Timothy Marcus Mayberry, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Indiana Department of Corrections, Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Timothy Marcus Mayberry appeals following the trial court's order dismissing his complaint against the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). Mayberry raises six issues for our review, which we reorder and restate as the following:

1. Whether the court erred when it denied his request for counsel.

2. Whether the court erred when it denied his request for a hearing on his motion for summary judgment.

3. Whether the trial court erred when it enforced a settlement agreement.

4. Whether the court erred when it denied his motion for summary judgment.

5. Whether the court erred when it quashed his subpoenas.

6. Whether the court erred when it set a trial date over twenty months out from his request.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mayberry was an inmate at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. On October 14, 2021, the DOC transferred him to the Miami Correctional Facility. On March 21, 2022, Mayberry filed a complaint against the DOC and several of its employees and alleged that they had negligently lost or damaged several pieces of his personal property during the transfer. Mayberry filed a motion for appointment of counsel.

[4] Thereafter, the DOC filed a motion to dismiss Mayberry's complaint. The trial court granted the DOC's motion and denied Mayberry's motion for appointment of counsel as moot. Mayberry appealed. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Mayberry's complaint as to the DOC but affirmed it as to the DOC employees. See Mayberry v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., No. 22A-CT-2482, 2023 WL 2028733 at *2-3 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2023) (mem.). This Court also directed the trial court to consider Mayberry's motion for appointment of counsel. See id. at *3.

[5] On remand, the trial court considered Mayberry's request for counsel and denied it, finding that Mayberry's “case is [a] civil case[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 65. Mayberry filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. Mayberry then filed a motion for a scheduling order and alleged that the “events giving rise to this action [are] approaching the two-year mark and there exist[s] a possibility that material evidence may be affected by this passage of time[.]” Id. at 71.

[6] On June 22, 2023, Mayberry filed a motion for summary judgment. In his accompanying memorandum, Mayberry asserted that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that the DOC “had exclusive control over [his] personal property at the time that it was lost and damaged.” Id. at 139. And he alleged that “the only way [his] personal property could have been lost and damaged was if the [DOC's] employees failed to safely and securely inspect, inventory, pack, transfer, and receive said property[.]” Id. at 141.

[7] The DOC responded to Mayberry's motion on August 21. The DOC alleged that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether it had exclusive control over Mayberry's property and whether the DOC's actions could be the only cause of the loss. The DOC designated the affidavit of Steven Gardner, a sergeant at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, who affirmed that he had “organized the personal property” of Mayberry, that Mayberry's property “could have exceeded the allowable amount,” and that Mayberry “could have misplaced his own personal property or transferred items to fellow inmates.” Id. at 158-59.

[8] On August 24, Mayberry filed a request for a ruling on his motion for summary judgment. On August 25, the court denied Mayberry's summary-judgment motion. Then, on August 30, Mayberry filed a request for a hearing on his motion for summary judgment. The court found that Mayberry's motion had “already been ruled on” and took “no further action.” Id. at 167. On September 11, Mayberry filed a request for a jury trial and asked that it be held “within the next sixty (60) days.” Id. at 184. The court scheduled a jury trial for June 10 and 11, 2025.

[9] Mayberry requested subpoenas for the DOC officials, the DOC inmates, and a private citizen, which the court granted. The DOC filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. The DOC alleged that the testimony of the DOC officials would be “duplicative and cumulative” of testimony from individuals Mayberry had listed on his witness list. Id. at 244. The DOC also alleged that the subpoena for the incarcerated individuals should be quashed because their testimony was “irrelevant” to Mayberry's claims. Id. at 246. And the DOC alleged that the private individual's testimony was “wholly unnecessary” because Mayberry could testify to the same matters. Id. at 247. The trial court granted the DOC's motion and quashed the subpoenas.

[10] Thereafter, the parties engaged in mediation and reached a settlement. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the DOC agreed to pay Mayberry $5,750.00, “[s]ubject to the approval of this settlement by the Governor and the Attorney General,” and Mayberry agreed to “cause the dismissal with prejudice” of his current claims against the DOC within ten days of his receipt of the funds. Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 56. Both parties signed the settlement agreement. Accordingly, on May 27, 2025, the DOC filed a motion for the court to vacate the previously scheduled trial date, which motion the court granted.

[11] On June 20, the DOC informed Mayberry that the settlement agreement had been approved by the Governor and the Attorney General. The DOC further informed Mayberry that he needed to sign a release and execute a W-9 and that once the completed documents were received the Attorney General's office would process the settlement funds. Mayberry completed the forms the same day.

