Drew Owens, Appellant-Respondent v. Jordan Owens, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Drew Owens (“Father”) and Jordan Owens (“Mother”) relocated with their two children from Indiana to Oregon to engage in a polyamorous relationship with the husband (“Tyler”) of Father's brother (“Zack”).¹ Upon arrival in Oregon, Mother's relationships with Father and Tyler deteriorated, while Father's relationship with Tyler intensified. When Father began spending more than half of each week with Tyler and refusing to help Mother when their children were sick, Mother moved herself and the children back to Indiana.

[2] Mother filed for divorce in Indiana on the same day that Father filed for divorce in Oregon. A court in Oregon dissolved the marriage between Father and Mother, but it deferred issues of child custody, visitation, and support to Indiana's courts. After hearing evidence, the Wells Circuit Court awarded Mother sole legal and physical custody of the children, provided parenting time for Father in accordance with the Parenting Time Guidelines, ordered Father to pay child support, and allocated parenting-time transportation expenses between Mother and Father in proportion to their incomes.

[3] Father appeals to argue the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Mother custody, clearly erred when calculating Mother's income, and erroneously allocated transportation expenses without adequately considering Mother's responsibility for the geographic distance between their residences. Because the record contains evidence that supports the trial court's findings and those findings support the trial court's conclusions and orders, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] Mother and Father married in September 2016. Their first daughter, O.O., was born in 2018, and their second daughter, F.O., was born in 2020 (hereinafter, collectively “Children”). Father worked for Amazon, and Mother was responsible for homeschooling the children. At some point in their relationship, Mother and Father each began having a romantic relationship with Tyler, the husband of Father's brother, Zack. Zack and Tyler lived in Oregon, but Tyler would come to Indiana to visit Father and Mother.

[5] In early February 2024, Mother and Father moved with their children to Oregon. They stayed in the home of Zack and Tyler for a few weeks and then leased a nearby residence in early March. During this first month in Oregon, Tyler ended his relationship with Mother, and the relationship between Tyler and Father intensified. Father began spending three days a week with Mother and Children, while spending the remainder of his time at the home of Tyler and Zack.

[6] Father transferred his employment with Amazon from Indiana to Oregon, but two weeks after moving into the leased house, Father took an unpaid leave of absence from work to address his mental health concerns, and the unpaid leave placed financial stress on the parties. Despite no longer working, Father did not spend additional time with Mother or Children, who were having difficulty adjusting to all the changes that had occurred. On one occasion, Father refused to help Mother care for Children when they were sick and vomiting because Father had plans to watch Tyler get a tattoo.

[7] On March 30, 2024, Mother suggested that she and Father move their family back to Indiana so that Father could see his therapist and deal with his deteriorating mental health. Father agreed to limit his relationship with Tyler and to make her and Children a priority. Father went to the home of Zack and Tyler to tell Tyler his decision, but he did not return. Mother took the children to find Father, and Mother and Father argued in front of the children. A few days later, when Father's behavior had not changed, Mother decided to move back to Indiana with Children, and she asked friends to loan her the money necessary for the trip.

[8] On April 4, 2024, Mother filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Indiana, and Father filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Oregon. The court in Oregon dissolved the parties’ marriage but declined to accept jurisdiction over child-related issues because the Children were in Indiana. The Wells Circuit Court accepted jurisdiction over the child-related issues, and Mother and Father agreed to use a mediator to set an interim agreement. That Interim Agreement was filed with the trial court on December 17, 2024, and the trial court approved it the next day. Mother petitioned for the trial court to appoint a Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) in January 2025, and the trial court appointed Lierin Rossman as GAL (“GAL Rossman”).

[9] The trial court held the final hearing on August 12, 2025, and September 8, 2025. The court heard testimony from Father, Mother, Tyler, GAL Rossman, and two of Mother's friends. The parties thereafter submitted final arguments in writing. On December 26, 2025, the trial court entered an extensive final order ² that granted sole legal and physical custody of Children to Mother, provided parenting time to Father in accordance with the Parenting Time Guidelines for when distance is a major factor, ordered Father to pay $209 per week in child support, and ordered transportation expenses paid by parents in accordance with their respective percentage shares of gross weekly income.

