Robert D. Littlejohn, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After his murder conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Robert Littlejohn filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects. The post-conviction court denied Littlejohn's petition, and he appeals. Finding no clear error in the post-conviction court's judgment, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] This Court articulated the following facts on direct appeal:

On September 7, 2019, Keonna Suttle (“Keonna”) returned home to 1610 Roosevelt Street (“1610 Roosevelt”) in Fort Wayne, Indiana after delivering tamales with her mother, Alisha Suttle (“Alisha”); her aunt, Siara Jackson (“Siara”); and a family friend, Kennedy Laramore (“Kennedy”). Keonna lived at 1610 Roosevelt with her grandmother, Diana Littlejohn (“Diana”) and step-grandfather, Littlejohn. When Keonna, Alisha, Siara, and Kennedy arrived at 1610 Roosevelt, Littlejohn's sister, Cynthia Littlejohn (“Cynthia”) was also there. Cynthia and Littlejohn had returned from visiting family members following the recent death of their father. Cynthia was outside as Keonna left the vehicle, which was parked on the street near 1610 Roosevelt, and Cynthia followed Keonna into the residence, angrily confronting Keonna and telling her to stay out of “grown folks business.”

Littlejohn, who was inside the house, told Cynthia to leave. Alisha was also inside the house and Siara and Kennedy remained outside in the vehicle. As to Keonna staying out of “grown folks business[,]” Alisha told Cynthia that if Cynthia had “anything to say to [Keonna]” that she could say it to her or to Diana but that Cynthia “got mad, she got smart, snarky” and Cynthia and Alisha began to argue. Alisha left the house and went back to the vehicle. Keonna was still in the house and as Cynthia was leaving through the front door, she hit Keonna, who was pregnant, in the jaw which caused a fight that continued outside the house. At that point, Alisha, Siara, and Kennedy left the vehicle and came up to the fight between Keonna and Cynthia, which was still occurring outside the home. Cynthia and Siara also began to fight after Cynthia tried to hit Siara in the face, and Alisha and Kennedy also joined the fight; Diana called for everyone to stop fighting, but the fight moved to the driveway and into the yard near Cynthia's car. Littlejohn attempted to stop the fight and get Cynthia to leave with him in her vehicle.

The events continued to escalate, and Littlejohn began shoving and knocking people around, at some point, striking Diana in the back of her head. The fighting continued, and Littlejohn went to the garage area and returned to the fight, which was in the area near Cynthia's car, with a knife in his hand. Once Littlejohn grabbed the knife and returned to the fight, he came toward Keonna and swung the knife at her stomach saying, “[y]ou and this baby gonna die” but did not make contact with Keonna. In defense of Keonna, Kennedy then came up and hit Littlejohn while she was unarmed. Both Keonna and Siara testified that Kennedy was unarmed, and they did not see her with a knife that night. After Kennedy hit Littlejohn, he began to chase her and eventually slashed Kennedy's arms with the knife and fatally stabbed her in the back. Immediately after Littlejohn fatally stabbed Kennedy, Littlejohn and Cynthia got into Cynthia's car and drove away.

Keonna called 911 during the fight, and Fort Wayne Police Department officers arrived at a chaotic scene shortly after the fight had ended. Police found two knives in the area, but they lacked usable DNA or fingerprints. Sergeant Shannon Hughes (“Sergeant Hughes”) pulled Cynthia's gold Chrysler Pacifica ove a short time later and found Littlejohn in the driver's seat and Cynthia in the passenger seat. Sergeant Hughes arrested Littlejohn and described him as “very angry, very hostile, excited.” Littlejohn also made statements to Detective Geoff Norton like “I cut them up because they came at my sister.”[1] Detective Jason Palm, who took swabs from Littlejohn, said Littlejohn's demeanor alternated between “hostile and cooperative” but that he ultimately “had no issues doing what [he] needed to do.”

Dr. Scott Wagner, a forensic pathologist, explained that Kennedy had wounds on her arms caused by a sharp object that were defensive wounds. Kennedy also received a stab wound that went five inches into her back between two of her ribs, which cut her left lung, aorta, and heart causing 600 milliliters of blood to pool in her left chest. Her cause of death was determined to be a stab wound to the chest. Littlejohn also exhibited minor wounds to his chest and back.