[12] On July 7, Mayberry filed a motion to reschedule the trial dates, alleging that he had agreed to the settlement only on the condition that he would receive the funds no later than June 26. He then stated that, because he had not yet received the funds, he “rescind[ed]” his agreement to the settlement. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 30. The DOC responded on August 11 and stated that the funds had been deposited on July 30. The DOC alleged that, “because the settlement funds in this matter have been deposited,” there was no reason to reschedule the trial dates. Id. at 44.

[13] The DOC then filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. In that motion, the DOC alleged that the settlement agreement “does not provide that [it] is to make the settlement funds available for [Mayberry's] use within 30 to 45 days after acceptance of the mediator's proposal,” nor does the agreement “provide any deadline by which [it] is to pay [Mayberry] the settlement funds [in] this matter.” Id. at 50. The DOC then alleged that Mayberry “released his current claims when he signed the Release and Settlement Agreement, in exchange for payment of settlement funds which have been provided to him pursuant to that agreement” and that, as such, “this matter should be dismissed with prejudice.” Id. at 53.

[14] Mayberry filed a response in opposition to the DOC's motion to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that there was “no settlement agreement” between him and the DOC because the DOC “failed to meet the condition precedent” of providing the funds within forty-five days of his acceptance of the agreement. Id. at 60. He further alleged that he “expressly made [the DOC] aware that timely paying fees was [his] only motivation for accepting the proposed settlement offer” and that, after the DOC missed the deadline, he “was no longer interested in the offer.” Id. at 61. And he contended that, because the DOC missed the payment deadline, “no enforceable contract was ever made.” Id. at 63. The trial court granted the DOC's motion to enforce and dismissed Mayberry's complaint. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[15] We first note that Mayberry proceeds pro se. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation omitted).

Issue One: Request for Counsel

[16] Mayberry first asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his request for appointed counsel. A trial court's decision regarding a request for appointment of counsel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074, 1083 (Ind. 2022). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[17] Indiana Code Chapter 34-10-1 governs a court's determination of whether to grant a request for appointed counsel in a civil case. In particular, Indiana Code Section 34-10-1-2 states as follows:

(b) If the court is satisfied that a person who makes an application [for appointed counsel] does not have sufficient means to prosecute or defend the action, the court:

(1) shall admit the applicant to prosecute or defend as an indigent person; and

(2) may, under exceptional circumstances, assign an attorney to defend or prosecute the cause.

(c) The factors that a court may consider under subsection (b)(2) include the following:

(1) The likelihood of the applicant prevailing on the merits of the applicant's claim or defense.

(2) The applicant's ability to investigate and present the applicant's claims or defenses without an attorney, given the type and complexity of the facts and legal issues in the actions.

(d) The court shall deny an application made under section 1 of this chapter if the court determines any of the following:

(1) The applicant failed to make a diligent effort to obtain an attorney before filing the application.

(2) The applicant is unlikely to prevail on the applicant's claim or defense.

(Emphases added).

[18] On appeal, Mayberry contends that the court denied his motion “based on an arbitrary and contradictory non-statutory reason” and that he “was otherwise eligible for the appointment [of] counsel.” Appellant's Br. at 28. However, Mayberry makes no argument on appeal as to any exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel, his ability to investigate and present his claims, or his efforts to obtain counsel before asking the court to appoint one for him. As such, he has not met his burden on appeal to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion.

Issue Two: Summary-Judgment Hearing

[19] Mayberry next contends that the court erred when it denied his request for a summary-judgment hearing. Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) provides that, “upon motion of any party made no later than ten (10) days after the response was filed or was due, the court shall conduct a hearing on the motion[.]”

[20] Here, there is no dispute that Mayberry filed a request for a hearing in his motion for summary judgment. However, three days after the DOC filed its response, Mayberry filed a request for a ruling for his motion. The next day, the trial court ruled on the motion and denied it. By the time the court received Mayberry's next request for a hearing, it had already denied the motion and, as such, there was no longer a need for a hearing. By then, the court had already considered the motion, response, and the parties’ designated evidence and determined that genuine issues of material fact existed. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a hearing.

Issue Three: Settlement Agreement

[21] Mayberry also contends that the court erred when it enforced the settlement agreement. To resolve this issue on appeal, we must interpret the agreement. It is well settled that the

[c]onstruction of the terms of a written contract generally is a pure question of law. The goal of contract interpretation is to determine the intent of the parties when they made the agreement. This court must examine the plain language of the contract, read it in context and, whenever possible, construe it so as to render every word, phrase, and term meaningful, unambiguous, and harmonious with the whole. If contract language is unambiguous, this court may not look to extrinsic evidence to expand, vary, or explain the instrument but must determine the parties’ intent from the four corners of the instrument.

Layne v. Layne, 77 N.E.3d 1254, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citations omitted).

[22] Mayberry maintains that “there is no settlement agreement (or any other enforceable agreement) between IDOC and [him] because IDOC failed to meet the condition precedent of the proposed settlement agreement: provide the funds to [him] by June 26th, 2025.” Appellant's Br. at 17. Mayberry maintains that he “conditioned [his] agreement” on receiving the settlement funds by June 26 and that, based on the DOC's failure, “there is no binding contract.” Id. at 17-18.

[23] However, we agree with the State that there was no “evidence that the contract was conditioned on the [DOC] providing [Mayberry] the settlement money by a specific date.” Appellee's Br. at 24. Indeed, the terms of the contract plainly state that the DOC will provide a specific sum of money to Mayberry in exchange for Mayberry dismissing his claims against the DOC. The only conditions in the agreement are that it is “[s]ubject to [the] approval of” the Governor and the Attorney General and that Mayberry had to sign a release and complete a W-9 form. Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 56. There is no indication anywhere in the contract that the DOC promised to provide the funds to Mayberry by a specific date or that Mayberry's acceptance was conditioned upon any such promise.

[24] Had Mayberry wished to have the funds transferred to him by a certain date, he could have included a provision in the contract. But he did not. Instead, the only deadline to which the parties agreed was Mayberry's agreement to have the cause against the DOC dismissed within ten days of his receipt of funds. Further, where the contract is silent as to its duration, “it is the general rule” that a party is given “a reasonable time within which to” comply. Rogier v. Am. Testing and Eng'g Corp., 734 N.E.2d 606, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Here, since the settlement agreement was silent as to when the DOC was required to pay Mayberry, the DOC was simply required to pay within a reasonable time. The DOC informed Mayberry on June 20 that the settlement had been approved by the Governor and the Attorney General. The DOC then placed the funds in Mayberry's account on July 30, just over one month later. We conclude that the DOC complied with the terms within a reasonable time.

[25] We acknowledge that Mayberry points to the DOC's conduct and to discussions between himself and the DOC to demonstrate that the DOC promised to deliver funds to him by a specific date. However, given that the contract is unambiguous and does not require the DOC to provide the funds by a certain date, we cannot look to Mayberry's extrinsic evidence to expand the terms of the contract to include his requested deadline. See Layne, 77 N.E.3d at 1265.

[26] The contract did not contain a certain date by which the DOC was required to provide funds to Mayberry. As such, there was no condition precedent as Mayberry contends, and the court did not err when it enforced the settlement agreement.

Remaining Issues

[27] Mayberry also argues that the court erred when it denied his motion for summary judgment, when it quashed his subpoenas, and when it scheduled a trial date over twenty months out from the date he requested it. However, we need not address the merits of any of those claims because they are all moot. In general, a case is deemed moot when the controversy at issue has been ended, settled, or otherwise disposed of such that the court can provide no effective relief to the parties. Moore v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1241, 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Therefore, in such instances it is unnecessary for the court to decide the question involved. Id.

[28] Here, as discussed above, Mayberry entered into an agreement to settle his claims with the DOC, which ended the controversy. Regarding his summary-judgment argument, because he chose to settle his claims with the DOC, we cannot now render him any effective relief. Even if we were to agree with Mayberry that the court erred, there would be nothing left for the court to consider on summary judgment. If we considered the merits of Mayberry's claim, we would essentially be issuing an advisory opinion. And it is a “cardinal principle of the judicial function” that “courts should not issue advisory opinions[.]” Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 786 (Ind. 2011).

[29] Similarly, because Mayberry settled his claims, there would be no proceedings at which witnesses could testify, so there is no effective relief we can provide to Mayberry regarding his quashed subpoenas. And, again, because Mayberry voluntarily entered into the settlement agreement, and the court dismissed the claims against the DOC, there will be no trial date. As such, Mayberry's claims regarding the trial date are also moot because we cannot provide any relief.

Conclusion

[30] The trial court did not err when it denied Mayberry's request for counsel, denied Mayberry's request for a summary-judgment hearing, or enforced the settlement agreement. And Mayberry's claims regarding the court's ruling on summary judgment, his subpoenas, and the trial date are moot given Mayberry's entry into the settlement agreement. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[31] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.