BEST v. STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY CSAA AAA (2026)

Case Summary

[1] After Brittney Best and Jeffrey Schooley's 17-year-old son was killed in a car accident, the tortfeasor's insurer paid a settlement in the amount of its per-person liability limit for bodily injury or $100,000. Half was paid to Best ($50,000) and half to Schooley ($50,000), who were never married to one another. At the time of the accident, Best's husband had an auto-insurance policy with The Standard Fire Insurance Company d/b/a Travelers Insurance covering both Best and her son, and the car her son was riding in was insured by CSAA General Insurance Company d/b/a AAA Insurance. Each policy had underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage with a per-person limit of $100,000. Since Best's payout from the tortfeasor's insurance was only $50,000, she made claims for UIM benefits against both Travelers and AAA. After Travelers and AAA denied Best's claims, she brought this action.

[2] Travelers and AAA moved to dismiss Best's complaint. They argued that the tortfeasor's car was not underinsured because the combined amount paid to the parents from the tortfeasor's insurance equaled the UIM coverage limit under each policy. Best moved for partial summary judgment, contending that the relevant amount was not the total that the tortfeasor's insurer paid but the amount she personally received. The trial court agreed with the insurers. But our Supreme Court has made clear that for purposes of determining whether a motor vehicle is underinsured under Indiana's UIM statute, the proper comparison is what the claimant actually received from the tortfeasor's policy and the per-person limit of the applicable UIM coverage. We therefore reverse the trial court's dismissal of Best's complaint and remand for entry of partial summary judgment for Best and a determination of which insurer(s) must pay her UIM benefits.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] One night in August 2023, 17-year-old Jaxson Schooley was riding in a car driven by his cousin. A driver traveling in the opposite direction crossed the center line and collided with the cousin's car head-on. Jaxson was pronounced dead at the scene. Jaxson's parents, Brittney Best and Jeffrey Schooley, were never married, and Best had primary physical custody of Jaxson before his death.

[4] Several insurance policies were implicated by the crash. The tortfeasor's car was insured by State Farm, and the policy's liability limit for bodily injury was $100,000 per person. The cousin's car was insured by his father's (Jaxson's uncle's) policy with AAA Insurance. The AAA policy included UIM coverage with a limit of $100,000 per person for bodily injury. Additionally, Best's husband had an auto policy with Travelers Insurance, which also included UIM coverage with a limit of $100,000 per person for bodily injury. The parties do not dispute that Jaxson and Best each qualified as insureds under both policies.

[5] A year after the accident, State Farm paid its full per-person liability limit of $100,000—$50,000 to Best and $50,000 to Schooley. Thereafter, Best made claims against Travelers and AAA for $50,000—the balance of the $100,000 UIM limit for each policy after deducting the $50,000 Best received from State Farm. When Travelers and AAA denied the claims, Best sued them for $50,000 each. Travelers and AAA moved to dismiss the complaint under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. They argued that the tortfeasor's car wasn't underinsured because State Farm paid a total of $100,000 to Best and Schooley for Jaxson's death, which is equal to the $100,000 UIM coverage limit under each policy. Best later moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that she is entitled to recover up to $50,000 in UIM benefits from AAA and up to $50,000 in UIM benefits from Travelers.

[6] After a hearing on the parties’ motions, the trial court denied Best's motion and granted the insurers’, dismissing Best's complaint. The court found that “the tortfeasor's insurer paid the full $100,000 per-person limit to resolve the singular wrongful death arising from that injury,” and thus Best wasn't entitled to UIM benefits. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 10.

[7] Best now appeals.¹

Discussion and Decision

[8] Best argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint and in denying her motion for partial summary judgment. Our review of both a Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Doe v. Adams, 53 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. In reviewing a 12(B)(6) motion, we take the facts alleged in the complaint as true, consider all allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw every reasonable inference in that party's favor. Residences at Ivy Quad Unit Owners Ass'n v. Ivy Quad Dev., LLC, 179 N.E.3d 977, 981 (Ind. 2022). And summary judgment is appropriate if, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, “ ‘the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)).

[9] Both the insurers’ motion to dismiss and Best's motion for partial summary judgment turn on whether the tortfeasor's car was underinsured. Best contends that it was because the $50,000 she received from State Farm, the tortfeasor's insurer, for Jaxson's death is less than the $100,000 UIM coverage limits in the Travelers and AAA policies. Travelers and AAA argue that the car was not underinsured because the aggregate $100,000 State Farm paid for Jaxson's death ($50,000 to Best and $50,000 to Schooley) is equal to their policies’ UIM limits.

