Agra-Trailers, Inc., Appellant-Defendant v. Robert P. Wining, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Robert P. Wining purchased a used truck from Agra-Trailers, Inc. (“Agra”), that did not function as promised when it was delivered. Wining filed a four-count complaint against Agra requesting $12,000 in compensatory damages plus unquantified punitive damages and attorney's fees. Agra did not respond to the complaint. Wining filed a motion for default judgment. Agra did not appear at the hearing on the motion, which the trial court granted. After a damages hearing, at which Agra again did not appear, the court entered judgment in favor of Wining for over $57,000. Agra filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8), asserting that Indiana Trial Rule 54(C) limited Wining's recovery to $12,000 and that Agra had a meritorious defense to Wining's claims. The trial court denied Agra's motion.

[2] On appeal, Agra argues that the trial court's ruling is erroneous. Wining requests an award of appellate attorney's fees. We affirm the trial court's ruling and deny Wining's request for fees.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The relevant facts are undisputed. In July 2024, Wining purchased a used truck (“the Truck”) from Agra for $35,000. The Truck was delivered in August 2024. “Upon attempting to drive the Truck home from the delivery location, the Truck failed to make it even one half of a mile before the engine emitted a large cloud of smoke and then the engine died.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 18 (Complaint, ¶6).

[4] In October, Wining filed a complaint against Agra alleging four counts: fraud, breach of contract, and two claims for breach of implied warranty. The fraud claim reads in pertinent part as follows:

16. Prior to selling the Truck, Agra repeatedly assured Wining that the Truck was in good condition and met all of Wining's requirements.

17. The Truck was not, in fact, in good condition and had serious defects, including a defective engine, exhaust system, catalytic converter, throttle, and more that had to be replaced by Wining.

18. Agra had also assured Wining that the Truck's boom was certified. However, upon speaking with the manufacturer, Wining discovered that the boom had not been certified since 2019. The cost to certify is $1,200.00.

19. Agra knew the extremely poor condition of the Truck prior to selling it to Wining.

20. Agra sold the Truck to Wining, despite knowing that it was not in suitable condition to operate and was not suitable for Wining's purposes.

21. Agra therefore knowingly and intentionally materially misrepresented the condition of the Truck to Wining to induce Wining to purchase the Truck.

22. Wining reasonably relied on Agra's assertions that the Truck was in good condition.

23. Due to Agra's fraudulent misrepresentations, Wining has been damaged in the amount of $12,000.00, the amount spent attempting to repair the various Truck defects.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Robert P. Wining, by counsel, requests judgment be entered against Defendant, Agra-Trailers, Inc., in the amount of $12,000.00, plus an award of punitive damages pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-51-3-4, for reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Ind. Code § 26-1-2-721, and for all other just and proper relief.

Id. at 19-20. The other three counts also requested $12,000 in damages and “all other just and proper relief.” Id. at 20, 22, 23.

[5] Agra did not file an appearance or an answer. In December, Wining filed a motion for default judgment. In February 2025, after a hearing at which Agra failed to appear, the trial court granted Wining's motion and set a damages hearing for March 18. Agra failed to appear at that hearing as well. Wining gave sworn testimony and submitted three exhibits in support of his claims. After the hearing, the court ordered Wining “to submit a proposed order with itemized damages calculations[.]” Id. at 61. On March 20, the court entered judgment in favor of Wining and against Agra “in the amount of $57,058.62, which consists of the principal in the amount of $13,253.28, punitive damages in the amount of $39,759.84, and attorney fees in the amount of $4,045.50, plus court costs, no part of which has been paid[.]” Id. at 62.

[6] On December 15, counsel entered an appearance for Agra. In January 2026, Agra filed a motion for relief from judgment, which asserted in pertinent part that relief was warranted under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) because Trial Rule 54(C) limited Wining's recovery to $12,000. In February, Wining filed a response to Agra's motion. In March, after a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying Agra's motion. Agra now appeals, and Wining requests an award of appellate attorney's fees.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Motion for Relief from Judgment

[7] Agra contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for relief from judgment. “The propriety of relief under Trial Rule 60(B) is a matter entrusted to the trial court's equitable discretion.” Fish v. 2444 Acquisitions, LLC, 46 N.E.3d 1261, 1263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. “An abuse of that discretion may occur if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.” Id.

[8] Trial Rule 60(B) provides in pertinent part, “On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for the following reasons: ․ (8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).”¹ A Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion “shall be filed within a reasonable time[,]” and the movant “must allege a meritorious claim or defense.” Id.

[9] Our Supreme Court has explained that, “[f]or the purposes of Rule 60(B), a meritorious claim or defense is one that would lead to a different result if the case were tried on the merits.” State v. Collier, 61 N.E.3d 265, 268 (Ind. 2016) (citation modified). “This requires a showing that vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise.” Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 73 (Ind. 2006) (citation modified). Like its federal counterpart, Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) “merely requires a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense, that is, a showing that will prevail until contradicted and overcome by other evidence.” Id. (citation modified). “The movant need only present evidence that, if credited, demonstrates that a different result would be reached if the case were retried on the merits and that it is unjust to allow the judgment to stand.” Id. at 73-74 (citation modified).

