Pierre E. Chester, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Pierre E. Chester appeals his conviction for operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license as a class C misdemeanor. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 14, 2024, Indiana State Trooper Tyler Vermillion observed a vehicle traveling in the right lane begin “to veer off towards the right ․ until it crossed over the solid white line that marks the outer edge of the lane.” Transcript Volume II at 10. The “passenger tires then went onto the shoulder,” and the vehicle “continued for a short time before correcting its lane of travel ․ back into the lane.” Id.

[3] Trooper Vermillion activated his emergency lights in order to initiate a traffic stop, but the vehicle “continued on for a large distance” before turning and coming to a stop on the side of the road. Id. Trooper Vermillion exited his police vehicle and watched the driver of the vehicle move to the passenger seat and the passenger move to the driver's seat. Trooper Vermillion approached the passenger side of the vehicle, smelled the odor of burnt marijuana, asked the passenger, later identified as Chester, for his license or ID, and confronted him about having switched seats with the passenger.

[4] Chester admitted that he did not have a license and asserted that he “was just sitting in there in order to allow the passenger, prior to the stop, time to rest her eyes.” Id. at 15. Trooper Vermillion ran Chester's “driving record and information,” and it showed that he “currently had a status of suspended infraction on a regular ID card.” Id. “Upon looking through his driver's license history,” Trooper Vermillion “could not see where he had ever possessed a license.” Id.

[5] On January 18, 2024, the State charged Chester with: Count I, possession of marijuana as a class B misdemeanor; Count II, possession of paraphernalia as a class C misdemeanor; Count III, operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license as a class C misdemeanor; and Count IV, driving while suspended as a class A infraction.

[6] On March 4, 2026, the court held a bench trial. The State presented the testimony of Trooper Vermillion, other troopers involved in the stop, and a forensic scientist. The court admitted bodycam video, dashcam video, and Chester's BMV record. After the State rested, defense counsel moved for judgment on the evidence with respect to the charges of possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia. The court denied the motion.

[7] Defense counsel asserted:

The crux in this case is obviously counts one and two. There's clear documentation as to counts three and four and we're not really contesting. The evidence is clear. I would suggest with respect to the no license and driving while suspended, that it's a mitigating factor, but certainly not a defense, that my client did end up getting a valid license, and, of course, he should be credited with that fact․ Without belaboring the fact or beating a dead horse, Your Honor, I'm simply asking the court to find my client not guilty and acquit him on counts one and two.

[8] The court found Chester guilty of Counts III and IV and took the matter with respect to Counts I and II under advisement. With respect to Counts III and IV, the court stated that it “believe[d] the State has met their burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt” and noted the BMV record as well as Chester's statements provided in the bodycam and dashcam recordings. Id. at 56. On March 11, 2026, the court entered an order which stated in part that “[t]he Defendant conceded to Counts III and IV based on the evidence presented by the State of Indiana.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 221. The order also indicated that it found Chester not guilty as to Counts I and II.

[9] On March 27, 2026, the court began the scheduled sentencing hearing, and defense counsel indicated that Chester had recently requested new counsel. The court rescheduled the hearing. On April 10, 2026, the court held a sentencing hearing with different counsel appearing for Chester. Defense counsel stated, “In reviewing the court's order, it indicated that, I mean, obviously, we're talking about counts one and two, ․ it indicated that defendant and counsel had conceded counts three and four.” Transcript Volume II at 71. He also stated, “The language of the concession, I wasn't sure if that would preclude an appeal or not.” Id. The court replied, “I do not see that as a preclusion to his appellate rights.” Id. at 71-72. After a recess for defense counsel to speak with Chester, the court stated, “Defense counsel had no evidence or testimony to present, simply wanted to preserve his client's appellate rights, which the court [e]nsured.” Id. at 73. With respect to Count III, the court sentenced Chester to time served and a driver's license suspension of sixty days. With respect to Count IV, the court imposed a fine of twenty-five dollars.

Discussion

[10] Chester challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license as a class C misdemeanor. He acknowledges that the State “presented sufficient evidence to show that [he] was knowingly or intentionally operating a motor vehicle on a highway” but argues that the State “did not demonstrate that [he] did not possess a valid driver's license in another jurisdiction.” Appellant's Brief at 7. He also contends that “the requirement for [him] to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he possessed a valid driver's license pursuant to Indiana Code § 9-24-18-1(b)(1) is not triggered, as the burden was not shifted to [him] by the State's lack of evidence.” Id. at 8.

[11] The State argues that Chester is estopped from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction because he conceded below that the State presented sufficient evidence and explicitly invited the trial court to return a guilty verdict. It also contends that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

[12] “Under the invited error doctrine, a party may not take advantage of an error that he commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of his own neglect or misconduct.” Gary v. State, 124 N.E.3d 90, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Stewart v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1277, 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied). At the bench trial, defense counsel stated, “The crux in this case is obviously counts one and two. There's clear documentation as to counts three and four and we're not really contesting. The evidence is clear.” Transcript Volume II at 55. Under the invited error doctrine, Chester cannot now argue the State's evidence was insufficient. See Gary, 124 N.E.3d at 95 (holding that defendant could not argue the State's evidence was insufficient after conceding that the State had carried its burden to present evidence to prove he committed the crime).

[13] Invited error notwithstanding, we cannot say reversal is warranted. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess witness credibility or reweigh the evidence. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Id. We affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. at 147. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id.

[14] The offense is governed by Ind. Code § 9-24-18-1, which provides:

(a) An individual, except an individual exempted under IC 9-24-1-7,[1] who knowingly or intentionally operates a motor vehicle upon a highway and has never received a valid driver's license[2] commits a Class C misdemeanor․

(b) In a prosecution under this section, the burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant:

(1) had been issued a driver's license or permit that was valid; or

(2) was operating a motor driven cycle;

at the time of the alleged offense. However, it is not a defense under subdivision (2) if the defendant was operating the motor driven cycle in violation of IC 9-21-11-12.

[15] The record reveals that defense counsel asked Trooper Vermillion, “[Y]ou indicated that you did not find any record of Mr. Chester being licensed, correct?” Transcript Volume II at 20. Trooper Vermillion replied, “Correct.” Id. When asked if he checked both Indiana and Illinois records, he answered, “I gave the information to my dispatch and they look through all of the records for the BMV and they also did not locate any information showing that he had ever had a license.” Id. He also stated, “I had determined that he had never had a license ․” Id. Chester's certified BMV record admitted at trial indicates that Indiana had not issued any driver's license to Chester prior to January 14, 2024. Based upon the record, we conclude that evidence of probative value exists from which the court could determine that Chester committed operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license as a class C misdemeanor.

[16] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Chester's conviction.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Chester does not cite Ind. Code § 9-24-1-7 and does not develop an argument that he was an exempt person as defined in that statute.

2.   At the time of the offense, Ind. Code § 9-13-2-48 defined “Driver's license” as follows:(1) Any type of license issued by the state in the form of a physical credential authorizing an individual to operate the type of vehicle for which the license was issued, in the manner for which the license was issued, on a highway. The term includes any endorsements added to the license under IC 9-24-8.5.(2) Except for a commercial driver's license issued under IC 9-24-6.1, any type of license issued by the state in the form of a mobile credential authorizing an individual to operate the type of vehicle for which the license was issued, in the manner for which the license was issued, on a highway. The term includes any endorsements added to the license under IC 9-24-8.5.Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 141-2024, § 2 (eff. July 1, 2024).

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.