[10] We first turn to Indiana's UIM statute, which defines “underinsured motor vehicle” as “an insured motor vehicle where the limits of coverage available for payment to the insured under all bodily injury liability policies covering persons liable to the insured are less than the limits for the insured's underinsured motorist coverage at the time of the accident.” Ind. Code § 27-7-5-4(b). In Corr v. American Family Insurance, our Supreme Court explained that the amount “ ‘available for payment to the insured,’ when describing coverage limits, is money present or ready for immediate use by the insured.” 767 N.E.2d 535, 540 (Ind. 2002).

[11] Best argues that in this context, “the insured” refers to the claimant (herself), and the relevant amount is the $50,000 she personally received from State Farm for Jaxson's death. Travelers and AAA assert that Jaxson, not Best, is the relevant “insured” and that the amount “available for payment” is the total $100,000 State Farm paid as a result of Jaxson's death, not what Best personally received. Corr reveals that Best's interpretation is correct.

[12] In Corr, 15-year-old Janel Corr died from injuries she sustained in a car accident, and four other passengers were seriously injured. The tortfeasor's van was insured by two policies, each with bodily-injury liability limits of $300,000 per accident. The tortfeasor's insurers each tendered $300,000, which was allocated among several claimants, including Janel's parents, James Corr and Pamela Corr. James and Pamela, who were divorced, each received $57,500 of the total $600,000. James and Pamela both had their own auto-insurance policies with American Family Insurance (AFI), both with UIM coverage of $100,000 per person. The Corrs sued AFI for UIM benefits under their respective policies, and the trial court granted summary judgment to AFI on the ground that the tortfeasor's van was not underinsured.

[13] On appeal, the Corrs argued that under the UIM statute, the tortfeasor's van was underinsured because the $57,500 paid to each of them was less than the $100,000 per-person limits of their respective UIM coverage. AFI claimed that the proper comparison was the liability limits of the tortfeasor's policies to the limits of the Corrs’ UIM coverage. The Supreme Court agreed with the Corrs, explaining that Indiana's UIM statute “turns on the amount of the ‘coverage limits available for payment to the insured’ not the overall coverage limits of the policy.” 767 N.E.2d at 539. And “available for payment to the insured,” the Court held, means “present or ready for immediate use by the insured, not amounts potentially accessible.” Id. at 540. Thus, the Court concluded, “the amount ‘available’ is the $57,500 each Corr actually recovered.” Id.

[14] Importantly, the Corr Court never considered the aggregate $115,000 ($57,500 x 2) paid to the Corrs for their daughter's death as the dispositive amount. See id. at 540 (“The issue is whether we are to compare the [tortfeasor's] policy limits ․ or the amount recovered ($57,500) to the amount of each Corr's UIM coverage.”). This is because the relevant “insured” for purposes of determining the amount “available for payment to the insured” was not the daughter; the Corrs, as the claimants, were the relevant insureds under their respective policies. If Travelers and AAA's interpretation of the UIM statute were correct, the Supreme Court would have denied UIM benefits to the Corrs because the total $115,000 paid as a result of their daughter's death exceeds the $100,000 per-person UIM limit of each of their policies.

[15] Applying Corr here, the dispositive amount for purposes of determining whether the tortfeasor's car was underinsured is $50,000—the amount that Best, the claimant, recovered from State Farm, the tortfeasor's liability insurer. And because this amount is less than the $100,000 UIM limits under the Travelers and AAA policies, the tortfeasor's car was underinsured.

[16] This conclusion is bolstered by Lakes v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., where the Supreme Court reaffirmed Corr and reiterated that “the proper comparison in determining whether the tortfeasor's vehicle was underinsured [i]s ․ what the claimant actually received and the UIM policy limit.” 964 N.E.2d 796, 803 (Ind. 2012); see also id. at 805 (“In Corr, we held that the relevant comparison is the amount of money ‘available for payment’ to the claimant through the tortfeasor's policy as compared to the per-person limits of the UIM policy.” (emphasis added)). Although Lakes involved a surviving victim seeking UIM benefits based on her own injuries as opposed to parents seeking benefits as a result of their child's death, the Court there held that “whether a vehicle is underinsured depends, in all cases, on whether the amount received from the tortfeasor's policy is less than the per-person limits on UIM coverage.” Id. at 805 (emphasis added). Lakes’s references to the “claimant” and the amount “received” reinforce that the determinative amount here is the $50,000 that State Farm paid to Best specifically, not the total amount State Farm paid to both Best and Schooley as a result of Jaxson's death.