[10] “Additionally, in order to be granted relief pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(8), the moving party must demonstrate some extraordinary or exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief.” Collier, 61 N.E.3d at 268 (citing Smith v. State, 38 N.E.3d 218, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), In re Adoption of T.L.W., 835 N.E.2d 598, 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), and WW Extended Care, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 755 N.E.2d 712, 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). Thus, in order to be granted relief, a Trial Rule 60(B)(8) movant “must show that: 1) he brought his claim within a reasonable time in light of the circumstances of the case; 2) extraordinary or exceptional circumstances justify that relief; and 3) he has alleged a meritorious claim or defense.” Id. at 269; see also T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 728 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Collier, 61 N.E.3d at 268) (“Additionally, our precedent requires the moving party to ‘demonstrate some extraordinary or exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief.’ ”).²

[11] The basis for Agra's Trial Rule 60(B)(8) claim is Trial Rule 54(C), which states,

A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.

Agra asserts that “the reason justifying relief” under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) is that Wining prayed for only $12,000 in his demand for judgment, and thus Trial Rule 54(C) precluded the court from awarding Wining anything exceeding that amount in its default judgment.

[12] We need not address this argument because we conclude that, regardless of its merits, Agra has failed to make a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense to Wining's fraud claim, which was the only claim that requested compensatory damages plus punitive damages and attorney's fees.³ This Court has stated,

To prove fraud, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) a material misrepresentation of past or existing fact which (2) was untrue, (3) was made with knowledge of or in reckless ignorance of its falsity, (4) was made with the intent to deceive, (5) was rightfully relied upon by the complaining party, and (6) which proximately caused the injury or damage of which the plaintiff complains.

Angel v. Powelson, 977 N.E.2d 434, 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[13] At the uncontested damages hearing, Wining testified that when he talked with an Agra employee about purchasing the Truck, the employee assured him that “the truck runs good.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 8. Wining further testified that after the Truck was purchased and delivered,

I start the truck up, it ran horribly. It made it about less than a tenth of [a] mile down the road, it started billowing blue smoke and completely died, um, so [the delivery driver] had to tow me up to my driveway with his semi. He and I called another friend of mine who is a mechanic came over and we looked at it. We found a couple things that weren't plugged in, um, but after everything was hooked up correctly, the truck was still billowing blue smoke.․ And had an engine knock.

Id. at 10-11. Finally, Wining testified that he had to have the Truck towed to another mechanic and “[e]nded up having to get a new rebuilt engine” and other replacement parts, all of which cost him over $13,000. Id. at 12-13.

[14] Wining's testimony is consistent with the foregoing allegations in his complaint, which track the essential elements of fraud.⁴ The only arguably relevant defense that Agra offers is that “fraud requires a false representation of existing material fact—not generalized commendations that a 19-year-old truck ‘ran well’ or was ‘in good condition.’ ” Appellant's Br. at 23. But Agra cites no authority for this proposition, so its argument is waived. Dotlich v. Dotlich, 475 N.E.2d 331, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).

[15] Because Agra has failed to establish a meritorious defense to Wining's fraud claim, we affirm the trial court's denial of Agra's motion for relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(8).⁵

Issue Two: Appellate Attorney's Fees

[16] As mentioned above, Wining requested and received attorney's fees pursuant to Indiana Code Section 26-1-2-721, which reads in pertinent part,

Remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available under this chapter for non-fraudulent breach. In all suits based on fraud or material misrepresentation, if the plaintiff recovers judgment in any amount, the plaintiff shall also be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees which shall be entered by the court trying the suit as part of the judgment in that suit.

Wining asserts that “Indiana courts have construed comparable statutes authorizing reasonable attorney fees to include fees incurred in successfully defending a judgment on appeal[,]” and he “respectfully requests that this Court remand the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of determining and adding to the judgment the reasonable attorney fees incurred in preparing this Appellee's Brief and otherwise responding to this appeal.” Appellee's Br. at 18-19 (citing Benge v. Miller, 855 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), and Heartland Res., Inc. v. Bedel, 903 N.E.2d 1004, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).

[17] But Wining does not even cite, let alone quote, the fee recovery statutes at issue in those cases, and thus he has failed to establish that they are sufficiently “comparable” to justify a fee award in this case. Therefore, we find Wining's argument waived. See Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (“We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf[.]”).

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Those sub-paragraphs address “(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) any ground for a motion to correct error ․; (3) fraud ․; [and] (4) entry of default or judgment by default was entered against such party who was served only by publication and who was without actual knowledge of the action and judgment, order or proceedings[.]” Ind. Trial Rule 60(B).

2.   Agra points out that Trial Rule 60(B)(8) does not contain the words “extraordinary” or “exceptional,” Reply Br. at 11, but it is well settled that “[w]e are bound by the pronouncements of our Supreme Court on questions of Indiana law.” Gresham v. State, 414 N.E.2d 313, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).

3.   Consequently, we need not address Agra's argument regarding its alleged meritorious defenses to Wining's remaining claims. To state the obvious, in a contested retrial on the merits, Wining's damages would not be limited by Trial Rule 54(C).

4.   Agra notes that the Truck was sold “as is,” but properly concedes that “an as-is clause does not insulate a seller from liability for fraudulent misrepresentation.” Appellant's Br. at 23 (citing Fimbel v. DeClark, 695 N.E.2d 125, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied). Agra focuses on Wining's prepurchase queries and Agra's responses regarding whether the Truck would pass a California smog test and whether its boom was certified, but Wining's fraud claim is not limited to those issues.

5.   Accordingly, we need not address whether Agra filed its motion within a reasonable time or whether it demonstrated extraordinary or exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.