Discussion and Decision

[10] The trial court entered findings and conclusions, which means that we review its judgment for clear error. Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026). To do so, we “determine whether the evidence supports the court's findings and whether those findings support the court's judgment.” Id. We “reverse only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id.

[11] In family law cases, we have a “well-established preference” for giving broad deference to trial court judges, who saw the witnesses as they testified. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). Accordingly, “[o]n appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Id. (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)). “Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.” Id. (quoting Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011)).

1. Custody

[12] Father first challenges the trial court's determination that Mother would receive primary physical and sole legal custody of Children. When a trial court makes an initial custody determination, “there is no presumption favoring either parent.” Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8.³ The trial court instead must determine what is “in accordance with the best interests of the child.” Id. While making its determination, the trial court “shall consider all relevant factors, including” as relevant herein: the child's age and sex, the parents’ wishes, the child's wishes, the child's relationships with others (parents, siblings, others), the child's adjustment to life circumstances (home, school, community), and “the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.” Id.

[13] The trial court entered the following conclusions in support of its decision to give Mother physical custody of Children:

9. The Court has considered the best interests of the children along with the statutory factors set forth at Ind. Code 31-17-2-8.

10. The children are both female and are 5 and 7 years of age.

11. Both parents seek physical and legal custody of the children.

12. Under a provisional order of the Court, the parties shared essentially a balanced parenting time schedule. The testimony of the parties is that when the children initially arrive at Father's home there is a period of adjustment for the children.

13. In addition, [O.O.] expressed concerns about her experiences in Oregon to the GAL, describing “situations that felt different for her or times she did not understand the behavior of others.” The Court interprets this as concerns the child has living in Father's home.

14. It appears that both parents care for, love, and are bonded to their children. When the parties resided in Indiana, Father worked and supported the family, while Mother stayed home with the children, responsible for home schooling, and meeting the children's medical needs.

15. During the brief period of time the parties lived together in Oregon, it appears Father prioritized his relationship with Tyler over Mother and the children, spending four nights per week at Tyler's home without the children. At that time, Father did not have any concerns leaving the children in Mother's care and leaving her responsible for the daily needs of the children.

16. The Court has also considered the relationship between other persons who might affect the children's best interests. Father is living in the same residence with two other men: his brother and his brother's husband; Father is romantically involved with his brother's husband. When the children are living with Father, they will be part of this interrelationship between the three, who will also be the caregivers to the children. On one occasion, [O.O.] had concerns about Tyler, describing him as “off.”

17. As stated above, during the parties’ marriage, they elected to home school the children. Mother was primarily responsible for the children's education while the parties were together.

18. During the provisional period, both parties have shared educational responsibilities. The Court has some concerns about how serious Father was regarding the children's education: He reported as educational opportunities facials, bath bombs, and interactions with the police while the police were investigating Mother's concerns in July 2025.

19. Except for the brief period the parties resided together in Oregon, the children have spent their entire lives in Indiana, relatives to both parents reside in Indiana; the children's home school community is in Indiana; they have relationships with medical providers in Indiana; and the children have been involved in extracurricular activities in Indiana.

20. During the parties’ marriage, it appears that both parties have had periods of mental health concerns.

21. Father emphasized portions of text message exchanges in which Mother requested that Father return home to assist with the children, asserting these messages demonstrated Mother's alleged inability to care for the children independently.

22. The Court finds this characterization disingenuous. When reviewed in context, the text messages reflect Mother's efforts to engage in cooperative parenting during periods of acute need rather than evidence of parental incapacity.

23. For example, in one text message exchange, Mother contacted Father while he was working a night-shift job after one of the children became ill and vomited on her and the bedding. Mother requested Father's assistance with disposing of soiled linens and watching the child so Mother could rest after having been awake throughout the night caring for the sick child.

24. The Court does not interpret this exchange as evidence of Mother's inability to parent. Instead, the Court finds the exchange reflects a reasonable request for assistance from a co-parent during an acute situation and an effort by Mother to engage in cooperative parenting in the children's best interests.