On September 12, 2019, the State charged Littlejohn with murder. On March 3, 2020, the trial court held a three-day jury trial. At trial, Littlejohn tendered proposed jury instructions regarding voluntary manslaughter and sudden heat. The trial court rejected Littlejohn's proposed voluntary manslaughter and sudden heat instructions after listening to the arguments of Littlejohn's counsel and the prosecutor as to whether there was a serious evidentiary dispute. The jury found Littlejohn guilty as charged of murder.

Littlejohn v. State, No. 20A-CR-1066, 2021 WL 220960, at *1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2021) (unpublished) (alterations except footnote 1 in original) (record citations omitted), trans. denied.

[3] The trial court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Littlejohn to sixty years in the Department of Correction. Littlejohn raised three issues on direct appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his proposed jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing; and (3) whether his sentence was inappropriate such that it should be revised under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[4] On the first issue, the panel found no serious evidentiary dispute supporting a voluntary manslaughter instruction:

Littlejohn initially attempted to remove Cynthia from the situation and leave the scene while the women were fighting, but instead of continuing on this path, he shoved people and then grabbed a knife from the garage area.

․ Littlejohn's decision to get a knife and enter the fray after his attempt to get Cynthia to leave the fight and proceeding to attack Keonna and fatally stab Kennedy[ ] does not show that he was overwhelmed with a sudden “impetus to kill” or that he lacked the reason of an ordinary person, rendering him incapable of cool reflection. See Stevens[ v. State], 691 N.E.2d [412,] 427 [(Ind. 1997), reh'g denied, cert. denied]. Moreover, after Littlejohn grabbed the knife and before the fatal stabbing, Littlejohn first swung the knife toward Keonna's stomach saying “[y]ou and this baby gonna die.” In defense of Keonna, Kennedy hit Littlejohn while she was unarmed, and Littlejohn proceeded to attack Kennedy with the knife, inflicting defensive wounds on her and fatally stabbing her in the back as she ran away. Littlejohn also had the presence of mind after fatally stabbing Kennedy to drive away from the scene. While there was testimony that Littlejohn was angry and the events of that night were chaotic, there was no evidence presented to show that Littlejohn's mental state was so obscured by his anger that he was prevented from exercising his rational faculties.

Littlejohn, 2021 WL 220960, at *4 (fifth alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (record citations omitted). On the second and third issues, the panel concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing and Littlejohn's sentence was not inappropriate given the nature of his crime and his character. This Court therefore affirmed Littlejohn's conviction and sentence, and Littlejohn unsuccessfully petitioned for transfer to our Supreme Court.

[5] On October 14, 2021, Littlejohn filed a pro-se petition for post-conviction relief alleging his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The public defender's office appeared for Littlejohn on October 29, 2021, but no further action occurred in the case until early 2025. In March of that year, Littlejohn amended his petition for post-conviction relief to assert that his trial counsel was ineffective for the following reasons:

1) He failed to request a jury instruction on reckless homicide as a lesser-included offense of murder;

2) He failed to object to Littlejohn being restrained in front of jurors; and

3) He failed to introduce evidence that Kennedy expressed suicidal ideation on the same day Littlejohn killed her and was found to have alcohol and cocaine in her system after her death.2

[6] Shortly before amending his petition, Littlejohn filed a Verified Motion for Juror Information alleging he was “shackled in front of his jury” and requesting that the Allen County Auditor's Office be ordered to disclose “the names and addresses of the jurors who served on his trial.”³ Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 27-28. That information was necessary, Littlejohn argued, so he could prove “at least some of the jurors were aware he was shackled.” Id. at 27.

[7] The post-conviction court ordered Littlejohn to file a notice specifying each portion of the trial record indicating he was shackled in front of the jury. Littlejohn filed a notice as ordered and cited two portions of the trial transcript. First, during voir dire, the trial court conducted a sidebar conference with the attorneys. During that sidebar, the judge asked defense counsel if he wanted to take a restroom break. The following colloquy then occurred:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Let me check with [Littlejohn] just in case.

THE COURT: Is – is he shackled?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah, uh, let's just go.

Trial Transcript Vol. 2 at 117.⁴ The court then decided not to recess for a restroom break and continued jury selection.

[8] Second, once jury selection was over, the trial judge released the empaneled jurors for a lunch break. When the proceedings resumed, the following exchange occurred before jurors were brought into the courtroom:

THE COURT: Are you ready, [defense counsel]?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is the State ready?

[DEPUTY PROSECUTOR]: Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, [Littlejohn is] still cuffed on the wrists.

THE COURT: ․ [C]an you find me a Bailiff who's done this before? You might as well leave [Littlejohn] in the orange jumpsuit if you're gonna leave the cuffs on him.

