IN RE: A.C. and Ma.C. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.C. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order adjudicating his two minor children A.C. and Ma.C. (“the Children”) to be Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Father presents three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as two issues:

1. Whether the trial court's adjudication of the Children as CHINS is clearly erroneous.

2. Whether the dispositional order is clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.¹

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and L.W. (“Mother”) (collectively “Parents”), who were never married, are the parents of A.C., born September 25, 2016, and Ma.C., born August 26, 2020. Mother has suffered from mental illness since her childhood, and she has been diagnosed with “chronic PTSD, borderline personality disorder, and schizoid-effective disorder with depressive type.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 27-28. Father and Mother have lived together on and off for several years. Father was incarcerated from late 2016 until late 2018, and he served a nine-month sentence beginning in December 2023. In May 2025, Mother suspected that Father was using illegal drugs, and she asked him to move out.

[4] The Children have lived with Mother for all but approximately two months of their lives, when they lived with Father. During August and September 2025, Father and the Children lived with Father's girlfriend, P.J., with whom Father had an “unstable” relationship. Tr. p. 26. On three occasions during those two months, P.J. asked Father and the Children to move out. There was also an allegation that an adult staying at P.J.’s residence ² had “inappropriately touched” A.C. Id. at 28.

[5] On December 2, 2025, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received two reports that Parents were neglecting the Children. At that time, Ma.C. was staying with Father,³ and A.C. was living with Mother. Mother was having suicidal thoughts, and she was threatening to “stab her neighbors․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 28. A family case manager, Shanjae Gilbert, interviewed Father and Mother. Gilbert observed that Mother

appeared overwhelmed, unengaged, and emotionally volatile, displaying periods of anger and tearfulness. [Mother] admitted to experiencing both suicidal and homicidal ideation during the assessment. [Mother] also reported difficulty meeting basic needs in the home, stating that she “wouldn't even feed a dog with the food in the refrigerator.”

Id. Mother stated that A.C. had had thoughts of suicide, and neither Father nor Mother sought help for A.C. Ultimately, Mother agreed to a short hospital stay for herself.

[6] Meanwhile, Father

presented multiple concerns regarding the ability to provide stability, safely and consistently to meet [the Children's] basic needs. [Father] reported unstable housing, food insecurity, and a lack of reliable transportation needed to support the children's daily care and school attendance. He confirmed he could not care for the children long-term without [Mother's] assistance. During an unannounced visit [by Gilbert] on 12/03/2025, [Father] additionally reported ongoing concerns regarding [Mother's] mental health, stating she experiences periodic episodes during which she becomes unable to meet the children's needs, including not feeding or supervising them. Although he did not believe she would intentionally harm the children, he expressed concerns about her ability to parent safely. [Father] reiterated that he also lacks stability and does not feel capable of being the children's full-time caregiver. On 12/05/2025, [Father] reported that [Mother] attempted to pick up the children from his home and, during the interaction, [she] grabbed [Ma.C.] by the head and pushed him toward the door when he refused to go with her [Father] further stated that if [Mother] abandons the children again, he does not want to be contacted and prefers the children be placed in foster care, citing his inability to continue managing the situation.

Id. at 29 (emphasis added).

[7] On December 9, DCS requested authorization to file a petition alleging that the Children were CHINS, which the court granted. In the petition, DCS alleged that the Children's physical or mental conditions were seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of Parents to supply them with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision when they were financially able to do so or due to Parents’ failure, refusal, or inability to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and the Children need care, treatment, or rehabilitation that they were not receiving and was unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. Following an initial hearing, on December 14, the trial court ordered that the Children be removed from Parents’ care and placed in foster care.

[8] Following a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition on January 29, 2026, the trial court found that the Children were CHINS. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: CHINS Adjudications

[9] Father contends that the trial court's CHINS adjudications are clearly erroneous. Our standard of review is well settled:

A CHINS proceeding is a civil action; thus, “the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Egly v. Blackford County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992). We consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We reverse only upon a showing that the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous. Id.

In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012).

[10] Father complains that the trial court did not enter specific findings, but findings are not required unless the parties request findings under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), which they did not. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014) (“[u]nlike CHINS dispositional decrees ․ no statute expressly requires formal findings in a CHINS fact-finding order”). When a trial court does not enter findings, we review under a general judgment standard and will affirm the judgment “ ‘if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)).

[11] DCS alleged that the Children were CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 (2025), which provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[12] Our Supreme Court has interpreted that statute to require “three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). And, when determining whether a child is a CHINS under Section 31-34-1-1, the juvenile court “should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290.

[13] Father argues that the evidence shows that the Children were neither seriously impaired nor seriously endangered by Father's inability, refusal, or neglect to provide for their needs. In support, Father cites the evidence showing that he and P.J., now his fiancée, had income and housing appropriate for the Children, and Father had enrolled the Children in school. But Father's argument is a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do on appeal.

[14] DCS presented ample evidence that Father had a history of failing to provide the Children with stable housing, including the two years he was incarcerated beginning in 2016 and the nine months he was incarcerated beginning in 2023. And when FCM Gilbert investigated the initial reports of neglect in early December 2025, less than two months before the factfinding hearing, Father reported food insecurity, as well as a lack of stable housing and reliable transportation. Father told Gilbert that he was unable to care for the Children without Mother's help, and he stated that he would rather the Children live in foster care if Mother had future mental health crises. In addition, P.J. testified that she had housing through a veteran's program and that Father was not “technically allowed to be living there under that program.” Tr. p. 78. Father's assertion on appeal that he was able to provide a stable home for the Children is not well taken.

