Hiram S. Slaven and Susan Slaven, Appellants/Petitioners v. City of Bloomington Board of Zoning Appeals, Appellee/Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2023, Hiram and Susan Slaven began constructing fencing and a new driveway at their home in Bloomington (“the City”), none of which complied with the local land-use ordinance. After the City notified the Slavens that their construction was not in compliance, the Slavens petitioned the City for variances. The City's Board of Zoning Appeals (“the BZA”) denied the Slavens’ petitions, and the trial court denied their petition for judicial review. The Slavens primarily contend that the trial court erred in denying their petition for judicial review because the BZA's findings lacked sufficient specificity. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] As part of the Bloomington Municipal Code (“the BMC”), the City has enacted zoning and development ordinances which, collectively, are referred to as the Unified Development Ordinance (“the UDO”). The BZA is a quasi-judicial body with the jurisdiction and authority to hear and decide upon petitions for development-standards variances from the UDO. BMC § 20.06.020(d)(1)(A).¹ A variance approved by the BZA allows a property owner to deviate from the development standards of the UDO. BMC § 20.07.010; BMC § 20.06.040(d)(7).

[3] The Slavens reside in a home at 2408 South Shadow Grove Court in the City, which sits on property consisting of two contiguous lots, as outlined in bold red in the following map and aerial photograph:

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Appellants’ App. Vol. III pp. 7, 8.

[4] In the fall of 2023, the Slavens began construction on their property, consisting of a circle driveway with two access points to replace the existing single-entry driveway, a wrought-iron front fence with limestone pillars, wrought-iron driveway gates, and privacy fences along portions of both sides of their property. The following photograph shows the front gates and fencing; the circle driveway's two entrances; and, on the left, a portion of the privacy fencing.

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Appellant's App. Vol. III. p. 10.

[5] On March 8, 2024, the City mailed a notice of violation to the Slavens’ address, which cited, among six other violations, a fencing height that exceeded the UDO standard of four feet in violation of Section 20.04.080(n)² and a circle driveway that was constructed in violation of Section 20.04.050(c).³ On July 24, 2024, after the work had been completed, the Slavens petitioned the City for variances from the UDO for the fencing and the circle driveway. A hearing before the BZA on the variance petitions was scheduled for October 17, 2024. Prior to the hearing, the staff of the City's Planning and Transportation Department (“the Staff”) prepared a report for the BZA, in which it recommended denial of the two requested variances.

[6] At the hearing, Joe Patterson, zoning and long-range planner for the City, testified that, while the UDO required at least 120 feet of street frontage with sixty feet between the two driveway cuts, the Slavens’ circle driveway was installed in only approximately 100 feet of frontage with only approximately sixteen feet between the two cuts. Patterson also testified that the Slavens had failed to establish that the lack of a circle driveway would be injurious. As for the fencing, Patterson testified that the fencing exceeded UDO limits, did not align with the character of the neighborhood, partially impeded easements, and was not exempt from the UDO due to the Slavens’ stated security and privacy concerns.

[7] The Slavens’ counsel argued that the fencing should be allowed for privacy and security reasons and that the circle driveway was justified because it allowed the Slavens to pull out forward, which was allegedly safer for other drivers and pedestrians. The BZA unanimously voted to deny both petitions and adopted the Staff's proposed findings in whole:

1) The approval will not be injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community.

PROPOSED FINDING:

Fencing: The granting of this variance would be injurious to the general welfare of the community. The fencing could have been constructed to meet the existing regulations within the UDO as personal security and privacy concerns are not valid exemptions from development standards. As constructed, the fencing does not align with the character of the neighborhood.

Circle Drive: The petitioners failed to address how a lack of a circle drive would be injurious. The assertion that the home is located on two lots does not automatically allow for a separate drive as the two lots were built as one developable lot for planning and zoning purposes and the property has historically been accessed by a singular driveway with no known or reported negative impacts. The safety concerns provided could be addressed with a turnaround or some similar feature within the property.

[․]

2) The use and value of the area adjacent to the property included in the Development Standards Variance will not be affected in a substantially adverse manner.

PROPOSED FINDING:

Fencing: The use and value of the areas adjacent to the property are affected in a substantially adverse manner as the manner of installation does not meet the character of the neighborhood.

Circle Drive: Although there is one other property on this street with a circle drive, this is not the predominant development pattern within this neighborhood. The use and value of the areas adjacent to the property are not affected in a substantially adverse manner as circle drives do exist for other homes within the immediate neighborhood.

[․]

3) The strict application of the terms of the Unified Development Ordinance will result in practical difficulties in the use of the property; that the practical difficulties are peculiar to the property in question; that the Development Standards Variance will relieve the practical difficulties.

