IN RE: the Paternity of T.W.T.-B. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Samantha Tarkington (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order modifying legal custody, physical custody, and parenting time in favor of James Ball (“Father”). Mother presents the following consolidated and restated issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in identifying a substantial change in circumstances supporting modification; and

II. Whether the trial court adequately explained its deviation from the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (“the Guidelines”).

[2] We affirm the modification of legal and physical custody but remand for the trial court to either enter a written explanation for its deviation from the Guidelines or award Mother the Guidelines’ minimum parenting time.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother and Father met in 2017 and began a romantic relationship. In 2019, they met with Dr. Alan Childs (“Dr. Childs”), a clinical psychologist, and participated in couples counseling. As part of that process, Dr. Childs evaluated Mother and diagnosed her with adjustment disorder with anxiety, borderline personality disorder, and conversion disorder. Dr. Childs did not disclose the results of that evaluation to Father, and the counseling sessions did not address the diagnoses. Father nonetheless suspected that Mother suffered from mental-health issues.

[4] T.W.T.-B. (“Child”) was born in September 2020. The following month, Mother petitioned to establish paternity, which led to an agreed decree of paternity. In May 2021, Mother and Father stipulated to an order granting Mother sole legal and physical custody of Child, and Father declined any formal parenting time. In August 2023, Father petitioned to modify parenting time. The parties resolved the matter through a mediated agreement, which the trial court approved in September 2023 (“the September 2023 Agreement”). Under that order—which modified parenting time only—Father was to have parenting time with Child on Sundays from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. for six months, and thereafter, parenting time consistent with the Guidelines.

[5] On November 21, 2023, Father filed a Verified Petition for Modification of Custody and Parenting Time and Motion for Expedited Rule to Show Cause, alleging that Mother was denying him parenting time and that her behavior had become increasingly erratic since September 2023. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on December 18, 2023; Mother did not appear, and Father appeared with counsel and presented testimony. The next day, the trial court entered an order finding that Mother had willfully violated the September 2023 parenting-time order and that she suffered from significant, unaddressed mental-health issues that at times produced erratic behavior in Child's presence. The court further found that Mother had “interfer[ed] with the Father-[C]hild relationship and den[ied] the benefit thereof to [Child] against his best interests.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 57. The court stated: “Effective as of the date of this Order, Father shall have sole legal and physical custody of [Child].” Id. at 58. The court further stated: “Given the modification of custody herein, Father's child support obligation shall abate as of December 21, 2023.” Id. at 59. The court directed that “[C]hild shall be exchanged to Father's custody by 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2023,” and that Mother's parenting time thereafter “shall be supervised by Family House” in Valparaiso “for a minimum of 3-4 hours per week.” Id. at 58.

[6] The court indicated that its order was provisional, as it set a status hearing for April 10, 2024, and ordered that Father and Mother participate in psychological evaluations. Mother filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied on March 14, 2024, while affirming the date and time of the status hearing. The next day, Mother was evicted from her residence. The property manager, Sabine Miller (“Property Manager”), entered the home shortly afterward—by which time Child was no longer living there—and observed empty alcohol bottles inside and on the patio, a cat left behind without a litter box, and what appeared to be human feces and urine in a basement shower.

[7] The trial court later appointed a guardian ad litem (“the GAL”) and, on July 30, 2024, granted the GAL's request that Mother undergo the psychological evaluation. Mother began that evaluation with Dr. Childs in September 2024, but it was not completed until February 2025. According to Dr. Childs, Mother's failure to participate in drug screening caused some of the delay. Mother told him that she “wasn't ready to do that” and that she “had difficulty financially as well.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. Dr. Childs also noted that Mother exhibited “some erratic behaviors” during the evaluation period. Id. The 2025 evaluation yielded diagnoses of alcohol-induced anxiety disorder with moderate or severe use disorder; moderate alcohol use disorder; adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct; other specified personality disorder with mixed borderline, narcissistic, schizotypal, and paranoid features; and a parent-child relational problem. Dr. Childs opined that these conditions, if left untreated, could negatively affect Child due to “potential dysregulation, inconsistency, and instability” with exposure to “erratic changes and emotional disturbances.” Id. at 21. He recommended cognitive-behavioral therapy, substance-abuse therapy, psychiatric consultation, group therapy, and ongoing support through a program like AA or NA.

