Aric D. Fulton, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] During Aric Fulton's birthday gathering, he viciously attacked Joseph Washington with an assortment of weapons over a period of several hours. Fulton was charged with and convicted of multiple crimes arising from this protracted episode, and the trial court sentenced him to 52 years of incarceration. Fulton now appeals, presenting three issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court erred by admitting and excluding certain evidence at trial.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 21, 2022, Fulton hosted a gathering at his Hammond, Indiana, residence to celebrate his birthday. Washington, who knew Fulton casually from work at a banquet hall, arrived “when it was just becoming night.” Tr. Vol. IV at 51. Washington was the first party guest, and Fulton gave him a tour of the home before they started playing pool. Sometime later, two of Fulton's former coworkers from Ford arrived at Fulton's home. Less than an hour later, Fulton “c[ame] out of nowhere like, ‘You all could get out.’ ” Id. at 8. The two former coworkers left, and Fulton locked the door behind them with a key and put the key into his pocket. When Washington told Fulton he was also leaving, Fulton accused him of taking the key. Washington denied taking Fulton's key, and Fulton “pull[ed] out a gun.” Id. at 10. Washington backed away from Fulton, telling Fulton that he saw Fulton put the key in his pocket and did not want any trouble. “[O]ut of nowhere, [Fulton] sho[t Washington].” Id. Washington's “whole leg went numb,” and he fell to the floor. Id.

[4] Once Washington was on the ground, Fulton stopped accusing him of taking the key and started asking “who sent” him while hitting Washington “multiple times in the head” with the handgun. Tr. Vol. IV at 12. Washington did not have the “energy” or “ability to ․ defend” himself while Fulton hit and began choking him. Id. Fulton “held [Washington] at gunpoint and made [him] take [his] clothes off.” Id. at 14. Fulton then used a “tow strap,” Tr. Vol. II at 220, and “tied [Washington's] hands behind [his] back ․ while he ․ questioned [Washington] on who sent [him], why did they sen[d him], why did [he] get sent?” Tr. Vol. IV at 15. Fulton pulled money out of Washington's pants and threw it down. Washington, clad in only his underwear, attempted to get off the floor and “throw [him]self through the window,” id. at 15–16, but Fulton caught him and started choking and beating Washington until Washington “lost consciousness,” id. at 16. When Washington came to, Fulton started beating him with a golf club. Fulton, referring to himself as the “black Jeffrey Dahmer,” then hogtied Washington with an extension cord before “drag[ging]” him to the back of the home and “throw[ing him] down a flight of stairs.” Id. at 17.

[5] From the basement, Washington made another attempt to escape, but Fulton caught him and choked him until he lost consciousness again. When Washington returned to consciousness, he was on the back porch “in a black bag,” and could hear Fulton saying he needed to “get rid of” Washington. Tr. Vol. IV at 18. Washington told Fulton that he would not call the police if Fulton let him go; Fulton agreed after taking a picture of Washington's identification and threatening to kill his family if he told anyone. Fulton loosened the restraints, had Washington walk out the back door in his underwear with a bag on his head, put Washington in the backseat of Washington's vehicle, and returned some of the money Fulton had taken. After Fulton closed the vehicle's door, Washington removed the bag from his head, moved to the front seat, and drove to his brother's house in Lansing, Illinois.

[6] Washington's brother called 911. When Lansing Police Department Officer Todd Yonker responded to the call, he observed that Washington was “bruised and bloodied” and had a gunshot wound in his left thigh. Tr. Vol. II at 219. Washington had a “tow strap and ․ an extension cord” wrapped around his right arm. Id. at 220. When asked “what happened,” Washington responded, “I didn't know where the keys are.” State's Ex. 1 at 01:43–01:50.

[7] Fulton learned that law enforcement was looking for him, so he called 911 to speak with them. When Fulton was transported to the local police station for questioning, he did not claim that Washington had attacked him; instead, he said “he should have waited another day [to call] so that way he could have his people come by the house and take care of things.” Tr. Vol. III at 45.

