Carl T. Bond, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On August 17, 2025, Carl Bond knowingly fled from law enforcement in his vehicle, leading to a chase. The State charged Bond with, and he was convicted of, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and he was sentenced to two years of incarceration. Bond contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement.¹ Because we conclude otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] While on patrol in a fully-marked police vehicle on August 17, 2025, Fort Wayne Police Officers Parker Rudolph and Jonathan Hansen approached a red light at the intersection of Ardmore Avenue and Covington Road. As they approached the intersection, Officers Rudolph and Hansen observed Bond, who was driving a black Jeep, “stop over the stop line at the red light at the intersection[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 78. They again observed Bond stop “over the intersection line and into the crosswalk” at a red light “at the intersection of Ardmore Avenue and Taylor Street[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 94. Bond had been traveling and stopped in the center lane and did not have his turn signal activated.²

[3] After observing the second infraction, Officer Rudolph initiated a traffic stop. Bond pulled over and provided Officer Rudolph with his “State issued ID[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 79. As he spoke with Bond, Officer Rudolph observed that Bond “seemed a little nervous” and “smell[ed] the odor of raw marijuana emanating from” Bond's vehicle. Tr. Vol. II p. 79. Officer Rudolph obtained Bond's information, returned to his police vehicle, and called for backup.

[4] Once backup had arrived, Officers Rudolph, Hansen, and Hugo Villagomez approached Bond's vehicle. Officer Hansen approached the driver's side of Bond's vehicle, smelled the odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle, and asked Bond to exit the vehicle. Officer Hansen repeated the order after Bond refused to comply. At some point, while Bond “was still refusing[,]” Officer Hansen “reached inside [the vehicle],” and “opened the door handle to open the door.” Tr. Vol. II p. 100. Bond said that he was “not getting out,” and Officer Hansen “observed him put the Jeep into drive and speed off from” the officers. Tr. Vol. II p. 100. Bond had not been told that “he was free to leave.” Tr. Vol. II p. 100.

[5] The officers returned to their vehicles, activated their emergency sirens, and pursued Bond. After fleeing for approximately half a mile, Bond ran a red light at an intersection and crashed into another vehicle. Bond then continued to flee on foot, ignoring the officers’ repeated commands to stop. After approximately a quarter of a mile, Bond stopped running and sat down on a hill behind a strip mall. The officers eventually caught up to Bond and arrested him. Officer Villagomez searched Bond's car, finding marijuana and paraphernalia inside.

[6] Bond agreed to speak with Fort Wayne Police Detective Robert Warstler after his arrest. During his interview, Bond admitted that he had had marijuana in the car, the police had initiated a traffic stop during which they had asked him to get out of his car, he had refused to step out of his car, and he had driven off after refusing to get out of his car.

[7] On August 18, 2025, the State charged Bond with Count I - Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, Count II - Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Count III - Class A misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident, and Count IV - Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. The trial court subsequently dismissed Count III and reduced Count IV to a Class B misdemeanor. A jury trial was held on March 12, 2026. During trial, Bond admitted that he had had marijuana in the car, police had asked him to get out of his car, he had refused to do so, and he had driven off after refusing to get out of his car. The jury found Bonds guilty as charged. On April 9, 2026, the trial court vacated Count II, entered judgment of conviction for Counts I and IV, and sentenced Bond to an aggregate two-year term of incarceration in the Department of Correction.

Discussion and Decision

[8] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[9] Bond contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. A person commits Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement by knowingly or intentionally fleeing “from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer's siren or emergency lights, identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop[.]” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3). The offense is a Level 6 felony “if the person uses a vehicle to commit the offense[.]” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(c)(1). The Indiana Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory element “after the officer has ․ ordered the person to stop” to require “that such order to stop rest on probable cause or reasonable suspicion, that is, specific, articulable facts that would lead the officer to reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot.” Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249, 1255 (Ind. 2014).