[8] In April 2025, when Child was approximately four and a half years old, he regressed in toilet training, demonstrated difficulty with redirection, and engaged in sexually inappropriate play. He began therapy with Cynthia Bridgman (“Therapist”), who diagnosed Child with adjustment disorder with disturbance of conduct and emotions. Therapist reported that Child often presented with increased anxiety after parenting time with Mother. Therapist also noted that Mother had been dismissive of her parenting recommendations, “quickly stat[ing] that she already knows about those things and she already does those things.” Id. at 54.

[9] With the ordered evaluation complete and Mother's condition stabilizing in early 2025, the GAL recommended unsupervised parenting time. The trial court set the matter for a final hearing on November 4, 2025. Meanwhile, on August 27, 2025, the parties entered into a temporary mediated settlement agreement, which the court approved the same day pending the final hearing. The agreement lifted supervision and gave Mother unsupervised parenting time on alternating weekends, from Friday school pickup until Sunday evening. The parties would share holidays under the Guidelines, and Mother would have telephonic parenting time on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays of Father's weekends.

[10] Ahead of the final hearing, the GAL filed a report in which she recommended equal parenting time. The GAL wrote that Mother's mental health appeared to be stable, that there were no major concerns during recent unsupervised parenting time, and that Mother had completed a group substance-abuse program in which she submitted clean weekly screens.

[11] The trial court held the final hearing on November 4, 2025, which included testimony from Father, Mother, the GAL, Dr. Childs, Therapist, and Property Manager. Id. at 4 (noting that it was holding a “final hearing on Father's Petition to Modify Custody, Parenting Time[,] and Rule to Show Cause”). The trial court took the matter under advisement and, on December 4, 2025, entered a written order with findings and conclusions. The order granted Father primary physical custody and made permanent the temporary order's parenting-time provisions. But the order did not make clear whether the court had resolved the request to modify legal custody. Mother appealed.

[12] While retaining jurisdiction, we remanded for the trial court to clarify its order on legal custody. The court issued an amended order on July 30, 2026, which this Court docketed on August 4, 2026. The amended order clarified that the court awarded Father sole legal custody. In pertinent part, the court found a substantial change in circumstances related to Mother's worsened mental health, noting that “[Mother's] instability manifested itself through her behavior throughout the course of these proceedings until January of 2025.” Am. Order on Final Hr'g of Nov. 4, 2025, at 3. The court referred to Property Manager's testimony about the condition of the residence Mother vacated and to evidence that “Mother would exhibit erratic behavior” during interactions with Dr. Childs. Id. at 2. It also referred to Dr. Childs's testimony indicating that (1) Mother's diagnoses “lead[ ] to Mother utilizing alcohol as a way to self-medicate, emotional mood fluctuations, and erratic and impulsive behavior”; and (2) “Mother would require close monitoring of sobriety and stabilization to ensure that she is able to regulate her emotions as Mother's diagnosis can impact the ability to parent a child without treatment.” Id.

[13] As to legal custody, the court found that Mother and Father “are unable to communicate and cooperate effectively,” noting that “Mother will often respond to Father's messages regarding [Child] with profanity and discussions regarding her own sexual activity.” Id. at 4. The court observed that Child has a “close and beneficial relationship with both parents, but experiences some level of anxiety after [parenting time] with Mother.” Id. The court found “that it is in the best interest of [Child] that Father is awarded sole legal custody.” Id. Following entry of the clarified order, we resumed our consideration of the appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Mother challenges the modification of legal and physical custody and contends the trial court erred by awarding her less than the Guidelines’ minimum parenting time without explaining its decision. While we affirm the modification of child custody, we remand for the trial court to address the parenting-time issue.

I. Custody Modification

[15] The trial court modified legal and physical custody after finding a substantial change in circumstances in Mother's mental health and concluding that modification served Child's best interests. Mother does not challenge the best-interests determination. She instead challenges the substantial-change finding on two fronts. First, Mother contends that a statute barred the trial court from hearing evidence of her mental health. Second, she contends that even if the court properly heard the evidence, it was insufficient to establish a substantial change warranting a custody modification. We address each in turn, along with Mother's request that we revisit Dwyer v. Wynkoop, 684 N.E.2d 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), to the extent the case permits a court to treat a previously existing condition as a substantial change.

[16] We review a custody modification for an abuse of discretion, mindful of the “well-established preference in Indiana ‘for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.’ ” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 178 (Ind. 1993)). Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard: we consider first whether the evidence supports the findings, and second whether the findings support the judgment. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123. We will not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). A finding is clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts or inferences to support it. Shao v. Li, 276 N.E.3d 89, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment, and we neither reweigh evidence nor reassess witness credibility. Payes v. Rivas, 270 N.E.3d 1, 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). It is not enough that the evidence might support a different conclusion; it “must positively require the conclusion contended for by [the] appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 210 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 1965)).