Id. at 135.

[9] The State opposed Littlejohn's motion for juror information, arguing the trial court adhered to its standard procedures “to ensure that the jurors [did] not see [Littlejohn's] shackles[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32. Moreover, the State asserted that releasing jurors’ information to Littlejohn's post-conviction counsel would improperly intrude into the jurors’ lives absent “any reason to believe—much less of a manifest indication—that the Court's standard procedure[s] failed to prevent the jurors from seeing the shackles.” Id. Ultimately, the post-conviction court summarily denied Littlejohn's motion.

[10] The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on August 22, 2025. At the start of the hearing, the court admitted the transcript and exhibits from Littlejohn's trial into evidence. Littlejohn then called his trial counsel, Robert Gevers, as his first witness. Gevers testified he had been an attorney for forty years, meaning he had around thirty-five years of experience when he represented Littlejohn in 2019-2020. He said that his recollection of Littlejohn's case was “better than some but not as good as others.” Post-Conviction Transcript at 7. He could not remember whether Littlejohn was shackled during trial, though he said Littlejohn “[m]ay well have been[.]” Id. He also could not recall any point during trial in which Littlejohn was handcuffed in front of jurors.

[11] When Littlejohn's post-conviction counsel asked Gevers about his defense strategy, Gevers answered that he “thought ․ either ․ [r]eckless [homicide] or ․ [v]oluntary [m]anslaughter would be the better [c]harge and better [v]erdict.” Id. at 9. Littlejohn's post-conviction attorney did not follow up by asking Gevers why he only requested a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, not reckless homicide. Littlejohn introduced a letter Gevers sent him after the trial, in which Gevers lamented that “the jury did not agree with [their] argument that [Littlejohn] did not intend to murder the young lady.” Exhibits at 7.⁵

[12] Littlejohn then introduced a toxicology report showing Kennedy had alcohol and cocaine in her system when she died. He also introduced an incident report prepared by officers on the morning of September 7, 2019. According to that report, Kennedy's mother told law enforcement Kennedy had expressed a desire to commit suicide and had taken “a bunch of pills.” Id. at 17. When an officer went to Kennedy's home to check on her, she was emotional and did not want to speak with the police. However, she eventually denied suicidal ideation. The officer transported Kennedy to a hospital for a mental health evaluation, and the report contains no information about what happened after the officer released Kennedy to the hospital's custody.

[13] Gevers testified he did not remember whether the incident report was in his file during Littlejohn's trial, though he did recall that the State filed a motion in limine to prevent the defense from offering evidence that Kennedy received mental health treatment on the day she was killed. When asked if he considered offering any such evidence, Gevers said, “I don't recall that I thought it was going to be of any help to my defense strategy.” Post-Conviction Tr. at 11. When asked about the toxicology report, Gevers said he remembered having it in his file, but he didn't offer it at trial because he “didn't think that it was going to be of help to any great extent in [Littlejohn's] defense.” Id. at 12.

[14] During Gevers’ cross-examination, the State introduced an affidavit signed by Lieutenant Gerald Hogan with the Allen County Sheriff's Department. According to that affidavit, Hogan has been the supervisor of courtroom security in the Allen County Courthouse since 2014. Though he was not present in the courtroom for Littlejohn's trial and had no specific memory of it, Hogan affirmed that the routine practices at that time for transporting defendants into the courtroom were as follows:

Defendants [were] escorted to the third floor of the courthouse in an elevator not accessible to the jurors, and [were] taken into or out of the courtroom only when the jurors [were] not present. Inside the courtroom, defendants [were] seated at the counsel table facing the jury's box, at right angles to the judge's bench. At all times, the counsel table [was] surrounded on three (3) sides by curtains extending from the surface of the table to the floor, so as to prevent jurors from seeing any shackles or restraints of any kind that may have been placed upon a defendant. Only the side of the table at which the defendant and the defendant's attorney [were] seated, the side facing away from the jury, ha[d] no curtains.

Ex. at 19-20. Gevers said he had no reason to believe jurors could see Littlejohn's shackles and asserted that if he had a reason to believe otherwise, he “would have ․ brought it to the [t]rial [c]ourt's attention” and “ask[ed] for a [m]istrial” or an appropriate corrective action. Post-Conviction Tr. at 14.