[15] Moreover, Mother testified that: Father had once slapped A.C. across the face; Father had not provided A.C. with needed emotional support; and Mother had suspected Father of substance abuse in May 2025. Mother described Father's relationship with P.J. as “unstable,” and Mother testified that P.J. had “kicked [Father and the Children] out of the house” three times during August and September 2025, just a few months before the factfinding hearing. Tr. p. 26.

[16] The evidence shows that Father's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the Children, that the Children's needs are unmet, and that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. The trial court's CHINS adjudications are not clearly erroneous.

Issue Two: Dispositional Order

[17] Father also argues that the trial court's dispositional order is “contrary to law and clearly erroneous.” Appellant's Br. at 31. Indiana Code section 31-34-19-10 (2025) provides:

(a) The juvenile court shall accompany the court's dispositional decree with written findings and conclusions upon the record concerning the following:

(1) The needs of the child for care, treatment, rehabilitation, or placement.

(2) The need for participation by the parent, guardian, or custodian in the plan of care for the child.

(3) Efforts made, if the child is a child in need of services, to:

(A) prevent the child's removal from; or

(B) reunite the child with; the child's parent, guardian, or custodian in accordance with federal law.

(4) Family services that were offered and provided to:

(A) a child in need of services; or

(B) the child's parent, guardian, or custodian;

in accordance with federal law.

(5) The court's reasons for the disposition.

(6) Whether the child is a dual status child under IC 31-41.

(b) The juvenile court may incorporate a finding or conclusion from a predispositional report as a written finding or conclusion upon the record in the court's dispositional decree.

[18] Here, the trial court ordered Father to participate in the following: “1. Father's engagement w/ parenting assessment and follow all recommendations[, and] 2. Clinical interview and assessment and follow all recommendations.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 144. Father contends that the trial court's findings and conclusions are not “adequate” to support the dispositional order and that the order is “contrary to the holding of our Supreme Court in the case of In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. 2010).” Appellant's Br. at 33.

[19] Notably, Father does not explain in any detail how the trial court's findings and conclusions are inadequate. Instead, Father merely suggests that this case is analogous to In re N.E., where our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's CHINS determination but reversed the dispositional order and remanded with instructions. 919 N.E.2d at 108. In In re N.E., there was conflicting evidence whether the child had lived with her father or her mother for the majority of her young life. DCS had filed a petition alleging that N.E. was a CHINS due to her mother's failure to protect her from domestic violence. But father and mother did not live together, so the alleged domestic violence had nothing to do with father. Our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's adjudication of N.E. as a CHINS.

[20] However, with respect to the dispositional order, which placed N.E. in foster care rather than with father, the Court stated that

the State had been unaware that N.E. spent a substantial portion of her time with Father. The allegations in the CHINS petition neither pertained to Father nor contended that he knew of the acts or omissions by Mother that resulted in the CHINS proceeding. The State presented no evidence at the hearing that N.E. was in danger in Father's care.[] The Guardian ad Litem stated that “[t]here is ․ no doubt that [N.E.] was appropriately cared for while in [Grandmother's] home․”

Id. at 107. And the Court observed that “the court's reasons for its disposition regarding N.E. do not seem to have taken into account the time she spent in Father's (and Grandmother's) care—or anything else regarding the suitability of placing N.E. with Father.” Id. at 108. Thus, the Court held that the dispositional order “may well have interfered with Father's rights in the upbringing of N.E. and violated the ‘least restrictive (most family like)’ placement mandate of Indiana Code section 31-34-19-6(1)(A).” Id.

[21] Father ignores the clear differences between In re N.E. and this case. Here, DCS presented evidence at the fact-finding hearing that the Children had previously lived with Father for only two months, in late 2025, and, during that short time, Father and the Children lacked stable housing. And in December, despite his prior participation in Father's Engagement during “the last CHINS case,”⁴ Father did not feel able to care for the Children without Mother's help. Tr. p. 62. The trial court's findings are supported by the evidence.⁵

[22] While the trial court's findings and conclusions certainly could have included more specific references to the evidence, we agree with DCS that the findings and conclusions adequately track the statute. And the findings and conclusions are analogous to those that we considered in In re T.F., where we affirmed the dispositional order. 272 N.E.3d 1025, 1033-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (noting that mother did not challenge any specific finding and quoting the findings that tracked Ind. Code § 31-34-19-10).

[23] The dispositional order is not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[24] The trial court's adjudication of the Children as CHINS is not clearly erroneous. The evidence supports the trial court's findings, and the findings support the conclusions that the Children are CHINS. The evidence also supports the trial court's findings in the dispositional order, and that order is not clearly erroneous.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent Father purports to challenge the trial court's ruling on his motion for custody, Father does not present cogent argument in support of that issue. While the first issue in his “Statement of the Issues” refers to his motion for custody, the Argument section of his brief does not include an argument related to that motion. In any event, Father does not refute the Department of Child Services’ argument that the court has not yet ruled on that motion and there is no final, appealable order on that purported issue.

2.   There were multiple people living in or staying at P.J.’s residence in early December 2025.

3.   The record is not clear regarding how long Ma.C. had been staying with Father at that point.

4.   The evidence shows that the most recent CHINS case involving Father and the Children was in 2023. But the record on appeal does not include much information about that prior case other than the fact that Father completed Father's Engagement and Mother received wraparound services.

5.   Father also relies on this Court's opinion in In re J.Q., 836 N.E.2d 961 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), for support on this issue. But the issue in In re J.Q. was the sufficiency of the evidence to support the CHINS determination with only a passing reference to the court's findings in the disposition report.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.