25. The Court is concerned that Father presented this exchange as evidence of parental incapacity when it more accurately demonstrates Mother's attempt to seek reasonable support.

26. [A]nother text message exchange occurred presumably during a period when the parties were in Oregon. In the exchange, Mother informed Father that the children were sick; and that she had not been sleeping due to caring for them. Mother asked Father to return home to assist with the children and to reconsider attending Tyler's tattoo appointment in light of the children's condition.

27. Father emphasized the importance of attending the tattoo appointment and insisted upon strict adherence to a previously agreed schedule.

28. The Court finds this exchange significant not as evidence of Mother's inability to parent, but as further illustration of Mother's repeated efforts to seek co-parenting assistance during periods of acute need, and Father's prioritization of personal romantic over immediate parenting responsibilities.

29. Finally, while Mother admittedly has had periods of depression and relied upon Father to assist with the needs of the children, Father took a mental health leave of absence from work almost immediately upon settling in Oregon. At the time, Father was the sole income provider to the family. Father then appeared to prioritize his relationship with Tyler, leaving Mother alone to care for the children.

30. Father places significant importance on the incident where Mother brought the children to Tyler and Zack's home to demonstrate that Mother willingly exposed the children to a confrontation. While ideally the children would not have been exposed to the arguments of the parties, all of the adults share some blame in arguing in front of children, but also worsening the situation by trying to remove the children from the vehicle.

31. The Court therefore concludes that it is in the children's best interest that Mother have physical custody of the parties’ minor children.

(Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 23-25.) Regarding legal custody, the trial court concluded:

32. Legal custody requires the ability to make decisions in the children's best interests, including the ability to communicate and exercise appropriate judgment regarding the children's welfare.

33. Based upon the Findings of Fact, including credibility determinations, the parties’ demonstrated conduct, [and] the geographic distance between the parties, the Court concludes that joint legal custody is not appropriate and not in the best interest of the children.

34. The Court therefore concludes that it is in the best interests of the children that Mother be awarded sole legal custody, with authority to make major decisions regarding the children's education, health care, and general welfare. Mother shall keep Father reasonably informed of significant decisions affecting the children in these areas.

35. During the final hearing, both parties testified that they believe it is in the children's best interests to attend traditional, in-person schooling rather than continuing homeschooling. While the Court agrees that traditional schooling appears to be in the children's best interests based upon the evidence presented, the Court recognizes that educational decisions fall within the scope of legal custody and are decisions for the parent vested with that authority, not mandates imposed by the Court. Accordingly, the Court makes no specific order directing the children's educational placement.

(Id. at 25-26.)

[14] Father asserts the custody award is against the logic and effect of the evidence. He argues the trial court impermissibly relied on his relationship with Tyler and drew unsupported inferences from Children's statements to GAL Rossman; gave inadequate weight to GAL Rossman's report, which recommended that he receive custody; and overemphasized Children's homeschooling and the parties’ mental health. We address each contention below.

1.1 Father's relationship with Tyler

[15] Father's initial argument regarding custody is that his “relationship with Tyler should have played no role in custody.” (Appellant's Br. at 18) (initial capitalization removed). This argument is patently incorrect, because the relationship of a parent with any other person who lives in the home where Children would live is relevant evidence for the trial court to consider when determining the best interests of Children. See Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8(4)(C) (“court shall consider ․ interaction and interrelationship of the child with ․ any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests”).

[16] Moreover, while Indiana law makes clear that parents cannot be denied custody based on sexual orientation without evidence of a negative impact on any children at issue, see Teegarden v. Teegarden, 642 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“homosexuality standing alone without evidence of any adverse effect upon the welfare of the child does not render the homosexual parent unfit as a matter of law to have custody of the child”), Father has directed us to no finding, conclusion, or statement by the trial court during the proceedings that suggests the trial court ruled against Father based on his sexual orientation or gender identity. Nor have we uncovered any such statement by the trial court in our review. Instead, the trial court entered nearly twenty pages of findings and conclusions that outlined valid bases for the decision it made. Accordingly, we reject Father's assertion that the trial court's ruling was based on improper motives around sexual orientation or gender identity.

