Larry Gene Burns, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On August 25, 2025, Larry Gene Burns, Jr., pled guilty to Level 5 felony child solicitation after he exposed himself to a fifteen-year-old girl. On September 12, 2025, Burns filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and reinstate a plea of not guilty, which the trial court denied. Burns contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 3, 2023, the State charged Burns with Level 5 felony child solicitation, alleging that he had exposed himself to a fifteen-year-old girl. The State further alleged that Burns was a habitual offender. While this case was pending, Burns was also charged with Level 6 felony methamphetamine possession in cause number 48C01-2503-F6-729 (“Cause No. F6-729”). Burns was already serving an executed sentence on community corrections for Level 4 felony methamphetamine possession in cause number 48C01-1902-F4-328 (“Cause No. F4-328”).

[3] On August 25, 2025, Burns entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to Level 5 felony child solicitation in this case and Level 6 felony methamphetamine possession in Cause No. F6-729. Burns also agreed to admit to violating the terms of his sentence in Cause No. F4-328. In exchange for Burns's guilty plea, the State agreed that the executed portion of his sentence for the two new criminal convictions would be limited to four years.

[4] The plea agreement contained an acknowledgement of rights. Burns indicated that he had read and understood his constitutional rights, that he was waiving those rights by pleading guilty, and that his decision to plead guilty was his own free and voluntary choice. Burns also agreed that he was satisfied with his trial counsel's representation and acknowledged that the plea agreement was in his best interests.

[5] A guilty-plea hearing was held the same day. Prior to pleading guilty, the trial court confirmed that Burns had had an opportunity to discuss the plea agreement with each of his attorneys and that the plea agreement bore Burns's signature. The trial court reiterated Burns's constitutional rights and ensured he knew he was waiving those rights by pleading guilty. Burns also indicated that no one had forced or threatened him into pleading guilty. After the State presented a factual basis for the charges against Burns, the trial court found that he had understood the nature of the charges against him, that he had made his plea freely and voluntarily, and that there was a sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea. The trial court took Burns's plea under advisement, ordered a presentence investigation report be completed, and scheduled a sentencing hearing for October 20, 2025.

[6] On September 12, 2025, Burns filed a pro se written “Motion to Change Plea” accompanied by facts in support of his motion. Burns alleged that his trial counsel in the child-solicitation case, Attorney Townsend, had been “very persuasive about [him] signing” the plea agreement. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 52. Burns contended that he was “coerced” and “put under threat that even if [he] chose to take the level 5 charge to trial and was found not guilty, the prosecutor would file the habitual criminal charge against [him] for the remaining charges[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 52. Burns further claimed that Attorney Townsend had “caused [him] to feel great duress, giving [him] just over 24 hours to weigh out [his] options and take everything into consideration.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 52. On September 24, 2025, Burns moved to dismiss Attorney Townsend, claiming that he had rendered ineffective assistance by “coerc[ing him] into plea which would lead into a manifest of injustice[.]”¹ Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 56–57.

[7] On October 19, 2025, Attorney Townsend filed a notice with the court to address Burns's contentions in both motions. Burns's claim that he had only had twenty-four hours to consider the plea agreement, Attorney Townsend indicated that he had discussed the plea agreement with Burns “multiple times.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 95. Specifically, Attorney Townsend explained that he had met with Burns on Friday, August 22, 2025, to discuss the plea agreement, had given him the weekend to consider its terms, and had met with Burns again on Monday, August 25, when Burns had indicated he wanted to sign the plea agreement.²

[8] On October 20, 2025, before Burns's sentencing hearing, the trial court provided Burns and Attorney Townsend with the opportunity to present additional evidence regarding Burns's pending motions. After hearing nothing further, the trial court denied Burns's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Taking notice of the record from the plea hearing, the trial court reasoned that Burns had stated under oath that he had not been threatened or forced to enter the plea agreement. The trial court accepted Burns's guilty plea and sentenced him to four years of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision

[9] After a guilty plea is entered, but before the sentence is imposed, the trial court may permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea for any fair and just reason unless the State has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the plea. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b). The trial court shall grant the motion if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Id.

[10] Absent a showing of manifest injustice by the defendant, the decision whether to grant or deny the motion rests solely in the trial court's discretion. Id. A trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “arrives in this Court with a presumption in favor of the ruling.” Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001) (citing Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995)). “We will not disturb the court's ruling where it was based on conflicting evidence.” Johnson v. State, 734 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 2000).

[11] Burns cites several ways in which he alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw, claiming that withdrawal “was necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Appellant's Br. p. 7. In support of this assertion, Burns argues that Attorney Townsend provided ineffective assistance by only providing him with twenty-four hours to review his plea agreement, that the State's threat to seek a habitual-offender enhancement was improper, and that “duress and coercion” made Burns's guilty plea involuntary. Appellant's Br. p. 7. Lastly, Burns contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying his motion to withdraw.

I. The Trial Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Burns's Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea

[12] As a threshold matter, we note that the State argues that Burns has waived this issue for review because his written motion to the trial court was not verified, as is required by Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b). Given that the parties have fully briefed the merits of the issues before us, however, together with our preference for deciding cases on the merits, we elect to review the merits of Burns's arguments on appeal. See, e.g., Kelly v. Levandoski, 825 N.E.2d 850, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[W]e prefer to decide issues on their merits when possible.”), trans. denied.

[13] Burns argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw because withdrawal was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. “Manifest injustice” is a “necessarily imprecise standard,” and “[a] trial court's ruling comes to us with a presumption that it is correct.” Ivy v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted), trans. denied. “Manifest injustice” occurs whenever

(1) the convicted person was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (2) the plea was not entered or ratified by the convicted person; (3) the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made; (4) the prosecuting attorney failed to abide by the terms of a plea agreement; or (5) the plea and judgment of conviction are void or voidable for any other reason.

Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(c). A defendant must prove manifest injustice by a preponderance of the evidence. Bland v. State, 708 N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

A. Burns's Trial Counsel did not Render Ineffective Assistance

[14] In arguing that withdrawal was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice, Burns first contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by providing him with only twenty-four hours to review the plea agreement. “The right to effective counsel is rooted in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ind. 2006). “The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). Our “benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686. However, we begin with the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate legal assistance. Weisheit v. State, 109 N.E.3d 978, 983 (Ind. 2018) (citations omitted).

[15] To rebut that presumption, a petitioner must show that (1) “counsel's performance was deficient based on prevailing professional norms[,]” and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. (citing Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687)). “[I]solated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective.” Id. at 984. “Although the performance prong and the prejudice prong are separate inquiries, failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail.” Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 645 (Ind. 2008).

[16] Here, the trial court determined that Burns had failed to prove that Attorney Townsend acted deficiently. Taking notice of the plea-hearing record, the trial court noted that Burns stated under oath that he had discussed the plea agreement with both Attorneys Townsend and Alger before signing it.³ Burns also agreed that he understood the rights he forfeited by entering the plea agreement. Not once during the plea colloquy did Burns claim that he needed more time to consider the plea agreement, discuss its terms with trial counsel, or seek clarification from the court. The trial court also considered Attorney Townsend's notice, which refuted Burns's assertions of ineffective assistance. Attorney Townsend stated that he had “met with Defendant several times during the course of his appointment,” and had “reviewed and discussed the plea agreement multiple times.” Appellant's App. Vol. I p. 95. Attorney Townsend also stated that he had met with Burns on a Friday to discuss the plea agreement, and Burns had requested the weekend to consider his options. After providing Burns with the weekend, Attorney Townsend had met with Burns the following Monday, at which time Burns had indicated that he was ready to sign the agreement. These statements contradict Burns's assertion that Attorney Townsend had pressured him to make a decision within twenty-four hours. Johnson, 734 N.E.2d at 245 (“We will not disturb the court's ruling where it was based on conflicting evidence.”). Burns “has not presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that counsel performed competently.” Brightman, 758 N.E.2d at 47. Because Burns failed to prove that Attorney Townsend performed deficiently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burns's motion to withdraw on this ground.

B. The State did not Improperly Threaten Burns with a Habitual-Offender Enhancement

[17] Burns next alleges that the State's “threat of an [(sic)] habitual offender charge” led to him “having his arm figuratively twisted by his attorney into taking the plea.” Appellant's Br. p. 7. Burns does not dispute that he was subject to a habitual-offender enhancement. In fact, Burns qualified for the habitual-offender enhancement due to his three prior unrelated felony convictions. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(c). As such, the State's intent to seek the habitual-offender enhancement if Burns proceeded to trial does not rise to the level of manifest injustice because the State was “legitimately poised to carry out the threat.” Jeffries v. State, 966 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

C. Burns's Guilty Plea was Entered Knowingly and Voluntarily

[18] Burns also argues that “duress and coercion overc[ame] the voluntariness of the plea.” Appellant's Br. p. 7. In his handwritten letter to the trial court, Burns stated that he felt “as though I was forced to sign the plea because I would receive more time than the plea recommended than I would by maintaining my innocence of the level 5 charge.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 52. This is precisely the type of decision a defendant typically faces when choosing whether to enter into a plea agreement. See Knight v. State, 202 N.E.3d 475, 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding that uncertainty about a higher possible sentence is a normal pressure and does not render a plea involuntary), trans. denied.

[19] Again, taking notice of the plea-hearing record, the trial court found that Burns had “freely and voluntarily” entered his guilty plea. Tr. Vol. I p. 11. Under oath, Burns denied being forced or threatened into pleading guilty. Tr. Vol. I p. 6. Burns also denied that any promises outside the plea agreement had been made to him to encourage him to plead guilty. Tr. Vol. I p. 7. Furthermore, the plea agreement—which Burns signed—outlined the rights that Burns would forfeit by pleading guilty. Before accepting Burns's guilty plea, the trial court confirmed that he understood these consequences of pleading guilty and the contents of the plea agreement. The trial court did not find that Burns met his burden to prove that manifest injustice would occur. As such, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw. Knight, 202 N.E.3d at 481; Bland, 708 N.E.2d at 882.

II. The Trial Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Failing to Hold a Hearing

[20] Finally, Burns contends that the trial court erred in not holding a hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. However, as Burns correctly notes, “[c]onvening a hearing is merely a discretionary option of the trial court.” Fletcher v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1022, 1023 (Ind. 1995). The trial court had Burns's letter containing facts to support his motion, Attorney Townsend's notice, and the plea colloquy record before it. Before deciding on Burns's motion, the trial court also offered Burns and Attorney Townsend the opportunity to present additional evidence, and both declined. Burns cannot fault the trial court for failing to hold a hearing when he did not take advantage of the opportunity to support his argument when offered. Cf. Lee v. State, 175 Ind. App. 17, 369 N.E.2d 1083, 1085 (1977) (holding that appellant could not have been denied the right to make a final argument “[w]ithout having availed himself of the opportunity”). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a hearing before denying Burns's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

[21] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his motion to dismiss his court-appointed counsel, Burns also claimed that his attorney had failed to conduct discovery, an argument he does not renew on appeal.

2.   Attorney Townsend's notice specifically states that he met with Burns “on Friday, August 20, 2025” and “again on Monday, August 25, 2025 to discuss the resolution.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 96. We note that August 20, 2025 was a Wednesday, not a Friday.

3.   Attorney Alger represented Burns in Cause No. F6-729.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.