[15] After Gevers, Littlejohn's post-conviction counsel called Porsha Ware, Littlejohn's daughter. She testified she was present at her father's trial and at one point saw him wearing handcuffs and shackles while the jury was in the courtroom. As she described it, “they took off his wrists ․ shackles, but they never took off his ankles.” Id. at 18. When pressed, however, she could not remember if jurors were brought into the courtroom before Littlejohn's handcuffs were removed. Next, Littlejohn called Jason Holocher, who described Littlejohn as “a friend of [his] for twenty years.” Id. at 20. He, too, testified that Littlejohn was handcuffed and shackled in the presence of jurors. On cross-examination, the State asked Holocher to provide more details of his recollection of Littlejohn's trial. Holocher answered, “I was in the [c]ourtroom when the proceedings were going on, and they entered [Littlejohn] into the room ․ with handcuffs and shackles and the [j]ury was present.” Id. at 22.

[16] After Holocher's testimony, Littlejohn rested his case and renewed his motion to compel the auditor's office to disclose the names and addresses of his jurors. The post-conviction court took the renewed motion under advisement, and the proceedings concluded after the State indicated it had no further evidence.

[17] On September 8, 2025, the post-conviction court entered an order denying Littlejohn's renewed motion for juror information. Thereafter, on September 10, the court set deadlines for the parties to file any additional pleadings and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. After the parties submitted briefs and proposed orders, on February 12, 2026, the court entered an order denying Littlejohn's petition for post-conviction relief, which was supported by thorough findings and conclusions.

[18] Regarding Littlejohn's claim that Gevers was ineffective for not requesting a reckless homicide instruction, the post-conviction court reasoned as follows:

Littlejohn acknowledges ․ that Kennedy hit him and then he stabbed her, which has no tendency to establish that the killing may have been merely reckless rather than knowing or intentional. The “chaotic” nature of the situation, with many people throwing punches and ․ Littlejohn “swinging wildly” before Kennedy hit him, has no tendency to establish that ․ Littlejohn merely continued to swing wildly and recklessly with the knife after Kennedy hit him․ Littlejohn chased Kennedy and inflicted a five-inch-deep stab wound in her back․ Littlejohn[ ] admi[tted] ․ that he “cut them up because they came at my sister” ․, strongly tending to establish that the stabbing was intentional rather than merely reckless. When these facts are taken into consideration, the evidence may be seen to point only to the conclusion that ․ Littlejohn knowingly or intentionally killed Kennedy—not that he recklessly killed her while wildly swinging a knife in the midst of a chaotic melee.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 137-38.

[19] As for Littlejohn's claim that Gevers failed to object to him being restrained in the view of jurors, the court noted that “Littlejohn's argument ․ [was] deficient to the point of being potentially misleading.” Id. at 139. Referring to the colloquy between the trial judge and defense counsel during jury selection, the court reasoned:

From the context of Gevers’ remark, “yeah, uh, let's just go” ․, it is evident that (1) the Court could not see whether ․ Littlejohn was shackled, otherwise there would have been no need to ask, and (2) Gevers's remark “let's just go” referred only to proceeding with another round of jury selection without taking a rest room break. The first colloquy to which ․ Littlejohn refers has no tendency to establish that any actual or prospective jurors could see him in shackles.

Id. With respect to the exchange between the trial judge, defense counsel, and court staff before jurors were brought back into the courtroom after lunch, the court concluded:

After Gevers notified the Court (outside the presence of the jury) that ․ Littlejohn was still in handcuffs, the Court requested “a Bailiff who's done this before” because “You might as well leave him in the orange jumpsuit if you're gonna leave the cuffs on him.” ․ This can only be interpreted as meaning that the Court was well aware of the prejudicial tendency of allowing the jury to see a defendant in jail clothes or handcuffs, and intended to prevent such prejudice. The most reasonable inference is that, although apparently an inexperienced bailiff may have failed to remove ․ Littlejohn's handcuffs promptly, a more experienced bailiff proceeded to do so at the Court's request before the jury entered the courtroom. This colloquy likewise has no tendency to establish that any actual or prospective jurors could see ․ Littlejohn in shackles.

Id. at 139-140.