[17] Finally, to the extent Father suggests the trial court should not have drawn negative inferences about the impact on Children of his living situation, Father has not demonstrated the trial court's findings and conclusions were clearly erroneous. Father was living with his brother and his brother's husband, and Father was in a romantic relationship with his brother's husband. Children, who were five and seven years old, would be subjected to the “interrelationship between the three” adults in that house during Father's parenting time. (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 23.) O.O. described Tyler as “off” (id. at 76) (GAL report) & (id. at 20) (trial court finding 43), and, while we may not know exactly what O.O. meant by that description, we cannot say the trial court's interpretation of that behavior causing “concerns” for O.O. was clearly erroneous. (Id. at 23.) Nor can we say the trial court erroneously inferred that O.O. had “concerns” about Father's house (id.) from O.O.’s report of “situations that felt different for her or times she did not understand the behavior of others” in Oregon. (Id. at 76) (GAL report) & (id. at 20) (trial court finding 42).

1.2 GAL's report

[18] Father next argues the trial court gave inadequate weight to the report of GAL Rossman, who recommended that Father receive primary custody of Children. A GAL's report is evidence the trial court may receive, and it may not be excluded as hearsay. Shao v. Li, 276 N.E.3d 89, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-17-2-12(b)). Nevertheless, a trial court is not required to adopt the opinion of an expert regarding custody. Clark v. Madden, 725 N.E.2d 100, 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Instead, the trial court has discretion to credit or discredit a custody recommendation, and we may not reweigh evidence on appeal. Madden v. Phelps, 152 N.E.3d 602, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). That the trial court reached a conclusion different from the guardian ad litem's recommendation is not, standing alone, an abuse of discretion.

1.3 Homeschooling and mental health

[19] Finally, Father contends the evidence concerning Children's homeschooling and the parties’ mental health does not support the award of custody to Mother. The trial court concluded that, although the parties shared educational responsibilities during the provisional period, it had concerns about how seriously Father approached Children's education because Father's curriculum log included facials, bath bombs, and an interaction with police as educational activities. The trial court also concluded that “both parties have had periods of mental health concerns.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 24.)

[20] Father argues that his records reflect extensive instruction in the core subjects and that the parties’ shared history of mental-health difficulties should not have weighed against him. However, Father's arguments about educational activities ask us to reweigh the evidence, which our standard of review does not permit. See Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124 (stating standard of review). Moreover, the trial court acknowledged that both parties had experienced mental health concerns, but the trial court also determined that Father's mental health concerns had occurred more recently. Thus, to the extent the trial court might have interpreted Father's mental health concerns to weigh in favor of Mother, we cannot say the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. Because the trial court's conclusions have support in the findings and record, we affirm the award of physical and legal custody to Mother.

2. Mother's weekly income

[21] Father challenges the trial court's determination of Mother's weekly gross income for purposes of child support calculation. Indiana's Child Support Guidelines are based on an “Income Shares Model” that attempts to provide children with the same proportion of parental income that they would have received if their parents had lived together. Ind. Child Support Guideline 1. Accordingly, the trial court must determine each parent's “weekly gross income” – “actual weekly gross income of the parent if employed to full capacity, potential income if unemployed or underemployed, and the value of in-kind benefits received by the parent.” Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A)(1).

If a court finds a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed without just cause, child support shall be calculated based on a determination of potential income. A determination of potential income shall be made by determining employment potential and probable earnings level based on the obligor's employment and earnings history, occupational qualifications, educational attainment, literacy, age, health, criminal record or other employment barriers, prevailing job opportunities, and earnings levels in the community.

Child Supp. G. 3(A)(3). As the Commentary to that Guideline makes clear, “a great deal of discretion will have to be used” in the determination of potential income. Commentary 2(c) to Child Supp. G. 3(A).

[22] Father's Brief asserts: “The Trial Court found that [Mother] made $12.00 per hour working at the YMCA because there was ‘no evidence to the contrary’ and imputed income to [Mother] at $12.00 per hour and $480.00 per a 40 hour week.” (Appellant's Br. at 25.) Father has, however, misrepresented what the trial court determined. The trial court's Conclusion of Law stated:

The Court finds that Mother earned $12.00 per hour when she worked at the YMCA. As there was no evidence to the contrary, the Court further finds that Mother is capable of fulltime employment. The Court imputes a gross weekly income for Mother at $480.

(Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 27-8.) Thus, the trial court found there was “no evidence to the contrary” to Mother being able to work forty hours a week. The trial court did not, as Father suggests, indicate the evidence of Mother's hourly wage was uncontradicted.

[23] On the first day of the final hearing, Mother testified she was working at the YMCA and making $12 per hour. On the second day of the final hearing, Mother testified she had obtained new employment and was making $30 per hour but working only nine to ten hours per week. Mother's testimony and evidence support the trial court's sole Finding of Fact regarding this issue:

48. Mother was employed at the YMCA and earned $12.00 per hour, per Mother's 2024 W-2 and several paystubs. No evidence was presented why Mother was only working a few hours per week or if she was capable of working full time.

(Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 21.) That Finding of Fact also supports the trial court's conclusion that Mother was capable of full-time work.

[24] Because the trial court determined Mother was capable of full-time work, it had to exercise its discretion to determine how much hourly income to impute to Mother. The trial court judge, who lives in the same county as Mother, is in a much better position than we are to estimate the “prevailing job opportunities, and earnings levels in the community.” Child Supp. G. 3(A)(3). The court chose to impute $12 per hour, which was within the evidence presented at the final hearing, and we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. Father has not demonstrated clear error or an abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination of Mother's weekly gross income.

3. Transportation expenses

[25] Father next argues the trial court committed clear error by ordering the parties to pay parenting-time transportation expenses in proportion to their income because, according to Father, Mother should be responsible for a greater percentage of the expenses. According to Indiana Parenting Time Guideline I(B)(1), absent some other agreement between the parents, “the parent receiving the child shall provide transportation for the child at the start of the scheduled parenting time and the other parent shall provide transportation for the child at the end of the scheduled parenting time.” In the commentary thereto, the Rule provides: “The cost of transportation should be shared based on consideration of various factors, including the distance involved, the financial resources of the parents, the reason why the distances exist, and the family situation of each parent at that time.” Comment 2 to Guideline I(B)(1).

[26] Father claims the trial court should have given additional consideration to “the reasons for the geographic distance” between the homes of Mother and Father. (Appellant's Br. at 26.) According to Father, the circumstances prompting the distance between the parties “are undisputed,” (id. at 27), and are the responsibility of Mother, who “placed unreasonable restrictions on” Father. (Id.) However, as Mother argues, Father “must also carry blame for the distance[,]” (Appellee's Br. at 23), because he “prioritized Tyler's relationship over his wife and children[.]” (Id.)

[27] The trial court found “Mother's testimony and communications to be credible and consistent with prioritizing the children's needs.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 19.) The trial court found: “Father wanted to prioritize his relationship with Tyler.” (Id. at 17.) When Father took a mental health leave from work in Oregon, “he did not” spend more time with the children, (id.), even though “the children were struggling with the changes.” (Id.) Father refused to help Mother when the children were sick because of the “importance of attending [Tyler's] tattoo appointment[.]” (Id. at 19.) In light of these findings by the trial court, we reject Father's claim that the evidence of “fault” for the distance was undisputed and we accordingly cannot hold the trial court committed clear error when it divided transportation expenses in accordance with income.

Conclusion

[28] Father has not demonstrated clear error in the award of custody to Mother, in the setting of Mother's weekly gross income, or in the apportioning of the travel expenses for parenting time based on the parties’ respective shares of income. We accordingly affirm the trial court's judgment.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Both “Zach” and “Zack” are used in the Record as spellings for the name of Drew's brother. We use the spelling that matches the spelling used in the portion of the trial court's order that we quote.

2.   We commend the trial court on the quality of its final order, which contained fifty-one findings of fact and sixty-four conclusions of law.

3.   Father's analysis quotes Indiana Code section 31-17-2-15, which lists factors the trial court should consider when determining whether to enter an order of joint custody. As the trial court herein did not issue a joint-custody order, we focus our analysis on Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8.

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.