[8] Law enforcement officers searched Fulton's residence. Inside, officers found areas of discoloration on the carpet near the pool table, cleaning supplies on the floor, and red substances on the floor that appeared to be blood. Officers found a golf bag with covered golf clubs; the 7-iron, once uncovered, revealed blood on its head. The doorway leading to the basement stairs showed a large red smudge appearing to be blood, and there were red substances on the steps to the basement, against a post at the bottom of the stairs, and on a concrete wall in the basement. Officers found a $100 bill tucked under the couch in the living room. Both Fulton's and Washington's DNA were on the 7-iron, tow strap, and extension cord. The plastic bag recovered from Washington's vehicle contained hair and Washington's DNA on the inside of the bag.

[9] The State charged Fulton with several criminal counts, among them, attempted murder as a Level 1 felony, robbery as a Level 2 felony, and criminal confinement as a Level 3 felony. At trial, Fulton testified that (1) he acted in self-defense; (2) someone “must have planted” the 7-iron with Washington's blood on it in Fulton's golf bag, Tr. Vol. IV at 142; and (3) he put Washington “in the back of the car so it would be easy for him to get to the front seat,” id. at 150. The jury found Fulton guilty as charged. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered convictions only on attempted murder; robbery as a Level 5 felony, entered as a lesser-included offense of the Level 2 felony; and criminal confinement. The trial court sentenced Fulton to 52 years of incarceration. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Any Error in the Admission or Exclusion of Certain Evidence at Trial Was Harmless

[10] Fulton claims that the trial court erred in admitting and excluding certain evidence at trial. We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied. “[W]e may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858 (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)).

[11] Fulton specifically claims that the trial court abused its discretion by (a) imposing limits on his cross-examination of Washington, (b) imposing limits on his own testimony, and (c) allowing the State to ask him if he had been fired from his prior employment. We address each claim in turn.

a. Cross-Examination of Washington

[12] Fulton contends that the trial court violated his right to confrontation under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution by preventing him from questioning Washington about “why the fight went unreported.” Appellant's Br. at 13–14. At trial, before Washington testified, Fulton's attorney (“Defense Counsel”) requested to “be able to ask [Washington on cross-examination], ‘isn't it true that you told my client not to call the police?’ ” Tr. Vol. III at 193. Defense Counsel believed Washington was “probably going to say no,” id. at 196, and indicated he would “take whatever answer comes” and not ask “anything beyond that,” id. at 193. The trial court took the request under advisement and instructed Defense Counsel to revisit the request at the appropriate time.

[13] During his cross-examination of Washington, Defense Counsel renewed his request to ask Washington “if he asked my client not to call the police.” Tr. Vol. IV at 35. The State objected, arguing it was outside the bounds of direct examination. Defense Counsel argued in response that Fulton's defense was that Washington was the initial aggressor; thus, he should be permitted to ask Washington whether he requested that Fulton not call 911 to show that Washington had motive to lie during his testimony. The trial court ruled that Defense Counsel could not ask this question during the State's case-in-chief but could recall Washington in the defense case after Fulton testified. Defense Counsel responded: “I agree with Your Honor. I will approach it that way, and I won't ask it now.” Id. at 37. Defense Counsel did not excuse Washington from his subpoena after the State released him; however, Defense Counsel did not call Washington as a witness during the defense case.

[14] We do not need to address Fulton's constitutional contentions on this issue because he affirmatively agreed with the trial court's limitation on his questioning of Washington yet, on appeal, claims the trial court erred. “For a party to preserve a claim for review, we generally require that party to object to the trial court's ruling and to state the reasons for that objection.” Bradley v. State, 248 N.E.3d 563, 573 (Ind. 2024) (citing Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018)). On appeal, Fulton ignores his agreement with the trial court's limitation on his cross-examination of Washington. In Fulton's case-in-chief, he did not recall Washington to the witness stand to question him about not wanting Fulton to call the police. Fulton has waived this issue.

b. Limitation of Fulton's Testimony

[15] Fulton next argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution by preventing him from testifying about Washington's probationary status. Essentially, Fulton claims the trial court infringed on his right to present a complete defense. “Although an abuse-of-discretion standard typically applies to a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence, we engage in de novo review when an alleged ‘constitutional violation has resulted from the admission [or exclusion] of evidence.’ ” Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 452 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 2013)).

Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution specifically guarantees a criminal defendant's right to be heard by himself and counsel. This provision places a unique value upon the desire of an individual accused of a crime to speak out personally in the courtroom and state what in his mind constitutes a predicate for his innocence of the charges. Several provisions of the federal constitution, including the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, likewise protect a defendant's right to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense.

Harris v. State, 211 N.E.3d 929, 942 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, “these rights are subject to established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” Id. In other words, the “right to present a complete defense is not absolute.” Crossland v. State, 256 N.E.3d 517, 528 (Ind. 2025).

[16] At trial, Fulton requested to be able to testify that Washington asked him not to call 911 because Washington was on probation and did not want to get into trouble for fighting. This goes beyond the excluded testimony he sought to elicit from Washington during cross-examination, which was limited to whether Washington asked him not to call 911. The trial court sustained the State's objection to this testimony, and Fulton made an ongoing objection, arguing Washington's probationary status went to his motive to lie. Fulton then testified that he only hit and shot Washington in self-defense and that he was going to call the police until Washington told him not to call.

[17] Generally, relevant evidence is admissible at trial. Ind. Evidence Rule 402. Relevant evidence is that which “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and ․ the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Evid. R. 401. The trial court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Evid. R. 403.

[18] Here, Fulton was permitted to testify that Washington asked Fulton not to call 911 and that Washington was the initial aggressor—this enabled Fulton to show Washington's alleged motive to fabricate without getting into his criminal history. Assuming arguendo that Washington's probationary status was relevant, the probative value thereof was low, adding little to what was already offered; yet, the danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury was high, given the disconnect between Washington's probationary status and his alleged fabrication of events. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by excluding evidence of Washington's probationary status.

[19] Even if we were to credit Fulton's argument that the exclusion of Washington's probationary status was erroneous, we need not reverse because the constitutional error alleged “was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Crossland, 256 N.E.3d at 528 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). In analyzing whether an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the factors we consider are “[t]he importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case.” McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684).

[20] Washington's out-of-court statement about being on probation would not have created a reasonable doubt of Fulton's guilt. Fulton already testified that Washington was the initial aggressor and asked Fulton not to call 911, implying that Washington did not want to get into trouble for fighting. Simply adding Washington's probationary status adds virtually nothing to that other than letting the jury know that Washington had been convicted of a criminal offense and was on probation. The prejudice of leaving the jury with the impression that Washington had been convicted substantially outweighed its minimal relevance.

[21] The jury heard both Fulton's and Washington's versions of what happened and believed Washington's. We are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdicts would not have changed had the jury learned of Washington's probationary status given the overwhelming evidence supporting Fulton's guilt and Washington's version of events. The evidence shows that Washington was restrained by both a tow strap and extension cord and physically abused by Fulton over an extended period of time. When law enforcement officers first encountered Washington, he appeared to be in a state of shock, his hands were still shaking uncontrollably, and answered, “I didn't know where the keys are,” State's Ex. 1 at 01:43–01:50, when asked what happened. The bag, which Washington testified Fulton placed over his head to walk him out to his vehicle, contained hair and Washington's DNA on the inside. The stairs, which Washington testified Fulton threw him down, showed apparent blood smears consistent with his testimony. Washington's injuries were also consistent with his testimony.