[20] The post-conviction court did not credit Ware's and Holocher's testimonies. The court noted that Ware “did not remember whether the jury was present to see the shackles or to see the handcuffs before they were taken off ․” Id. at 138-39. As for Holocher, the court concluded he “might well be deemed a biased witness due to his 20-year friendship with ․ Littlejohn” and reasoned Holocher had been unable to provide a detailed account of the alleged incident during which Littlejohn was handcuffed in front of jurors. Id. at 139. In sum, the court reasoned:

The evidence ․ presents two possibilities ․ One possibility is that, despite the centuries-old rule that the Court, attorney Gevers, and the courtroom security personnel all knew must be enforced, all of them were so dull-witted that they failed to notice when the rule was being violated. The other possibility is that ․ Littlejohn's old friend Jason Holocher was mistaken in his more than five-year-old alleged recollection that the rule had been violated. The Court finds the second possibility, not the first.

Id. at 140-41.

[21] Finally, the court rejected Littlejohn's argument that Gevers should have offered evidence of Kennedy's mental state to support his self-defense argument:

[Littlejohn's] idea is that [Kennedy's drug use and suicidal ideation] may have made [her] more prone to risk-taking, and therefore more likely to have used unlawful force against [him]․ Even if it had been conclusively proven (rather than merely conjectured) that [Kennedy] used unlawful force against ․ Littlejohn, there would be no reasonable probability that ․ Littlejohn would have been acquitted on the basis of self-defense

․

․

Littlejohn chased the victim down and stabbed her in the back. His act in doing so can be regarded only as retaliation, not self-defense, as the victim could not have presented a threat of inflicting serious bodily injury upon ․ Littlejohn while running away from him.

․ Littlejohn also makes no mention of his willing participation in the violence, as manifested in his returning to the fight with a knife in his hand. This cannot be interpreted as meaning that ․ Littlejohn thought it reasonably necessary to use the knife in defense of himself or another, in view of his prompt expression of intent to kill both Keonna Suttle and her unborn child, who (it should hardly need to be said) presented no threat to ․ Littlejohn or anyone else he might have thought of defending.

․ Littlejohn's willing participation in the fight, or his lack of reasonable belief in the necessity to chase the victim and stab her in the back, would have readily sufficed to defeat [his] claim of self-defense, no matter how aggressively the victim might have been hitting him before she turned and ran away from him.

Id. at 141-143.

[22] Littlejohn now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[23] Because Littlejohn had the burden to prove he was entitled to post-conviction relief, he appeals from a negative judgment. Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 681 (Ind. 2017). To prevail, he “must show that the evidence leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” Id. We will “not reverse a denial of post-conviction relief unless ‘there is no way within the law that the court below could have reached the decision it did.’ ” Bradbury v. State, 180 N.E.3d 249, 252 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. 2002), reh'g denied, cert. denied), as modified on reh’g, cert. denied. And though we do not defer to its legal conclusions, we will affirm the post-conviction court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Humphrey, 73 NE.3d at 682.

[24] Littlejohn contends he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. See Hanks v. State, 71 N.E.3d 1178, 1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (noting “[o]ur state constitution protects the same right” as the federal constitution in this respect), trans. denied. To succeed on that claim, Littlejohn had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that: “(1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms; and (2) the deficiency was so prejudicial as to create a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different absent counsel's errors.” Bradbury, 180 N.E.3d at 252 (applying the test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), reh'g denied); see also Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5) (burden of proof).

[25] When assessing an attorney's performance, we presume he “exercised ‘reasonable professional judgment’ and rendered adequate legal assistance” throughout the proceedings. Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1177 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746), reh'g denied. “Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and these decisions are entitled to deferential review.” Bradbury, 180 N.E.3d at 252. Consequently, “[i]solated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective.” Wilson, 157 N.E.3d at 1177 (quoting Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 747) (alteration in original). Under the Sixth Amendment and the Indiana constitution, defendants are entitled to reasonably competent representation, “not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.” Bradbury, 180 N.E.3d at 252 (quoting Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)).

[26] Even if an attorney's performance fell short of prevailing standards, the defendant must show the “deficient performance actually prejudiced [his] defense.” Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (Ind. 2013). Said differently, he must demonstrate “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1138, 1147 (Ind. 2010), reh'g denied.

[27] As noted above, Littlejohn asserts Gevers erred in three respects: (1) not requesting a jury instruction on reckless homicide; (2) failing to object to Littlejohn being restrained in the presence of jurors; and (3) deciding not to offer evidence of Kennedy's mental state to support Littlejohn's self-defense claim. We address each in turn.