[17] A trial court may not modify a child-custody order unless modification is in the child's best interests and a substantial change has occurred in one or more of the statutory factors. Ind. Code § 31-14-13-6. The statutory factors include “[t]he mental and physical health of all individuals involved ․” I.C. § 31-14-13-2(6). Courts assess whether a change is substantial by considering the child's environment and the change's effect on the child; a change “slight or inconsequential in one case” may be “catastrophic in another.” Sanford v. Wilburn, 185 N.E.3d 451, 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Poret v. Martin, 434 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ind. 1982)).¹

A. Mental Health Evidence

[18] Mother argues that Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21(c) prohibited Father from offering evidence of her mental health. That statute, however, belongs to the dissolution chapter and does not govern this paternity action. In any case, the governing paternity chapter contains a materially identical bar: in a custody-modification proceeding, the court “may not hear evidence on a matter occurring before the last custody proceeding between the parties unless the matter relates to a change in the factors relating to the best interests of the child” described in section 2 and, if applicable, section 2.5. I.C. § 31-14-13-9 (emphasis added). The exception is dispositive here. One enumerated factor is “[t]he mental and physical health of all individuals involved,” and Father offered the mental-health evidence precisely to show a change in that factor. I.C. §§ 31-14-13-2(6) & 31-14-13-6. Because that evidence bears on whether Mother's mental health had changed, it falls squarely within that exception. The statute did not bar the mental-health evidence.

[19] Furthermore, Mother's insistence that Father knew of her 2019 diagnosis before entering into the September 2023 Agreement does not alter this conclusion. The statutory exception turns on whether the offered evidence relates to a change in a best-interests factor, not on what the opposing party privately suspected. Mother's knowledge-based argument instead targets language in Dwyer related to the statutory bar on certain evidence, which we address below. Because the statute's plain terms permitted the evidence, the trial court did not err in considering it.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[20] Mother next contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish a substantial change in circumstances relating to her mental health. Her sufficiency challenge targets the trial court's finding that Father was “unaware of Mother's diagnosis at the time he entered into the [September 2023 Agreement]” while Mother had been “aware of her mental health issues and diagnosis since at least 2019 ․” Am. Order on Final Hr'g of Nov. 4, 2025, at 3, 4. The record supports the finding. Father testified that although he suspected Mother had mental health struggles, he had nothing to confirm them, and the 2019 evaluation was not provided to him or the trial court until the current proceedings. Under our deferential standard, there was sufficient evidentiary support for the finding. Moreover, Mother does not challenge the finding that “her instability manifested itself through her behavior throughout the course of these proceedings until January of 2025.” Id. at 3.

[21] The evidence most favorable to the judgment establishes that, following the May 2021 custody order, Mother's condition deteriorated. Her 2025 evaluation revealed a worsened alcohol use disorder and newly identified personality disorder features—mixed borderline, narcissistic, schizotypal, and paranoid. Dr. Childs opined that these features, if left untreated, could negatively affect Child and would require close monitoring of Mother's sobriety and stabilization. The condition of Mother's vacated residence—alcohol bottles throughout, an abandoned cat, and apparent human waste in the basement shower—is probative of destabilization.

[22] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Mother argues that the trial court could not rely on any evidence predating the September 2023 Agreement, and she asks us to overrule Dwyer to the extent it allows a court to treat a previously existing condition as a substantial change. Relatedly, she contends that, because Father entered the September 2023 Agreement with knowledge of her condition, he waived any later reliance on it and that principles of merger bar its relitigation. We need not reach Mother's arguments regarding evidence of circumstances prior to September 2023. Confined to developments between that date and the final hearing on November 4, 2025, the substantial-change determination has been met. Because the modification does not rest on evidence predating September 2023, we do not further address Mother's contentions.

II. Parenting Time

[23] Mother contends the trial court erred by awarding her less parenting time than the Guidelines prescribe without providing an explanation. We review parenting-time decisions for an abuse of discretion, neither reweighing the evidence nor judging witness credibility. Hurst v. Smith, 192 N.E.3d 233, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when it misinterprets the law. Id.

[24] A trial court's “primary consideration” in parenting-time matters is the child's best interests. Id. Because this is a paternity action, the governing provision is Indiana Code section 31-14-14-1(a), which entitles a noncustodial parent to “reasonable parenting time” unless the court finds, after a hearing, that the parenting time might “endanger the child's physical health and well-being” or “significantly impair the child's emotional development.” Courts presume the Guidelines apply in all child-custody cases, and they “represent the minimum time a parent should have to maintain frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with a child.” Guidelines Preamble.