PROPOSED FINDING:

Fencing: The strict application of the terms of the UDO does not result in any practical difficulties of maintaining a four-foot tall fence within the front yard area as there are numerous properties within the City that meet the four-foot requirement. There are no practical difficulties to meeting the fence height requirement that are peculiar to this property. The home is a distance from the front property line that is not uncommon and no peculiar property characteristics warrant variance from the requirement. The approval of this variance would detract from the character of the neighborhood and would fail to meet standards as desired by the UDO for the community in general which could be met under practical circumstances.

Circle Drive: The strict application of the terms of the UDO does not result in practical difficulties as the UDO does not assume that every property will have enough frontage for a circle driveway. The petition site has 100 feet of frontage, which exceeds the minimum width requirements for the zoning district. There are no practical difficulties to meeting the driveway requirements for this property, as the number of driveway cuts that meet the UDO requirement previously existed on this site. The approval of this variance would detract from the character of the neighborhood and would fail to meet standards as required by the UDO for the community in general. There are no peculiar conditions of this property that do not allow safe access to the property through a singular connection. The location of this property at the end of a cul-de-sac results in very low traffic and thus low safety haz[ard] ingress and egress.

Appellants’ App. Vol. III pp. 13–15 (emphases in original). On November 18, 2024, the Slavens petitioned for judicial review in the Monroe Circuit Court. On March 2, 2026, the trial court affirmed the BZA's decision.

Discussion and Decision

[8] The Slavens contend that the BZA erred in denying their petitions for variances for their circle driveway and fencing.

This court and the trial court are bound by the same standards when reviewing the decision of a board of zoning appeals. Our review begins with the presumption that the BZA, due to its expertise in zoning matters, reached a correct decision. Because of their expertise, it is the BZA's duty to make findings of fact. We may only review the BZA's findings to determine whether they are supported by the evidence in the record. If our review reveals however that the evidence upon which the BZA acted was devoid of probative value, that the quantum of legitimate evidence was so proportionately meager as to lead to a conviction that the BZA's finding does not rest on a rational basis, or that the result of the hearing must have been substantially influenced by improper considerations, the BZA's order will be set aside.

Moreover, a zoning board must issue findings tailored to address the specific facts presented to the BZA. These basic findings of fact are not sufficient to support the BZA's ultimate findings if they are merely a general replication of the requirements of the ordinance at issue. Thus, we have held that this duty includes a requirement that a BZA enter both specific findings of fact and ultimate findings, or determinations.

Town of Munster Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Abrinko, 905 N.E.2d 488, 491–92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted), trans. denied.

[9] Indiana Code section 36-7-4-1614(d) provides, in part, that we should grant relief if we “determine[ ] that a person seeking judicial relief has been prejudiced by a zoning decision that is [․] arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]” “The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of a zoning decision is on the party to the judicial review proceeding asserting invalidity.” Ind. Code § 36-7-4-1614(a).

In reviewing an administrative decision, a trial court may not try the facts de novo or substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court may reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses. Reviewing courts must accept the facts as found by the zoning board.

Hoosier Outdoor Advert. Corp. v. RBL Mgmt., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 157, 163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

[10] When determining whether an administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court must determine from the entire record whether the agency's decision lacks a reasonably sound evidentiary basis. Thus, we have noted that evidence will be considered substantial if it is more than a

scintilla and less than a preponderance. In other words, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Crooked Creek Conserv. & Gun Club, Inc. v. Hamilton Cnty. N. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 677 N.E.2d 544, 548–49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted), trans. denied.

[11] As for the granting or denying of petitions for variances, Indiana Code section 36-7-4-918.5 provides, in part, as follows:

A variance may be approved under this section upon a determination in writing that:

(1) The approval will not be injurious to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of the community;

(2) the use and value of the area adjacent to the property included in the variance will not be affected in a substantially adverse manner; and

(3) the strict application of the terms of the zoning ordinance will result in practical difficulties in the use of the property.

Generally, the determination of whether “practical difficulties” would result involves (but is not limited to) consideration of whether the petitioner will suffer a significant economic injury from the enforcement of the zoning ordinance; “whether the injury is self-created or self-imposed[;] and whether any feasible alternative is available, within the terms of the ordinance, which achieve[s] the same goals of the landowner.” Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Marion Cnty., Div. II v. McDonald's Corp., 481 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).

[12] The Slavens claim that the BZA rejected their arguments against the feasible alternatives identified by the BZA without explaining its decisions in sufficient detail. It is true, as mentioned, that a BZA's “findings must be tailored to address the specific facts presented to the Board [and that] basic findings of fact are not sufficient to support the Board's ultimate findings if they are merely a general replication of the requirements of the ordinance at issue.” Network Towers, LLC v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of LaPorte Cnty. Ind., 770 N.E.2d 837, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citations and quotations marks omitted). The BZA's findings here are not merely general replications of the UDO's requirements, however, and the Slavens identify no authority for the proposition that factual findings in zoning decisions need to contain the high levels of detail that they urge.⁴ With this in mind, we conclude that the record contains substantial and sufficient evidence to support the BZA's decision with respect to both the circle driveway and the fencing.