1. Reckless Homicide Instruction

[28] Littlejohn first claims Gevers was ineffective for failing to request a reckless homicide instruction. On appeal, he asserts that “[i]f [Gevers] had asked for instructions and a verdict form on reckless homicide, the trial court would have given it ․” Appellant's Brief at 15. However, it was well within Gevers’ “considerable discretion” not to request a lesser included instruction on reckless homicide, because if he had done so, the trial court likely would have declined it. Bradbury, 180 N.E.3d at 254 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 682 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied, cert. denied); see Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 161 (Ind. 1999) (“[F]ailure to submit an instruction is not deficient performance if the court would have refused the instruction anyway.”), reh'g denied, cert. denied.

[29] When determining whether to give a proposed lesser-included instruction, a court applies the two-step framework established by our Supreme Court in Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995).⁶ First, it asks whether the offense described in the defendant's proposed instruction was either inherently or factually included in the charged offense. Id. at 566-67. If it was, the court must determine whether the record shows “a serious evidentiary dispute about the element or elements distinguishing the greater from the lesser offense” such that, “in view of this dispute, a jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater[.]” Id. at 567. When there is a serious evidentiary dispute, “it is reversible error for a trial court not to give an instruction, when requested, on the ․ lesser offense.” Id. But “[i]f the evidence does not so support the giving of a requested instruction ․, then a trial court should not give the requested instruction.” Id.

[30] It's well-settled that “[r]eckless [h]omicide is ․ an inherently included offense of [m]urder.” Id. Therefore, had Gevers requested a reckless homicide instruction, the trial court would have been required to decide whether there was a serious evidentiary dispute enabling the jury to conclude that Littlejohn committed reckless homicide but not murder. See Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1082 (Ind. 2000) (proceeding directly to the final step of the Wright analysis because “[r]eckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder”). And we see no error in the post-conviction court's reasoning that at step two, the trial court would have found no serious evidentiary dispute.

[31] The only difference between murder and reckless homicide “is the defendant's state of mind: reckless homicide occurs when the defendant ‘recklessly’ kills another human being and murder occurs when the killing is done ‘knowingly’ or ‘intentionally.’ ” Etienne v. State, 716 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Ind. 1999); see Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(1) (2018), 35-42-1-5 (2014). A reckless killing occurs when the defendant acted “in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(c) (1977). An intentional killing, on the other hand, occurs when it was the defendant's “conscious objective” to kill, and a killing is done knowingly when the defendant was “aware of a high probability that” his actions would cause death. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a), (b).

[32] A reckless homicide instruction is generally not warranted when the evidence shows the defendant professed his intent to kill. Evans, 727 N.E.2d at 1082 (“Defendant's professed intent to kill excludes any arguable grounds to suggest that he didn't have an intent to kill[.]”) (internal quotation marks omitted). And when a defendant pursued the victim and inflicted multiple stab wounds, a finding of mere recklessness is generally not supported by the evidence. Id. at 1081-82. Indeed, a “knowing killing may be inferred from a defendant's use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.” Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 931 (Ind. 1998), reh'g denied. For example, our Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's rejection of a proposed reckless homicide instruction where “uncontradicted testimony” showed the victim “died of a stab wound that pierced her heart[.]” McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 85 (Ind. 1998). From that testimony, the Court held “the trial court reasonably concluded [the evidence] showed only knowing or intentional not reckless conduct.” Id.

[33] Here, Littlejohn contends the evidence at trial supported a reckless homicide instruction because “[t]he situation was chaotic” and “[he] was swinging wildly [with the knife] trying to protect his sister ․” Appellant's Br. at 16. Littlejohn omits several key facts from his analysis. He took advantage of a pause in the fight to go to his garage and arm himself with a knife. He then returned to the altercation and made his lethal intention clear by swinging the knife at Keonna's stomach and telling her, “You and this baby gonna die.” Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 175.

[34] After Kennedy struck Littlejohn in Keonna's defense, Littlejohn did not “swing[ ] wildly” at her, as he claims. Appellant's Br. at 16. Rather, he pursued her as she ran away, slashed her arms with the knife, and stabbed her in the back, inflicting a five-inch-deep wound that pierced her heart. And minutes after the killing, while in the police cruiser, Littlejohn repeatedly vocalized that his intention was to injure and kill both Keonna and Kennedy:

• “You're damn right I'mma cut ‘em. They [unintelligible] my sister, I'mma stab the sh** outta ‘em.” State's Ex. 14 at 02:46-02:52.

• “Three mother******* women [unintelligible] my sister, I'm beatin’ their a**. I'm cuttin’ ’em, too.” Id. at 08:27-08:31.

• “I knocked them mother******s out. I put some holes in they a**. That's what's gonna happen, goddamnit.” Id. at 08:39-08:48.