[25] A deviation that results in less parenting time than the minimum set forth in the Guidelines “must be accompanied by a written explanation indicating why the deviation is necessary or appropriate in the case.” Id. at Preamble (C)(3). The written explanation “must state the reason(s) for the deviation,” though it “need not be as formal as Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ․” Id. at Preamble (C)(3) cmt. That requirement is not a formality. Because the Guidelines require a written explanation, the trial court must reflect on the parenting-time decision, and the writing enables this court to adequately review the deviation and the reasons behind it. B.L. v. J.S., 59 N.E.3d 253, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.

[26] The trial court addressed parenting time in paragraph 8 of the amended order, stating: “Mother shall be entitled to exercise parenting time with the minor child consistent with the Temporary Parenting Time Order of August 27, 2025[,] and said order is affirmed and made permanent.” Am. Order on Final Hr'g of Nov. 4, 2025, at 4. The incorporated order gave Mother parenting time on alternating weekends, from Friday school pickup until Sunday evening; provided that holidays would be shared under the Guidelines; and granted Mother telephonic parenting time on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays of Father's weekends. The parties agree that the arrangement falls below the Guidelines’ presumptive minimum.

[27] The parties dispute how to characterize the parenting-time order. Mother contends the trial court restricted her parenting time, so that the court had to enter a statutory finding that the parenting time would endanger Child's physical health and well-being or significantly impair his emotional development. Father contends that the order deviated from the Guidelines but did not restrict Mother's parenting time, so that the Guidelines required only a written explanation. The distinction matters, because each triggers a different requirement.

[28] We agree with Father that the order is a deviation, not a restriction resulting in unreasonable parenting time under Indiana Code section 31-14-14-1(a). An order eliminating overnights or requiring supervised parenting time is such a restriction. See Stafford v. Stafford, 256 N.E.3d 595, 599–600 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025); Roper v. Roper, 223 N.E.3d 732, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). This order afforded Mother unsupervised, overnight parenting time every other weekend with provisions for regular telephone calls with Child during Father's parenting time. Because the order did not curtail parenting time unreasonably, we review it as a deviation requiring a written explanation.

[29] That explanation is missing. Neither the final order nor the temporary order it incorporated acknowledges the deviation. Father argues that, when read as a whole, the order supplies the trial court's rationale. He identifies several findings that provide that rationale—among them, the condition of Mother's former residence; Dr. Childs's testimony that a lack of consistency in Mother's treatment could negatively affect her relationship with Child and that Mother would require close monitoring to regulate her emotions; Child's toilet-training regression and inappropriate behaviors; Child's increased anxiety after parenting time with Mother; and the court's reference to testimony that a shared parenting-time plan would be “difficult for [Child] as a significant amount of travel time would be required.” Am. Order on Final Hr'g of Nov. 4, 2025, at 3. But the Guidelines call for a written explanation directed at the deviation itself. Even considered together, the findings Father has identified support the trial court's custody and best-interests determinations; the court did not tie these findings to the decision to award Mother less parenting time than the minimum under the Guidelines. Moreover, none identifies the arrangement as a deviation or explains why less parenting time is necessary or appropriate. A court does not satisfy the requirement by leaving the reviewing court to infer the explanation from findings made for other purposes.

[30] Because the parenting-time order does not explain the reasons for the deviation the trial court imposed—whether in the order itself or in the incorporated temporary order—it does not satisfy the Guidelines. We therefore remand for the trial court to either enter a written explanation for its deviation from the Guidelines or award Mother the Guidelines’ minimum parenting time. See Hurst, 192 N.E.3d at 246 (remanding where there was no explanation for a deviation from the minimum).

Conclusion

[31] We affirm the trial court's modification of legal and physical custody. As to parenting time, because the court did not explain its deviation from the Guidelines, we remand with instructions to either enter a written explanation for the deviation or award Mother the Guidelines’ minimum parenting time.

[32] Affirmed in part and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In a paternity context, custody issues are determined under Indiana Code sections 31-14-13-2 and 31-14-13-6 whereas, in a dissolution-of-marriage context, custody issues are determined under Indiana Code sections 31-17-2-8 and 31-17-2-21. E.g., In re Paternity of K.J.L., 725 N.E.2d 155, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Because the provisions are substantially the same for our present purposes, we draw on caselaw from both contexts.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.