[17] Despite Corr’s clear holding and reaffirmance in Lakes, Travelers and AAA rely on the Child Wrongful Death Act (CWDA) and its application to UIM claims in Hanna v. Indiana Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 963 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied, to maintain that the relevant amount for comparison is the total State Farm paid for Jaxson's death. In Hanna, after the Hannas’ son was killed in a crash caused by two at-fault drivers, the drivers’ insurers paid the Hannas their respective policies’ liability limits for a total of $300,000. Together, the Hannas were insured under the same auto policy with Indiana Farmers, which included UIM coverage with a $250,000 per-person limit. The Hannas argued that they were each entitled to the per-person limit because they were both named insureds under the Indiana Farmers policy. Treating the $300,000 payout as $150,000 payments to each of them, the Hannas argued that because neither of them had received the $250,000 per-person limit, they were each entitled to $100,000 in UIM benefits.

[18] A panel of this Court held that the Hannas couldn't recover under their Indiana Farmers policy in their individual capacities because their “claim arises from the CWDA, ․ not in a personal capacity,” and “nothing in the statute permits each parent to maintain a separate wrongful death claim in his or her own right.” Hanna, 963 N.E.2d at 77-78. And we held that “even assuming solely for the sake of argument that the Hannas are otherwise entitled to recover under their [own] policy,” they could not do so under the UIM provisions of their policy. Id. at 77. We explained that if more than one person had been injured in the accident, each would be entitled to recover the per-person limit; but because the Hannas’ son was the only insured who suffered bodily injury, the most they could recover in UIM benefits was a single per-person limit of $250,000, not $250,000 each. And because the $300,000 they recovered from the tortfeasors’ insurers exceeded their own policy's $250,000 per-person limit, they were not entitled to UIM benefits.

[19] While we agree with the outcome in Hanna, in our view, the CWDA is not what should have driven the result. The CWDA provides parents a cause of action against the person who caused their child's wrongful death and sets forth the types of damages the parents may recover. The action must be brought by “the father and mother jointly, or either of them by naming the other parent as a codefendant to answer as to his or her interest.” I.C. § 34-23-2-1(c)(1). But the Hannas’ claim was not that kind of claim—it was a contract claim against their own insurer for UIM benefits, not a claim against the drivers who caused their son's death. And the CWDA “does not affect or supersede any other right, remedy, or defense provided by any other law.” Id. at (j). So the CWDA's requirement that the parents bring a single, joint wrongful-death action never applied to the Hannas’ UIM claim, and it shouldn't have been the basis for rejecting their individual claims. The real problem with the Hannas’ argument was simpler: because their son was the only insured who suffered bodily injury, only one per-person limit was available under their joint UIM policy—not one limit for each parent.²

[20] Best's suit, like the Hannas’, is a contract claim against UIM carriers, not a wrongful-death claim against a tortfeasor, so the CWDA's joint-action requirement doesn't apply. Unlike the Hannas, Best is not claiming a second per-person limit under a UIM policy she shares with another insured pressing the same claim. She is claiming the remainder of the Travelers and AAA policies’ per-person limit for Jaxson's death, which is in line with Corr. As explained above, Best is entitled to the remainder of the $100,000 per-person limit because the amount she received from State Farm is less than $100,000.

[21] Travelers and AAA assert that adopting Best's approach would “produce absurd results,” Travelers's Br. p. 10, and “allow statutory beneficiaries to manufacture UIM exposure by allocating a single tortfeasor payment among themselves in shares below the UIM limit,” AAA's Br. p. 16. But as Best points out, the Supreme Court has already considered this possibility:

We recognize that the view we take of the [UIM] statute creates it[s] own anomalies. If, as here, there are multiple claimants they may reduce the “amount available” to any single claimant below the minimum UIM coverage even if the limits if applied to only one claimant would be adequate. We conclude that the legislature has chosen to look to “available” amounts, and accordingly accept this anomaly as less problematic than leaving the victim of an underinsured motorist worse off than the victim of a wholly uninsured motorist.

Corr, 767 N.E.2d at 540. This “view of the statute as a full-recovery, remedial measure,” id., prioritizes complete recovery for claimants over protecting insurers from the risk of “manufacture[d] UIM exposure.” And in any event, such risk is not present here because, as explained above, Best is the sole claimant for UIM benefits.

[22] Because the $50,000 Best received from State Farm is less than the $100,000 limit for UIM coverage in both the AAA and Travelers policies, the trial court erred in concluding that Best is not entitled to UIM benefits. We therefore reverse the dismissal of Best's complaint and denial of her motion for partial summary judgment. Although Best is entitled to $50,000 in UIM benefits, no argument was made in the trial court about which insurer(s) would have to pay. Because neither insurer addressed how liability would be apportioned between them if the tortfeasor's car was found to be underinsured, we leave that question for the trial court on remand. Accordingly, we remand for entry of partial summary judgment that Best is entitled to $50,000 in UIM benefits and a determination of how she will collect the $50,000.

[23] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We thank the Indiana Trial Lawyers Association for its informative amicus brief in support of Best.

2.   As Best highlights, Hanna has never been cited in another UIM case.

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.