• You wanna try to jump on my sister ․ ? I kill you mother******s, man. I'll kill anybody [who] tr[ies] to [get] ’tween my sister and jump on me.” Id. at 10:06-10:15.

[35] We see no clear error in the post-conviction court's conclusion that the evidence at Littlejohn's trial did not support a finding that he acted recklessly, rather than intentionally or knowingly. We therefore affirm the post-conviction court's conclusion that Gevers did not render ineffective assistance by declining to request a reckless homicide instruction.

2. Restraints in the Presence of Jurors

[36] Next, Littlejohn contends Gevers erred by failing to “object to [Littlejohn] being restrained during [the] jury trial.” Appellant's Br. at 22. It is well-settled that due process concerns prohibit a defendant from being unnecessarily shackled in front of jurors. Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d 1022, 1029 (Ind. 2007), reh'g denied, cert. denied. As our Supreme Court has summarized,

[T]hree reasons underlie the prohibition on unnecessary shackling. First, visible shackling “undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the fact-finding process.” [Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630 (2005)]. Second, shackling can interfere with the defendant's ability to communicate with his lawyer and participate in the defense. Id. at 631 ․ Third, shackles impair the dignity of the judicial process. Id. at 631-32[.]

Stephenson, 894 N.E.2d at 1029. Thus, if a defendant objects to being restrained at trial, the restraints must generally be removed unless “the trial court makes a particularized finding of need in the specific case.” Id.

[37] According to Littlejohn, “[t]here was no reason for [him] to be shackled in the courtroom ․,” so Gevers was ineffective for failing to object. Appellant's Reply Br. at 7. And he claims this is true “whether the jury saw the shackles or not.” Id. Our analysis of this issue proceeds in two parts. We first address Littlejohn's claim that the post-conviction court erred “when it prohibited [him] from fully investigating” whether jurors saw or heard his restraints. Appellant's Br. at 25. Then we examine whether Gevers was ineffective for failing to object to Littlejohn being shackled during his trial.

Littlejohn's Motion for Juror Information

[38] Littlejohn argues the post-conviction court erred in denying his renewed Motion for Juror Information. Post-conviction courts have “broad discretion in ruling on discovery matters and we will affirm their determinations absent a showing of clear error and resulting prejudice.” Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1251.

[39] Littlejohn's post-conviction counsel wanted the names and contact information of jurors so he could “speak to the [j]urors” to see if any of them “saw or heard ․ Littlejohn's shackles.” Post-Conviction Tr. at 22-23. But “post-trial investigations of jurors should be used only in extraordinary cases and ․ deference to a juror's privacy should govern a court's inquiry.” Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 655 (Ind. 2021), reh'g denied. Releasing jurors’ names and contact information risks “the safety and personal privacy of citizens who serve as jurors[,]” meaning “[p]ost-trial investigations of jurors should be the exception, not the rule.” State v. Dye, 784 N.E.2d 469, 477 (Ind. 2003).

[40] To justify direct contact with jurors, Littlejohn was required to show “manifest indications of material discrepancies appearing in the record.” Isom, 170 N.E.3d at 655 (quoting Dye, 784 N.E.2d at 477). And even then, permitting Littlejohn's post-conviction counsel to directly contact jurors might still have been inappropriate given the availability of less-invasive discovery techniques. See id. (discussing a scenario where “the parties agreed to send a letter to the jurors, through the [post-conviction] court, informing them that the attorneys might wish to talk to them and listing the attorneys’ contact information”). Indeed, “direct disclosure is not required where other reasonable means of investigation are available.” Id.

[41] The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion when it followed our Supreme Court's guidance that “no case law require[s] a post-conviction court to share juror-contact information to facilitate direct contact[.]” Id. Less-invasive means of investigation might have been available to Littlejohn, but his post-conviction counsel did not pursue them. We therefore affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the renewed Motion for Juror Information.

Gevers’ Lack of Objection to Littlejohn's Restraints

[42] Turning to whether Gevers was ineffective for failing to object to Littlejohn's restraints, we first note that trial counsel has discretion to decide whether to object to a defendant's restraints. If, for example, defense counsel believes “an objection to wearing restraints would not have been sustained by the trial judge even if made[,]” he cannot be found ineffective for failing to object. Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1195 (Ind. 2001), cert. denied. Nonetheless, Gevers could not remember during the post-conviction hearing whether Littlejohn was shackled at trial, so we do not know if he considered lodging an objection.