[10] “Though admittedly a somewhat abstract concept, reasonable suspicion is not an illusory standard.” Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1259 (Ind. 2019) (internal quotations omitted). “Reasonable suspicion exists where the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has or is about to occur.” Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind. 1999). “An officer must be able to point to specific facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind. 2003). “Absent proof that an officer's order to stop meets such requirements, the evidence will be insufficient to establish the offense[.]” Gaddie, 10 N.E.3d at 1255. Law enforcement may not rely on a “mere hunch[,]” but rather “must be able to articulate some facts that provide a particularized and objective basis for believing a traffic violation occurred.” Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1259 (internal citation and quotations omitted). “That is reasonable suspicion—the constitutional floor—for a traffic stop.” Id.

[11] Bond does not deny that he knowingly used a vehicle to flee from law enforcement, arguing only that the evidence is insufficient to prove that Officer Hansen's order to stop was lawful. Officer Rudolph testified that he initiated the traffic stop after he and Officer Hansen had observed Bond commit the same traffic infraction twice. “It is unequivocal under our jurisprudence that even a minor traffic violation is sufficient to give an officer probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.” Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013). Thus, “police officers may stop a vehicle when they observe minor traffic violations.” Black v. State, 621 N.E.2d 368, 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).

[12] Officer Rudolph testified that he and Officer Hansen had observed Bond commit the traffic infraction of stopping over the clearly marked stop line at a red light. Indiana Code section 9-21-3-7(b) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(3) Steady red indication means the following:

(A) Except as provided in clauses (B) and (D), vehicular traffic facing a steady circular red or red arrow signal shall stop at a clearly marked stop line. However, if there is no clearly marked stop line, vehicular traffic shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection. If there is no crosswalk, vehicular traffic shall stop before entering the intersection and shall remain standing until an indication to proceed is shown.

(B) Except when a sign is in place prohibiting a turn described in this clause, vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal, after coming to a complete stop, may cautiously enter the intersection to do the following:

(i) Make a right turn.

(ii) Make a left turn if turning from the left lane or a designated left-turn lane of a one-way street into another one-way street with the flow of traffic.

Vehicular traffic making a turn described in this clause shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic using the intersection.

(Emphases added).

[13] In arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction, Bond asserts that the State “did not present any evidence that [he] failed to meet the exceptions contained in [Indiana] Code [section] 9-21-3-7(b)(3)(B)(i) and (ii).” Appellant's Br. p. 9.

In determining whether a statutory exception, such as the one provided here, constitutes a material element of the offense or an affirmative defense to the crime, our courts assess the location of the exception relative to the location of the definition of the principal offense. If the exception is closely connected with the clause creating the offense, the exception is a material element of that offense and must be proven by the State. If, however, the exception is contained in a subsequent clause or statute, the exception is an affirmative defense and must be raised by the defendant.

Neese v. State, 994 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The exception at issue in this case is contained in a subsequent clause to the definition of the principal infraction. It should therefore be treated as an affirmative defense to the infraction of failing to stop at a red traffic signal before a clearly marked stop line. See id.

[14] “A defendant bears the initial burden to prove any affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “If the defendant meets this initial burden, the State is then required to rebut the defense.” Id. Bond did not raise this affirmative defense below and his conduct did not suggest that he was attempting to meet the exception as he was in the center lane, which only provided the option of traveling straight, not in either of the turn lanes. Bond has therefore failed to meet his initial burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence. As such, the State was not required to present any evidence rebutting the affirmative defense.

[15] The State presented evidence indicating that Officer Rudolph initiated a traffic stop after he and Officer Hansen had observed Bond commit a traffic infraction. Their observation of the infraction created reasonable suspicion to stop Bond. See State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006) (“A traffic violation, however minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.”). The State also presented evidence that Bond, using a motor vehicle, knowingly fled from Officer Hansen after Officer Hansen had ordered him to stop. Bond's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence effectively amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

[16] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Law enforcement recovered marijuana from Bond's vehicle during a search incident to his arrest. Bond was also convicted of Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. He does not challenge this conviction.

2.   There were left-turn and right-turn lanes on each side of the center lane at this intersection.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.