in 2018; (2) intimidation as a level 6 felony under cause number 35D01-1705-F6-105 (“Cause No. 105”) in 2017; (3) possession of marijuana as a class D felony under cause number 35D01-0704-FD-74 (“Cause No. 74”) in 2007; and (4) battery by bodily waste as a class D felony under cause number 35D01-0205-FD-121 (“Cause No. 121”) in 2002.

[3] In September 2019, the court held a jury trial. The jury found Weinley not guilty of Counts I, II, and III, and guilty of Counts IV and V. Weinley then pled guilty to being an habitual offender. On October 15, 2019, the court sentenced Weinley to fifteen years for Count IV and enhanced the sentence by fifteen years based on his habitual offender status. It also sentenced Weinley to a concurrent sentence of two years for Count V.

[4] On direct appeal, Weinley argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for Counts IV and V, the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him, and his sentence was inappropriate, and this Court affirmed. Weinley v. State, No. 19A-CR-2442, 2021 WL 1884614, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. May 11, 2021), trans. denied. On October 16, 2025, the court entered an Order Granting Post-Conviction Relief under cause number 35C01-2203-PC-6. The court found that fundamental error occurred when Weinley did not personally waive his right to a jury trial during the habitual offender phase of the trial proceedings and found that Weinley was entitled to post-conviction relief.

[5] On October 23, 2025, the State filed a Motion for Retrial of the Habitual Offender Enhancement under Cause No. 225, and the court granted the motion. On April 23, 2026, the court held a jury trial on the issue of whether Weinley was an habitual offender. The State presented the testimony of multiple law enforcement officers, and the court admitted multiple documents relating to Weinley's prior convictions including sentencing orders in Cause Nos. 291, 105, 74, and 121. The jury found Weinley to be an habitual offender. The court enhanced the sentence for Count IV by fifteen years for his status as an habitual offender.

Discussion

[6] Weinley phrases the issue as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the determination that he is an habitual offender. He concedes that he has four prior unrelated convictions. He also acknowledges that it would appear that the first two convictions alleged in the State's habitual offender information “would be less than 10 years old from the date of the offenses in the present matter,” but argues that his third and fourth convictions alleged by the State “are older than 10 years from the alleged date of his offenses” and “cannot be used to justify a determination that he is” an habitual offender because “he believes that all of the enum[e]rated past convictions” should be less than ten years old.² Appellant's Brief at 19-20.

[7] In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we will affirm unless, considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment, and neither reweighing the evidence nor judging the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude that no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Tyson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 715, 717-718 (Ind. 2002). To the extent resolution of this issue requires that we interpret Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8, we note that in construing statutes, our primary goal is to determine the legislature's intent. D.P. v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1210, 1216 (Ind. 2020). “[T]o ascertain that intent, we must first look to the statutes’ language.” Id. “If the language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning and cannot resort to judicial construction.” Id.

[8] Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(d) provides:

A person convicted of a felony offense is a habitual offender if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that:

(1) the person has been convicted of three (3) prior unrelated felonies; and

(2) if the person is alleged to have committed a prior unrelated:

(A) Level 5 felony;

(B) Level 6 felony;

(C) Class C felony; or

(D) Class D felony;

not more than ten (10) years have elapsed between the time the person was released from imprisonment, probation, or parole (whichever is latest) for at least one (1) of the three (3) prior unrelated felonies and the time the person committed the current offense.

[9] With respect to Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(d)(1), Weinley concedes that he has four unrelated convictions and makes no argument that his prior convictions do not meet the requirement under subsection (d)(1). As for subsection (d)(2), the State alleged that Weinley had two level 6 felonies and two class D felonies, and the plain language of subsection (d)(2) requires that “not more than ten (10) years have elapsed between the time the person was released from imprisonment, probation, or parole (whichever is latest) for at least one (1) of the three (3) prior unrelated felonies and the time the person committed the current offense.” (Emphasis added). The State alleged that Weinley's prior convictions include possession of methamphetamine as a level 6 felony, which was committed in November 2017 and for which he was sentenced in March 2018, and intimidation as a level 6 felony, which was committed in May 2017 and for which he was sentenced in July 2017. Thus, each of these two prior convictions meets the requirement under subsection (d)(2) that “not more than ten (10) years have elapsed between the time the person was released from imprisonment, probation, or parole (whichever is latest)” and the time Weinley committed the current offense in 2018. We conclude that the State presented evidence of probative value from which the jury could have found Weinley to be an habitual offender beyond a reasonable doubt.

[10] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Count IV alleged that, “[o]n or between June 18, 2018 and July 3, 2018, ․ [Weinley] knowingly caused another person, to-wit: D.M.H., to submit to other sexual conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5), when D.M.H. was compelled by force or imminent threat of force.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 54.

2.   In his brief, Weinley notes, “This Counsel is bringing forth this issue on appeal pursuant to Weinley's instructions to do so.” Appellant's Brief at 18 n.6.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur