IN RE: : The Matter of the Adoption of R.K. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] B.K. (“Father”) is the biological father of R.K. (d/o/b January 9, 2013) (“Child”). In 2022, following domestic violence allegations involving Father, Child was determined to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”), and was placed with Child's maternal grandparents, R.C. and R.C. (collectively, “Appellees”). On April 30, 2025, Appellees initiated adoption proceedings. The adoption court granted Appellees’ adoption petition, determining that Father's consent to the adoption was not required pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8. The adoption court also determined sua sponte that Father's consent was irrevocably implied pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-10-1. Father challenges these determinations on appeal. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] C.C., Child's biological mother (“Mother”), died in 2016, when Child was three years old. In 2022, after domestic violence charges were brought against Father, Child was removed from his care and determined to be a CHINS. Through the CHINS proceedings, Appellees were awarded sole legal and physical custody of Child on February 15, 2023.

[3] Father was permitted to see Child during supervised therapeutic visits at the Bowen Center. At some point, the Bowen Center informed Father that it would no longer bill Child's insurance and that he must pay the twenty-dollar visit fee himself. Citing his inability to afford the visits, Father's last visit with Child was in March of 2023.

[4] On April 30, 2025, Appellees petitioned to adopt Child, alleging that Father's consent was not required because Father had failed to have meaningful contact with Child for more than one year. Appellees’ notice of adoption proceedings (“the Notice”) advised Father that he must contest the adoption by written motion within thirty days from service or that his consent would be irrevocably implied. On June 2, 2025, Father appeared pro se at a status hearing. At the hearing, Father requested and was appointed a public defender.

[5] On August 18, 2025, a hearing was held to determine whether Father's consent to the adoption was required. The adoption court determined that Father's consent was not necessary because Father had failed to have meaningful contact with Child for over two years when he had been able to do so. Although Father claimed that he could not afford the supervised visits, Father had not petitioned the adoption court for an alternative visitation arrangement to account for his claimed financial hardship. Father claimed that he had failed to request such relief because he had hoped to quickly “get back to financial stability.” Tr. Vol. I p. 46. The adoption court also found that Father had worked up to three jobs at a time to support himself and had had minimal living expenses while staying with his aunt. Father had also paid child support and home-detention fees and financially supported his mother during this time.

[6] Father acknowledged that he had not seen Child since the last supervised visit in 2023. Despite Appellees’ living in the same home with the same telephone number for several years, Father had not attempted to contact or visit Child at Appellees’ home during those two years. Father testified that he did not “want to harass” Appellees by trying to contact them to visit or contact Child. Tr. Vol. I p. 44. The adoption court concluded that Father's consent was implied pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(A).

[7] The adoption court also determined sua sponte that Father's consent was irrevocably implied because he had failed to file a written motion to contest the adoption within fifteen days of service of the Notice, as required by Indiana Code section 31-19-10-1(b). The adoption court determined that Father had failed to submit a written motion even after having been appointed counsel on June 2, 2025.

[8] Father prematurely appealed the decision that his consent to adopt was not necessary, and we remanded the matter for a final hearing. On February 25, 2026, the adoption court held a final hearing and granted Appellees’ petition to adopt Child.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Father contends that the adoption court erred by concluding that his consent to the adoption was not required because he had justifiable cause for not communicating with Child for over one year.

We generally show considerable deference to the trial court's decision in family law matters because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children. So, when reviewing an adoption case, we presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption. And we will not disturb that decision unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial judge reached an opposite conclusion. We will not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Rather, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision.

Matter of Adoption of I.B., 163 N.E.3d 270, 274 (Ind. 2021) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

When, as in this case, the trial court has made findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: we must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment. Factual findings are clearly erroneous if the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them, and a judgment is clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and the conclusions relying on those findings.

In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted and formatting altered).

[10] Generally, a petition to adopt a minor child may be granted only if written consent to adopt has been provided by the biological parents. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1. There are, however, numerous exceptions to the consent requirement. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8. For example, an adoption court may dispose of the paternal-consent requirement when a child has been in the custody of another person for at least one year and the parent fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with their child while able to do so. Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(2)(A)–(B). A petitioner for adoption without parental consent has the burden of proving, “by clear and indubitable evidence,” one of the statutory criteria allowing for adoption without consent. In re Adoption of J.T.A., 988 N.E.2d 1250, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[11] Here, Father does not dispute that Child has been in Appellees’ custody since 2022 and that Father had not seen Child since 2023. Father argues that the adoption court's decision to dispense the parental-consent requirement was nonetheless clearly erroneous because he had justifiable cause in failing to maintain meaningful contact with Child for at least a year due to financial hardship. Whether a non-custodial parent had justifiable cause to forgo communication with their child depends on the totality of the circumstances. E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 764–65 (Ind. 2018).

[12] Father presented ample evidence of his financial situation to the adoption court, which ultimately concluded that Father had had the opportunity to communicate with Child but had chosen not to do so for at least one year. The record indicates that Father knew where Child resided and had Appellants’ telephone number but had never tried to visit or contact Child. The adoption court found that Father had worked up to three jobs at a time to support himself and his mother and to make child support and home-detention payments, but that Father had incurred few expenses living rent-free with an aunt. Even with these additional financial obligations, Father had never requested relief from the adoption court to modify the visitation agreement due to his alleged financial hardship. Under the circumstances, the adoption court's finding that Father had been able to contact his Child during this time and had failed to do so is not clearly erroneous. Father's claim to the contrary is merely a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.¹ In re I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274.

[13] The judgment of the adoption court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Having concluded that the trial court did not err in finding that Father's consent to the adoption was not necessary under Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8, we need not consider Father's alternative argument that the trial court erred in additionally finding that his consent was irrevocably implied under Indiana Code section 31-19-10-1.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.