[22] On the other hand, Fulton's version was unbelievable and not supported by the evidence. For instance, Fulton claims he swung his putter at Washington once and denied ever hitting Washington with his 7-iron; however, the 7-iron recovered from Fulton's residence contained Washington's blood on the head of it. Fulton's only response to this was that someone must have planted the evidence of Washington's blood on Fulton's 7-iron. Fulton denied covering Washington's head with a plastic bag to walk Washington to his vehicle and claimed he only “put him in the back of the car so it would be easy for him to get to the front seat.” Tr. Vol. IV at 150. The physical evidence conflicts with the former, and the explanation of the latter is devoid of any logical reasoning. For the foregoing reasons, any error in the exclusion of testimony regarding Washington's probation status was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

c. Questioning about Prior Employment

[23] Fulton claims the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that he had been fired from Ford, his former employer. During his direct testimony, Fulton testified that he told his former coworkers the night of his birthday gathering that he might return to work at Ford. On cross-examination, the State asked why he left Ford, and he replied, “Because I was fittin’ to get another job and the shift that they gave me, I wasn't able to do the things that I wanted to do. But I could have eas[il]y come back because I was in the union too.” Tr. Vol. IV at 113. During a hearing outside the jury's presence, the State requested to be able to ask Fulton whether he was fired from Ford for impeachment purposes. Fulton objected, arguing it was impermissible evidence of other wrongdoing pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). The trial court overruled Fulton's objection and permitted the State to ask Fulton whether he had been fired.

[THE STATE:] Isn't it true that you were fired from Ford?

[FULTON:] Really, I was under investigation—

[THE STATE:] It's a yes-or-no question.

[FULTON:] I was—

THE COURT: Sir, you just—you just have to answer yes or no.

[FULTON]: I can't say I was fired—

THE COURT: You cannot. Just yes or no, were you fired? [FULTON]: Yes, ma'am.

[THE STATE:] So you weren't going to go back if they were going to give you a raise? Yes or no?

[FULTON:] I could have went back.

[THE STATE:] Yes or no?

[FULTON:] No.

Id. at 116. On appeal, Fulton continues to argue this was impermissible character evidence pursuant to Evidence Rule 404(b), and the State continues to argue that the evidence was offered purely for impeachment purposes, falling outside of 404(b). Compare Appellant's Br. at 21–24, with Appellee's Br. at 21–22.

[24] Subject to certain exceptions, Evidence Rule 404(b) prohibits using “evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act ․ to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Evid. R. 404(b)(1). “Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) serves to safeguard the presumption of innocence in favor of criminal defendants. This restriction prevents the jury from indulging in the ‘forbidden inference’ that a criminal defendant's ‘prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.’ ” Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024, 1026–27 (Ind. 1999)), cert. denied. “[E]vidence which creates a mere inference of prior bad conduct does not fall within the purview of Evidence Rule 404(b).” Dixson v. State, 865 N.E.2d 704, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Allen v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1222, 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied), trans. denied.

[25] “Otherwise inadmissible evidence may be admitted where the defendant opens the door to questioning on that evidence. The door may be opened when the trier of fact has been left with a false or misleading impression of the facts.” Griffith v. State, 259 N.E.3d 1025, 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 130 (Ind. 2009)). “When that happens, the State may introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence if it is a fair response to evidence elicited by the defendant.” Id. (quoting Wilder v. State, 91 N.E.3d 1016, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). “This includes evidence otherwise constitutionally prohibited or barred by the Rules of Evidence.” Id. (citing Cameron v. State, 22 N.E.3d 588, 592–93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); F.W.C. v. State, 821 N.E.2d 907, 911–12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

[26] Here, Fulton testified on his direct examination that he could return to work at Ford. This opened the door to the State being permitted to question Fulton about the nature of his separation from Ford. See Pearish v. State, 264 Ind. 339, 345, 344 N.E.2d 296, 299 (1976) (holding that if an individual mentions his military service during direct examination, he may be questioned regarding the nature of his discharge on cross-examination). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence.

Conclusion

[27] In sum, Fulton has waived his argument that the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of Washington, any error in excluding Fulton's testimony about Washington's probationary status was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that Fulton had been fired from Ford. We therefore affirm Fulton's convictions.

[28] Affirmed.

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.