[43] But even assuming for the sake of argument that Gevers’ performance was deficient in this respect, Littlejohn did not meet his burden to show “but for [Gevers’] error[ ], the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Wrinkles v. State, 915 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind. 2009). While it is uncontested on appeal that Littlejohn was shackled in the presence of jurors, nothing in the record indicates jurors could see or hear Littlejohn's restraints. Undisputed evidence showed that curtains surrounded the counsel tables such that the trial judge—who was positioned at a ninety-degree angle to Littlejohn—could not see if Littlejohn was shackled. No evidence was presented that the jurors—who sat facing Littlejohn—could see past the curtains that covered his lower body. While Ware and Holocher testified Littlejohn may have been handcuffed and shackled in the jurors’ view, the post-conviction court did not credit their testimonies. We will not second-guess that credibility determination. And Gevers did object early in the trial when the bailiff neglected to remove Littlejohn's handcuffs, indicating that both defense counsel and the trial court took care that jurors would not see Littlejohn's restraints.

[44] That said, even when jurors do not see them, restraints “can interfere with the accused's ‘ability to communicate’ with his lawyer” or “participate in his own defense[.]” Deck, 544 U.S. at 631 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970), reh'g denied). But Littlejohn presented no evidence or argument that he was unable to communicate with Gevers at trial or otherwise participate in his defense. See United States v. Cooper, 591 F.3d 582, 589 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding defendant's shackles did not affect the outcome of trial when his “standby lawyer was sitting right next to him, and so the shackling did not impede his access to legal advice”), cert. denied. Therefore, the post-conviction court did not clearly err in concluding that Littlejohn was not prejudiced by Gevers’ failure to object to Littlejohn's shackles.

3. Evidence of Kennedy's Mental State

[45] Finally, Littlejohn claims Gevers was ineffective for failing to offer evidence of Kennedy's mental state on the day Littlejohn stabbed her. According to Littlejohn, evidence that Kennedy had cocaine and alcohol in her system and was evaluated for suicidal ideation showed she “was in a volatile state at the time of the crime.” Appellant's Br. at 20. Littlejohn contends Kennedy's alleged volatile state was relevant to his claim that he reasonably “believe[d] he needed to threaten others with a knife ․” Id.

[46] As an initial matter, Gevers testified he considered offering evidence of Kennedy's mental state but made the strategic decision not to introduce it. Given that an attorney's “[s]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable[,]” we show them great deference. Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 64 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690), reh'g denied.

[47] Even if Gevers’ strategic decision-making could be reasonably questioned, Littlejohn points to no authority supporting his claim that an alleged murder victim's toxicology report and mental health records are admissible to prove she was prone to taking risks. To have been acting in self-defense by use of deadly force, Littlejohn needed to “reasonably believe[ ]” that stabbing Kennedy was “necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to [himself] or a third person or the commission of a forcibly felony.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (2019) (amended 2024). But as the post-conviction court aptly noted, evidence of Kennedy's mental state had no tendency to prove or disprove Littlejohn's “lack of reasonable belief in the necessity to chase [Kennedy] and stab her in the back ․, no matter how aggressively [she] might have been hitting him before she turned and ran away ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 160-61. The post-conviction court did not clearly err in concluding the outcome of Littlejohn's trial would have been the same even if Gevers tried to introduce evidence of Kennedy's mental state.

Conclusion

[48] For these reasons, the post-conviction court's judgment is affirmed.

[49] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Littlejohn made several other statements professing his intent to stab and kill Keonna and Kennedy, which we outline in the discussion below.

2.   The petition also alleged Littlejohn's trial counsel failed to advise him of his right to testify in his own defense and erred by not objecting to the admission of the video depicting him stabbing Kennedy. However, Littlejohn later withdrew those allegations.

3.   As Littlejohn alleged, neither the trial court nor the prosecutor's office retained records of jurors who served during Littlejohn's trial. However, according to Littlejohn, the auditor's office had the jurors’ names and addresses but would not disclose that information without a court order.

4.   When citing the transcript of Littlejohn's trial, we refer to it as the “Trial Transcript.” We cite the transcript from the post-conviction proceedings as the “Post-Conviction Transcript.”

5.   Because Littlejohn's trial exhibits were admitted in the post-conviction proceedings, we cite only the post-conviction exhibits.

6.   Though the Wright Court articulated a three-step process, the Court has since condensed the analysis into two steps, combining what were previously steps one and two. See Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 668 (Ind. 2021) (citing Wright and noting only two steps in the analysis), reh'g denied.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.