[13] In the case of the circle driveway, the BZA found that the Slavens’ property had historically been served by a single driveway with no known or reported negative effects and that any safety concerns that Slavens might have could be addressed by a turnaround or similar feature. Under the circumstances of this case and pursuant to our highly-deferential standard of review, no more-detailed explanation was required. The BZA's rejection of the Slavens’ safety argument is supported by the lack of evidence of any historical or existing hazard and the fact that their home is located at the end of a cul-de-sac. As for the argument that a turnaround would reduce the Slavens’ usable living space in their front yard, the BZA likely rejected it either because there would only be a need for a turnaround if a safety issue actually existed or because it appears from an aerial photograph of the property that a turnaround, even assuming one were needed, would likely take up less space than the circle driveway does currently:

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Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 11.⁵ Either way, there is substantial evidence to support the BZA's rejection of their argument.

[14] As for the fencing, the BZA found a lack of practical difficulties based on the fact that many properties in the area had the UDO-mandated four-foot fences and that nothing about the Slavens’ property in particular warranted variance from the requirement, noting that the house was “a distance from the front property line that is not uncommon[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 15. This is supported by substantial evidence and therefore sufficient. In fact, the aerial photograph above (and the wider-angle aerial photograph embedded in paragraph 3) indicates that the Slavens’ house, if anything, is further back from the front property line than most of the other houses in the immediate vicinity. The Slavens have not established, as a matter of law, that the BZA erred in denying their variance with regard to their privacy fencing.

[15] The Slavens also argue that the BZA's findings indicated that it treated their safety and privacy concerns as invalid “exemptions,” when it should have treated them as considerations relevant to feasibility. The mere fact that the BZA referred to the Slavens’ concerns as “exemptions” (even assuming that that is somehow improper) is not dispositive. Our review of the record as a whole indicates that the BZA considered the Slavens’ stated concerns and, along with all of the other facts and circumstances before it, weighed them as it deemed appropriate. There is no indication whatsoever that the BZA dismissed the Slavens’ stated concerns because it believed them to be exemptions; it simply found that they were insufficient to override the interest of enforcing the UDO as written.

[16] Finally, the Slavens seem to argue that the fact they began construction of the fencing and circle driveway before seeking variances does not relieve the BZA from making adequate findings regarding practical difficulties. As we have already determined, however, the BZA's findings were not inadequate. The Slavens have failed to establish that the BZA erred in denying their variance petitions.

[17] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All citations to the BMC are from https://library.municode.com/in/bloomington/codes/code_of_ ordinances (last visited August 19, 2026).

2.   Section 20.04.080(n)(3)(A) provides, in part, that fences and walls for houses on interior lots located “[f]orward of the front building wall of the primary structure [․] shall not exceed four feet in height.” The City has also alleged that at least some of the fencing has been erected on a drainage and utility easement, an alleged violation of Section 20.04.080(n)(2)(B) that is not addressed in this case. (Appellants’ App. Vol. III pp. 183–84).

3.   Section 20.04.050(c)(1) provides, in relevant part, as follows:(1) Number of Drives.(A) Single-Family, Duplex, Triplex, and Fourplex Residential Uses. For single-family, duplex, triplex, and fourplex residential uses, a maximum of one driveway access point shall be permitted, regardless of the number of street frontages, except that a circle drive shall be permitted according to the following standards:i. The maximum circle drive width shall be ten feet;ii. The lot shall have a minimum of one hundred twenty feet of street frontage on the street the circle drive will access; andiii. The minimum distance between the driveway access points of a circle drive shall be sixty feet, measured from the inside edge of each driveway where it intersects the public right-of-way.

4.   Neither Edward Rose of Indiana, LLC v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals, 907 N.E.2d 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, nor Burton v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Madison County., 174 N.E.3d 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied, (nor the two cases read in conjunction) stands for the precise proposition the Slavens urge us to adopt. Edward Rose is a case in which a variance petitioner failed to carry its burden to establish practical difficulties, and Burton is one in which neighbors of the petitioner failed to carry their burden to demonstrate that the Madison County BZA had erred in granting a variance; neither turns on the lack of specificity of findings. Edward Rose, 907 N.E.2d at 606; Burton, 174 N.E.3d at 219.

5.   The Slavens’ house is in the center of the photograph above, and their property consists of the two contiguous lots (outlined in red) that the circle drive straddles.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.